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Reconciling State Immunity with Remedies
for War Victims in a Legal Pluriverse
Anne Peters and Valentina Volpe
Abstract The chapter explains the threefold aspiration of the book as an academic,
societal, and diplomatic project. It introduces the three interwoven themes of inter-
national law arising in the German-Italian saga: state immunity, reparation for
serious human rights violations committed during World War II, and the interplay
between international and domestic law, notably the role of courts therein. The
chapter proposes an approach of ‘ordered pluralism’ to coordinate this interplay,
and finally tables a ‘modest proposal’ for a way out of the current impasse.
I. Introduction
We are writing this introduction while the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated,
especially in Italy, the dwindling of a generation leading to the obliteration of its
memory. This book was conceived to recount that individual and collective remem-
brance in its intertwinements with law and history. Such entanglements are particularly
painful when courts and judges are called to adjudicate on historical narratives.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Giovanni Boggero, Giuseppina DeMarco and Violetta
Ritz for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this chapter and to Trevor Krayer for his
helpful research assistance. The article is the result of a common reflection; nevertheless, the
introduction and section II are mostly attributable to Valentina Volpe and sections III-V to Anne
Peters. The concluding ‘Modest Proposal’ (section VI) was written four hands.
A. Peters
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: apeters-office@mpil.de
V. Volpe (*)
Lille Catholic University, Faculty of Law - Centre de Recherche sur les Relations entre le Risque
et le Droit (C3RD), Lille, France
e-mail: valentina.volpe@univ-catholille.fr
© The Author(s) 2021
V. Volpe et al. (eds.), Remedies against Immunity?, Beiträge zum ausländischen
öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 297,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62304-6_1
3
This is what happened in the litigation on reparation for German war crimes
which culminated in Sentenza 238/2014.1 With this judgment, the Italian Constitu-
tional Court (ItCC) denied the German Republic’s immunity from civil jurisdiction
over claims to reparation for Nazi crimes committed during World War II (WWII),
indirectly challenging the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s Jurisdictional Immu-
nities Judgment of 20122 and paving the way for a series of domestic proceedings
against Germany.
Against this background, our work has a threefold aspiration: it provides a
scholarly contribution on the issue of war crimes and reparation for the victims of
armed conflict; it seeks to form part of a broader civic debate, shedding light on these
topics for a larger public engagement; and it proposes concrete legal and political
solutions to the parties involved to overcome the present paralysis with a view to a
durable interstate conflict resolution. We submit that a latent crisis fuelled by
Sentenza 238/2014 is festering in the relationship between the German and Italian
Republics. Future exchanges at both institutional and civil society levels might also
help judges directly involved in the post-Sentenza reparation cases which are
currently pending. Keeping this objective in mind, we see the book as an exercise
of academic diplomacy, in a forward-looking and conciliatory spirit.
Our authors hail from diverse academic backgrounds and represent a wide variety
of perspectives across domestic and international public law. We deliberately invited
only Italian and German nationals and addressed them specific sets of questions. One
of our objectives was to tease out (and ideally overcome) postures of possible
epistemic nationalism.3
The book’s primary scholarly aim covers three legal themes: state immunity,4
reparation for serious human rights violations and war crimes,5 including historical
ones,6 and the interaction between international and domestic law and institutions,
notably courts.7
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
3The exercise brought to light that the legal assessment (positive or negative) of Sentenza 238/2014
did not coincide with nationality (see Joseph H H Weiler, ‘A Dialogical Epilogue’, in this volume).
4See for recent scholarship Hazel Fox/Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: OUP 3rd
ed 2013); Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in
the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill 2015); Tom Ruys/Nicolas Angelet/Luca Ferro
(eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2019).
See for an excellent compilation and analysis of the relevant case-law Rosanne van Alebeek/
Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Immunities of States and their Officials’, in André Nollkaemper/August
Reinisch et al (eds), International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook (Oxford: OUP 2018),
100-169.
5See in recent scholarship Cristián Correa/Shuichi Furuya/Clara Sandoval, Reparation for Victims
of Armed Conflict, Max Planck Trialogues on the Law of Peace and War, Vol 3, edited by Anne
Peters/Christian Marxsen (Cambridge: CUP 2020).
6See in scholarship on reparation for historical crimes: Gerry Johnstone/Joel Quirk, ‘Repairing
Historical Wrongs’, Social & Legal Studies 21 (2012), 155-169; Daniel Butt, Rectifying Interna-
tional Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford: OUP 2008).
7See in scholarship André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law
(Oxford: OUP 2012); Davíd Thór Björgvinsson, The Intersection of International Law and
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These three themes are interlinked: the international rules and principles of state
immunity operate in proceedings before national courts, and are being developed
through the practice of those courts which in turn contributes to the formation of
customary law, in addition to international treaty law.8 With regard to the reparation
of serious violations of international human rights, an interaction between the
international and the domestic level of rules and institutions is visible as well:
reparation is sometimes acknowledged and granted as a matter of international
legal obligation, but needs in any case to be implemented through domestic pro-
cedures. These themes form the intertwined threads running through the volume.
After the introduction, Part II, Immunity, investigates core international law
concepts, such as those of pre/post-judgment immunity and international state
responsibility, as embedded in contemporary legal discourse (Paolo Palchetti,
Christian Tomuschat and Heike Krieger). Part III, Remedies, examines the tension
between state immunity and the right to remedy, suggesting original schemes for
overcoming the legal impasse and solving the conundrum under international law
(Riccardo Pavoni, Jörg Luther, Stefan Kadelbach and Filippo Fontanelli). Part IV
adds European Perspectives to the main themes of the book by showcasing relevant
regional examples of legal cooperation and judicial dialogue against a common
European horizon (Alessandro Bufalini, Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Doris
König and Andreas Zimmermann). Part V, Courts, addresses a series of questions
on the role of judges in the areas of immunity and human rights at both the national
and international level (Christian J. Tams, Raffaela Kunz, Giovanni Boggero and
Karin Oellers-Frahm). Part VI, Negotiations, suggests, inter alia, concrete ways out
of the impasse with a forward-looking aspiration (Andreas von Arnauld, Valerio
Onida, Andreas L. Paulus and Francesco Francioni).
In Part VII, The Past and Future of Remedies, emeritus justice Sabino Cassese,
sitting judge in the Court that decided Sentenza 238/2014, adds some personal
recollections and critical reflections on the Judgment. Joseph H. H. Weiler’s Dia-
logical Epilogue concludes the volume by entering into conversation with some of
the authors and placing the main findings of the book in a wider European and
international law perspective.
In order to set the scene for the following chapters, we first summarise the
proceedings leading to Sentenza 238/2014 (section II) and then contextualise the
Domestic Law: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2015); Helmut
Philipp Aust/Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts:
Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford: OUP 2016); Machiko Kanetake/André Nollkaemper,
The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestation and Deference (Oxford:
Hart 2016).
8See van Alebeek/Pavoni, ‘Immunities of States’ 2018 (n 4), 169: ‘[T]he pivotal role of domestic
courts in the development of international immunity rules translates into an interplay of domestic
law and international law in domestic immunity decisions, and partly explains the many contro-
versies on the precise parameters of the various rules in this area of the law.’ Immunities are
therefore ‘a messy affair’, Anne Peters, ‘Immune against Constitutionalisation?’ in Peters et al,
Global Constitutionalism 2015 (n 4), 1-19, at 1.
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judgment by offering a snapshot of the law on the main themes of the volume
(sections III–V), a law which is, as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
put in Jones, in a ‘state of flux’.9 We close with concrete legal policy suggestions for
moving toward a resolution of the Italian-German controversy (section VI).
II. Sentenza 238/2014: The Culmination of a Judicial Saga
1. The Historical Background
The events leading to Sentenza 238/2014 can be traced back to the unsolved quarrels
between Italy and Germany regarding WWII crimes. Sentenza is, therefore, one
pronouncement in a long judicial conversation or judicial tug-of-war that has
developed at the local, national, and international level.10 The facts that gave rise
to the various judicial proceedings are the uncontested atrocities committed by
German forces in the occupied Italian territory between September 1943 and the
end of the war in May 1945.11 They notoriously included massacres of civilians and
the deportation of a large number of the population for forced labour. The core issue
litigated on the multilevel judicial battlefield is reparation for these civilian victims
and for the ‘Italian Military Internees’ (IMIs), ie the several hundred thousand
members of the Italian army who German forces took prisoner both in Italy and
elsewhere in Europe. IMIs were denied the status of prisoner of war (POW) and were
deported to Germany and German-occupied territories for use as forced labour.
9ECtHR, Jones and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 January 2014, Applications Nos
34356/06 and 40528/06, para 213 (concerning civil claims for torture lodged against foreign state
officials).
10For an assessment of Sentenza 238/2014 primarily from the perspective of Italian domestic law
which is not the focus of this book, see: Francesco Salerno, ‘Giustizia costituzionale versus giustizia
internazionale nell’applicazione del diritto internazionale generalmente riconosciuto’, Quaderni
Costituzionali 35 (2015), 33-58; Francesco Buffa, ‘Introduzione: I diritti fondamentali tra obblighi
internazionali e Costituzione’, Questione Giustizia 1 (2015), 45-50; Paolo Veronesi, Colpe di stato:
I crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità davanti alla Corte costituzionale (Milan: Franco Angeli
2017).
11See the German exhibition on Italian IMIs in the ‘Dokumentationszentrum NS-Zwangsarbeit’ in
Berlin: https://www.ns-zwangsarbeit.de/italienische-militaerinternierte/themen/deutschland-und-
italien-als-buendnispartner-1936-1943/. See for a more in-depth analysis, the research of a group
of Italian historians: Paolo Pezzino, ‘The German Military Occupation of Italy and the War against
Civilians’, Modern Italy 12 (2007), 173-188.
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2. The Italian Corte di Cassazione and the Ferrini and Milde
Judgments
The question of war crimes reparation gained relevance and a renewed judicial and
political attention in the early 2000s.12 One of the main actors of this judicial turn has
been the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), which gained international
attention with the inauguration, in those years, of a ground-breaking jurisprudence
concerning state immunity and gross human rights violations.
The Corte di Cassazione adopted the well-known Ferrini judgment in 2004.13
The procedural history began in September 1998, when Luigi Ferrini instituted
proceedings against the Federal Republic of Germany before the Tribunal of Arezzo.
Ferrini was an Italian national who had been arrested and deported to Germany in
1944 where he had been detained and forced to work in a factory until the end of the
war. He was seeking damages for the physical and psychological injuries suffered.
Unsurprisingly, in November 2000, the Tribunal of Arezzo decided that Luigi
Ferrini’s claim was inadmissible because Germany, as a sovereign state, was
protected by jurisdictional immunity. On the same grounds, the Court of Appeal
of Florence dismissed the appeal of the claimant. However, on 11 March 2004, the
Italian Corte di Cassazione quite unpredictably contradicted this well-established
line of jurisprudence grounded in international customary law, holding that Italian
courts had jurisdiction over the claims for compensation brought against Germany
by Luigi Ferrini. The Court argued that state immunity does not apply in circum-
stances in which the act complained of constitutes an international crime. Assuming
the role of an interpreter of international law, the Italian Corte di Cassazione
affirmed: ‘Respect for the inviolable rights of the human person has indeed assumed
the value of a fundamental principle of the international legal order (. . .). The
emergence of this principle cannot fail to reflect on the scope of other principles to
which this order is traditionally inspired and, in particular, on the “sovereign
equality” of States, to which state immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction is linked’.
‘[T]here can be no doubt that the antinomy should be resolved by giving prevalence
to the highest-ranking norms’.14
A few years later, while numerous reparation proceedings were instituted before
ordinary Italian courts, the Corte di Cassazione confirmed the Ferrini jurisprudence
12In 1996 two important prodromal events fuelled a renewed political and legal interest towards
Nazi crimes in Italy, the Priebke case (Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 15 October 1996 and
Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 28 February 1996, No 60/1996. Cf as well, Corte di Cassazione,
Judgments of 10 February 1997 and 16 November 1998, No 1230/1998 (Priebke and Hass)) and
the discovery of the Armadio della Vergogna (the closet of shame) containing the long hidden
names and files of numerous war criminals. The establishment of the German Foundation ‘Remem-
brance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft) in 2000, which
excluded the IMIs from the available financial compensation, is another important event in this
judicial saga.
13Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/2004 (Ferrini).
14Ibid, paras 9.2 and 9.1 (translated by the authors).
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in a number of cases all adjudicated in 2008. The most remarkable of them was
surely the Milde case.15 Max Josef Milde had been a member of the ‘Hermann
Göring’ division of the German armed forces who was charged with participation in
massacres committed on 29 June 1944 in Civitella in Val di Chiana, Cornia and San
Pancrazio in Italy. The Military Court of La Spezia had sentenced Milde in absentia
to life imprisonment and ordered Milde and Germany, jointly and separately, to pay
reparation to the successors in title of the victims of the massacre who appeared as
civil parties in the proceedings. Germany appealed to the Military Court of Appeals
in Rome against that part of the decision which was directed against the German
Republic and the Court dismissed the appeal in 2007. The following year, the Corte
di Cassazione rejected Germany’s argument of lack of jurisdiction and confirmed the
reasoning it had adopted in Ferrini: in cases of serious international law crimes, the
jurisdictional immunity of states should be set aside. According to the Court, ‘the
principle of respect for the “sovereign equality” of States must remain without
effects in the event of crimes against humanity (. . .) whose real substance consists
in an abuse of state sovereignty’.16
In the same year, the Corte di Cassazione granted an application of exequatur to
the Greek courts’ judgments Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany
concerning Nazi massacres of the Greek civilian population during WWII.17
3. The ICJ and the Jurisdictional Immunity Judgment
The German reaction was not long in coming. In December 2008, just a few months
after the Milde judgment of the Corte di Cassazione, the Federal Republic of
Germany instituted proceedings before the ICJ against the Italian Republic.
15Cf Corte di Cassazione, Orders of 28 May 2008, Nos 14201/2008, 14202/2008, 14203/2008,
14204/2008, 14205/2008, 14206/2008, 14207/2008, 14208/2008, 14209/2008, 14210/2008,
14211/2008, 14212/2008. Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 21 October 2008, No 1072/2008
(Milde). Annalisa Ciampi, ‘The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction Over Germany
in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War: The Civitella Case’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 7 (2009), 597-615. For a critical appraisal of the case, Giovanni Boggero,
‘Giustizia per i crimini internazionali di guerra nella strage di Civitella?’, in Procura Generale
Militare della Repubblica presso la Corte Suprema di Cassazione (ed), Casi e ‘materiali’ di diritto
penale militare (Rome: Stabilimento Grafico Militare 2012), 277-303.
16Corte di Cassazione, Milde (n 15), para 5. As a consequence, ‘the customary principle of the
jurisdictional immunity of States does not have an absolute and indiscriminate character and is
destined to remain inoperative in cases (. . .) [concerning] the reintegration of damages caused by
international crimes.’ Ibid, para 4 (translated by the authors).
17Corte di Cassazione, Judgments of 29 May 2008, No 14199/2008 and 20 May 2011, No 11163/
2011. Cf, Tribunal of Leivadia, Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, 30 October
1997 and Supreme Court of Greece, Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany,
Judgment of 4 May 2000, No 11/2000.
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According to Germany, Italy through its judicial practice ‘failed to respect the jurisdic-
tional immunity which . . . [the German state] enjoys under international law’.18
In the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, issued in 2012, the ICJ endorsed the
German position. In particular, the Court openly contradicted the Ferrini jurispru-
dence and the legal argument that a normative hierarchy between peremptory human
rights and immunity must lead to setting aside state immunity in domestic litigation
dealing with ius cogens violations. The Court stated that ‘under customary interna-
tional law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the
fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law’.19 The
ICJ grounded this decision on the quite formalistic assumption that the rules of ius
cogens and those of state immunity do not conflict because they operate at different
levels. The rules of state immunity ‘are procedural in character and are confined to
determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in
respect of another State’,20 and these procedural immunity rules do not address the
question of whether or not the conduct around which the proceedings turn in
substance was lawful or unlawful.21
The ICJ also rejected an additional set of arguments brought by Italy.22 The
Italian ‘last resort’ claim deemed ‘Italian courts (. . .) justified in denying Germany
the immunity to which it would otherwise have been entitled, because all other
attempts to secure compensation for the various groups of victims involved in the
Italian proceedings had failed’.23 The ICJ considered, with particular reference to the
IMIs status, that it was ‘a matter of surprise—and regret—that Germany decided to
deny compensation to a group of victims on the ground that they had been entitled to
a status [that of POW] which, at the relevant time, Germany had refused to
recognize’.24 However, the Court could find ‘no basis’ in the state practice condi-
tioning the entitlement of state immunity ‘upon the existence of effective alternative
means of securing redress’.25
In conclusion, the ICJ held that Italy violated the jurisdictional immunity which
Germany enjoys under international law by allowing civil claims based on violations
of international humanitarian law by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945,26
and that Italy also committed violations of the immunity owed to Germany by taking
enforcement measures against German properties, in particular Villa Vigoni, a
German cultural centre on Lake Como.27
18ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 1, quoting the German application.
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The ICJ judgment received mixed assessments in the academic world, and critical
voices seemed to prevail.28 Commentators found the judgment ‘unsatisfying’,29 with
‘thin reasoning’,30 and failing to give ‘an encouraging legal message’, while being
‘not particularly persuasive’, and ‘collaborating in the deconstruction of jus
cogens’.31 They deplored the ‘excessively formalistic reasoning’ and ‘disputable
logic’ of the judgment which was ultimately deemed a ‘missed opportunity’.32 The
fiercest critic sensed an ‘air of strong conservatism’ in the judgment, identified
‘entirely misplaced’ statements, and in the end, found the judgment’s reasoning
‘unacceptable’.33 In the opposing camp, defenders appraised the ICJ judgment as ‘no
surprise, but wise’34 and as making ‘eminent sense’.35
Most of the Italian courts immediately acknowledged and complied with the ICJ
judgment. They declared all further civil actions brought against Germany with
claims for reparation for human rights violations during WWII inadmissible.36
In order to avoid further civil actions before Italian courts and obey the ICJ
Judgment, the Italian Parliament adopted Law No 5/2013 by which Italy ratified the
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty (UNCSI).37 The Statute prescribes how Italian courts must react to a judgment
28See for a recent critical assessment: Selman Özdan, ‘State Immunity or State Impunity in Cases of
Violations of Human Rights Recognised as Jus Cogens Norms’, The International Journal of
Human Rights 23 (2019), 1521-1545.
29François Boudreault, ‘Identifying Conflicts of Norms: The ICJ Approach in the Case of the
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening)’, Leiden Journal of
International Law 25 (2012), 1003-1012, at 1008. The author also sees merits in the judgment.
30Lorna McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: Is There a Future after Germany v. Italy?’,
Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 (2013), 125-145, at 128.
31Carlos Espósito, ‘Jus Cogens and Jurisdictional Immunities of States at the International Court of
Justice: “A Conflict Does Exist”’, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011), 161-174, at
174, 163, and 173.
32Stefania Negri, ‘Sovereign Immunity v. Redress for War Crimes: The Judgment of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany
v. Italy)’, International Community Law Review 16 (2014), 123-137, at 137; Benedetto Conforti,
‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of Foreign States: A Missed
Opportunity’, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011), 134-142.
33Benedetto Conforti, ‘A Missed Opportunity’ 2011 (n 32), 142.
34Markus Krajewski/Christopher Singer, ‘Should Judges be Front-Runners? The ICJ, State Immu-
nity and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations
Law 16 (2012), 1-34, at 27.
35Stefan Talmon, ‘Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distin-
guished’, Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012), 979-1002, at 1002.
36Graziella Romeo, ‘Looking Back in Anger and Forward in Trust: The Complicate Patchwork of
the Damages Regime for Infringements of Rights in Italy’, in Ewa Bagińska (ed), Damages for
Violations of Human Rights: A Comparative Study of Domestic Legal Systems (Heidelberg:
Springer 2016), 217-240, at 232, citing as an example Corte d’Appello di Torino, Judgment of
14 May 2012, No 941/2012 (Germany v De Guglielmi).
37Italian Law 14 January 2013, No 5. Article 3(2) of the Law added new grounds for a reopening of
proceedings beyond the grounds already provided for in the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.
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of the ICJ declaring the immunity of a foreign state: in proceedings pending a final
judgment, the courts are to pronounce ex officio their lack of jurisdiction.38 Final
judgments can be appealed to be overturned (‘impugnate per revocazione’).39
In the meantime, further civil proceedings were nonetheless instituted. The
Tribunal of Florence heard three such proceedings. Instead of declaring the com-
plaints inadmissible, the Tribunal stayed the proceedings and addressed a question of
constitutionality to the ItCC, concerning the compatibility of Law No 5/2013 with
Article 2 and Article 24 of the Italian Constitution.40 This proceeding gave rise to
Sentenza 238/2014.
4. The Italian Constitutional Court and Sentenza 238/2014
The ItCC’s Sentenza of 22 October 201441 reopened the legal and political debate on
the issue of compensation to Italian victims (and their heirs) of Nazi crimes during
WWII.42
Using a different approach from the one adopted by the Corte di Cassazione in
Ferrini, the Judgment of the ItCC paid lip service to the international law principle of
state immunity and to the ‘external’ binding force of ICJ judgments (by virtue of
Article 94 of the UN Charter). In Sentenza 238/2014, the ItCC neatly distinguished
the ‘international’ from ‘domestic’ effects of an international norm and the ICJ
judgment. The Corte Costituzionale stated that these international norms and acts
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004), UN
Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force); The Convention has 22 ratifications as
of October 2020, while 30 are needed for its entry into force.
38Italian Law, 5/2013 (n 37), Art 3(1).
39Ibid, Art 3(2).
40Article 2: ‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of the person, both as an
individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Republic expects that
the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.’ Article 24(1):
‘Anyone may bring cases before a court of law in order to protect their rights under civil and
administrative law’.
41The English translation of Sentenza 238/2014, as published on the website of the Italian
Constitutional Court, is reproduced at the end of this volume, with kind permission of the Corte
Costituzionale.
42The following section builds on Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph—How ToMake The Best
Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order’, EJIL Talk!,
(22 December 2014), available at www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-
out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-italianconstitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-order-part-i/. See also
Anne Peters/Valentina Volpe, ‘In Search for Conciliation—Conference Remedies against Immu-
nity?’, VerfBlog, (11 May 2017), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/introduction-in-search-for-
conciliation.
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could not deploy any internal effect within the Italian legal order, on the basis of a
dualistic (‘Triepelian’)43 understanding of the relationship between domestic law
and international law: ‘[T]he incorporation, and thus the application, of the interna-
tional norm would inevitably be precluded, insofar as it conflicts with inviolable
principles and rights’ of the Italian constitutional order.44
Access to justice, as guaranteed by Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, is both a
right and a principle in this sense. The guarantee encompasses the right to appear and
to be defended before a court of law in order to protect one’s rights and at the same
time, in the Court’s jurisprudence, it is considered among the ‘supreme principles’ of
the Italian constitutional order.
The Italian Constitutional Court did not verbally contest the ‘particularly quali-
fied’ ICJ interpretation of the international customary law regarding immunity.45
However, the Corte Costituzionale strongly affirmed its exclusive role as a guarantor
of constitutional principles: ‘It falls exclusively to this Court to ensure the respect of
the Constitution and particularly of its fundamental principles’.46 The Corte reserved
for itself the competence to review the compatibility of the international norm of
state immunity from the civil jurisdiction against the benchmark of those (constitu-
tional) principles. It ascertained whether the customary norm of immunity, as
interpreted by the ICJ, can be ‘incorporated into the constitutional order’.47 By
framing the issue purely as a matter of ‘incorporation’, the ItCC ‘shields Judgment
238/2014 from the obvious criticism: that the ItCC thought it knew international law
better than the ICJ (. . .). Rather, [the ItCC] claims to know Italian constitutional law
better’, as Christian J. Tams puts it in his chapter. This is a particularly problematic
feature of Sentenza 238/2014. The outcome is that, without openly admitting it, the
ItCC reserved for itself the competence to ascertain whether international law ‘is
constitutional’ or not.48
Despite its staunch dualism, the Corte brought international law into play, by
insinuating that the Judgment ‘may also contribute to a desirable—and desired by
many—evolution of international law itself’.49
43Cf Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig: Verlag von C. L. Hirschfeld 1899).
44ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), ‘The Law’ para 3.4.
45‘[T]he interpretation by the ICJ of the customary law of immunity of States from the civil
jurisdiction of other States for acts considered jure imperii is particularly qualified and does not
allow further examination by national governments and/or judicial authorities, including this
Court’. Ibid, ‘The Law’ para 3.1.
46Ibid, ‘The Law’ para 3.3.
47Ibid, ‘The Law’ para 3.4.
48Stefano Battini, ‘È costituzionale il diritto internazionale?’, Giornale di diritto amministrativo
3 (2015), 367-377.
49ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), ‘The Law’ para 3.3.
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Sentenza 238/2014 has triggered extensive and heated scholarly commentary.
Supporters50 celebrated the judgment as the ‘best possible solution’51 which
‘deserves full appreciation’ because it ‘reflects the most cherished values of our
civilization’,52 and it was seen as ‘a lesson in juridical civilization’ and a ‘badge of
honour (. . .) to human rights’.53 Critics54 reproached the judgment for ‘seriously
imperil[ing] the authority of international law’,55 as well as for being ‘contradictory’
and a ‘breach of the law’,56 and they qualified it as a ‘sort of murder of international
law through municipal law’, even as a ‘judicial putsch’.57 Both sides probably agree
that it was the ‘judgment of the year’58 and a ‘historic decision’.59
Sentenza 238/2014 itself does not yet constitute an internationally wrongful act,
because it does not in itself disregard state immunity. What counts are the lower
courts’ reconsiderations of the claims and their decisions on holding them admissible
by setting aside state immunity. Arguably, the simple reopening of those proceed-
ings, not only decisions on their merits or the execution of a judgment, could already
be seen to constitute an internationally wrongful act. The content of Italian state
responsibility would then be primarily restitution in kind which in our case
would mean to somehow strike down the civil lawsuits against Germany.
Moreover, any execution of a substantive judgment would, in addition, violate
post-judgment immunity against execution (Paolo Palchetti). The relevant parts of
the pertinent provision of Article 19 of the UN Convention on State Immunity of
50See, besides the voices quoted: Gianluigi Palombella, ‘German War Crimes and the Rule of
International Law’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 607-613.
51Micaela Frulli, ‘“Time Will Tell Who Just Fell and Who’s Been Left Behind”: On the Clash
between the International Court of Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court’, Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 587-594, at 590.
52Cesare Pinelli, ‘Decision no. 238/2014 of the Constitutional Court: Between Undue Fiction and
Respect for Constitutional Principles’, Questions of International Law: Zoom Out 2 (2014), 33-41,
at 41.
53Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘AHistoric Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the Balance between
the Italian Legal Order’s Fundamental Values and Customary International Law’, The Italian
Yearbook of International Law 24 (2015), 37-52, at 38 and 52.
54See for a different type of critique Massimo Iovane, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court Judgment
No. 238 and the Myth of the “Constitutionalization” of International Law’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 595-605.
55Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities and Judicial Protection: The Decision of the Italian
Constitutional Court No. 238 of 2014’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 98 (2015), 126-134, at 133.
56Felix Würkert, ‘Historische Immunität? Anmerkung zu Sentenza Nr. 238 der Corte Costituzionale
vom 22. Oktober 2014’, Archiv des Völkerrechts 53 (2015), 90-120, at 108 and 110 (translated by
the authors).
57Robert Kolb, ‘The Relationship Between the International and the Municipal Legal Order:
Reflections on the Decision no 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, Questions of Inter-
national Law: Zoom Out 2 (2014), 5-16, at 11 and 13.
58Oreste Pollicino, ‘From Academia to the (Constitutional) Bench’, Diritto pubblico comparato ed
europeo 4 (2015), 1117-1140, at 1117.
59Cataldi, ‘A Historic Decision’ 2015 (n 53).
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2004 seem to express customary international law.60 The most attractive German
object of execution, the Villa Vigoni, is protected because it serves governmental
objectives in a wider sense, including cultural policy, and has a non-commercial
character.61 However, a mortgage on part of this property was registered (again) in
2019, shedding light on the persisting legal insecurity.62
Sentenza 238/2014 triggered a wave of judgments by several Italian courts.63
These lower court decisions in Florence (2015 and 2016),64 Rome (2015),65 Pia-
cenza (2015),66 Ascoli Piceno (2016 and 2017),67 Sulmona (2017),68 and Fermo
(2018)69 ordered Germany to pay reparation to Italian victims of massacres and
deportation. At least 38 cases are currently pending,70 although Germany has decided
to no longer appear before Italian courts. The Corte di Cassazione ultimately
60UNCSI, 2004 (n 37).
61ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 119; cf, Art 19(c) of the UNCSI (n 37): ‘No post-
judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against property of a State
may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State unless and except to
the extent that: (c) it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use
by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State
of the forum, provided that postjudgment measures of constraint may only be taken against property
that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed.’
62Registry of the judicial mortgage on 11 November 2019 after the Tribunale di Sulmona had issued
its Order of 2 November 2017, RGACC 20/2015. Moreover, the question of whether credits owed
by the Ferrovie dello Stato to Deutsche Bahn AG can legitimately be attached by the Italian state
remains open. See Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between Cynicism and
Idealism’, in this volume.
63See on the post-238/2014 cases, Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between
Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume, and Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The
International Court of Justice—The Italian Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Ques-
tion of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 76 (2016), 193-202; Giovanni
Boggero, ‘The Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional Court for
Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the “Triepelian Approach” Possible?’,Heidelberg Journal
of International Law 76 (2016), 203-224.
64Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 6 July 2015, NRG 8879/2011 and Judgment of 22 February
2016, NRG 14740/2009.
65Tribunale di Roma, Judgment of 20 May 2015, No 11069/2015.
66Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment of 28 September 2015, No 723/2015.
67Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order of 8 March 2016, NRG 112/2015 and Order of 24 February
2017, NRG 523/2015.
68Tribunale di Sulmona, Order of 2 November 2017, RGACC 20/2015.
69Tribunale di Fermo, Judgment of 20 October 2018, No 708/2018.
70A source from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated this figure to the authors in
July 2020. The text of the email reads: ‘The Federal Government does not have a complete
overview of the number of plaintiffs in Italy, their background, their submissions or the exact status
of the proceedings, because the Federal Government does not participate in these proceedings that
are contrary to international law and rejects the illegal notification of the proceedings, usually
without taking note of the content of the application. We are currently aware of 38 pending
proceedings’ (translated by the authors).
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confirmed and reinforced these judgments, echoing the familiar Ferrini jurispru-
dence, in a recent case of September 2020.71
Moreover, just one year before, the same Corte di Cassazione seemed to have
already allowed the execution of some of these lower judgments, at least against
those assets of the Federal Republic of Germany that are not devoted to public
purposes (Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm).72
As early as 25 November 2014, one month after Sentenza 238/2014, Italy had
declared its general recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ under the optional
clause of Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, potentially inviting a second lawsuit before
the ICJ. However, Germany decided against instituting a second proceeding before
the ICJ against Italy for violating state immunity and for failing to uphold the 2012
judgment. At the time of writing, the situation does not seem any closer to a solution.
III. Immunity and Human Rights-Based Exceptions
The recent development of international law on immunities has been marked, in the
words of Rosanne van Alebeek and Riccardo Pavoni, by ‘a clear trend towards
restricting immunity so as to impact least the rights and interests of private parties’.73
Nevertheless, ‘unabated heed is usually paid to the core rationale for immunity rules:
the need to protect the sovereign rights of states’.74 In a sober assessment, Ingrid
Wuerth affirms that ‘[a]s international law stands today, immunity applies in suits
alleging human rights violations as it does in other cases.’75 The early millennium’s
momentum towards human-rights based exceptions to immunity76 has been slowed
down or even cut off. This halt may be due to the experience that such exceptions
cause interstate frictions (as illustrated by the German-Italian case), and it is of
course a consequence of the authoritative pronouncement by the ICJ in Jurisdic-
tional Immunities. The hesitation also corresponds to a mounting scepticism toward
the humanisation of international law and what the critique calls a human rights
71Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 28 September 2020, No 20442/2020.
72Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 3 September 2019, No 21995/2019; Cristina M Mariottini,
‘Case Note: Deutsche Bahn AG v. Regione Stereá Ellada’, American Journal of International Law
114 (2020), 486-493.
73van Alebeek/Pavoni, ‘Immunities of States’ 2018 (n 4), 169.
74Ibid.
75Ingrid Wuerth, ‘International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era’, Texas Law Review 96 (2017),
279-349, at 292.
76See in scholarship among the many voices, Paola Gaeta, ‘Immunity of States and State Officials:
A Major Stumbling Block to Judicial Scrutiny?’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The
Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP 2012), 227-238.
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overreach or ‘proliferation’.77 The backlash against international human rights is, to
some extent, populist rhetoric.78 Nevertheless, it must be taken seriously.
The tension between immunity and the protection of private interests is most
acute when it comes to claims for reparation for war crimes and crimes against
humanity before national courts. While the ICJ in Jurisdictional Immunities has
decided only on the immunity of the state sued as a legal person before domestic
courts in civil procedures, the Court explicitly distinguished this constellation from
criminal law proceedings against state officials.79 However, a range of actors is
seeking to keep the door open for a further evolution of the law, notably but not
strictly limited to criminal proceedings against state officials. So far, six states have
deposited interpretative declarations upon their ratification of UNCSI, stating that
the Convention is without prejudice to any future international development in the
protection of human rights.80 In 2009, the Institut de droit international adopted its
Naples Resolution which states that ‘[i]mmunities should not constitute an obstacle
to the appropriate reparation to which victims (...) are entitled.’81 A decade later,
draft Article 7 ‘Crimes under international law in respect of which immunity ratione
materiae shall not apply’ was provisionally adopted within the International Law
Commission.82
77Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford:
Hart 2000); Jacob Mchangama/Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘The Danger of Human Rights Prolifera-
tion: When Defending Liberty, Less Is More’, Foreign Affairs (24 July 2013); Makau Mutua, ‘Is the
Age of Human Rights Over?’, in Sophia A McClennen/Alexandra Schultheis Moore (eds), The
Routledge Companion to Literature and Human Rights (London: Routledge 2016), 450-458;
Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press
2013).
78Veronika Bílková, ‘Populism and Human Rights’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
49 (2018), 143-174.
79ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 91.
80Interpretative declarations by Norway (27 March 2006); Sweden (23 December 2009); Switzer-
land (16 April 2010); Italy (6 May 2013); Finland (23 April 2014); Liechtenstein (22 April 2015).
81Article 2(2) of the Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who
Act on Behalf of the State in Case of International Crimes, Rapporteur: Lady Fox. Institut de droit
international, Third Commission, Naples Session, 3-11 September 2009, Annuaire de l’Institut de
droit international 73 (2010), 1-231.
82ILC, Seventy-first session, Geneva, 29 April to 7 June 2019 and 8 July to 9 August 2019, Seventh
report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, by Concepción Escobar
Hernández, Special Rapporteur (A/CN.4/729) with Annex I: ‘Draft articles on immunity of State
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction provisionally adopted by the Commission’. Draft Article
7 runs: ‘1. Immunity ratione materiae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction shall not
apply in respect of the following crimes under international law: (a) crime of genocide; (b) crimes
against humanity; (c) war crimes; (d) crime of apartheid; (e) torture; (f) enforced disappearance.
2. For the purposes of the present draft article, the crimes under international law mentioned above
are to be understood according to their definition in the treaties enumerated in the annex to the
present draft articles.’ See for state practice the criminal proceeding in Switzerland against a former
Algerian minister of defence, instituted for torture, where the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal
denied immunity ratione personae for acts which the minister had allegedly committed when still in
office (Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal, Khaled Nezzar case, Decision of 25 July 2012,
BB.2011.140).
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Three main argumentative strategies have been employed to carve out an excep-
tion from immunity in the event of serious human rights violations and crimes: the
idea of an implied waiver of immunity, the theory of a normative hierarchy under
which the ius cogens status of the crimes would trump immunity, and finally the
‘remedy theory’ which focuses on the right to a judge which would lead to an
obligation of the courts to examine the merits instead of dismissing a limine any
complaint, and if only as a last resort (ultima ratio).83 However, none of these
approaches has gained much ground (except the last one to which we will return
below), nor has led to a broad change in practice.84
As a factual matter, the development of a new customary law—or treaty-based
exception to state immunity (especially from execution) in cases of serious viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian law—is not impossible, but it
still seems improbable, even at the highly integrated European regional level, as
Andreas Zimmermann convincingly demonstrates in his chapter. A distinct question
is whether and under which conditions it is desirable in legal policy terms.
Normatively, granting compensation for international crimes (notably recent
ones) may form a useful part of a transitional justice strategy and contribute to the
establishment of a sustainable peaceful order. Nevertheless, executive measures
against foreign states based on judgments granting compensation against those
countries, issued by the domestic courts of the victims’ own states, risk creating
significant international tensions. ‘No state’—as Christian Tomuschat recalls—‘is
prepared to see its governmental conduct supervised by the judiciary of another
country’, and ‘by attributing to each state its own sphere of jurisdiction (. . .)
international law contributes to upholding peace in interstate relations’. This risk
of conflict might even be exacerbated when judgments concern historical as opposed
to recent crimes.
One way of containing this risk is resorting to domestic litigation in the home
state of the victims only as an ultima ratio. This was, as mentioned, the Italian
argument before the ICJ.85 The civil proceedings are the last resort only when
alternative remedies are lacking. As previously explained, Sentenza 238/2014 and
subsequent judgments by the Italian Corte di Cassazione86 have resorted to the third
argumentative strategy, relying on the individual victims’ right of access to a court
83See for the identification and analysis of these three strategies: Pierre D’Argent/Pauline Lesaffre,
‘Immunities and Jus Cogens Violations’, in Tom Ruys/Nicolas Angelet/Luca Ferro (eds), The
Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2019), 614-633, at
615-624.
84Ibid, 614 and 630.
85See above text with notes 23-24. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 98.
86Cf, Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21946/2015 (Flatow), especially
paras 4, 5, 6.6. The judgment concerns the request for exequatur of a US court decision awarding
damages against Iran for acts of terrorism that had killed, inter alia, Michelle Alisa Flatow and were
qualified as a crime against humanity. The second judgment is Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of
29 October 2015, No 43696/2015 (Opačić), especially para 5.2.1. It concerned a war crime against
an Italian non-combat helicopter during the Yugoslav Wars.
Reconciling State Immunity with Remedies for War Victims in a Legal Pluriverse 17
(as also stressed by Valerio Onida). However, these judgments have not endorsed
the condition of ‘last resort’. In other words, they have not conditioned the displace-
ment of state immunity on the absence of another effective and reasonable means for
the plaintiffs to reclaim their rights.87 Before the Italian courts, applicants have not
been asked to show that they do not benefit from any other effective remedy.
The weak point of the Italian case law is that it does not dwell sufficiently on the
contours of how the right of access to a court (which is of course not absolute) may
legitimately be restricted. The task therefore is to spell out the conditions for such
restrictions.
This task has so far been undertaken mainly by the ECtHR which has been called
a ‘de facto court of appeal’ on immunity.88 Philippa Webb finds that the Strasbourg
Court ‘has the potential to lead us into an age of greater accountability for human
rights violations’.89 The ECtHR case law on the immunity of international organi-
zations (not of states) has gone in the direction of a balancing test, tying the denial of
access to a court (as a lawful restriction of the right to access under Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) to the existence of a reasonable
alternative remedy. With regard to state immunity, such a balancing approach would
however not be in line with ICJ’s ruling in Jurisdictional Immunities.90 And because
the ECtHR has confirmed that the 2012 ICJ Judgment ‘must be considered by this
Court as authoritative as regards the content of customary international law’,91 a
further elaboration of a balancing approach by the Strasburg Court seems unlikely.
An alternative to lifting state immunity (under certain conditions) might be to
strengthen diplomatic protection, maybe by acknowledging an international
law-based obligation of the states to consider properly and with due diligence any
request by their citizens to undertake steps of diplomatic protection at the international
level.92 Another way to secure accountability could be to establish an obligation of the
states whose officials committed the crimes to grant access to judicial remedy and to
award reparation under their own domestic law,93 typically state liability statutes. Such
a state obligation would ultimately be enforceable in international fora, and might
help victims more than adjudication and enforcement in other equally sovereign
87See explicitly, Corte di Cassazione, Opačić (n 86), para 5.2.1. See also D’Argent/Lesaffre,
‘Immunities’ 2019 (n 83), 623.
88Philippa Webb, ‘AMoving Target: The Approach of the Strasbourg Court to Immunity’, in Anne
van Aaken/Iulia Motoc (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and General Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: OUP 2018), 251-263, at 262.
89Ibid, 263.
90See above text with notes 23-24. ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 101.
91ECtHR, Jones (n 9), para 198.
92Anja Höfelmeier, Die Vollstreckungsimmunität der Staaten im Wandel des Völkerrechts (Berlin:
Springer 2018), 306-308; Cf also Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the
Individual in International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2016), 402-405.
93Italian (and Greek) lawsuits before German courts have been unsuccessful in this sense. Cf,
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277;
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, BVerfGK 7, 303
(Distomo).
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states.94 Given the dilemma in which courts find themselves, ‘between a rock and a
hard place’ (Andreas Paulus), it seems important to continue exploring these strategies
for reconciling human rights protection with peaceful interstate coexistence.
IV. Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations and War
Crimes
The deportation of IMIs and their exploitation as forced labourers together with the
massacres against the civilian population were (as Germany acknowledges) ‘a
serious violation of the international law of armed conflict applicable in 1943-
1945’ for which the state has assumed full responsibility.95 Moreover, Germany
paid reparations to the state of Italy, based on two international treaties of 1961.96
Nevertheless, Germany has not granted individual reparation to large numbers of
victims, and this denial is what led to Sentenza 238/2014.
The civil proceedings which ultimately involved the Corte Costituzionale might
be seen in the overall current climate of addressing historical crimes. A strong wave
of demands for reparation in the context of colonialism,97 violence committed
against indigenous peoples,98 and slavery99 is rolling on. Germany in particular is
confronted with state claims for reparation, notably for damages caused in WWII, by
Greece and Poland.100 In addition, Namibia has requested reparation for crimes
94Höfelmeier, ‘Vollstreckungsimmunität’ 2018 (n 92), 307-308.
95ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 52.
96On 2 June 1961, two Agreements were concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and
Italy. Individual payments were nonetheless not contemplated. Agreement between the Federal
Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain Property-Related, Economic and
Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian version published in
Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963 No 19, 668; Agreement between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist
Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian version published in
Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No 22, 791.
97See, eg, Larissa van den Herik, ‘Reparation for Decolonisation Violence: A Short Overview of
Recent Dutch Litigation’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 78 (2018), 629-633.
98Federico Lenzerini (ed), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative
Perspectives (Oxford: OUP 2008).
99Cf the current US debate on reparation for slavery: H.R. 40 - Commission to Study and Develop
Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, 116th Congress 1st Session, introduced in House
3 January 2019, available at www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/40/text. Cf as well
the 2021 South Korean’s judgment ordering Japan to pay compensation for wartime sexual slavery,
Daniel Franchini, ‘South Korea’s denial of Japan’s immunity for international crimes: Restricting or
bypassing the law of state immunity?’, Voelkerrechtsblog, (18 January 2021), available at https://
voelkerrechtsblog.org/south-koreas-denial-of-japans-immunity-for-international-crimes/.
100See the Greek verbal note of 4 June 2019, available at https://www.mfa.gr/epikairotita/diloseis-
omilies/anakoinose-tou-upourgeiou-exoterikon-skhetika-me-ten-epidose-rematikes-diakoinoses-
sto-germaniko-upourgeio-exoterikon-gia-tis-polemikes-epanorthoseis-kai-apozemioseis-apo-ton-
kai-pagkosmio-polemo-04062019.html. A Polish commission to identify damage done by
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committed by German officials in the colonial context against the Herero and Nama
people.101 In a recent urgent debate in the UNHuman Rights Council, the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights stated that ‘[b]ehind today’s racial violence, systemic
racism, and discriminatory policing lies the failure to acknowledge and confront the
legacy of the slave trade and colonialism’. She urged states to ‘make amends for
centuries of violence and discrimination, including through formal apologies, truth-
telling processes, and reparations in various forms.’102
It is of course a fundamental question whether and under which conditions it
makes sense to draw history before courts. Indeed, as Andreas von Arnauld recalls in
his chapter, ‘adjudicating history might prove bottomless once one goes further
back, with claims relating to early colonialism and beyond. However, in most of the
recent cases of “history taken to court,” compensation is but a secondary aim, the
primary aim being to make the voice of the victims heard (. . .)’. He continues that
courts are increasingly turned into fora to make one’s story heard, ‘and this process is
used as leverage to exert pressure on the political system to listen’.
A judicial response is plausible where, as in the case leading to Sentenza 238/2014,
the conduct was already unlawful according to the standards of international law
applicable at the time of perpetration. Still, the issue of reparation for individual
victims might need a nuanced response when the crimes lie in the distant past.
Even for contemporary atrocities, general international law as it stands does not
yet fully acknowledge an individual right to reparation for victims of armed con-
flict.103 But individual reparation is increasingly present in special reparation
schemes, established by interstate treaties, other (often hybrid international/domes-
tic) legal instruments, and soft law.104 In other words, reparation for victims of
international and non-international armed conflicts is becoming a typical feature in
the ius post bellum, and this trend is unlikely to fade away. Nonetheless, as Stefan
Germany against Poland in the context of World War II has, according to the press, accomplished
its work in May 2020. However, the results are not public. The commission had been established by
the Polish governing party ‘Law and Justice’ and was chaired by a member of parliament belonging
to that party.
101Negotiations between Germany and Namibia are ongoing. See for two antagonist assessments:
Patrick O Heinemann, ‘Die deutschen Genozide an den Herero und Nama: Grenzen der rechtlichen
Aufarbeitung’, Der Staat 55 (2016), 461-487; Kenneth L Lewis Jr, ‘The Namibian Holocaust:
Genocide Ignored, History Repeated, Yet Reparations Denied’, Florida Journal of International
Law 29 (2017), 133-149.
102UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, statement of 17 June 2020 (43rd
session of the Human Rights Council, Urgent Debate on current racially inspired human rights
violations, systemic racism, police brutality against people of African descent and violence against
peaceful protests) (emphasis added).
103The UN General Assembly’s Principles are not hard law and cannot in themselves create such an
entitlement. UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Annex, GA Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005.
104Christian Marxsen, ‘The Emergence of an Individual Right to Reparation for Victims of Armed
Conflict’, in Peters/Marxsen, Max Planck Trialogues 2020 (n 5), 1-15.
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Kadelbach argues, in the law of international armed conflict, a true antagonism is
visible between the substantial and procedural dimensions of the law of reparations.
While the victims are recognized as holders of the claims, ‘the procedural right to
espouse these claims on their behalf is still in the hand of the states.’ This might also
explain why a gap in implementation of ‘scandalous proportions’ remains, as a UN
Special Rapporteur—who saw a ‘dismal record in the implementation of repara-
tions’—put it.105
With regard to the German crimes in particular, Graziella Romeo deplores
the ‘double standards’ on the side of Italy. Human rights violations committed by
Italian officials during the Fascist regime, for example by adopting and applying
racial laws, and also by aiding German forces in perpetrating massacres against
civilians, were not compensated on an individual basis but were mainly addressed
‘with legislative provisions pertaining to welfare policy and only insufficiently
restored, while a general regime concerning the restoration for human rights viola-
tions is still missing.’106 She opines that the ‘desirable (...) evolution of international
law itself’, as solicited by the Corte Costituzionale,107 ‘needs to be paired with a
similar effort on the side of the Italian Parliament and courts’.108 This shared ‘sorry
saga’ indeed generates a shared committment (Francesco Francioni). Similar ‘dou-
ble standards’ seem to be applied by the German side, too. In particular, the
selectivity of various compensation schemes adopted by Germany and the constant
exclusion of IMIs from reparation schemes dedicated to WWII victims (Jörg Luther)
are not clearly justified: ‘Why the French railroad deportees and not IMIs?’
(Riccardo Pavoni).
Another important point is that—in the end—reparation for victims of armed
conflict can only come about in an interplay between international and domestic law.
If domestic institutions and procedures are not built up, then a putative international
law-based entitlement to reparation would anyway remain virtual, a ‘pie in the sky’
as Shuichi Furuya recently put it.109 However, the domestic reparation programmes
for the victims of war crimes in both interstate and civil wars are often situated in a
grey zone between law and politics. Such programmes have occasionally become an
issue in regional human rights courts. These courts then examine the effectiveness of
such programmes while applying the principle of subsidiarity which demands a
certain amount of deference to the domestic institutions. This aspect is another
manifestation of the new pluriverse made of international law and multiple domestic
legal orders. This brings us to the third theme of the book: the interaction between
international and domestic law and the role of domestic courts therein.
105Pablo de Greiff, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation
and guarantees of non-recurrence, UN Doc. A/69/518, 14 October 2014 (quote from the summary).
106Romeo, ‘Looking Back’ 2016 (n 36), 237.
107ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.3.
108Romeo, ‘Looking Back’ 2016 (n 36), 237.
109Shuichi Furuya, ‘The Right to Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, in Peters/Marxsen,
Max Planck Trialogues 2020 (n 5), 19.
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V. The Interplay Between International and Domestic Law
As we have seen, state immunity, remedies and reparation for victims of atrocities
are legal institutions which sit at the interface of international and domestic law.
‘Cross-fertilisation’ among different jurisdictions and their courts is typical in both
areas.110
Generally speaking, national courts are called to apply and enforce international
rules. This role has been captured by the theory of ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’,111
and by the idea that national judges are the ‘natural judges of international law’.112
Thus, the activity of domestic courts strengthens and promotes international law.
On the other hand, national courts often, and maybe increasingly so, resist the
application of international law and the implementation of international judgments,
notably of the regional human rights courts.113 In the Inter-American human rights
system, courts in Venezuela, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, and Argentina have refused to fully implement judgments issued by the Inter-
American Human Rights Bodies since 2011.114 In the European human rights
system, the resistance by the Russian Constitutional Court, followed by the legisla-
ture, is notorious, and the Court quoted Sentenza 238/2014 as a precedent.115
110Cf for the issue of immunity D’Argent/Lesaffre, ‘Immunities’ 2019 (n 83), 629.
111See Georges Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’, in Walter Schätzel/
Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer (eds), Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation: Festschrift für
Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Frankfurt a M: Vittorio Klostermann 1956), 324-342.
Hans Kelsen referred to domestic criminal courts as organs of the international community that
apply domestic law and international law simultaneously; Hans Kelsen, Principles of International
Law (Robert W Tucker (ed), New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston 2nd ed 1966), at 205-206
and 210.
112Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial
Function of National Courts’, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review
34 (2011), 133-168, at 150.
113Raffaela Kunz, ‘Judging International Judgments Anew? The Human Rights Courts before
Domestic Courts’, European Journal of International Law 30 (2019), 1129-1163; Raffaela Kunz,
Richter über internationale Gerichte? (Heidelberg: Springer 2020).
114See Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights’, Cornell International Law Journal 44 (2011), 493-533;
Ximena Soley/Silvia Steininger, ‘Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, International Journal of Law in Context 14 (2018),
237-257.
115Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-П/2015. See also Federal Law
of the Russian Federation, No 7-KFZ introducing amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law,
No 1-FKZ of 21 July 1994 on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, entered into force
on 15 December 2015; Cf, more recently, Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the amendment
to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, No 1-FKZ of 14 March 2020. See on the 2015
judgment and on further decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court, Lauri Mälksoo, ‘Russia’s
Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights: Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-П/2015’, European Constitutional Law
Review 12 (2016), 377-395; Matthias Hartwig, ‘Vom Dialog zum Disput?
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1. Sentenza 238/2014 in the Line of Resistance of Domestic
Courts Against International Judgments
Thus, Sentenza 238/2014 appears as one more building block in the wall of ‘pro-
tection’ built up by domestic courts against ‘intrusion’ of international law, relying
on the precepts of their national constitution.116 This theme runs as a fil rouge
through various chapters of the book. By way of introduction, we wish to recapit-
ulate the most important points de repère.117 The ItCC relied on its established case-
law on the effects of European Union law, notably on the doctrine of controlimiti in
order to erect a barrier to the ‘introduction’ of the ICJ judgment into the domestic
legal order: ‘As was upheld several times by this Court, there is no doubt that the
fundamental principles of the constitutional order and inalienable human rights
constitute a “limit to the introduction (. . .) of generally recognized norms of inter-
national law’ (. . .) and serve as ‘counterlimits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of
European Union [and now international] law”’ into the domestic legal system.118
Ironically, this front of resistance had been spearheaded—as it is well known—
both by the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), and by the ItCC already in
the 1970s.119 In 2004, the FCC denied a strictly binding effect of the ECHR and
ECtHR-judgments, and instead (only) ordered German authorities and courts to
‘take into account’ the Convention and Strasbourg judgments, and only within the
confines of the German Basic Law.120 The most recent German case of 2020 held
Verfassungsrecht vs. Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: Der Fall der Russländischen
Föderation’, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 44 (2017), 1-23; Ausra Padskocimaite, ‘Consti-
tutional Courts and (Non)execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A
Comparison of Cases from Russia and Lithuania’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law
77 (2017), 651-684; Jeffrey Kahn, ‘The Relationship between the European Court of Human Rights
and the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation: Conflicting Conceptions of Sovereignty in
Strasbourg and St Petersburg’, European Journal of International Law 30 (2019), 933-959; Galina
A Nelaeva/Elena A Khabarova/Natalia V Sidorova, ‘Russia’s Relations with the European Court of
Human Rights in the Aftermath of the Markin Decision: Debating the “Backlash”’, Human Rights
Review 21 (2020), 93-112.
116Anne Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law’, Vienna
Journal on International Constitutional Law 3 (2009), 170-198. The judgments mentioned in the
preceding section differ in tone and substance. But even well-meant decisions which erect moderate
and good faith-‘protections’ against international law can be abused as ‘precedents’ by actors with a
pronounced anti-international law agenda.
117This section again builds on Peters, ‘Triepel’ 2014 (n 42).
118ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), ‘The Law’, para 3.2 (emphasis and square brackets added).
119In the 1970s, both Courts mounted critique against an insufficient respect for human rights by the
then European Community (Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71,
BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I) and ItCC, Judgment of 27 December 1973, No 183/1973 (Frontini))
and threatened, with different levels of intensity, to scrutinize EC-acts against the yardstick of
domestic fundamental rights and to refuse to allow their application in Germany and Italy.
120Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307
(Görgülü).
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that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s judgment upholding the
European Central Bank’s decision to establish a Public Sector Purchase Programme
was ‘manifestly disproportionate’ and thus ultra vires.121
Sentenza 238/2014 repeats that any international norm (or international judg-
ment) which stands in conflict with ‘principi fondamentali dell’ordinamento
costituzionale’ may not be applied by domestic institutions. The German FCC in
Görgülü had marked the boundary of applicability of judgments of the ECtHR with
exactly the same wording (‘tragende Grundsätze der Verfassung’).
The referring court of Florence had quoted a previous Italian constitutional
judgment pointing to the ‘identità’ of the Italian legal order. There, the ItCC had
reaffirmed the principle that ‘the tendency of the Italian legal order to be open to
generally recognized norms of international law and international treaties is limited
by the necessity to preserve its identity; thus, first of all, by the values enshrined in
the Constitution’.122 This is exactly what other European courts have done before
(albeit with regard to EU law): the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional,123 the French
Conseil constitutionnel,124 and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.125
Sentenza 238/2014 is in some way a follower of the CJEU’s Kadi decision126
which the ItCC quotes.127 But unlike Kadi, which mounts resistance against the UN
Security Council and thus against an essentially unaccountable and not fully repre-
sentative body, Sentenza 238/2014 is directed against the International Court of
Justice, a body which represents the international rule of law and all regions of the
world. Generally speaking, this Court has so far enjoyed a high degree of accep-
tance.128 The de facto disobedience to the ICJ seems less justified as a matter of
principle, and implies more serious damage to the normativity of the international
legal system than disobeying the Security Council.
Just like Kadi, Sentenza 238/2014 insists on the fact that it has nothing to do with
‘outbound’ compliance of the state (Italy) with international law, but only concerns
the internal compatibility of two Italian laws with the Italian Constitution: ‘The
121Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, paras 117-143. See for a
strong critique Sabino Cassese, ‘Il Guinzaglio Tedesco’, Il Foglio, 19 May 2020.
122ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 1.2, quoting Judgment of 22 March 2001, No 73/2001
(emphasis added).
123Tribunal constitucional, Declaration of 13 December 2004, DTC 1/2004, sec II, para 3.
124Conseil constitutionnel, Decision of 27 July 2006, No 2006-540, para 19.
125Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 (Treaty of Lisbon), para 340.
(See also Constitutional Court of Lithuania, case no 17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 on the priority of the
state constitution over EU law, 14 March 2006, sec III, para 9.4).
126CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, Judgment of
3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461.
127But see Martin Scheinin, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’s Judgement 238 of 2014 Is Not
Another Kadi Case’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 615-620.
128This acceptance is not tainted by the fact that less than half of all states have accepted the Court’s
compulsory jurisdiction. States regularly subject themselves to its jurisdiction and the authority of
the judgments is rarely contested.
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result is a further reduction of the scope of this norm, with effects in the domestic
legal order only.’129 Put differently, the ItCC neatly distinguishes ‘internal’ and
‘external’ effects of an international norm: ‘The impediment to the incorporation of
the conventional norm [Article 94 of the United Nations Charter] to our legal
order—albeit exclusively for the purposes of the present case—has no effects on
the lawfulness of the external norm itself, and therefore results in the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the special law of adaptation, insofar as it contrasts with the
abovementioned fundamental principles of the Constitution’.130 So technically (in a
dualist world view), the case is not about supremacy but about incorporation:
‘Accordingly, the incorporation, and thus the application, of the international
norm would inevitably be precluded, insofar as it conflicts with inviolable principles
and rights. This is exactly what has happened in the present case.’131
The judicial pretence that the ‘internal’ unconstitutionality basically does not
concern international law, and the observation that the judicial pronouncement does
not accord any priority or supremacy to internal law is formally correct. However, it
is as unpersuasive in substance as it was in the CJEU Kadi judgment.132 That
distinction between inside and outside resonates with good old nineteenth century
dualism, according to which international law and domestic law are ‘two circles
which at best touch each other but which never intersect’.133
The Italian Constitutional Court’s consolation that ‘[i]n any other case, it is
certainly clear that the undertaking of the Italian State to respect all of the interna-
tional obligations imposed by the accession to the United Nations Charter, including
the duty to comply with the judgments of the ICJ, remains unchanged’134 does not
help much for managing the practical problem at stake.
2. A Plea for a Pluralisme Ordonné
That stiff dualism à la Heinrich Triepel and Dionisio Anzilotti does not only fail to
resolve the practical problem but additionally bears the real risk of reinforcing the
perception that international law is only soft law or even no law at all. We submit that
more flexibility is warranted. Courts should entertain procedural mechanisms of
reciprocal restraint, respect, and cooperation for adjusting competing claims of
authority between the international and the national bodies.135
129ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), ‘The Law’, para 3.3 (emphasis added).
130Ibid, para 4.1 (emphasis added).
131Ibid, para 3.4 (emphasis added).
132CJEU, Kadi (n 126), paras 287-288 and 299.
133Triepel, Völkerrecht (n 43), 111 (translated by the authors).
134ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 4.1.
135Cf also Anne Peters, ‘The Refinement of International Law: From Fragmentation to Regime
Interaction and Politicization’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 15 (2017), 671-704.
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Domestic (constitutional) courts should take into consideration international law
in good faith and interpret the domestic constitution in the light of international law.
A domestic court could interpret the (constitutional) right of access to a court (such
as under Article 24 of the Italian Constitution) in the light of the ECtHR judgment
Sfountouris v Germany, which implicitly held that access to domestic courts
(in Germany) in suits for damages on account of German WWII-crimes appears to
satisfy the standards of Article 6 ECHR.136 Against this context, Sentenza 238/2014
appears as une occasion perdue, considering that ‘the ItCC had the opportunity to
oppose state immunity from jurisdiction to another international law principle’
(Sabino Cassese).
National courts can also use a more ‘harmonising’ approach à la Jones.137 Jones
was a case on state immunity (involving Saudi Arabia) against allegations of torture.
The ECtHR here had insisted that both issue areas of international law, the law of
immunities and human rights law, must be reconciled, acknowledging ‘the need to
interpret the Convention so far as possible in harmony with other rules of interna-
tional law of which it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State
immunity’.138 This led the ECtHR ‘to conclude that measures taken by a State
which reflect generally recognised rules of public international law on State immu-
nity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the
right of access to a court’.139 But the Court also observed that ‘in light of the
developments currently under way in this area of public international law, this is a
matter which needs to be kept under review’.140
National courts can also apply the Bosphorus strategy.141 In that approach, courts
should employ a legal presumption that a legal act performed by a body rooted in
‘another’ legal system is in conformity with their ‘own’ standards. In Bosphorus, this
presumption is coupled with the reciprocal recognition of such acts, ‘as long as’
some minimum requirements are not undercut. In this scheme, domestic courts
abstain from revisiting (judicial or quasi-judicial) decisions taken by an international
body on the basis of the rebuttable presumption that the respective international
regime, or another state’s domestic legal system (in our case Germany) offers a
functionally equivalent legal protection. It is ‘the admissibility of an imperfect
accordance between the two systems’, as Alessandro Bufalini puts it, that enhances
the potentialities of equivalent protection as a technique for the balancing of different
interests. Concededly, this more dialogical technique requires a close relationship or
136ECtHR, Sfountouris and Others v Germany, Decision of 31 May 2011, Application No 24120/
06. This decision on inadmissibility found a claim based on Article 1 AP 1 in conjunction with
Article 14 ECHR to be inadmissible ratione materiae.




141ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 June 2005, Application No
45036/98.
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similarity of legal orders, explaining why the technique is often used in the European
context, while ‘it is not used very often in genuine international law cases’ (Doris
König).
Most importantly, conflicts between international law and constitutional law
should be resolved by balancing in the concrete case, not on the basis of a normative
hierarchy or the norms’ expression in international law as opposed to domestic law.
Less attention should be paid to the formal sources of law, and more to the substance
of the rules in question. The ranking and effects of the norms at stake should be
assessed in a subtler manner according to their substantial weight and signifi-
cance.142 Such a non-formalist, substance-oriented perspective implies that on the
one hand, certain less significant provisions in state constitutions would have to give
way to important international norms. Inversely, fundamental rights guarantees
should prevail over less important norms (independent of their locus and type of
codification). The fundamental idea is that what counts is the substance, not the
formal category of conflicting norms. Admittedly, this new approach does not
always offer strict guidance, because it is debatable which norms are ‘important’
in terms of substance. Still, such a flexible approach appears to correspond better
with the current state of global legal integration than the idea of a strict hierarchy,
particularly in human rights matters. From this perspective, international law, con-
stitutional law, and other states’ constitutional law find themselves in a fluid state of
interaction and reciprocal influence, based on discourse and mutual adaptation, but
not in a hierarchical relationship.143
This flexible, procedural solution also reflects the fact that many different inter-
ests and claims are at play and to a certain extent allows the multiple roles played by
domestic courts to be reconciled. Raffaela Kunz invites courts to increasingly see
themselves as ‘mediators between orders’ rather than guardian of a particular legal
system. ‘More than strict conflict rules and hierarchies, what better fits to the
complex reality is an approach that allows to take into account the different interests
at stake and to balance them’.
Is the openness of the question ‘who decides who decides’ and the lack of an
ultimate authority—in our context a tribunal sitting over and above the ICJ and the
Italian Corte Costituzionale—a merit of the global order? In theory, such openness
constitutes an additional mechanism for limiting power and seems to allow for a
heterarchical adjustment of regimes. Within this paradigm, the constitutional resis-
tance of the Corte Costituzionale might be interpreted as the pulling of an ‘emer-
gency brake’ whose availability had been the pre-condition for the opening-up of the
states’ constitutions towards the international sphere in the first place. Along this
line, one could argue that—in the absence of a super-arbiter—the Italian courts are
entitled to act as ‘guardians’ of the rights of the victims or their descendants ‘as long
142Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost’ 2009 (n 116).
143Yota Negishi, ‘The Pro Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating the Relationship between
Conventionality Control and Constitutionality Control’, European Journal of International Law
28 (2017), 457-481.
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as’ a customary human rights exception to state immunity has not crystallized or
until a special agreement between Germany and Italy, on a special compensation
programme or a claims tribunal, has been concluded. Potential models for each of
these solutions already exist. In particular, numerous internal and international
arrangements in the context of transitional justice might inspire the creation of a
German-Italian Fund for the IMIs, as Filippo Fontanelli explains in detail in his
chapter.
In the long run, reasonable resistance by national actors—if it is exercised under
respect of the principles for ordering pluralism, notably in good faith and with due
regard for the overarching ideal of international cooperation—might build up the
political pressure needed to promote the progressive evolution of international law in
the direction of a system more considerate of human rights. This is the ‘barking and
biting’ approach mentioned by Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella: barking and a ‘bite,
from time to time and in exceptional circumstances, can be appropriate and neces-
sary’. Indeed, such domestic resistance has, in the past, had salutary effects in the
sense that it has stimulated an improvement in the attacked regime’s fundamental
rights protection: in reaction to the German Constitutional Court’s Solange I deci-
sion, the EC/EU formalised its scheme of fundamental rights protection culminating
in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and—perhaps—the accession of the
EU to the ECHR. Arguably, it was in reaction to the CJEU’s Kadi decision and its
progeny that the United Nations 1267-sanctions regime was complemented with an
ombudsman procedure.144
At first glance, Sentenza 238/2014 strengthens the position of the individual
against the state. But on a more profound level, it strengthens unilateralism and
particularism over universalism and multilateralism. As Heike Krieger highlights,
these kinds of challenges to the normativity of the international legal order are
troubling. Sentenza 238/2014 ultimately gives priority to one state’s national outlook
about what constitutes a proper legal order over the universal standard pronounced
by an international court. Concededly, this ICJ standard is unsatisfactory and seems
to be biased in favour of the stability of an interstate system. On the other hand, it still
has the merit of being universal. The lack of an ultimate arbiter tends to result in the
political dominance of the more powerful actors which are normally the domestic
ones such as the Italian Corte Costituzionale—and the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht. One way out would be to establish such an arbiter.145
144UN Security Council, Resolution 1904 (17 December 2009), which has been gradually
improved, UN SC Res. 1989 (17 June 2011).
145As recently proposed by Daniel Sarmiento and Joseph H H Weiler in the aftermath of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ultra vires pronouncement. The authors suggested to establish a mixed
chamber, composed of both European and national judges, to decide about allegations that an
international body acts ultra vires and thereby infringes national sovereignty (and national consti-
tutional law). Daniel Sarmiento/Joseph H H Weiler, ‘The EU Judiciary After Weiss: Proposing A
New Mixed Chamber of the Court of Justice’, VerfBlog, (2 June 2020), available at https://
verfassungsblog.de/the-eu-judiciary-after-weiss/. See also along this line, Christine Landfried,
‘Politische Versäumnisse’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (18 June 2020).
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As long as this is missing, we need to work towards what has been called a
‘pluralisme ordonné’.146
VI. A ‘Modest Proposal’
This book reflects multiple sensibilities and different perspectives on the issue of war
crimes, immunities and reparation. Although an idem sentire is recognizable among
the authors, they meaningfully disagree on strategies for a sustainable solution of the
stalemate. This variety of viewpoints prevents us from adopting one shared conclu-
sion and explains the form of the ‘dialogical’ epilogue en lieu de conclusion.
As editors, in a purely personal capacity, we nevertheless submit a five-step
‘modest proposal’ which is inspired by ideas formulated by numerous authors, and
represents a short manifesto ideally addressed to decisionmakers.
Negotiations
Political talks concerning the issue at hand should be resumed as soon as possible,
as already encouraged by the ICJ in its 2012 Judgment.147 Further legal action,
eg filing another case before the ICJ, would not lead to an effective solution and
would come at the expense of the victims.
Reparation
A joint German-Italian reparation fund should be created to provide lump sum
payments to the victims. A prior stocktaking of the reparation measures adopted
so far and a non-bureaucratic registration of victims would form the basis for the
creation of such a fund. When compiling the list of victims and determining the most
important reparation criteria (eligibility requirements, level, and type of reparation),
Italy could take over a leading role and send an important sign of assuming
responsibility towards its own citizens. Criteria based on the economic need of
victims could also be taken into consideration.
Victims
There is a need to recognize those victims who have thus far received no
attention, including the IMIs. Together with the payment of an—at least sym-
bolic—reparation sum, such recognition would generate satisfaction, encouraging
pacification.148
146Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le pluralisme ordonné: Les forces imaginantes du droit (Paris: Seuil
2006).
147‘[The Court] considers (. . .) that the claims (. . .) could be the subject of further negotiation
involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving the issue.’ ICJ, Jurisdictional
Immunities (n 2), para 104.
148In the end, it may be less the ‘status’ of victim which is disputed but the legal (and economic)
consequences, namely the entitlement to financial compensation. See for an empirical analysis of
the pronounced preferences of victims for monetary compensation over other forms of ‘reparation’,
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Where a direct victim had lost her or his life as a consequence of wrongful acts,
the heirs can bring a case before courts. First degree relatives (in the vertical line) and
the spouse should be considered as direct victims still affected by the events. In
principle, no other relatives or further generations of heirs should be eligible for
lump sum reparation.
Actors
Besides the Italian and German foreign ministers, the Heads of State could assume a
leading role in initiating the necessary steps. It is advisable to involve civil society
organizations as well as other non-state actors.
Time-Factor
Effective reparation requires adopting the aforesaid measures urgently. At the same
time, determined action might be appreciated as manifesting cooperation within
Europe and as underlining Italy’s and Germany’s unreserved commitment to
safeguarding human rights and promoting human dignity.
Post (Personal) Scriptum
Valentina Volpe
For a long time, a shared family memory portrayed my grandfather Giuseppe Volpe, Maresciallo
dei Carabinieri, as a deportee in the concentration camp of Dachau. We knew few things about his
imprisonment: the couple of letters he sent, the watch and the wedding ring he wore, and the fact
that he died in this same camp, on Christmas Eve 1944, mere months before liberation.
Contradicting decades of family narrations, recent databases dedicated to non-returned IMI’s
indicated, in fact, a camp on the French territory, in the Vosges mountains, as the alleged destination
of his European wartime journey.
Coincidenze The Natzweiler-Struthof camp was located just a few kilometers from Strasbourg,
the city where I spent my Erasmus year. Exactly 60 years after the end of WWII, I was living, in the
same places of my grandfather’s imprisonment, one of the most genuine experiences of European
companionship, and ‘companion’—as Mario Rigoni Stern once wrote—etymologically unites
those who shared the same bread (‘cum panis’).149 As I was gradually getting used to the image
of the peaceful Vosges mountains as his ultimate resting place, additional coincidences linked to
this volume’s research began to emerge, bringing our discontinuous stories closer. The Natzweiler-
Struthof concentration camp, as Dachau before, turned out to be just another intermediate stop in his
deportation journey.
Prakash Adhikari/Wendy L Hansen, ‘Reparations and Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Civil
War’, Journal of Human Rights 12 (2013), 423-446, at 441. These findings concern victims of
recent conflicts who need the money to rebuild their lives out of the ruins of war. The preferences
may be different when it comes to crimes lying further in the past.
149Mario Rigoni Stern, Letter to the Provincial Congress of the ANPI Treviso, 2007, Il Calendario
del Popolo (August-September 2008).
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In the German city of Heilbronn, in the district of Neckargartach, there is a small concentration
camp cemetery near the river Neckar in which 246 deportees were laid to rest. It was there that I
discovered Giuseppe Volpe’s resting place in May 2018. If finally, there is a flower on his
memorial, it is thanks to this volume.150 Heilbronn is just an hour’s drive from Heidelberg, the
city in which I completed my postdoctoral research on human rights and international law at the
MPIL, and where this book about interstate conciliation was conceived. For three years, unaware,
we have been both, grandfather and granddaughter, contemplating the same Neckar river, which
crosses both Heidelberg and Heilbronn, silently linking our generations.
I dedicate this book to nonno Giuseppe who I never met, to his generation and to my own, to
those in-between and especially to those to come. May they handle the unprecedented, yet fragile,
privilege of being com-panions in Europe with care.
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Part II
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Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über
alles? Legal Implications Beyond
Germany’s Jurisdictional Immunity
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Abstract The main consequence of Sentenza 238/2014 is that Germany has been
denied jurisdictional immunities before Italian courts. However, the inflexible con-
ception of the right of access to courts adopted by the Corte Costituzionale gives rise
to a number of questions that go well beyond the issue at stake in Judgment
238/2014. First, there is the issue of whether the right of access to justice should
also prevail over the international customary rule on immunity from execution.
Secondly, one may ask whether the need to protect the right provided by Article
24 of the Italian Constitution could trump the criteria established by Italian law for
exercising civil jurisdiction in order to allow access to justice in respect to all
international crimes, even those committed outside Italian territory and involving
individuals having no link to Italy. Finally, there is the question of whether a
sacrifice of the right of access to justice would be justified if alternative,
non-judicial means of redress were available to the victims; in particular, whether
an alternative means of redress should in any case ensure to each and every
individual victim full compensation or whether instead, in light of the specific
circumstances of the case—the fact that the crimes occurred in the course of an
international armed conflict affecting hundreds of thousands of victims—such
alternative means could provide only symbolic compensation based on a lump
sum settlement. This chapter aims at exploring these and possibly other issues
arising in connection to the broad interpretation of the principle of access to justice
given by the Corte Costituzionale.
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International legal thinking has long been dominated by the perception of the state as
a unitary subject. In strict legal terms, the unity of the state entails that the conduct of
any state organ is to be regarded as the conduct of the state itself for the purposes of
establishing international responsibility. It also entails that, ‘in general, in interna-
tional law and practice, it is the executive of the state that represents the state in its
international relations and speaks for it at the international level’.1 The concept of the
state as a unitary subject evidently relies on a legal fiction. Reality is more complex:
behind the unitary veil of the state, there is a plurality of organs; these organs, at
times, speak in different voices on questions of international law; they may have
different priorities when performing acts that have international implications; and
some of these organs are constitutionally independent from the executive.
The ‘need to look behind the monolithic face of the State’ becomes crucial for
understanding the ‘Italian concerns’ following Judgment 238/2014.2 In parallel with
the interstate dispute between Germany and Italy, the question of Germany’s
immunity before Italian courts has generated an intense and prolonged confrontation
between different organs of the Italian state. On the one side, there is a hyperactive
judiciary, which appears determined to provide court access to victims through a
controversial interpretation of international rules and, in the case of the Italian
Constitutional Court (ItCC), irrespective of the costs in terms of compliance with
the international rule of law. On the other side, there are political organs of the state
that have shown a certain reluctance in engaging in meaningful political initiatives,
both at the international and the intra-national level, for addressing the claims of
victims. At an initial stage, the point of conflict concerned the determination of
customary international rules on state immunity, with the judiciary and the executive
expressing differing views as to the existence of an exception to immunity in cases of
grave breaches of human rights and humanitarian law. Later the conflict centred
around the implementation of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Jurisdic-
tional Immunities Judgment: while the executive and parliament focused their efforts
on securing Germany’s immunity without apparently taking care of the fate of the
victims’ claims, the ItCC had no hesitation in giving precedence to the right to
jurisdictional protection over compliance with the 2012 ICJ Judgment.
This internal confrontation explains the difficulty in discerning a unitary and
coherent position of the state. It also explains the current deadlock in the conflicting
approaches. Admittedly, after Judgment 238/2014 the room to manoeuvre available
1ICJ, Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April
2011, ICJ Reports 2011, 70, para 37.
2I borrowed this expression from Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Concept of “The State”: Variable
Geometry and Dualist Perceptions’, in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes/Vera Gowlland-Debbas
(eds), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality, Liber Amicorum
Georges Abi-Saab (The Hague: Kluwer 2001), 547–561, at 561.
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to political organs appears limited. Yet, the Italian judiciary itself appears to be in no
better position. With dozens of proceedings against Germany nearing their comple-
tion, the question of the enforcement of these judgments looms ahead. The ItCC may
soon be called upon to assess the compatibility of the Italian Constitution with the
customary international rule on immunity from execution. The choice would be a
hard one. Denying immunity from execution because of its inconsistency with the
Constitution would have far reaching consequences. Should the ItCC reach the
opposite conclusion, the protection afforded to the victims by Judgment 238/2014
would be emptied of much of its substance.
While the main consequence of Judgment 238/2014 is that Germany is currently
being denied jurisdictional immunity before Italian courts, the inflexible conception
of the right of access to court adopted by the Corte Costituzionale has a number of
implications that go well beyond the specific question of Germany’s jurisdictional
immunity. First, one may ask what could be the impact of the Judgment 238/2014 on
the attitude of Italian political organs as regards sovereign immunity for acta iure
imperii amounting to international crimes, and in particular whether the Italian
government is now constitutionally bound not to invoke immunity if claims for
compensation arising from such crimes are brought against Italy before the domestic
judges of another state. Secondly, there is the issue of whether, following the logic
underlying Judgment 238/2014, the right of access to justice should also prevail over
the international customary rule on immunity from execution. Thirdly, there is the
question of whether the need to protect the right provided by Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution could trump the criteria established by Italian law for exercising civil
jurisdiction in order to allow access to justice in respect to all international crimes,
even those committed outside the Italian territory and involving individuals having
no link with Italy. And, finally, one ought to consider the question of whether a
sacrifice to the right of access to justice would be justified if alternative, non-judicial
means of redress were available to the victims; even assuming that Sentenza
238/2014 leaves open the possibility of having recourse to alternative means of
redress, it remains to be seen what basic requirements these alternative means must
meet. These are some of the issues arising in connection to the broad interpretation of
the principle of access to justice given by the Corte Costituzionale. They will be
examined in turn in the following paragraphs.
II. The Impact of Judgment 238/2014 on the Italian
Government As Regards the Recognition of Immunity
The Ferrini Judgment,3 as well as all subsequent judgments of Italian courts until
2012, were based on the premise that under international law there existed an
exception to immunity in cases of international crimes and that denying immunity
3Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/2004 (Ferrini), in Rivista di diritto
internazionale 87 (2004), 540 et seq.
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to Germany, therefore, did not engage Italy’s international responsibility. Before the
ICJ, the Italian government defended the view of Italian courts on the conviction that
a judgment could be regarded as authoritative by the different actors involved only if
rendered after an extensive review of all the arguments put forward by Italian courts.
In its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, the ICJ addressed these arguments and
found that they had no basis in current international law.4 Unlike the Ferrini
Judgment, Judgment 238/2014 is not based on the view that under international
law Italy is entitled to deny immunity to Germany. The ItCC recognized that,
because of the authority of the ICJ, the view expressed by that Court on the content
of the law on state immunity has to be regarded as reflecting the current status of the
law on the matter.5
While admitting that international law currently grants immunity for acta iure
imperii, even if these acts amount to international crimes, there is little doubt that, by
its Sentenza, the ItCC clearly aimed at contributing to the development of the
international law on state immunity. Not only did it expressly note that a further
reduction of the scope of the international rule on state immunity, particularly in
cases of international crimes, would be ‘a desirable—and desired by many—evolu-
tion of international law’,6 it also referred to the role of domestic judges in the
development of customary international law. In this respect, it could be said that with
Judgment 238/2014 the ItCC contributed in setting the position of the Italian state
with regard to the content of the rule on state immunity in cases of grave breaches of
human rights and humanitarian law. It is less clear whether and to what extent the
other organs of the state will follow this view when confronted with the question of
state immunity beyond the cases brought against Germany.
So far, Italian political organs appear to have refrained from openly aligning
themselves to the indications coming from the ItCC. Significantly, in proceedings
pending before Italian courts against Germany, the executive has continued to plead
in favour of a dismissal of the case for a lack of jurisdiction.7 Since in principle
Judgment 238/2014 only concerned the applicability of the international rule of
immunity by Italian courts in relation to a specific situation, the executive may have
an interest in containing the impact of that Judgment by denying it any possible
effect beyond its strict scope of application. In this respect, the fact that the executive
might continue to defend the view that a state is entitled to immunity for acta iure
imperii, irrespective of whether these acts amount to international crimes, has an
impact on the attempt made by the ItCC to prompt a development of the international
4ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 139.
5Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014, Conclusions in point of law,
para 3.1.
6Ibid, para 3.3.
7See Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The International Court of Justice—The Italian
Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of
International Law 76 (2016), 193-202, at 195-196. See also Heike Krieger, chapter ‘Sentenza 238/
2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform?’, in this volume.
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law of state immunity. Since the state practice must be assessed ‘as a whole’, the
inconsistency in the practice of different organs within the Italian state would have
the effect of reducing the weight to be given to that practice.8
From this perspective, it cannot be ruled out that Italy would invoke immunity if
claims for compensation arising from international crimes committed by Italy during
World War II (WWII) were brought against it before the domestic judges of another
state. In the long run, however, particularly if Italian courts apply the principle
upheld in Judgment 238/2014 to other situations and systematically deny immunity
to states in cases involving the commission of international crimes, this inconsistent
behaviour of the state would hardly be sustainable, let alone acceptable.
Finally, the possible impact of Judgment 238/2014 on Italy’s compliance with the
obligations stemming from the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property (UNCSI, or Convention) deserves a mention. At the time
of the UNCSI’s ratification in 2012, Italy made a declaration whereby it underlined
‘that Italy understands that the Convention will be interpreted and applied in
accordance with the principles of international law and, in particular, with the
principles concerning the protection of human rights from serious violations’. In
addition, Italy made clear its understanding ‘that the Convention does not apply to
the activities of armed forces and their personnel, whether carried out during an
armed conflict as defined by international humanitarian law, or undertaken in the
exercise of their official duties’.9 Clearly, the first declaration, which only concerns
‘principles of international law’, cannot have the effect of ensuring the compatibility
of the obligations stemming from the UNCSI with Judgment 238/2014. By limiting
the Convention’s scope of application in respect to Italy, the second declaration may
offer some form of legal protection to Italy. Ironically, a declaration that was made
essentially in order to protect Italian armed forces from the risk of being subjected to
the jurisdiction of another state by virtue of the exceptions to immunity provided by
the UNCSI may now become the instrument for avoiding a possible breach of the
UNCSI: by excluding the activities of armed forces from the UNCSI’s scope of
application, the denial of immunity by Italian judges for acts committed by foreign
8See, in this regard, the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the identification of
customary international law. Conclusion No 7, as approved on second reading in 2018, provides as
follows: ‘1. Account is to be taken of all available practice of a particular State, which is to be
assessed as a whole. 2. Where the practice of a particular State varies, the weight to be given to that
practice may, depending on the circumstances, be reduced.’ It should be noted that in its commen-
tary the ILC held the view that ‘the practice of the executive branch is often the most relevant on the
international plane and thus has particular weight in connection to the identification of customary
international law, though account may need to be taken of the constitutional position of the various
organs in question’. ILC, Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law,
Report on the Work of the Seventieth session (2018), UN Doc. A/73/10, 135. In the present case, as
the position of judges exercising jurisdiction over Germany finds its basis in a decision of the ItCC,
it would be hard to maintain that the view of the executive should be given more weight than that
accorded to the judiciary.
9The text of Italy’s declaration is available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src¼IND&mtdsg_no¼III-13&chapter¼3&clang¼_en#EndDec.
Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles? Legal Implications. . . 43
troops would amount only to a breach of obligations under customary
international law.
It has been suggested that the Italian government should withdraw these decla-
rations and make a new one aimed at ensuring the compatibility of Italy’s obligations
under the Convention with the principles stemming from Judgment 238/2014.10 No
doubt, as recognized by the International Law Commission (ILC), ‘[t]he fact that a
treaty provision reflects a rule of customary international law does not in itself
constitute an obstacle to the formulation of a reservation to that provision’.11 By
making a declaration whereby, for instance, it excludes the applicability of the
general rule of immunity set forth in Article 5 of the 2004 Convention in cases
involving pecuniary compensation for serious human rights violations, Italy would
make clear the existence of a constitutional obstacle to the full implementation of the
Convention within its legal order. It remains to be seen what the reaction from the
other parties would be. Considering that the UNCSI aims at enhancing ‘the rule of
law and legal certainty’ by contributing ‘to the codification and development of
international law and the harmonization of practice in this area’,12 it would not be
surprising if this reservation could be regarded as running contrary to the object and
purpose of the Convention.
III. A ‘Containment Strategy’?: Immunity from Jurisdiction
and Immunity from Execution
Among the possible solutions to the situation created by Judgment 238/2014, one is,
most simply, to accept this situation on the assumption that the judgments of Italian
courts ordering Germany to pay compensation to the victims and their heirs will have
little practical effects thanks to the protection afforded to states’ properties by the
customary international rule on immunity from execution. Such a minimalistic
approach, aimed only at containing the consequences of Judgment 238/2014, relies
on the fact that since the ItCC’s Judgment 238/2014 only deals with immunity from
jurisdiction, by virtue of Article 10 of the Italian Constitution, the international rule
on immunity from execution continues to produce its effect within the Italian legal
order.13 The distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
10Francesco Salerno, ‘Giustizia costituzionale versus giustizia internazionale nell’applicazione del
diritto internazionale generalmente riconosciuto’, Quaderni Costituzionali 35 (2015), 33-58, at 57.
11See Guideline 3.1.5.3 of the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties adopted by the ILC in
2011, UN Doc. A/66/10, para 75.
12See the preamble of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
(2 December 2004), UN Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
13See ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), Conclusions in point of law, para 1 (‘the referring judge
limits the questions raised to the issue of the jurisdiction to examine the claim for compensation for
damages, and does not include the issue of enforcement action’). See also Heike Krieger, chapter
‘Sentenza 238/2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform?’, in this volume.
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execution has so far been respected by Italian courts. Thus, the Court of Appeals of
Milan recognized that under customary international law no post-judgment measures
of constraint can be taken against the property of a state that is in use or intended to
be used for non-commercial government purposes; for that reason, it confirmed the
decision of the Tribunal of Como ordering that the mortgage on Villa Vigoni
inscribed at the land registry be cancelled.14
The importance attached by political organs to the protection offered by immu-
nity from execution is reflected in a new statutory provision adopted a few weeks
after Judgment 238/2014. Article 19 bis of Italian Law-decree No 132, converted
into Law No 162 of 10 November 2014, exempts from attachment any amount of
money in the availability of subjects involved in one of the following functions:
diplomatic mission of the state or its consular posts, special missions, missions to
international organizations or delegations to organs of international organizations or
to international conferences.15 Interestingly, such an exemption is only conditional
on a declaration made by the head of the diplomatic mission, by which it is said that
the relevant bank account is exclusively intended for use for the abovementioned
functions.16
No doubt, from the viewpoint of international law, the distinction between
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution rests on solid grounds.17
In its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, the ICJ observed that ‘[t]he rules of
customary international law governing immunity from enforcement and those
governing jurisdictional immunity (understood stricto sensu as the right of a State
not to be the subject of judicial proceedings in the courts of another State) are
distinct, and must be applied separately’.18 The ItCC, in a judgment rendered in
1992, also recognized that the rule on immunity from execution is autonomous and
distinct from that on immunity from jurisdiction.19
However, relying on the protection afforded to Germany by the international rule
on immunity from execution can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory solution. First,
as already observed, it is likely that sooner or later the question of the compatibility
14Corte d’Appello di Milano, Order of 25 March 2015, No 4183/2013.
15Italian Law 10 November 2014, No 162.
16On this point, see the critical remarks of Benedetto Conforti, ‘Il legislatore torna indietro di circa
novant’anni: la nuova norma sull’esecuzione su conti correnti di Stati stranieri’, Rivista di diritto
internazionale 98 (2015), 558–561. See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in
this volume.
17On the separateness of the regimes governing immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
execution see, among others, Ian Sinclair, ‘The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Develop-
ments’, Recueil des cours 168 (1980-II), 115–284, at 218; August Reinisch, ‘State Immunity from
Enforcement Measures’, in Gerhard Hafner/Marcelo Kohen/Susan Breau (eds), State Practice
Regarding State Immunity (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Njhoff 2006), 151–166; Xiaodong Yang,
State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2012), at 347 et seq.
18ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 113.
19Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 15 July 1992, No 329/1992, in Rivista di diritto internazionale
75 (1992), 356 et seq.
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of such a rule with fundamental constitutional principles will be brought before the
ItCC. While it is to be expected that the ItCC will take into account that ‘the
immunity from enforcement enjoyed by States in regard to their property situated
on foreign territory goes further than the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by those
same States before foreign courts’,20 the outcome of any future decision by the ItCC
on immunity from execution is difficult to predict. In this respect, the fact that
political organs have taken no initiative to address the substantial concerns under-
lying Judgment 238/2014 may become a factor that, in the overall assessment of the
weight to be given to the competing interests at stake, risks weakening the arguments
in favour of preserving immunity from execution.
Even if the ItCC were to recognize the compatibility of this international rule with
the Italian Constitution, the presence of dozens of final judgments ordering Germany
to pay compensation risks becoming a perennial source of tension, with the claim-
ants attempting to enforce them through measures of constraint directed against
German property in use for other than government non-commercial purposes. Such
an outcome would also be extremely frustrating for the victims, who after having
been told that they have a right to a judge and after having been awarded compen-
sation would discover that they have substantially little, if any, chance of having
their judgments enforced. Their situation would be similar to that of the relatives of
the victims of the Distomo massacre, who were found to be entitled to compensation
from the German state but were unable to obtain the execution of the judgment on
account of the Greek state’s refusal to allow them to bring enforcement proceedings
against Germany.21 As that precedent shows, victims could hardly hope to obtain
some form of redress by lodging a complaint before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR). While recognizing that ‘[t]he right of access to a tribunal would be
illusory if a Contracting state’s legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision
to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party’, in Kalogeropoulou the ECtHR
denied that the conduct of Greek authorities amounted to an unjustified interference
with the complainants’ right of access to a tribunal. The ECtHR relied on the
existence of a generally recognized rule on state immunity from execution to
conclude that ‘although the Greek courts ordered the German state to pay damages
to the applicants, this did not necessarily oblige the Greek state to ensure that the
applicants could recover their debt through enforcement proceedings in Greece’.22
20ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 113.
21On this case see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), paras 30–31.
22ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany, Decision of 12 December 2002,
Application No 59021/00.
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IV. Beyond State Immunity: The Criteria for Establishing
the Jurisdiction of Italian Judges
Italian courts have already shown a certain willingness to apply the principle upheld
in Judgment 238/2014 beyond the cases brought against Germany. In its Judgment
of 29 October 2015 in the Opačić case, a criminal division of the Court of Cassation
relied on Judgment 238/2014 to justify the denial of immunity to Serbia in relation to
a request for compensation advanced by the heirs of Italian victims of war crimes
committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia in 1992.23 This Judgment of the
Court of Cassation is remarkable as it appears to expand the breadth of situations in
which a denial of immunity would be justified. In particular, the Court of Cassation
interpreted ItCC’s Sentenza 238/2014 to the effect that in cases of international
crimes immunity must be denied irrespective of whether there are alternative
remedies available to the complainants in order to recover damages.24 Under this
interpretation, the right of access to justice as provided by Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution could not suffer any limitation even if some alternative forms of redress
were available to the victims of international crimes committed by a foreign state.
Should one accept this interpretation of Judgment 238/2014, it would follow that the
introduction of some alternative form of protection following the conclusion of an
agreement between Germany and Italy would not justify the possibility of restoring
the immunity of Germany in accordance to international law.25
In Flatow and Eisenfeld, the Court of Cassation was called upon to rule on an
exequatur request regarding a judgment of a US court condemning Iran to pay a sum
of money to compensate the heirs of victims of acts of terrorism committed in Israel.
In its Judgments of 28 October 2015, the Court of Cassation recognized that,
according to the principle upheld in Judgment 238/2014, Iran would not have been
entitled to immunity for acts amounting to crimes against humanity. In the end,
however, it denied exequatur because of the non-fulfilment of the criteria established
by Italian law for exercising civil jurisdiction.26
The Judgments in Flatow and Eisenfeld reveal a possible tension between the
criteria for exercising civil jurisdiction and the effective protection of the right of
23Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 29 October 2015, No 43696/2015 (Opačić).
24See ibid, para 5.2.1, Conclusions in point of law: ‘Judgment 238/2014 of the Constitutional Court
did not pose the condition that, in order to establish the jurisdiction over foreign states for war
crimes, it is required that there is no other possibility for the victims to obtain redress for the
damages suffered’ (translated by the author). On this Judgment, see Riccardo Pavoni, ‘How Broad
is the Principle Upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 238?’, Journal of
International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 573–585, at 577.
25I will return to this issue in the next section.
26Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21946/2015 (Flatow); Corte di
Cassazione, Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21947/2015 (Eisenfeld).
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access to justice as interpreted by the ItCC. Under the criteria established by Italian
law, civil jurisdiction is based on some connection between the case and the forum.27
This means that, in the absence of the required nexus, access to justice may be
precluded by the lack of jurisdiction of Italian courts. In Flatow and Eisenfeld, the
Court of Cassation did not uphold the claim of the applicants that jurisdiction could
be based on an international rule authorizing universal civil jurisdiction in cases of
international crimes. It also excluded that Judgment 238/2014 had the effect of
introducing the principle of universal civil jurisdiction in the Italian legal order.
By strictly abiding by the criteria established by Italian law for exercising civil
jurisdiction, the Court of Cassation substantially precluded access to justice in a
situation in which—as the Court itself admitted—the principle of jurisdictional
protection would have justified the denial of immunity to the respondent state.
However, while the distinction between jurisdiction and immunity is
unobjectionable, the whole situation appears to be characterized by a certain incon-
sistency:28 if, in cases of claims against a foreign state for international crimes, the
right to access to justice must be given a prominent value, it is hard to explain why
access to justice must not be precluded by the international rule of state immunity but
can be precluded by domestic laws through which Italy delimits the scope of
jurisdiction of its own judges. In this respect, the Judgments in Flatow and Eisenfeld
illustrate that the decision of the ItCC might have an impact that goes beyond the
question of the immunity enjoyed by foreign states before Italian courts. In fact, after
Judgment 238/2014, the compatibility between the right of access to justice as
interpreted by the ItCC and domestic rules barring the exercise of jurisdiction over
claims for compensation arising from international crimes committed by a foreign
state cannot be taken for granted. Should the ItCC, following the path inaugurated by
Judgment 238/2014, find that any such limitation to the jurisdiction of Italian judges
would be contrary to Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, the dispute between Italy
and Germany on the question of Germany’s immunity would risk becoming for Italy
only the first in a long list of disputes with other states.
27According to Salerno, ‘Giustizia costituzionale’ 2015 (n 10), 54, in cases against a foreign state
and relating to acta iure imperii of that state, Art 3(2) of Italian Law No 218 of 31May 1995 permits
grounding the jurisdiction of Italian courts if, in the absence of other connections, the applicant
resides in Italy. However, in Flatow and in Eisenfeld the Court of Cassation denied that the
residence in Italy of the applicant was sufficient to ground the jurisdiction of Italian courts.
28For critical comments on the solution retained by the Court of Cassation, see Pavoni, ‘How
Broad’ 2016 (n 24), 584.
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V. Judgment 238/2014 and Its Silences: An Interstate
Agreement on Compensation As an Alternative to Individual
Access to Italian Courts?
In its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment the ICJ started its examination of the
question concerning the alleged violation of Germany’s immunity by recalling that
the acts constituting the object of the proceedings before Italian courts ‘can only be
described as displaying a complete disregard for the “elementary considerations of
humanity”’, and that Germany ‘accepts that these acts were unlawful and stated
before this Court that it “is fully aware of [its] responsibility in this regard”’.29 At the
same time, the Court noted that ‘since the dismissal of Italy’s counter-claim, it no
longer has before it any submissions asking it to rule on the question of whether
Germany has a duty of reparation towards the Italian victims of the crimes commit-
ted by the German Reich and whether it has complied with that obligation in respect
of all those victims, or only some of them’.30 While the ICJ did not rule upon the
latter questions, it made two remarks that the Parties were expected to take seriously
into account, irrespective of the fact that they were not formally binding upon them.
In a first passage the ICJ noted that, while granting immunity to Germany had the
effect of precluding judicial redress for the Italian victims, their claims ‘could be the
subject of further negotiation involving the two states concerned, with a view to
resolving the issue’.31 Thus, the Court itself seemed to invite the Parties to consider
the possibility of engaging in a negotiation, on the assumption that negotiation and
not recourse to the domestic courts of one state is a preferable way of dealing with
this matter. As to the object of this negotiation, it should be stressed that the Court
referred to negotiation over ‘the claims arising from the treatment of the Italian
military internees (. . .) together with other claims of Italian nationals which have
allegedly not been settled—and which formed the basis for the Italian proceed-
ings’.32 This is a crucial point. The negotiation envisaged by the ICJ as the alterna-
tive to an (unlawful) recourse to domestic courts has to deal with the claims of the
individual victims. In this respect, the fact that Germany and Italy, after the ICJ’s
Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, may have agreed to engage in common cultural
initiatives, such as the construction of documentation centres or memorials, without
taking care to address the claims of the victims can hardly be regarded as a solution
going in the direction indicated by the ICJ, the more so if one considers that the ICJ
speaks of ‘negotiation involving the two States’ (‘négociations impliquant les deux
Etats’) and not of ‘negotiations between the two States’. As it is connoted by the
word ‘involving’, other actors should have been given a role in the negotiation. In
particular, the victims themselves should have had a role. The two states should have
29ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 52.
30ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 48.
31ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 104.
32Ibid.
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at least consulted the victims or the associations of victims. To my knowledge,
nothing of the sort occurred.
The ICJ Judgment provides an additional argument in favour of an agreement
aimed at addressing the individual claims of the victims. It was Germany, with the
establishment in 2000 of the Foundation ‘Rememberance, Responsibility and
Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft), that first proposed the possibility
of individual compensation for the victims of forced labour, including Italian
victims. Thousands of Italian Military Internees (IMIs) lodged requests for compen-
sation and had a reasonable expectation to be regarded as entitled to receive
it. However, more than 127,000 of the 130,000 requests for compensation lodged
by Italian victims were rejected. The ICJ took a very clear position on Germany’s
decision to reject the requests advanced by IMIs: ‘it is a matter of surprise—and
regret—that Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims on the
ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at the relevant time, Germany
had refused to recognize, particularly since those victims had thereby been denied
the legal protection to which that status entitled them’.33 An opposition of principle
towards the establishment of a mechanism for addressing individual claims of
compensation is already difficult to understand, as it was Germany that in 2000
envisaged such a possibility for the victims of forced labour. Insisting on that
opposition after the ICJ’s strong censure would likely be perceived by Italian victims
as a form of discrimination against them and would risk undermining the signifi-
cance of the other common initiatives that Italy and Germany may agree to undertake
in relation to the crimes committed during WWII.
No doubt a political initiative involving Germany and Italy and aimed at
establishing a mechanism for addressing the reparation claims of the victims while
at the same time restoring Germany’s immunity before Italian courts would not only
be in line with the views expressed by the ICJ in its Jurisdictional Immunities
Judgment; such an outcome would also represent the most dignified way to put an
end to this long-standing dispute.34 It is not clear, however, whether an interstate
agreement on compensation might be regarded by the ItCC as an adequate alterna-
tive route for providing protection to the rights of the victims, thereby justifying a
limitation to the right of access to court and the recognition of Germany’s immunity.
In fact, Judgment 238/2014 does not clarify whether or to what extent a sacrifice to
the right of jurisdictional protection would be justified if alternative, non-judicial
means of redress were available to the victims. The ItCC failed to assess the possible
33ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 4), para 99.
34An agreement between Germany and Italy may be concluded without the need to reopen the
question of whether Germany has an obligation of reparation for serious violations of international
humanitarian law against Italian victims. As already mentioned, in 2010 it was Italy that asked the
Court, by way of a counterclaim, to establish that Germany had violated such obligation. Germany
opposed the counterclaim. In the end, the ICJ found that it had no jurisdiction to rule upon it. In a
pragmatic way, the two states may now accept their having different views as to the scope and effect
of the waiver clause contained in the 1947 Italy’s Peace Treaty without this preventing them from
reaching an agreement over the compensation of Italian victims.
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role of alternative forms of protection. Despite the serious implications of Judgment
238/2014, no attempt was made to delineate a possible way out.
While the Court has taken a rigid stance as to the possibility of sacrificing the
principle of jurisdictional protection, the conclusion of an interstate agreement
would inevitably have an impact on the overall assessment of the different interests
at stake. Arguably, in balancing the principle of jurisdictional protection with Italy’s
compliance with international law, the introduction of some alternative means of
protecting the rights of the victims could tip the balance in favour of a solution that
leads to better harmonization between the two conflicting interests.35
Whether an interstate agreement on compensation will be regarded as an adequate
alternative remedy justifying the sacrifice of the right of access to justice will also
depend on the terms of the agreement. In this respect, it is to be expected that one of
the most controversial points in a possible negotiation will concern the amount of
compensation due to the victims. Judgment 238/2014 gave no indication on whether
an alternative means of redress should in any case ensure to each and every
individual victim full compensation or whether instead, in light of the specific
circumstances of the case—the fact that the crimes occurred in the course of an
international armed conflict affecting hundreds of thousands of victims—it could
provide only compensation based on a lump-sum settlement. While in past cases
Germany only provided symbolic compensation to victims,36 there is the risk that a
mechanism providing for only symbolic compensation would not be regarded by the
ItCC as an adequate alternative remedy. On this and similar issues, such as that of
determining the individuals that could benefit from a future reparation scheme, a
flexible approach that accepts forms of redress other than full compensation appears
to be warranted.
The negotiation’s method of conduct may also matter. Given the nature of the
dispute, the multitude of different actors involved, and the criticism and diffidence
frequently addressed against the conduct of political organs in this long-standing
affair, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of informing and
consulting the main stakeholders (as suggested by the ICJ), as well as respecting
certain standards of transparency.
35On this point, see also Remo Caponi, ‘A Fresh Start: How to Resolve the Conflict between the ICJ
and the Italian Constitutional Court’, VerfBlog, (28 January 2015), available at http://
verfassungsblog.de/fresh-start-resolve-conflict-icj-italian-constitutional-court/; Remo Caponi,
‘Immunità dello Stato dalla giurisdizione, negoziato diplomatico e diritto di azione nella vicenda
delle pretese risarcitorie per i crimini nazisti’, Giurisprudenza costituzionale 5 (2014), 3908-3915,
at 3908 et seq. See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
36On the decision of the German government to pay a symbolic financial compensation to some
4,000 Russian prisoners of war, see Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 7), at 202; see
also Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this
volume.
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VI. Conclusion
For Italy, the consequences unleashed by Judgment 238/2014 are not confined to the
question of Germany’s jurisdictional immunities before Italian courts and to the
ensuing risk that Germany will once more bring the case before the ICJ. After
Judgment 238/2014, the Italian government faces the problem of either continuing
to defend the view that a state is entitled to immunity for acta iure imperii,
irrespective of whether these acts amount to international crimes, or aligning itself
to the indications coming from the ItCC, which includes presenting a new declara-
tion aimed at ensuring the compatibility of Italy’s obligations under the 2004 UN
Convention with the principles stemming from Judgment 238/2014. Italian courts
will sooner or later be confronted with the problem of the execution of the judgments
condemning Germany for the crimes committed during WWII. In the meantime,
following the principle established by Judgment 238/2014, the Court of Cassation
denied immunity to Serbia. While—so far—the same Court has resisted any attempt
to introduce the principle of universal civil jurisdiction into the Italian legal order,
the risk of Italian courts becoming an attractive forum for litigations against foreign
states is high.
Judgment 238/2014 had the merit of forcefully raising the question of the rights of
the victims of grave breaches of human rights and of the way in which these rights
are to be protected. Unfortunately, by focusing exclusively on individual access to
justice and on the need to promote an evolution of the law of state immunity, it raises
more questions than it answers. Some of the consequences of Sentenza may be
unintentional but, in the absence of a new decision clarifying the conditions under
which a sacrifice to the right of jurisdictional protection would be justified, the
current situation is one of legal uncertainty. In this scenario, political organs should
attempt to provide some solutions. A political initiative aimed at addressing some of
the concerns behind Judgment 238/2014 would constitute a first, important step in
that direction.
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The Illusion of Perfect Justice
Christian Tomuschat
Abstract The judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) of 22 October
2014 has set a bad precedent for international law by denying the implementation,
within Italy, of the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of
3 February 2012. The ICJ found that Italian courts and tribunals had violated
German jurisdictional immunity by entertaining suits brought by Italian citizens
against Germany on account of damages caused by war crimes committed during
World War II by German occupation forces. According to a well-consolidated rule
of general international law, no state may be sued before the courts of another state
with regard to acts performed in the exercise of its sovereign power. In contraven-
tion of Article 94 of the UN Charter, the ItCC deemed it legitimate to discard that
ruling because of the particularly grave character of many of the violations in
question. It proceeded from the assumption that the right to a remedy established
under the Italian Constitution was absolute and must apply even where the
financial settlement of the consequences of armed conflict is at issue. However,
it has failed to show the existence of any individual reparation claims and has
omitted to assess the issue of war reparations owed by Germany in their broader
complexity. The judgment of the ItCC might be used in the future as a pretext to
ignore decisions of the World Court.
I. Preliminary Observations
Battles of the past should not be endlessly continued. Unfortunately, the dispute
between Germany and Italy concerning the settlement of the damages caused during
the occupation of Italy by the German Wehrmacht from September 1943 to May
1945 seems to have all the ingredients of an interminable confrontation where
positions of principle clash with no end in sight. Though World War II (WWII)
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lies more than 70 years in the past, the scars it has left have not led to the healing of
the bitter wounds which that war inflicted on all of those involved—primarily the
victims of deliberate persecution but also those who have had to endure the conse-
quences of a war that was, from its very inception, criminal.
Let me make clear that no attempt will be or can be made to provide excuses
for the bitter fate that struck the Italian citizens who brought actions for financial
compensation against Germany, actions that eventually led to the surprising and
even revolutionary outcome of the judgment of the Italian Constitutional
Court (ItCC) of 22 October 2014,1 which held that under Italian constitutional
law the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 3 February 20122
could not be executed. Whatever judges may decide, the fact is that the German
military and security forces gravely violated the applicable regime of humani-
tarian law. More than mere wrongdoing, this was a breach of the standards of
civilization that can claim a venerable and consolidated tradition in Europe. The
Nazi regime led Germany into an abyss of criminal conduct before the war
machine, once set into motion, rolled back and crushed the German people
themselves. Fortunately, we do not here have to argue about historical develop-
ments; we need only take note of them in a spirit of objectivity while reflecting on
remedial action.
Much has already been written about that seminal ItCC judgment and its
consequences. As an outside observer, one easily gets the impression that almost
every Italian expert in the field, constitutionalists and internationalists alike, felt
compelled to comment on the new course chosen by the ItCC in its approach to
international law, as primarily determined by Article 10 of the Italian Constitution.
I have made a great effort to inform myself about all of those reactions to the
ItCC’s findings, leggendo pure i più sottili commenti in lingua giuridica italiana.
Nonetheless, I cannot pretend that I have read every single article, note and
comment. Yet the overall picture seems to be fairly clear.3 I sincerely hope that I
have been able to collect and assess all relevant facts without overlooking essential
details.
A second clarification should be put forward at this moment. Not being a
specialist of Italian constitutional law, it is not my intention to engage in a discussion
about the way in which the ItCC, in its examination of the constitutionality of the
relevant norms, assessed the customary rule of jurisdictional immunity under inter-
national law. Generally, such review is designed to scrutinize the constitutionality of
parliamentary statutes of national origin with the Constitution (Article 134). In any
event, it was inconceivable to declare Article 10 of the Constitution—the door-
opener for the general rules of international law—unconstitutional without introduc-
ing a new theory about the core substance of the Constitution being placed at a
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
3See also Christian Tomuschat, ‘The National Constitution Trumps International Law’, Italian
Journal of Public Law 6 (2014), 189–196.
56 C. Tomuschat
higher hierarchical level. The ItCC found indeed another, more sophisticated way to
block the access of the principle of immunity to the Italian domestic legal order.
II. The Surprise: Silence on the Main Issues
First, the very heart of the dispute centres around the existence of reparation claims
against Germany that have allegedly arisen for individual victims of the measures
taken by the Nazi authorities in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).
But the ItCC nowhere raised or answered the question of whether such entitlements
could have emerged as a consequence of German governmental wrongdoing. It
stands to reason that the ICJ was not seized with the issue. The only charge brought
by Germany consisted of the allegation that Italy had infringed her sovereign right of
jurisdictional immunity. Accordingly, the ICJ could not go into an issue pertaining to
the merits of the cases pending before the Italian courts and tribunals.4 On the other
hand, by insisting on the imperative requirement that a legal right must be enforce-
able, the ItCC would have been obligated in good logic to state in unambiguous
terms that such individual entitlements to reparation had to be recognized in law. Yet
it has failed to raise this issue—which is obviously a fairly complex one since the
doctrine of individual human rights is a post-WWII invention. The doctrine of
controlimiti, however, cannot bring into being a right against a foreign state.
Second, the ItCC has failed to mention that those who chose to sue Germany
before Italian courts and tribunals had an actual opportunity to bring their claims
before the German judicial system. Some of the claimants did indeed pursue that
course, rising up to the level of the German Constitutional Court. Eventually, all
those claims were dismissed as unfounded as to their merits.5 Thus, remedies were in
fact made available. It is a mistake to confound the availability of a remedy with its
well-foundedness.6
Third, as far as the substantive aspects of the complex legal configuration are
concerned, the ItCC has not regarded it opportune to mention that the case before it
was part of a complex puzzle: the settlement of all the substantive consequences
entailed byWWII in the absence of a legal instrument explicitly called a Peace Treaty.
4The few observations in ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 104, amount to no more than a
signal of sympathy for the victims. For a different perspective, see Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of
Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
5Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277, paras 29, 37;
Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, Judgment of 9 September 2004, 9 A 336.02, para 52. In this context see
also the Distomo cases where German courts dismissed claims brought by Greek victims of WWII
massacres: Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, BVerfGK
7, 303, paras 12, 17.
6See also Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, and Sabino Cassese, chapter
‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume. For a different perspective see Valerio Onida, chapter
‘Moving Beyond Judicial Conflict in the Name of the Pre-eminence of Fundamental Human
Rights’, in this volume.
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III. Challenge to a Foundational Rule of International Law
Sentenza 238/2014 stands out uniquely in the history of international law. There
have been other judgments of the ICJ that were ignored by the losing party;7 the
refusal of the American authorities to obey the injunctions of the ICJ in the LaGrand
case,8 for example, is fresh in every international lawyer’s mind. Those confronta-
tions, however, were of an incidental character and centring on individual cases.
Never before has a domestic court by refusing to follow a pronouncement of the ICJ
challenged a generally recognized rule of customary international law. This deeper
challenge to the international legal community transcends the underlying contro-
versy between Italy and Germany and its consequences are unfathomable. Lawyers
in the US have already woken up and are considering initiating proceedings against
former European colonial powers relating back to occurrences more than a hundred
years ago.9
The ItCC has carefully avoided criticizing the ICJ itself by pointing to alleged
errors or other imperfections in its reasoning. Only the Tribunale di Piacenza
ventured to take that more direct course by holding without hesitation that the ICJ
had not fully understood what stage the development of international law had
reached in our contemporary epoch: it invented a class of ‘super primacy’ norms
protecting human life and human dignity.10 Yet, notwithstanding the politeness of
the ItCC’s views, they nonetheless contain a strong implicit element of criticism, as
noted, for instance, by Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi.11 Formally, however, no
7See Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case’, in this volume.
8ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports
2001, 466.
9See, eg, Sidney L Harring, ‘The Herero Demand for Reparations from Germany: The Hundred
Year Old Legacy of a Colonial War in the Politics of Modern Namibia’, in Max Du Plessis/Stephen
Peté (eds), Repairing the Past?: International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights
Abuses (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2007), 437–450.
10Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment of 28 September 2015, No 723/2015, 1, 12. One might argue
that the 2004 Ferrini Judgment by the Corte di Cassazione already contained a similar statement:
‘Para 9: Indeed, these are crimes that consist of the particularly intense or systematic violation of
basic human rights (. . .), which are protected by non-derogable norms that stand at the apex of the
international legal system, taking precedence over all other norms, whether of conventional or
customary nature (. . .) and therefore also over those norms governing immunity. Para 9.1: The
recognition of immunity from jurisdiction for States that are responsible for such offences is in
blatant contrast with the normative framework outlined above, since this recognition obstructs
rather than protects such values, the protection of which is rather to be considered, in accordance
with such norms and principles, essential for the entire international community (. . .). Moreover,
there can be no doubt that this antinomy must be resolved by giving precedence to the higher-
ranking norms’ (Translation taken from Yale Law School, Documents Collection Center, available
at https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/ferrini_v._germany_-_italy_-_2004.pdf). The
important difference, however, lies in the fact that at the time of the Ferrini Judgment no prior
authoritative international judgment existed concerning the specific matter at hand.
11Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘La sentenza n. 238/2014 della Corte costituzionale ed i suoi possibili
effetti sul diritto internazionale’, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 9 (2015), 23–40, at 39. In the
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reproach can be levelled at the ItCC. It has acted consistently within the framework
of dualism chosen as its point of departure, confining itself to pronouncing on the
effect of the immunity rule within the Italian domestic legal order. Both Heinrich
Triepel and Dionisio Anzilotti would have been happy with that methodological
approach. This chapter, by contrast, is confined to looking into the ItCC’s position
under international law.
We do not know whether the ItCC was really satisfied with its feat. The sole fact
that it had to admit its solitary stance, standing alone in a world that overwhelmingly
recognizes the principle of the jurisdictional immunity of states in respect of acts iure
imperii, may indeed provide insufficient grounds for satisfaction. In this regards, it is
certainly not improper to recall that every judicial body is made up of individual
members and that opinions may reasonably have diverged as to the suitability of
launching a head-on attack against the principle of jurisdictional immunity.12 In any
event, attention must be drawn to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), which in Jones v UK ruled only a few months before Sentenza
238/2014 that even in instances of alleged torture the rule of immunity applies,
shielding the alleged governmental offender against suits brought against it before
the civil courts of foreign countries.13 The voice of the ECtHR epitomizes the
European concept of human rights and would certainly have deserved being taken
into account by the ItCC. Even for a constitutional court it is hard to argue that its
national standard concerning legal remedies is higher and more demanding than
what at the world level and at the European level is considered to be in full
conformity with the rule of law. Persuasive grounds would have to be adduced to
show that Italy exceeds every other nation in protecting the right to a remedy where a
major human rights violation has occurred. In this regard, however, the judgment is
poorly motivated.
Additionally, inconsistencies are visible in the Italian practice itself. Reference
must be made to the Markovic case where the Corte di Cassazione dismissed an
application for reparation of damages suffered in the former Yugoslavia during the
so-called ‘Kosovo War’ and, it is alleged, with the complicity of Italy as a state
member of NATO. The Court held that it was not the function of the judiciary to
protect individuals from acts of aerial warfare since such acts were the expression of
a ‘political function’.14 Accordingly, the merits of the case were not considered. In
Sentenza 238/2014 the ItCC deemed it unnecessary to mention this earlier pro-
nouncement although it had been issued by the highest instance in civil matters.
Furthermore, attention should be paid to the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership,
and Cooperation between Italy and Libya, whose section II under the title ‘Closure
same vein Riccardo Pavoni, ‘Simoncioni v. Germany’, American Journal of International Law
109 (2015), 400–406, at 403.
12See Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume.
13ECtHR, Jones and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 January 2014, Applications
Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06.
14Corte di Cassazione, Order of 5 June 2002, No 8157/2002.
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of the Chapter of the Past and of the Pending Disputes’ is conceived as a final
settlement against the payment by Italy of US$5 billion spread over 20 years.15 All
the monies pledged were designed for infrastructural projects. No reparation pay-
ments were set aside for the benefit of the victims of Italian warfare in Libya.
All this casts serious doubts over the central thesis of the ItCC that the right to a
remedy, as stipulated in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, has the high rank
attributed to it by the ItCC. International practice has very rarely resorted to
reparation measures to the benefit of individual victims after disastrous occurrences
like wars or other types of armed conflicts. Primary and secondary rules have to be
distinguished. A value judgment can only be attached to the infringement of a
primary rule depending on the inherent character of the protected interests. The
killing of a human being in violation of the right to life amounts to a serious breach
either of IHL or of international human rights law (IHRL), entailing a duty of
compensation and possibly also the duty to prosecute the perpetrator. But the
obligation to make the required compensation payment, although undoubtedly
constituting a commitment under international law, does not amount to a ius cogens
rule. States, including wrongdoing states, have a large discretion as to the ways and
means to acquit their debt.
IV. Jurisdictional Immunity: An Essential Structural
Element of International Law
Regarding the core issue of the compatibility of a legal enactment excluding
individual claims against a foreign state, the ItCC has evolved an abstract concept
of precedence of core human rights guarantees by narrowing down the complexity of
the factual constellation at stake to such an extent that the key issues have remained
invisible. Deliberately, or else by lack of oversight, the ItCC has constructed a
strictly binary opposition between on the one hand a principle of the Italian consti-
tutional law and, on the other, the international law principle of jurisdictional
immunity. The ItCC sees this relationship as a confrontation between a good and
modern human rights principle and a formalistic traditional rule that serves to shield
the sovereign power interests of states against any curtailment. No serious effort is
made to analyze the principle of jurisdictional immunity as to its inherent qualities.
The ItCC does not see that jurisdictional immunity constitutes an essential element
of the current system of international law based on sovereign equality.
15Trattato di Amicizia, ‘Partenariato e Cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Grande
Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista’ (Benghazi, 30 August 2008), available at www.
camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/schedela/apritelecomando_wai.asp?codice¼16pdl0017390.
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Most of the Italian commentators have followed the ItCC on this.16 They discuss
at length the tension between a human rights guarantee and the principle of sover-
eign equality without ever reflecting on what interest the international community, as
it is framed today, has in separating from one another the areas of jurisdiction of the
states currently in existence. Many authors recall the leading role of Italian and
Belgian courts, in the first half of the twentieth century, in pushing ahead with the
now consolidated distinction between acta iure gestionis and acta iure imperii,
purporting to suggest that the road hitherto pursued can simply be continued: in
the same way as commercial activities were submitted to the scrutiny of foreign
courts, acta iure imperii could also be made subject to control by foreign courts.17
This reasoning, which also underlies Sentenza 238/2014,18 is fundamentally flawed.
Where a state, through its government or special commercial agencies, enters the
market, it cannot on plausible grounds claim benefits that are withheld to other
market actors. However, when a state has acted in pursuit of its political choices,
scrutiny of such acts will inevitably create tensions. No state is prepared to see its
governmental conduct supervised by the judiciary of another country and appropri-
ate reparation being imposed upon it. By attributing to each state its own sphere of
jurisdiction and establishing rules for the settlement of cross-boundary disputes,
international law contributes to upholding peace in interstate relations.19
When an armed conflict is waged on foreign territory, jurisdictional competences
enter into conflict. In principle, territorial sovereignty prevails. But the armed forces
of the foreign state do not forfeit their status as state organs. They retain this status,
which does not yield completely to the territorial sovereignty of the adversary.
International law has established rules and principles with a view to disentangling
this imbroglio. Accordingly, armed conflict has become a phenomenon governed by
international law. The consequences flowing therefrom must therefore be settled
according to the rules and mechanisms of international law. No state can decide
unilaterally what legal implications derive from such occurrences. The ancient
16See inter alia Gaetano Silvestri, ‘Sovranità vs Diritti Fondamentali’,Questione Giustizia 1 (2015),
57–63, at 60–63; Paolo Passaglia, ‘Una sentenza (auspicabilmente) storica: la Corte limita
l’immunità degli Stati esteri dalla giurisdizione civile’, Diritti Comparati, (28 October 2014),
available at www.diritticomparati.it/una-sentenza-auspicabilmente-storica-la-corte-limita-
limmunita-degli-stati-esteri-dalla-giurisdizion/.
17See inter alia Tobia Cantelmo/Valentina Capuozzo, ‘Tra Immunità e Contro-Limiti: un nuovo
Traguardo della Giurisprudenza Italiana in Corte Costituzionale Sentenza n. 238/2014 e Ordinanza
n. 30/2015’, Rivista di Diritto Pubblico Italiano, Comparato, Europeo 1 (2016), 1–27, at 5, 9,
10, 14, 27; Andrea Guazzarotti, ‘Il Paradosso della Ricognizione delle Consuetudini Internazionali.
Note Minime a Corte Cost. n. 238 del 2014’, Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, (5 November
2014), available at www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
guazzarotti_nota_238_2014.pdf, 1–4, at 1–3; Passaglia, ‘Una sentenza (auspicabilmente) storica’
2014 (n 16).
18See ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.3.
19In this vein, see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 57.
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doctrine of subjugation or debellatio,20 according to which a defeated state could be
deprived of any rights, a dead body delivered to the arbitrariness of the victors, has
become defunct and obsolete as it could not be reconciled with the now well-
established principle of self-determination.
V. The Different Methods of Reparation
The ItCC has failed to perceive that in our time alternative methods are available for
satisfying the demands of an injured state. In the present context, two main methods
can be discerned. The classic method consists of resorting to intergovernmental
mechanisms by relying on the assumption that harm inflicted on the nationals of a
state amounts in law to harm done to that state. The government concerned then
presents the losses incurred as one comprehensive claim, to be negotiated with the
wrongdoing state and possibly ending up in a lump sum agreement. The other
method consists of taking account of each and every item of harm, person by person,
thus making individual payments to everyone recognized as having suffered dam-
age. General international law does not acknowledge the latter method.
The traditional interstate method was imposed on Germany at the end of WWII.
At that time, Germany was not recognized as a sovereign actor with equal rights.
This was fully understandable. There was no legitimate representation of the German
people during the months following the military surrender on 8 May 1945. The
members of the last government of the Nazi Reich had all been arrested. Criminal
charges were prepared against them—and rightly so. The political opponents of the
Nazi regime having found refuge in other countries had not been able to form a
government in exile that could have been recognized as a legitimate representation of
the German people and a valid interlocutor with the victorious Allied powers.
Therefore, all the mechanisms for the transition from war to peace were established
without any effective German presence. At the Potsdam Conference, only the Soviet
Union, the UK, and the US were present; not even France was admitted. German
voices were neither heard nor consulted, meaning that the interests of the German
people were sidelined. When the victorious Allied powers negotiated the peace
treaty with Italy in Paris, Germany was also absent while an Italian delegation was
admitted and could to the best of its abilities defend Italian interests, although it
essentially had to accept the demands of the victorious powers.
Notwithstanding these procedural shortcomings, the negotiators at Potsdam
agreed on a mechanism according to which the German war debt was to be settled
collectively, according to the traditional method outlined above. The Potsdam
Agreement, negotiated and signed only by the three main powers, but intended to
become binding for all the former enemy states and the states participating in the
20See Lassa Oppenheim/Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: A Treatise (London:
Longmans, Vol II, 7th ed 1952), 600–601.
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fight against the Axis powers, stated categorically that Germany will ‘be compelled
to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has
caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape
responsibility’.21
Details of how the settlement should be effected were laid down in the subsequent
provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. Three main items of reparation were consid-
ered. First, removals of German industrial equipment were envisaged—and soon
carried out in particular in the Soviet zone of occupation. Second, agreement was
reached on confiscating all German external assets. And last, the determination was
made to separate from Germany one fourth of its national territory and to place it
under Polish or Soviet administration with a view to definitively allocating these
territories at a later stage to Poland and the Soviet Union under the terms of a final
peace treaty. Furthermore, the concomitant expulsion of the population in these
regions resulted in the confiscation of all the assets held by the German nationals
concerned.
The Potsdam determination was a clear signal: the Allied powers were of the view
that the war damages caused by Germany should be compensated by those collective
transfers of goods and territories, not by way of providing compensation to each and
every victim individually. They acted as trustees for all of the states that had
participated in the armed conflict, and for the implementation of their subsequent
decisions an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency was established in Paris by agreement
among all of the victorious powers.22 All the assets removed from Germany were to
be registered for the computation of the shares to be distributed to the countries
prejudiced by the war. No account was established for Italy since under Article 77 of
the Peace Treaty23 Italy, having acted as co-aggressor together with Germany, had
been denied any right to compensation.
21Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, 2 August 1945, Truman Paper—Naval Aide Files
vol XII (Potsdam Agreement), sec IV.
22Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation
Agency and on the Restitution of Monetary Gold, 14 January 1946, British Foreign Office Treaty
Series, London 1947, No 56.
23‘1. From the coming into force of the present Treaty property in Germany of Italy and of Italian
nationals shall no longer be treated as enemy property and all restrictions based on such treatment
shall be removed. 2. Identifiable property of Italy and of Italian nationals removed by force or duress
from Italian territory to Germany by German forces or authorities after September 3, 1943, shall be
eligible for restitution. 3. The restoration and restitution of Italian property in Germany shall be
effected in accordance with measures which will be determined by the Powers in occupation of
Germany. 4. Without prejudice to these and to any other dispositions in favour of Italy and Italian
nationals by the Powers occupying Germany, Italy waives on its own behalf and on behalf of Italian
nationals all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8, 1945, except
those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before
September 1, 1939. This waiver shall be deemed to include debts, all inter-governmental claims
in respect of arrangements entered into in the course of the war, and all claims for loss or damage
arising during the war. 5. Italy agrees to take all necessary measures to facilitate such transfers of
German assets in Italy as may be determined by those of the Powers occupying Germany which are
empowered to dispose of the said assets.’
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As is well known, no peace treaty bearing that name was concluded with
Germany. The political tensions arising almost immediately after the end of armed
hostilities prevented such a formalized end to WWII. Only at the moment of German
reunification was it deemed necessary to adopt a punto finale. Germany and the four
Allied powers negotiated the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Ger-
many.24 This treaty, although remaining silent about any measure of reparation, was
indeed meant to put a definitive end to the issue of reparations.25 The great step taken
by Germany was the recognition that the territories for many years provisionally
placed under Polish and Soviet occupation would henceforth be considered as
having passed under the jurisdiction of those countries. On the other hand, by
accepting the title of ‘Final Settlement’, the Allied forces certified that they would
be debarred from asserting any further war claims against Germany. In turn, Ger-
many renounced any possible claims against the Allied powers on account of the
breaches of humanitarian law committed by them: by attacking civilian objects,
bombing cities where no military targets were present, driving out people from their
ancestral lands, and thereby causing the death of millions of people.
24Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, 1696 UNTS
115 (Two-plus-Four Treaty).
25Ibid, see Preamble: ‘The Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the
French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America, Conscious of the fact that their peoples have
been living together in peace since 1945; Mindful of the recent historic changes in Europe which
make it possible to overcome the division of the continent; Having regard to the rights and
responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, and the
corresponding wartime and post-war agreements and decisions of the Four Powers; Resolved, in
accordance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; Recalling the
principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in
Helsinki; Recognizing that those principles have laid firm foundations for the establishment of a just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe; Determined to take account of everyone’s security interests;
Convinced of the need finally to overcome antagonism and to develop cooperation in Europe;
Confirming their readiness to reinforce security, in particular by adopting effective arms control,
disarmament and confidence-building measures; their willingness not to regard each other as
adversaries but to work for a relationship of trust and cooperation; and accordingly their readiness
to consider positively setting up appropriate institutional arrangements within the framework of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Welcoming the fact that the German people,
freely exercising their right of self-determination, have expressed their will to bring about the unity
of Germany as a state so that they will be able to serve the peace of the world as an equal and
sovereign partner in a united Europe; Convinced that the unification of Germany as a state with
definitive borders is a significant contribution to peace and stability in Europe; Intending to
conclude the final settlement with respect to Germany; Recognizing that thereby, and with the
unification of Germany as a democratic and peaceful state, the rights and responsibilities of the Four
Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole lose their function; Represented by their
Ministers for Foreign Affairs who, in accordance with the Ottawa Declaration of 13 February 1990,
met in Bonn on 5 May 1990, in Berlin on 22 June 1990, in Paris on 17 July 1990 with the
participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, and in Moscow on
12 September 1990; Have agreed as follows:’.
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VI. The Impossibility of Reparation of War Damages by
Individual Actions
Erroneously, the ItCC has embraced the view that with regard to grave crimes under
international law reparation must consist of individual payments to each and every
victim of German misconduct. It does not say so openly but the inference is inherent
in its insistence on the right to a remedy as a necessary consequence of the
infringement of a right. Positive international law, however, does not recognize
individual reparation claims. Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Agreement No IV estab-
lishes the collective responsibility of the state whose agents have committed an
unlawful act.26 Indeed, international practice has evolved a pattern according to
which mass damages caused by warfare should be settled at the interstate level by
agreement between the governments concerned. The bar of jurisdictional immunity
favours rational proceedings organized by a victim state by way of diplomatic
protection, under which all the individual claims can be aggregated in a systematic
fashion according to merit.
It is an illusion to believe that destroying the bar of jurisdictional immunity could
become a panacea in instances where grave violations of IHL or IHRL are in issue.
First, states against whom foreign courts have delivered compensation judgments
would hardly ever honour such judgments. It is remarkable that only a few authors
have found it necessary to delve into this highly practical issue.27 Encouraging the
victims to bring suits against a tortfeasor state may sound eminently constructive and
promising. In real terms, however, the successful claimants would not gain anything
tangible. They might achieve a moral victory but little else. Judgments against a
foreign state can be enforced only with great difficulties, as efforts in recent years to
recover monies from Argentina have amply shown. According to the UN Conven-
tion on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property,28 measures of con-
straint against state property are admissible only under extremely strict conditions
(Article 19) in consonance with firmly established rules of customary law. The ItCC
has been wise enough not to challenge these rules, whose non-respect could entail
highly adverse consequences for Italy as well. In sum, that great step forward praised
by many voices in the legal doctrine commenting on Judgment 238/2014 leads into a
vacuum where no real substance can be found. The ItCC may have secured for Italy a
moral victory, but it has shattered the foundations of international law by
undermining legal certainty in the operation of general international law. The rule
26See, eg, Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 6 October 2016, III ZR
140/15, BGHZ (Kunduz).
27Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice and Its Pitfalls’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
14 (2016), 629–636, at 634; Paolo Palchetti, ‘Can State Action on Behalf of Victims Be the
Alternative to Judicial Access to Justice in Case of Grave Breaches of Human Rights?’, Italian
Yearbook of International Law 24 (2014), 53–60, at 56.
28UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004),
UN Doc A/RES/59/83, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
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of jurisdictional immunity ensures the peaceful exercise of sovereign power
according to the paradigm of equality.29 Should domestic courts gain the power of
interfering in the domestic matters of other states by enjoining them to perform or not
perform specific acts, sovereign equality would suffer significant damage. Interna-
tional disputes about controversial issues under international law must be settled by
international means of settlement, inter alia, by determinations of international
bodies and not by unilateral decisions of one of the parties to the relevant dispute.
Nemo judex in re sua.
Coming back to the alternative between the two methods of settlement available
within the present-day system of international law, it stands to reason that it is
inconsistent to apply the two methods of reparation parallel to one another if not
explicitly agreed to by the parties concerned or otherwise consented to by the debtor
state. Thus, Germany has always been prepared to provide reparation to individual
victims of racial persecution. Israel, in particular, received generous compensation
payments, and a specific treaty was concluded with Italy for that purpose.30 Gener-
ally, however, where the determination is made to resort to the collective method of
reparation, to open up at the same time the second avenue would lead to placing a
double burden on the wrongdoing state. This brutal truth is unpleasant to hear, since
it cannot be denied that those who suffered during the German occupation of Italy
have not been palpably compensated as individuals. They feel entitled to be provided
with compensation, arguing that they have not benefitted personally from the
sacrifices that Germany had to concede under the Potsdam Agreement and its
implementation. In this context, the Italian state should have helped its citizens by
awarding to them, on its own initiative, appropriate reparation payments,31 given the
fact that compensation for war damages is a collective responsibility of the national
community.
VII. The Hard Task of Seeking an Equitable Peace
Settlement
The ItCC has closed its eyes to the context of the legal issue submitted to its legal
cognizance: adjudicating the dispute on the constitutionality of the legal norms
barring individual claims against Germany was an element in a comprehensive
peace settlement. Settling the consequences of war is an unpleasant undertaking.
29See ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 57.
30Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian
Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German
and Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No 22, 791.
31Suggested also by Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Judicial Immunity and Judicial Protection: The Decision of
the Italian Constitutional Court No. 238 of 2014’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 98 (2015),
126–134, at 131; Francioni, ‘Access to Justice’ 2016 (n 27), 636.
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The modern tendency is to grant, as a matter of good policy, comprehensive
compensation for the harm endured by all the victims,32 notwithstanding the fact
that no such entitlements have arisen under positive law.33 Additionally, it should
not be lost sight that the case at hand dates back more than 70 years to a time when
individual claims against a foreign state on account of war damages were simply
unheard of.
Establishing a settlement after a war constitutes a collective undertaking. All sides
are entitled to come forward with their demands and claims. It is true that the
countries attacked by Nazi Germany had suffered the most. At the same time, it is
equally true that Italy stood at Germany’s side for many years, supporting its
aggressive policies. Only in September 1943 did Italy, fortunately, abandon her
Berlin ally and join the anti-Axis powers. Had she left the unhappy alliance two
years earlier, Hitler might not have had the courage of trying to expand Germany’s
dictatorial regime to the whole of Europe and the Soviet Union. In any event, if one
seeks to establish a just and equitable equilibrium in a peace treaty, account must be
taken of the losses suffered on all sides. As hinted at already, 12 million Germans
were driven out from their ancestral homes, with millions dying during their flight.34
Since the fate and treatment of the Italian prisoners of war were at the core of the
dispute before the ICJ, the treatment of German prisoners of war matters too.
Contrary to the rules of the 1929 Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Article 75), Germans captured by Allied forces were not released immediately
after the end of hostilities. Russia kept German prisoners until 1955, ten years after
the German military surrender on 8 May 1945.35 The US and the UK sent more than
600,000 German prisoners of war from their respective zones of occupation to
France where they were used as forced labourers.36 The last prisoners of war were
allowed to return home from France in 1948, three years after the end of hostilities.
32UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/147 on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, remains a recommen-
dation and has not acquired the status of positive international law.
33For the position of the German Federal Court of Justice, see Judgment of 6 October 2016 (n 26).
34Exhaustive study by Ray M Douglas, Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
the Second World War (New Haven/London: Yale University Press 2012).
35See Rüdiger Overmans, Soldaten hinter Stacheldraht: deutsche Kriegsgefangene des Zweiten
Weltkriegs (Berlin: Propyläen 2000), 258. It is true, on the other hand, that the treatment of the
Soviet prisoners of war in the early stages of the war against the Soviet Union in 1941 is one of the
most shameful chapters of the German military history. No adequate measures were taken to protect
the captured soldiers by providing them with food and shelter. They were left in almost total
abandonment without any care and consequently died in large numbers.
36See Kurt W Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in französischer Hand (Zur Geschichte der
deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Vol XIII) (Munich/Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst
und Werner Gieseking 1971), 14–20.
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VIII. Looking to the Future
The most deplorable consequence of Sentenza 238/2014, on the basis of its key
determination, would be if WWII were continued at the legal level by all victims of
ill-treatment at the hands of a foreign power. This is a consequence that the ItCC has
not contemplated or in any event is not explicitly dealt with in its judgment. What
Italian victims could or can do in bringing claims against Germany would have to be
deemed applicable to German victims of grave violations of IHL as well, or for
example to African victims of Italian colonialism. International law is not a two-class
legal regime made up of full rights-holders on the one side and persons belonging to
a nation that forfeited all of its entitlement on the other. In terms of human rights,
equality and non-discrimination are the indispensable building blocks of the effec-
tive reign of the rule of law. Consequently, the judgment of the ItCC would make
impossible any peace settlement after a major armed conflict that was accompanied
by massive violations of international humanitarian law or international human
rights law. Every individual victim would keep their presumed or alleged entitle-
ments notwithstanding any lump sum agreement to the contrary.37 This would be
disastrous for world peace.
The case decided by the ItCC shows that in order to attain equitable peace
settlements an impartial third institution is required. Such institutions may be
established on a case-by-case basis—which presupposes that the parties involved
are more or less of equal political weight—or else the relevant parties would have to
turn to existing institutions. Obviously, in functional terms the most appropriate
institution today would be the UN Peacebuilding Commission established in 2005
concurrently by the General Assembly38 and the Security Council.39 Within this
Commission, fruitful cooperation of the two main bodies of the UN with any litigant
parties can be brought about. The shortcomings of the Peacebuilding Commission
are that it was established as an advisory body only, lacking the requisite institutional
devices of constraint. Here again it appears that the members of the Security Council
and their representatives on the Peacebuilding Commission need to acquire a new
sense of responsibility. In fact, even the permanent members of the Security Council
hold their seats only as a trust of the international community that has chosen them to
ensure the general interest of humankind. Their names were not inscribed in the UN
Charter as an invitation to assert, through the Security Council, their own specific
interests.
Therefore, the Security Council should assume responsibility in a situation where
indicia suggest that the parties involved, if left alone, would not attain a fair
settlement by failing to reciprocally take account of the interests of the other side.
37See Christian Tomuschat, ‘Peace Treaties and Jus Cogens’, in Christian Calliess (ed),
Herausforderungen an Staat und Verfassung. Liber Amicorum für Torsten Stein (Baden-Baden:
Nomos 2015), 339–359.
38UN General Assembly, A/RES/60/180, 20 December 2005.
39UN Security Council, S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005.
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The best example of a body that discharged its function with absolute neutrality and
fairness is the UN Compensation Commission, which was called upon to settle the
consequences of the war waged by Iraq against Kuwait.40 With an astounding degree
of sober professionalism, the Commission succeeded in distributing the available
assets among the claimants in a fair manner, dividing them into different classes and
prioritizing those that asserted relatively small amounts of compensation payments.
The judgment of the ItCC provides a well-intentioned reflection on the relation-
ship between the right to a remedy and the rule of jurisdictional immunity. But it has
totally lost sight of the underlying landscape of the disputes. Its solution, which
suggests pursuing, in cases of serious international crimes, claims against foreign
states on the home ground of the victim contrary to the internationally applicable
principle of jurisdictional immunity, leads astray. This would cause considerable
prejudice to the legal framework of the international community and, at the end of
the day, leave the happy claimants among all of the others who have not been able to
obtain an enforceable judgment with empty hands.
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Sentenza 238/2014: A Good Case
for Law-Reform?
Heike Krieger
Abstract Sentenza 238/2014 is an important judgment which does not only concern
the concrete case at hand but also pushes for a change in the law of state immunity.
However, such attempts at law-making by national courts may not always attain their
goal but may exert adverse effects which are harmful for the international legal
order. Sentenza 238/2014 may have an impact on three different yet related issues
central to the future development of international law: the relationship between
international and national law, exceptions to immunities, and individual reparations
in cases of mass atrocities.
This chapter criticises law-making through non-compliance with international
judicial decisions by national courts. Judges in democratic states under the rule of
law who try to push for law-reform, by initiating non-compliance with decisions of
international courts, should be aware that they may act in the company, and thereby
in support of, courts in regimes with autocratic tendencies, such as the Russian
Constitutional Court, which refuses to comply with judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, the chapter argues that immunity from
jurisdiction and immunity from execution should be kept distinct and that human
rights exceptions should not be applied to immunity from execution. Such a differ-
entiation remains justified because measures of constraint against property used for
government non-commercial purposes intrude even further onto sovereign rights
than the institution of proceedings before courts in the forum state. It is particularly
difficult for states to protect assets and other property situated in a foreign state.
These assets may therefore be more susceptible to abusive enforcement measures
while simultaneously forming an essential basis for the actual conduct of interna-
tional relations.
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The chapter concludes by advocating a cautious approach to individual repara-
tions in cases of mass atrocities. This more cautious approach observes the com-
plexities of ending armed conflicts and negotiating peace deals. An individual right
to monetary compensation based on civil claims processes does not allow for taking
into account broader political considerations related to establishing a stable post-war
order. Such a right is conducive to bilateral settlements between the state parties
concerned, which might create new injustices towards other groups of victims. It
might also overburden negotiations for a settlement to an ongoing armed conflict.
The chapter thereby starts from the assumption that the stability of the interna-
tional legal order itself as guaranteed by concepts such as immunities or the respect
for its judicial organs serves to protect human rights, albeit indirectly.
I. Introduction: A Case for Law-Reform?1
The German–Italian dispute over the scope of sovereign immunities and reparations
claims for war crimes committed by German armed forces during World War II
(WWII) in Italy is in many ways specific and historically contingent. At the same
time, it touches upon a number of fundamental challenges which the international
community has to address in the interest of furthering the international rule of law.
For many observers the dispute represents the injustices and inconsistencies inherent
in the international legal order and thus seems to contribute to that order’s legitimacy
deficits. They doubt that a legal order which hampers redress against serious human
rights violations before national courts in the interest of an abstract legal concept,
such as sovereign equality protected through state immunity, can be considered as
just.2 Moreover, they criticize a consistency deficit: if a ius cogens rule is violated
this should also affect relevant procedural rules.3 Such a perspective furthers the idea
of lifting the dispute beyond the specific context and using it as a plea for changing
the rules on state immunity. For other observers the case reflects the growing
challenges which international law faces from unilateral acts of non-compliance by
national courts in the interest of the protection of national constitutional law.4
1Parts of this chapter are based on Heike Krieger, ‘Between Evolution and Stagnation: Immunities
in a Globalized World’, Goettingen Journal of International Law 6 (2014), 177-216 and Heike
Krieger, ‘Addressing the Accountability Gap in Peacekeeping: Law-making by Domestic Courts
as a Way to Avoid UN Reform?’, Netherlands International Law Review 62 (2015), 259-277.
2See Valerio Onida, chapter ‘Moving beyond Judicial Conflict in the Name of the Pre-Eminence of
Fundamental Human Rights’, in this volume.
3Eg, Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’, American Journal of
International Law 106 (2012), 609-616, at 614-615.
4Eg, Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph—How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of
the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order, EJIL Talk, (22 December 2014), available
at www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-
italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-order-part-i/; Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitu-
tional Court and “Constructive Contestation”—A Miscarried Attempt?’, Journal of International
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Brought together, both perspectives raise the question of whether and to what extent
national courts can contribute in a balanced manner to changes of international law
which they consider necessary. Thus, Sentenza 238/2014 raises the hope that it ‘may
also contribute to a desirable—and desired by many—evolution of international law
itself’.5 But is Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) a good
case for law-reform?
Sentenza 238/2014 denied German immunity from civil jurisdiction against
claims arising from war crimes committed by German armed forces during WWII.
The ItCC argued that the customary international law rule of state immunity in such
cases violated fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution. Therefore, the ItCC
struck down Article 3 of the Italian Law No 5 of 14 January 2013, which had aimed
to execute the 2012 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment in the Jurisdic-
tional Immunities case,6 as well as the part of the law implementing the UN Charter
which relates to Article 94 of the UN Charter and thus to the compliance with the
2012 ICJ Judgment.7 In this judgment the ICJ had upheld the customary rule of
jurisdictional immunities without any exceptions for claims arising from war crimes
or crimes against humanity.
The creation of customary international law rules through judicial practice may be
a means to overcome the opposition of a state’s executive branch to further legal
developments since judicial reliance on customary international law allows for a
state’s explicit consent to become less important. Court networks may, in horizontal
and vertical dialogues, accelerate the development of customary international law
rules even against the expressed intentions of the executive branch on the basis of the
principle of judicial independence. Given its role in international relations, it is
unsurprising that the executive branch in particular tends to be sceptical of restricting
immunities even in cases of serious human rights violations. The frictions which
have arisen between the executive and the judiciary in Italy are not as distinctive as
they might first appear. Actually, in a number of states a split can be seen between
both branches about how to deal with immunity exceptions in cases of serious
violations of human rights. Comparable developments have emerged at least tem-
porarily in Switzerland and the US. The executive may even try to stop horizontal
dialogue between courts of different states by prompting the decision of an interna-
tional court. Likewise, the executive—at least in a parliamentary democracy—may
also hold back legal developments through instigating legislation.8
Criminal Justice 14 (2016) 621-627; Massimo Lando, ‘Intimations of Unconstitutionality: The
Supremacy of International Law and Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, The
Modern Law Review 78 (2015), 1028-1041. See also Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World
Court Makes a Bad Case’, in this volume.
5Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014, para 3.3.
6ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
7Art 1 of the Italian Law 17 August 1957, No 848.
8Krieger, ‘Between Evolution and Stagnation’ 2014 (n 1), 194 et seq with further references.
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The adverse impact of such uncoordinated efforts at prompting or retaining
law-reform in a decentralized legal order have culminated in the Jurisdictional
Immunities Judgment and Sentenza 238/2014 and point to the need for caution by
all actors involved. Such adverse consequences may affect the state itself in so far as
non-compliance by courts may incur state responsibility. Simultaneously, such
symbolic cases of non-compliance risk undermining the authority of international
judicial organs, such as the ICJ (sections II.1 and II.2). Thus, instead of promoting
the legitimacy of international law, a court opposing findings of international judicial
organs might be undermining the international rule of law. Unilateralist attempts to
further legal developments should be aware of such adverse effects. Otherwise they
may find themselves contributing to perceived legitimacy deficits of the international
legal order by furthering certain double standards, advocating highly contested
standards (section II.3), or creating expectations which international law might be
unable to fulfil (section II.4). Instead, any such effort for law-reform should aim at
advocating standards that are generalizable outside the specific context of the dispute
at hand (section III). The chapter concludes by stressing that concepts such as
immunities or the respect for judicial organs of the international order guarantee
its stability and thereby serve to protect human rights, albeit indirectly (section IV).
II. Adverse Effects
The idea to promote legal developments through judicial dialogue is ambivalent. On
the one hand, the creation of customary international law can be seen as an
uncoordinated, bottom-up process entailing cases of non-compliance as a starting
point for new legal rules. On the other hand, where constitutional courts contest
recent findings of international courts and even choose non-compliance with a
decision against ‘their’ respective state, they risk engaging their state’s responsibility
under international law even though they aim to further a specific perception of the
adequate legal development.
1. Incurring State Responsibility
According to Article 94 of the UN Charter and Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, Italy has
to comply with the findings of the 2012 ICJ Judgment. Article 94 of the UN Charter
requires a state to realize the obligations which stem from the operative part of the
ICJ’s decision, including the ratio decidendi.9 In view of Article 4 of the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
9Karin Oellers-Frahm/Hermann Mosler, ‘Art 94’, in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the
United Nations (Oxford: OUP 3rd ed 2012), 1174-1179.
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Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR),10 the 2012 ICJ Judgment binds all state
organs. Accordingly, the competent state organ has to follow the obligation
established by the Court’s Judgment. If it fails to do so, the state engages its
responsibility.11 As defined in the commentary to the ASR, ‘the essence of an
internationally wrongful act lies in the non-conformity of the State’s actual conduct
with the conduct it ought to have adopted in order to comply with a particular
international obligation’.12 The finding of the ItCC that Article 3 of the Law No
5/2013—which aims to implement the ICJ’s decision—‘has to be declared uncon-
stitutional’ constitutes such a non-conformity.13 However, the findings of the ItCC
may only establish conduct prior to a breach, so that the ‘apprehended or immi-
nent’14 breach has yet to occur.15 The commentary to the ASR does not formulate
any general rule in this regard but highlights that the decision needs to take into
account the primary obligation, the facts of the case, and the context. It suggests that
‘preparatory conduct does not itself amount to a breach if it does not “predetermine
the final decision to be taken”’.16
Thus, the question regarding whether Judgment 238/2014 violates Italy’s obli-
gations under the 2012 ICJ Judgment as based on Article 94 of the UN Charter
depends on the effects that the decision entails within the Italian legal order for other
Italian state organs in their international relations with Germany and on their actual
behaviour. According to Article 136 of the Italian Constitution, a law which the ItCC
has declared unconstitutional no longer has any effect from the day following the
publication of the decision. As Karin Oellers-Frahm has demonstrated, because of
Sentenza 238/2014 the law enacting the UN Charter—albeit merely in relation to
Article 94 of the UN Charter and the law implementing the ICJ Judgment—no
longer pertains to the Italian legal order; neither does the customary international law
rule on state immunity insofar as it contradicts fundamental constitutional princi-
ples.17 However, as long as the decision provides a certain leeway that allows other
10ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.
11Oellers-Frahm/Mosler, ‘Art 94’ 2012 (n 9).
12James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Intro-
duction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge: CUP 2002), 126 (Commentary to Art 12(3)).
13ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 5.
14Crawford, International Law 2002 (n 12), 138 et seq (Commentary to Art 14(13)).
15ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ
Reports 1997, 51, para 79: ‘Such a situation is not unusual in international law or, for that matter, in
domestic law. A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by preparatory actions which are not
to be confused with the act or offence itself. It is as well to distinguish between the actual
commission of a wrongful act (whether instantaneous or continuous) and the conduct prior to that
act which is of a preparatory character and which “does not qualify as a wrongful act”’.
16Crawford, International Law 2002 (n 12), 138 et seq (Commentary to Art 14(13)).
17Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The International Court of Justice—The Italian
Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of
International Law 76 (2016), 193-202, at 196.
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courts, the executive, and the legislative branch to comply with the 2012 ICJ
Judgment in a manner compatible with international law, a breach will not yet
have occurred.18 After all, the ICJ in its 2012 Judgment gave Italy a certain amount
of discretion in implementing the judgment when it found that ‘the Italian Republic
must, by enacting appropriate legislation, or by resorting to other methods of its
choosing, ensure that the decisions of its courts and those of other judicial authorities
infringing the immunity which the Federal Republic of Germany enjoys under
international law cease to have effect’.19 Thus, it is important to note that the Italian
executive branch argued in the ensuing cases before Italian civil courts that the
courts should grant Germany jurisdictional immunity.20 Of course, in the case at
hand these reflections are already theoretical because Italian courts have issued
default judgments and decisions on the merits in the wake of Sentenza 238/2014.21
These court proceedings do not only infringe the rules on state immunity but they
also constitute a breach of Italy’s legal obligation flowing from the findings of the
2012 ICJ Judgment.
In the academic literature, a number of voices suggest that the wrongfulness of
such conduct should be precluded. A particularly far-reaching approach argues that
wrongfulness could be precluded by invoking that a democratic state must respect
the fundamental rights guaranteed in its constitution.22 However, such approaches
are not only irreconcilable with Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, as well as Articles 4 and 32 ASR, but would also have adverse, long-term
effects for the international legal order. Such a justification would undermine the
sovereign equality of states and induce a hierarchy between states, necessarily
distinguishing between democratic states and other (non-democratic) states. The
question that would arise is whether even an international court or tribunal would be
well advised to make any determination on the basis of such value- and policy-
loaded criteria. Would the German and the Italian Constitutional Courts be justified
18Cf Crawford, International Law 2002 (n 12), 130 (Commentary to Art 12(12)); Christian
Tomuschat, ‘National and International Law in Italy: The End of an Idyll’, Italian Journal of
Public Law 6 (2014), 187-196, at 192 et seq.
19ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 6), para 139.
20Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 17), 195 et seq. See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter
‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
21Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 17), 193 et seq; for decisions on the merits, see
Tribunale di Firenze, Order of 23 March 2015, Case No 2012/1300 and Judgment of 6 July 2015,
No 2468/2015; Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment of 25 September 2015, No 723/2015. For an
English analysis of these three decisions, see Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 17),
197 et seq.
22For this approach, albeit critically, Massimo Iovane, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court Judgment
No. 238 and the Myth of the “Constitutionalization” of International Law’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 595-605, at 604; with reference to Benedetto Conforti, Diritto
Internazionale (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica 10th ed 2014), 402 et seq.
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in refusing compliance with judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) on the basis of their reasoning in the Görgülü case23 or in Sentenza
238/2014 because both Germany and Italy are genuine constitutional democracies
while the Russian Constitutional Court would not be justified to do so in the Yukos
case?24
2. Preserving Judicial Authority Through Legitimizing
Strategies?
Acting against traditional standards of the rule of law, national courts which choose
non-compliance exceed the limits of judicial dialogue and thus challenge the author-
ity of international judicial organs. Therefore, these courts will have to rely on
additional considerations of legitimacy in order to make a tenable case to their
domestic audiences and the international community. While the ItCC seems to
have been aware of such dilemmas, it has not succeeded in mitigating them through
its legitimizing strategy.
In its self-perception, Sentenza 238/2014 pressures for a progressive evolution of
international law and aims to gain legitimacy by referring to two precedents: (1) the
role of national courts in the early twentieth century, which enabled law-reform by
establishing the distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis,25 and
(2) the Kadi case26 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).27 Regarding the former,
Sentenza 238/2014 stresses the historically important role Italian courts played in the
process of establishing the differentiation between acta iure gestionis and acta iure
imperii.28 However, the historical comparison cannot sufficiently legitimize the
23Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307
(Görgülü).
24Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Judgment of 19 January 2017, No 1-П, regarding
the constitutionality of execution of the ECtHR Judgment of 31 July 2014 in the case OAO
Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v Russia, Judgments of 20 September 2011 and 31 July 2014,
Application No 14902/04; for an analysis of the Russian Constitutional Court’s approach, see
Matthias Hartwig, ‘Vom Dialog zum Disput? Verfassungsrecht vs. Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention—Der Fall der Russländischen Föderation’, Europäische
Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 44 (2017), 1-22.
25ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 3.3.
26CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of 3 September 2008, Joined Cases Nos
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P.
27ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 3.4.
28ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 3.3: ‘The customary international norm of immunity of
States from the civil jurisdiction of other States was originally absolute, since it included all state
behaviors. More recently, namely in the first half of the last century, this norm undertook a
progressive evolution by virtue of national jurisprudence, in the majority of States, up until the
identification of acta jure gestionis (an easily understandable expression) as the relevant limit. And
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ItCC’s approach once we consider differences in context. In the early twentieth
century, the international legal order was even more decentralized than it is today.
Italian and Belgian courts acted neither in non-compliance with the judgments of the
central judicial organ of the international community nor in the immediate wake of
the pronouncements of said organ’s decisions. Furthermore, they did not set a
precedent for other courts to question the authority of such institutions. As Anne
Peters and Raffaela Kunz have underlined, this last factor also constitutes a signif-
icant difference to the Kadi case of the ECJ. While both courts might aim to protect
‘constitutional principles’ against conflicting international obligations, the ECJ’s
Kadi decision is directed against a political organ whose nearly unfettered discretion
is hardly controlled by international courts.29 In this respect, the ECJ can raise a
much stronger claim for realizing the idea of a dédoublement fonctionnel—ie that it
acts as an organ of international law—than the ItCC.
Judges who push for law-reform by initiating non-compliance with the decisions
of international courts should be aware that the overall international climate is
currently changing. With the lingering shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world
order, certain elements of the international rule of law have come under attack.
Across the board, international norms and institutions are contested and perceptions
of the legitimacy of international law vary according to an increasingly diverging
array of national (ideological) backdrops.30 Today national courts act in the com-
pany, and are thereby in support, of the Russian Constitutional Court, which refuses
it is well known that this limit to the application of the norm of immunity was progressively
established mainly thanks to Italian judges (. . .) the so-called “Italian–Belgian theory”. In short,
national judges limited the scope of the customary international norm, as immunity from civil
jurisdiction of other States was granted only for acts considered jure imperii. (. . .) It is of significant
importance that the evolution as described above originated in the national jurisprudence, as
national courts normally have the power to determine their competence, and leave to international
organs the recognition of the practice for the purposes of identifying customary law and its
evolution. Since such a reduction of immunity for the purposes of protection of rights took place,
as far as the Italian legal order is concerned, thanks to the control exercised by ordinary judges in an
institutional system characterized by a flexible Constitution (in which the recognition of rights was
supported by limited guarantees only), the exercise of the same control in the republican constitu-
tional order (founded on the protection of rights and the consequent limitation of powers, as
guaranteed by a rigid Constitution) falls inevitably to this Court.’
29Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph’ 2014 (n 4); Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’ 2016 (n 4),
626; see also Martin Scheinin, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’s Judgment 238 of 2014 Is Not
Another Kadi Case’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 615-620; and Tomuschat,
‘National and International Law’ 2014 (n 18), 189.
30Heike Krieger/Georg Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law—Rise or Decline?—Approaching
Current Foundational Challenges’, in Heike Krieger/Georg Nolte/Andreas Zimmermann (eds), The
International Rule of Law: Rise or Decline?—Foundational Challenges (Oxford: OUP 2019), 3-30;
see also Karin Alter, ‘The Future of International Law’, in Diana Ayton-Shenker (ed), The New
Global Agenda: Priorities, Practices, and Pathways of the International Community, (Lanhman/
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2018); David Bosco, ‘We’ve Been Here Before: The
Durability of Multinationalism’, Columbia Journal of International Affairs 70 (2017), 9-15; Anne-
Marie Slaughter, ‘The Return of Anarchy?’, Columbia Journal of International Affairs 70 (2017),
Special 70th Anniversary Issue, 11-16.
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compliance with the judgments of the ECtHR. Even if Sentenza 238/2014 claims to
argue not at the level of international law but exclusively on the plane of domestic
law, the ItCC is well aware that only declaring unconstitutional the legislation
implementing the ICJ Judgment, and not the Judgment itself, still challenges the
authority of the UN’s principal judicial organ. After all, the ItCC explicitly expresses
the hope of contributing to law-reform. In the past, ‘reasonable resistance by national
actors—if it is exercised (. . .) in good faith and with due regard for the overarching
ideal of international cooperation—might (. . .) [have built] up the political pressure
needed for promoting the progressive evolution of international law in the direction
of a system more considerate of human rights’.31 As Anne Peters has stressed,
decisions such as Solange I of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) or
the ECJ’s Kadi decision have indeed contributed to a progressive development of
international law and international institutions.32 However, considerable changes in
the overall atmosphere of today’s international order affect our understanding of
what should be considered as good faith. Challenges arising from the
non-compliance of courts with ICJ decisions can be detrimental to the normativity
of the international legal order in its current shape.33 But more troubling is that such
challenges endanger the international legal order’s most important foundations,
namely universality and multilateralism and instead favour particularity and unilat-
eralism. In the long run, recurring precedents of national ‘civil disobedience’ might
be as dangerous for the normative force of international human rights law as they are
detrimental at present for international law in general. The symbolism and the
precedential effects of such forms of disobedience will likely not be contained to
those areas the ItCC conceives to be legitimate but extend to other scenarios such as
the Yukos case. Law-reform beyond formal avenues needs to make sure that its
postulations are generalizable and needs to take seriously the risk of misuse. In the
case of Sentenza 238/2014 the risk of abuse does not only arise from the precedential
effects of non-compliance but also from the implications for the rule on immunities
itself.
3. Change ‘Desired by Many’?: Highly Contested Exceptions
to Immunities
Sentenza 238/2014 hopes to ‘contribute to a desirable—and desired by many—
evolution of international law itself’34 by furthering human rights-based exceptions
to state immunities. It starts from the assumption that the values it wants to promote,
and which are based on its reading of the Italian Constitution, are globally shared.
31Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph’ 2014 (n 4).
32Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I).
33See also Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, in this volume.
34ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 3.3.
Sentenza 238/2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform? 79
Such an understanding would be a necessary starting point for any bona fide act of
non-compliance with an ICJ decision. However, in the case of human rights-based
exceptions to immunities, a consensus about the desirability of change is far from
clear. The 2012 ICJ Judgment was based on a thorough analysis of relevant national
court decisions and other state practice,35 and in its aftermath, other courts have
applied the Judgment.36 While human rights-based exceptions to the immunities of
state officials have proved to be highly contested in the Sixth Committee of the
UN,37 there are no comparable indications in international fora for such a dissent in
relation to state immunities.
Even within Italy, the findings of the ItCC are not undisputed. The Italian
executive branch seems well aware that changes in international law which the
ItCC advocates for are likely to entail adverse consequences also for Italy itself.38
As, for instance, the US State Department has affirmed in the past regarding the
claim for a ius cogens-based immunity exception for state officials in proceedings
before national courts, ‘[t]he recognition of such an exception could prompt recip-
rocal limitations by foreign jurisdictions exposing U.S. state officials to suit abroad
on that basis’.39 The US worries that by altering their own judicial practice, it will
contribute to the creation of a new customary international law rule that would lead
to US state officials being subject to similar proceedings all over the world. In
particular, in the case of the US, there is a not entirely unfounded apprehension that
these proceedings may not always be conducted impartially.40
Is this assumption farfetched? If proceedings are carried out against foreign states
and their state officials in cases of grave violations of human rights before national
35ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 6), paras 65 et seq.
36Eg Supreme Court of Canada, Judgment of 10 October 2010, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176
(Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran), paras 61, 103-108.
37The 2017 debate on Draft Art 7(1) containing human rights-based exceptions to immunities of
state officials can be summarized as follows: in total, 23 states have argued in favour of the general
rule included in the Article while 21 disagreed with it. A number of states promoting the rule have
expressed their conviction that it constitutes a progressive development of international law; see
Janina Barkholdt/Julian Kulaga, ‘Analytical Presentation of the Comments and Observations by
States on Draft Article 7, Paragraph 1, of the ILC Draft Articles on Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 2017’, KFG
Working Paper Series 14 (Berlin Potsdam Research Group ‘The International Rule of Law—Rise
or Decline?’), (16 May 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id¼3172104.
38Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 17), 195 et seq.
39US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Matar and Others v Dichter, Brief for the United
States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, 19 December 2007, Docket No
07-2579-cv, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Matar%20v%20%20Dichter,%20US%20for%
20Defendants%20Amicus%20Brief%2012.19.07.pdf, 4; see also John B Bellinger, ‘The Dog that
Caught the Car: Observations on the Past, Present, and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal
Adviser to Official Acts Immunities’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011), 819-835,
at 833 et seq.
40Krieger, ‘Between Evolution and Stagnation’ 2014 (n 1), 193 et seq with reference to Bellinger,
‘The Dog that Caught the Car’ 2011 (n 39), 834 et seq.
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courts in the US, Switzerland, Canada, Italy, and the UK, these states will also have
to accept such proceedings against them and their state officials before national
courts in Algeria, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Iran, Congo, Rwanda, or Zimba-
bwe.41 In the end, the denial of immunity requires an international community of
states under the rule of law providing an equivalent level of human rights protection.
As long as there is no such international community, immunity serves to protect
states themselves and their state officials from being exposed to court proceedings
that do not meet the standard of the rule of law.42 Hence, Judge Ellis stated in his
Memorandum Opinion in the Tabion v Mufti case that the aim of granting immunity
was ‘[to] protect United States [officials] from (. . .) prosecution in foreign lands (. . .)
[because] not all countries provide the level of due process to which United States
citizens have become accustomed’.43 In light of such conflicts between normative
claims and legal reality, immunity seems to be, in the words of Hazel Fox, ‘a neutral
way of denying jurisdiction to States over the internal administration of another State
and diverting claims to settlement in the courts of that State, or by diplomatic or other
international means to which that State has consented’.44
If immunity serves as a plea against the exercise of jurisdiction in a decentralized
legal system where competences are divided, and is—in the words of Hazel Fox and
Philippa Webb—‘a signal to the forum court that jurisdiction belongs to another
court or method of adjudication’,45 the question arises whether any consequences
need to be attached to the fact that claims for reparation by Italian citizens have been
rejected by German courts. After all, a justification for granting immunity can be
seen in the fact that generally immunities do not lead to the loss of a claim or that an
offender remains criminally responsible. As a rule, there are alternative legal paths
and international mechanism available that correspond to each kind of immunity.46
Thus, the ItCC in Sentenza 238/2014 has been interpreted as mandating ‘that the
customary rule of foreign state immunity is not incorporated into the Italian legal
system, insofar as that rule applies to international crimes for which there is no
effective means of redress available to the victims other than a suit in the forum
state’.47 However, the right of access to court, at least under the European
41Ibid, 213 et seq.
42Ibid, 214.
43US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Tabion v Mufti, Memorandum Opinion of
Judge Ellis, (E.D. Va. 1995) 877 F. Supp. 285, 293.
44Hazel Fox, ‘In Defence of State Immunity, Why the UN Convention on State Immunity is
Important’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (2006), 399-406, at 405.
45Hazel Fox/Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: OUP 3rd ed 2013), 27.
46Krieger, ‘Between Evolution and Stagnation’ 2014 (n 1), 204.
47Riccardo Pavoni, ‘How Broad is the Principle Upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in
Judgment No. 238?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 573-585, at 574; see also
Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume. See, for a comparable argument,
Micaela Frulli, ‘“Time Will Tell Who Just Fell and Who’s Been Left Behind”: On the Clash
between the International Court of Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court’, Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 587-594.
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is not per se infringed if a case is decided on
the merits. Cases brought before German courts were thought to be unfounded
because either the specific regime of state responsibility under German law was
not applicable to military activities in armed conflicts or because there is no
individual right to compensation for violations of international humanitarian law.48
While this approach may appear unjust, it conforms to the prevailing view in
international humanitarian law and corresponds mutatis mutandis to approaches in
other states under the rule of law.49 It therefore cannot be considered arbitrary
jurisprudence.
4. Creating False Promises: Human Rights Exceptions
to Immunities from Execution?
Has the situation of Italian claimants now been improved by Sentenza 238/2014 and
the ensuing decisions of Italian civil courts? To reach this aim yet another stage in
law-reform would be required: extending human rights exceptions to immunities
from execution. In Sentenza 238/2014, the ItCC explicitly did not deal with immu-
nity from measures of constraint.50 Thus, under Italian constitutional law it is not yet
clear whether immunities from execution are compatible with the right of access to
court where serious violations of human rights are at stake. Accordingly, in the
situation at hand, policy reasons push for further human rights exceptions to
immunities from execution.
Court decisions rendered in the wake of the ItCC’s jurisprudence create an
expectation on the side of the applicants that they will indeed receive a monetary
compensation. In Italy, most German state assets are protected by immunities
because they serve government non-commercial purposes, while enforcement in
Germany will be unsuccessful because judgments based on a violation of German
jurisdictional immunities suffer from a serious procedural defect, which means they
cannot serve as a basis for measures of constraint.51 Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the case at hand will put additional pressure on the distinction between
(pre-judgment) immunity from jurisdiction and (post-judgment) immunity from
execution. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that if immunity from jurisdiction was
48Cf Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277, para
38 et seq; see also Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 26 June 2003, III ZR
245/98, BGHZ 155, 279 (Distomo), 293 et seq for the period before 1949 and for the current legal
situation see Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 6 October 2016, III ZR 140/15, BGHZ 212, 173
(Kunduz).
49See Heike Krieger, ‘Addressing the Accountability Gap’ 2015 (n 1).
50ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 5), para 1; cf Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016
(n 17), 194.
51Tomuschat, ‘National and International Law’ 2014 (n 18), 193.
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to be considered unconstitutional because of an infringement of the right of access to
court, immunity from execution will likewise be affected.52
Such additional pressure is also buttressed by a broad expectation of consistency
as an element of the rule of law concept. Expectations of consistency create an extra
argumentative burden for justifying that human rights exceptions should not apply to
immunities from execution. A lack of consistency is the major policy argument in
favour of any kind of additional restriction of enforcement immunity because ‘a
denial of justice on the enforcement level would render the adjudicatory jurisdiction,
granted under any restrictive immunity concept, meaningless’.53
Accordingly, based on its jurisprudence that human rights should be effective and
not illusory, the ECtHR held that the right of access to court according to Article 6 of
the ECHR does not only concern the pre-judgment phase but also the post-judgment
phase of execution. The right, based on Article 6 of the ECHR, would ‘be illusory if
a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision
to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party’.54 Accordingly, a consequen-
tialist argument has been raised by two judges of the ECtHR in a concurring opinion
in the Al-Adsani case, according to which restrictions on immunity for violations of
the right of access to court ‘would thus have required a possibility of having
judgments—probably often default judgments—(. . .) executed against respondent
States. This in turn would raise the question whether the traditionally strong immu-
nity of public property from execution would also have had to be regarded as
incompatible with Article 6’.55
However, the judges raising this argument actually used it as a counterargument
against restricting pre-judgment immunity. They warned against the unintended
consequences which result from expectations of consistency and blur more complex
reasons for differentiation. Thus, the confirmation of the ICJ in the Jurisdictional
Immunities Judgment that immunity from suit and immunity from execution are
distinct56 is still widely shared.57 Under customary international law, states enjoy
immunity from execution in relation to property which is used for government
non-commercial purposes.58 Since immunity from execution is applied separately
from immunity from jurisdiction, arguments for excluding immunity from jurisdic-
tion are not directly applicable to immunity from execution.59
52Cf Fox/Webb, The Law of State Immunity 2013 (n 45), 514; see also Paolo Palchetti, chapter
‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
53Cf August Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement
Measures’, European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), 803-836, at 809.
54ECtHR, Hornsby v Greece, Judgment of 19 March 1997, Application No 18357/91, para 40.
55ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No
35763/97, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pellonpää, joined by Judge Sir Nicolas Bratza.
56ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 6), para 113.
57Fox/Webb, The Law of State Immunity 2013 (n 45), 490.
58See also Article 19 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property (2 December 2004), UN Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
59ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 6), para 113.
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Such a differentiation is justified because measures of constraint against property
used for government non-commercial purposes intrude even further onto sovereign
rights than the institution of proceedings before courts in the forum state.60 It is
particularly difficult for states to protect assets and other property situated in a
foreign state. These assets may therefore be susceptible to abusive enforcement
measures while at the same time constituting an essential basis for the actual conduct
of international relations. The rationale of strong protection for property designated
for government non-commercial purposes has clearly been expressed in the presi-
dential waiver issued by President Bill Clinton in relation to the 1976 Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, which allows US victims of terrorism to attach and
execute judgments against the diplomatic or consular properties of a foreign state:61
If this section [of the Act] were to result in attachment and execution against foreign embassy
properties, it would encroach on my authority under the Constitution to “receive Ambassa-
dors and other public Ministers”. Moreover, if applied to foreign diplomatic or consular
property, section 177 would place the United States in breach of its international treaty
obligations. It would put at risk the protection we enjoy at every embassy and consulate
throughout the world by eroding the principle that diplomatic property must be protected
regardless of bilateral relations (. . .). In addition, section 177 could seriously affect our
ability to enter into global claims settlements that are fair to all United States claimants and
could result in United States taxpayer liability in the event of a contrary claims tribunal
judgment.62
III. Generalizable Standards: Towards an Obligation
to Provide for Individual Reparation in Cases of Mass
Atrocities?
The presidential waiver outlined above emphasizes a need to negotiate global claims
settlements as an alternative form of compensation to individual reparation granted
by national courts in the US, thus stressing the need for political leeway in such
cases. Are there good reasons for retaining such leeway, or should there be an
obligation incumbent upon states to provide for individual monetary compensation
in cases of mass atrocities as a general rule of international law?
60Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice’ 2006 (n 53), 804.
61See Section 117 of the US Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1999, as
contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Public Law 21 October 1998, No 105-277, 112 Statute 2681.
62Statement on Signing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999, 34 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 2108, 2133 (23 October 1998),
quoted in Sean D Murphy, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law’, American Journal of International Law 93 (1999), 161-194, at 185 et seq.
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While international law still does not provide for a general right to compensation
in cases of violations of international humanitarian law, there are increasing efforts at
the international as well as the national level to change the existing law.63 Such a call
for an obligation to grant individual monetary compensation is owed to changing
public perceptions on the position of the individual in armed conflicts and a
concerted effort by NGOs to bring pertinent cases before national courts. Indications
of a change in the overall perception may, inter alia, be seen in the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law,64 although these principles would still not create a sub-
jective right under international law on which an individual could rely before a
domestic court.65
With respect to the 2013 Varvarin case, even the German FCC seems to have left
the door open for future judicial review of the activities of German armed forces
abroad. Although it did not have to decide on the question of whether the ordinary
law of state liability covers damages caused by war,66 it made clear that courts are
competent and capable to judicially control the decision to qualify the object of an
attack as a military object according to international humanitarian law.67 The FCC
thus stressed its competence to deal with violations of international humanitarian law
as a matter of human rights adjudication. Therefore, while the German Federal Court
of Justice in a 2016 judgment on an air strike in Kunduz, Afghanistan, clung to the
traditional interpretation that neither the specific regime of state responsibility under
German law is applicable to military activities in armed conflict nor that there is an
individual right to compensation for violations of international humanitarian law,68
the FCC might take a different stance in an appropriate case.
But it is not only the increasing focus on the individual in international law which
fosters such a change in the conceptualization of how to treat individuals during and
in the aftermath of an armed conflict. The perception that the individual should be
compensated as a matter of law is also due to the predominant nature of armed
conflicts during the last 20 years. Military interventions under the umbrella of the
UN or by NATO member states were often not understood as being conducted
against a whole state and its population but against non-state actors or ‘rogue’
63Cf Christian Marxsen/Anne Peters (eds), ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict: Impulses
from the Max Planck Trialogues’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 78 (2018), 519-633.
64UN General Assembly, Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 16 December 2005, UN Doc A/Res/60/147. See also
Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
65Philipp Stöckle, ‘Victims Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place: Individual Compensation
Claims against Troop-Contributing States’, Die Friedens-Warte 88 (2013), 119-141, at 128.
66Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 13 August 2013, 2 BvR 2660/06, 2 BvR 487/07, (German
Constitutional Court Order of Non-Acceptance), para 52.
67Ibid, para 55.
68BGH, Kunduz (n 48).
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governments. Accordingly, the post-conflict order needed to distinguish more
clearly between different groups and individuals within a state.69 Accordingly, the
affected population should be redressed for any harm incurred during the armed
conflict, or at least during the phase of post-conflict reconstruction. However, the
issue of individual reparations in cases of mass atrocities should be treated cau-
tiously. Military interventions with an aim of stabilizing another state and even of
protecting human rights may in the near future diminish in frequency while more
traditional forms of armed conflict may re-emerge, such as in Ukraine and Syria.
In this context, it is important to note that in current debates within the Interna-
tional Law Commission on crimes against humanity, the assertion that an individual
right to reparation in cases of mass atrocities exists, or should exist, under general
international law is apparently being treated carefully. The Special Rapporteur
emphasized in his third report of 2017 that:
[T]here appears to be recognition (. . .) that establishing an individual right to reparation for
each victim may be problematic in the context of a mass atrocity.70 (. . .) While reparation
specific to each of the victims may be warranted, such as through the use of regular civil
claims processes in national courts or through a specially designed process of mass claims
compensation, in some situations only collective forms of reparation may be feasible or
preferable, such as the building of monuments of remembrance or the reconstruction of
schools, hospitals, clinics and places of worship.71
This more cautious approach takes into account the complexities of ending armed
conflicts and negotiating peace deals. An individual right to monetary compensation
based on civil claims proceedings in cases of mass atrocities does not allow for
taking into account broader political considerations related to establishing a stable
post-war order. Such a right is conducive to bilateral settlements between the state
parties concerned, which might create new forms of injustice towards other groups
of victims; it might also overburden negotiations for a settlement to an ongoing
armed conflict. Take Syria as an example: the invocation of the individual criminal
responsibility of Bashar al-Assad is already obstructing peace talks. Likewise, ex
post claims for monetary compensation before civil courts in the aftermath of a
comprehensive peace agreement entail the tangible risk that parties to a conflict will
be even more reluctant to reach agreement if they cannot rely on the stability of such
an agreement.72 The various armed conflicts and conditions for ending them differ
considerably among each other. The specificities of these situations speak against
any generalization with a view of changing existing international law. Those respon-
sible for concluding peace agreements which allow for reconciliation should have a
broad political discretion in reaching this aim. While individual claims for monetary
69Gabriela Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’, European Journal of International Law 24 (2013),
391-421, at 393.
70Sean D Murphy, Third Report on Crimes against Humanity, 23 January 2017, UN Doc A/CN.4/
704, para 191.
71Ibid, para 194.
72Tomuschat, ‘National and International Law’ 2014 (n 18), at 191; see also Christian Tomuschat,
chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, in this volume.
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compensation might be part of such a process, as in Colombia,73 it seems wise to
leave room for the possibility that only collective and symbolic forms of reparation
will be foreseen.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Instead of furthering the law’s legitimacy, judgments such as Sentenza 238/2014
may erode the legitimacy of international law. Such a criticism is not sustained by a
‘realistic’ view that fosters state sovereignty for the protection of national interests.
To my mind, we should not forget that the stability of the international legal order
itself, as guaranteed by concepts such as immunities or the respect for its juridical
organs serves to protect human rights, albeit indirectly. It might be wiser to accept
that not every injustice can be addressed by law, that law cannot always provide a
satisfying solution, and that such solutions are sometimes better looked for and
confined to the political stage. In line with the passage of the 2012 ICJ Judgment,74 a
solution sustainable for both sides could be seen in negotiations at the political level.
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Part III
Remedies
A Plea for Legal Peace
Riccardo Pavoni
Abstract This chapter advocates legal peace between Germany and Italy as the
most sensible and appropriate way to deal with the aftermath of Sentenza 238/2014
of the Italian Constitutional Court and its declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
2012 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities.
This plea does not only arise from frustration with the current impasse but also from
the suspicion that the public good of legal peace has never seriously been canvassed
by the Italian and German governments. Section II takes stock of the legal develop-
ments relating to the dispute between Germany and Italy since Sentenza 238/2014
was delivered. It especially focuses on the attitudes of the governments concerned,
both in the context of the ongoing proceedings before Italian courts and elsewhere. It
finds such attitudes opaque and unduly dismissive of the necessity to devise legal
peace in the interest of the victims and of the integrity of international law.
Section III highlights how the behaviour of the governments so far was at odds
with the successful outcome of other intergovernmental negotiations concerning
reparations for crimes committed during World War II (WWII), a process which
has not been entirely finalized, as evidenced by the 2014 Agreement between the US
and France on compensation for the French railroad deportees who were excluded
from prior French reparation programmes. The Agreement between the US and
France and all previous similar arrangements were concluded under mounting
pressure of litigation before domestic courts against those states (and/or their
companies) that were responsible for unredressed WWII crimes, thus a situation
resembling the current state of the dispute between Germany and Italy. It is telling
that litigation ended when the courts took cognizance of the stipulation of intergov-
ernmental agreements establishing fair mechanisms for compensating the plaintiffs
and victims of the relevant crimes. Such practice, therefore, is essentially in line with
the proposition that state immunity (for human rights violations) is essentially con-
ditional on effective alternative remedies for the victims. This and other controver-
sial aspects related to the law of state immunity—such as the nature of state
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immunity, the North American remedies against immunity for state sponsors of
terrorism, and the persistent dynamism of pertinent practice—are revisited in section
IV. The purpose is to suggest that certainty about the law of international immuni-
ties, as allegedly flowing from the 2012 ICJ Judgment, is more apparent than real and
that this consideration should a fortiori urge the realization of legal peace in the
German–Italian affair.
I. Introduction
This chapter argues that ‘legal peace’ between Germany and Italy is the most
sensible and appropriate way of dealing with the aftermath of Sentenza 238/2014
of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC),1 which in substance held that the 2012
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities2 could not
be given effect as it breached the human right to judicial protection under the Italian
Constitution. The ItCC also refused to afford any domestic legal effects to the
ICJ-backed rule of state immunity for unredressed international crimes. Although
such a plea for legal peace arises, in part, from the frustrating impasse that presently
characterizes the dispute between Germany and Italy, it is especially driven by the
disturbing impression that, in the context of unredressed World War II (WWII)
crimes, the public good of legal peace has never been canvassed seriously by either
the Italian or German government.
Admittedly, there is no silver bullet for shaping legal peace against the back-
ground of the German–Italian affair. Legal peace might well be channelled through
arbitration, thereby conclusively determining whether Germany or Italy, or both,
have defaulted with respect to compensation owed to Italian Military Internees
(IMIs) and similarly situated victims of Nazi crimes. In any event, the crucial step
would be the elaboration of a fair institutional and exclusive funding mechanism
entrusted with processing outstanding compensation claims. While foreclosing
parallel private litigation, this mechanism should be capable of giving victims a
voice. The lack of an effective remedy for the victims, other than judicial pro-
ceedings in Italy, was indeed a key consideration underlying Sentenza 238/2014.3
There are sound reasons for believing that the setting up of a meaningful compen-
satory procedure would lead to the suspension or termination of the remaining cases
pending against Germany before Italian courts.4
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
3See Riccardo Pavoni, ‘How Broad is the Principle Upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in
Judgment No. 238?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 573-585.
4For instance, the Tribunal of Sulmona has recently awarded damages in the amount of €6.6 million
against Germany and in favour of the heirs of victims of a WWII massacre in the Abruzzo region
and of the Municipality of Roccaraso. See Tribunale di Sulmona, Judgment of 2 November 2017,
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Section II takes stock of the legal developments in the German–Italian affair since
Sentenza 238/2014 was delivered. It focuses on the attitudes of the governments
concerned within the proceedings before Italian courts and elsewhere. It finds these
attitudes opaque and unduly dismissive of the necessity to promote legal peace in the
interest of the victims and for the integrity of international law. Section III highlights
how the behaviour of the two governments is at odds with the successful outcomes
of other intergovernmental negotiations prompted by litigation before US courts
relating to crimes committed during WWII, a process meaningfully started in the
1990s and still unfinished. Tellingly, litigation ended when the courts took cogni-
zance of the stipulation of intergovernmental agreements establishing fair mecha-
nisms for compensating victims, whereas the outstanding cases currently pending
before US courts precisely involve situations that are not covered by such agree-
ments. Such practice, therefore, is essentially in line with the proposition that state
immunity (for human rights violations) should be conditional on effective alternative
remedies for the victims.5 Accordingly, section IV underscores that a number of
Case No 20/2015, available at http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/sentenze/ITA-Tribunale_di_
Sulmona_strage_di_pietransieri_Sulmona.pdf; for a comment, see Ferdinando Franceschelli, ‘Ger-
many Held Responsible for the Nazi Massacre of Pietransieri’, Italian Yearbook of International
Law 27 (2017), 449-452.
Various enforcement proceedings are also ongoing. See lately, Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of
3 September 2019, No 21995/2019 (Deutsche Bahn v Sterea Ellada Region), allowing the contin-
uation of garnishment proceedings against debts owed to Deutsche Bahn by the Italian railway
company for the purpose of recovering the damages awarded to the victims (and their heirs) of the
WWII Distomo massacre in Greece. However, in parallel proceedings relating to the same dispute,
the Court of Cassation held that Villa Vigoni—real estate owned by Germany—enjoyed immunity
from measures of constraint as it was exclusively used for sovereign, non-commercial purposes; see
Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 8 June 2018, No 14885/2018 (Sterea Ellada Region v Germany
and Presidency of the Council of Ministers).
5Although with several variations and to different degrees, this view is regarded by a growing
number of authors as the sole means of reconciling international and domestic law in this area, see,
eg, Micaela Frulli, ‘“Time Will Tell Who Just Fell and Who’s Left Behind”: On the Clash between
the International Court of Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 587-594, at 589-592; Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Access to Justice in
Constitutional and International Law: The Recent Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court’,
Italian Yearbook of International Law 24 (2014), 7-23, at 18-20; Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy): On Right Outcomes and Wrong Terms’, German
Yearbook of International Law 55 (2012), 281-318, at 312 (although taking a very cautious view
and, however, concluding that IMIs did have an effective remedy in Germany); Riccardo Pavoni,
‘Human Rights and the Immunities of Foreign States and International Organizations’, in Erika de
Wet/Jure Vidmar (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (Oxford: OUP
2012), 71-113; Benedetto Conforti, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the
Immunity of Foreign States: A Missed Opportunity’, Italian Yearbook of International Law
21 (2011), 133-142, at 138-142 (largely foreshadowing the decision of the Constitutional Court
discussed in the present book: ‘[I]mplementation [of international law] cannot be pushed to the
point of compromising the fundamental values of the State community, usually guaranteed by
constitutional rules (. . .). There is no doubt that the right of access to justice is part of such
fundamental values (. . .), and that, consequently, a customary rule inconsistent with Article
24 [of the Italian Constitution] cannot be applied in Italy’). Other authors point out that the
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tensions and controversial issues continue to affect the doctrine of state immunity,
starting from the unresolved question of its rationale and nature. The best illustration
thereof is no doubt offered by the contemporary practice of Canada and the US. The
ultimate purpose of section IV is to suggest that certainty about the law of interna-
tional immunities, as allegedly flowing from the 2012 ICJ Judgment, is more
apparent than real and that this consideration should a fortiori urge the realization
of legal peace in the German–Italian affair. A few concluding remarks are made in
section V.
II. Confrontation and Mutual Neglect Versus Legal Peace
The conduct of the two governments concerned both prior to and in the aftermath of
Sentenza 238/2014 has been characterized—to different degrees and with different
modalities—by reticence, ambiguity, and underground talks. Paradigmatic of this
conduct was the inaugural event in late 2016 of the permanent exhibition dedicated
to IMIs in the Berlin-Schöneweide Lager, a rather well-preserved WWII concentra-
tion camp. On that occasion, speaking before a wide audience including represen-
tatives of IMIs associations, the German and Italian Foreign Ministers made
absolutely no mention of the unresolved legal issues raised by the exclusion of
IMIs from any meaningful WWII reparation scheme and the related litigation against
Germany in Italian courts.6 After all, the two countries were smoothly proceed-
ing along the direction set forth in their 2008 Trieste Joint Declaration, whence they
announced the objective of creating a ‘common culture of memory’ regarding WWII
(with a focus on the terrible vicissitudes of IMIs) and the establishment of an Italo-
German Historical Commission for that purpose. There was apparently no link
between the financing of the exhibition and the German–Italian dispute. It is clear,
however, that the great absentees in that context were Italian judges and Sentenza
238/2014.
Interestingly, a few days later the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian parlia-
ment—endorsed by the executive—passed a motion concerning WWII crimes
‘alternative remedies test’ also constitutes the sole means of reconciling international law with itself,
see Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘A Historic Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the Balance
Between the Italian Legal Order’s Fundamental Values and Customary International Law’, Italian
Yearbook of International Law 24 (2015), 37-52, at 46 (‘When the fundamental principles of the
national legal system guaranteed by the review of national supreme courts also correspond to the
“common values” of the international community, these courts also act in the service of the
international legal system. Essentially, in such cases, national courts protect international law
from itself’). These authors evidently disapprove of the contrary conclusion reached by the ICJ in
its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, when it flatly rejected the so-called last resort argument
advanced by Italy; see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), paras 101-103.
6Frank-Walter Steinmeier/Paolo Gentiloni/Michele Montagno, ‘Zwischen allen Stühlen—die
Geschichte der italienischen Militärinternierten 1943-1945’, (28 November 2016), available at
https://www.istitutocervi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Istituto-Cervi-a-Berlino.pdf.
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committed against Italian nationals, which indirectly allows us to understand the
approach of the Italian government toward the WWII German reparations affair.7
The motion did not even mention Sentenza 238/2014, whereas it gave account of
the 2012 ICJ Judgment and recalled that the latter ‘unfortunately’8 upheld
Germany’s immunity before Italian courts. It committed the Italian government
to make sure that Germany will continue to finance initiatives aimed at the
reconstruction of a ‘shared historical memory’9 and ‘moral reparation’10 for the
victims of WWII crimes. The next steps, according to this motion, should there-
fore consist in having Germany renew its contribution to the German–Italian Fund
for the Future (Fondo italo-tedesco per il futuro) for the years 2018–2021. This
fund was jointly established in 2013 and operationalized thanks to an initial
contribution by Germany to the amount of €4 million. These resources should
be channelled into the construction or restoration of places of commemoration
and comparable monuments, as well as into the development of memory-related
online resources, such as an Atlas of the Nazi–Fascist massacres committed in
Italy between 1943 and 1945 and a Biographic Lexicon of IMIs.11 Thus, the 2016
motion of the Italian parliament overlooked the many final judicial decisions
awarding civil damages against Germany and diverted attention to the need for
the government to secure German cooperation in the execution of criminal
convictions of German nationals found responsible for Nazi crimes by Italian
courts (which is a reference to the long-standing problem of the failed extradition
of such nationals by Germany).
Therefore, several years after Sentenza 238/2014, the Italian government has yet
to illustrate to its citizens its own official position on this decision, especially to those
citizens most concerned: the plaintiffs and the judgment holders in the various
pending or concluded proceedings relating to WWII Nazi crimes.
Clues about the Italian executive’s position may emerge from a perusal of its legal
arguments outlined before the Italian courts dealing or having dealt with WWII
Nazi-related cases. But this is deeply unsatisfactory when seen against rule of law
notions such as a government’s responsiveness and transparency to its citizenry.
While Sentenza 238/2014 may arguably be considered a ‘shock to the international
legal community’,12 the Italian lay public are largely unaware of this judgment,
despite its importance for Italian national history and for the evolution of Italian
7Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament, Motion No 1-01375, adopted on 6 December 2016.
8Ibid (translated by the author).
9Ibid (translated by the author).
10Ibid (translated by the author).
11For an account of the genesis of this fund and a list of initiatives and projects that it has financed so
far, see Rappresentanze tedesche in Italia, ‘Cultura della memoria’, available at https://italien.diplo.
de/it-it/themen/kultur/CulturadellaMemoria-Ordner?openAccordionId¼item-1599424%2D%
2Dpanel.
12Christian Tomuschat, ‘The National Constitution Trumps International Law’, Italian Journal of
Public Law 6 (2014), 189-196, at 189 (emphasis added).
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sociological attitudes towards a tragic past which large sectors of the (older) popu-
lation have never come to terms with.13
What is clear is that, regardless of their political inclination, the changing
majorities leading the Italian government over the past decades have consistently
pursued agendas that were decidedly at variance with the positions and parallel activ-
ities of the Italian judiciary. Soon after Sentenza 238/2014, the government surrep-
titiously took advantage of the parliamentary debates on the conversion into law of a
decree containing a variety of measures on civil procedure in order to introduce an
amendment making the attachment of any bank account held in Italy by foreign
states in fact impossible. According to this provision,14 such bank accounts are not
subject to execution provided that the head of a diplomatic mission or consular post
of a foreign state has declared to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
relevant bank that the money deposited therein is exclusively intended for use in the
performance of diplomatic and/or consular functions. The foreign state’s declaration
triggers an absolute protection for such bank accounts, as it cannot be rebutted or
challenged in court on any ground whatsoever. This is a very generous provision15
on foreign state bank account immunity, which goes beyond customary international
law and Article 21(1)(a) of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property (UNCSI).16 Arguably, by essentially obliterating the role
of the judiciary in this matter, the provision is inconsistent with the Italian Consti-
tution.17 However, the key point here is that, by hastily seeking solutions to the
13Even judges of the ItCC are not immune to this sociological dimension of WWII events and Nazi
Germany’s occupation of Italy from late 1943. Sabino Cassese, a member of the ItCC at the time of
Sentenza 238/2014, nicely recalls how the deliberations on the case were oscillating between
sophisticated reflections on the legal issues at stake and rhetorical recollections by certain judges
who were evoking the ‘Germans at their doorstep’ (‘Esercizi di ingegno, sottili domande giuridiche
si alternano con esercizi di retorica di chi ricorda i tedeschi a casa propria’), Sabino Cassese,
Dentro la Corte: Diario di un giudice costituzionale (Bologna: il Mulino 2015), 261.
14Art 19-bis of Italian Law-decree No 132 of 12 September 2014, converted by Law No 162 of
10 November 2014.
15For instance, compare Section 13(5) of the UK State Immunity Act (SIA), according to which the
head of a foreign state’s diplomatic mission is entitled to produce a certificate ‘to the effect that any
property is not in use or intended for use by or on behalf of the State for commercial purposes’;
however, such a certificate ‘shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact unless the contrary is
proved’ (emphasis added) (SIA 1978, 17 ILM (1978) 1123). On the persistent key role of domestic
courts in this specific area, see Chester Brown/Roger O’Keefe, ‘Article 21’, in Roger O’Keefe/
Christian J Tams (eds), The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP 2013), 334-347, at 341-342, 347: ‘It will probably
remain the case, even in the application of Article 21(1), that one court’s actum jure imperii is
another’s actum jure gestionis’.
16UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004),
UN Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
17Cf Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 15 July 1992, No 329/1992 (Condor). For a fierce critique
of the provision in question, see Benedetto Conforti, ‘Il legislatore torna indietro di circa
novant’anni: la nuova norma sull’esecuzione sui conti correnti di Stati stranieri’, Rivista di diritto
internazionale 98 (2015), 558-561.
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German–Italian contingencies, the Italian government runs the risk of turning a blind
eye to opaque transactions and abuses facilitated by the privilege afforded to any
foreign state bank accounts held in Italy. One should hope that the competent
authorities will retain sufficient surveillance powers over such accounts.
Moreover, far from withdrawing from treaty provisions conferring jurisdiction on
disputes involving Italy to international bodies, on 25 November 2014 the Italian
government deposited its declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute.18 This course of action seems
imprudent and untimely in the wake of Sentenza 238/2014, as the latter may spur
domestic judicial proceedings against any foreign states accused of international
crimes.19 Such proceedings may in turn be easily challenged before the ICJ on the
strength of its 2012 Judgment. The Italian declaration contains no reservation to the
ICJ jurisdiction relating to disputes in this area. The initiative of the Italian govern-
ment in question also glaringly confirms the absence of dialogue between the
executive and the judiciary on the problems arising from the Italian jurisprudence
denying state immunity for international crimes.
As to the ambiguous judicial strategies pursued by the Italian government in the
outstanding proceedings against Germany, very little has changed vis-à-vis the
pre-Sentenza situation.20 The government supports Germany’s position with respect
to most of the key aspects of the dispute (such as the absence of jurisdiction of Italian
courts, the unconditional obligation to comply with the 2012 ICJ Judgment, the
prescription of the actions), save that it strongly contests its duty to hold Germany
harmless from any WWII reparation claims by Italian nationals, a duty allegedly
flowing from the 1947 Peace Treaty and the bilateral 1961 Bonn Agreements.21
On the other side, the most salient feature of Germany’s recent conduct is a
refusal to participate in the compensation proceedings resumed in Italian courts in
the wake of Sentenza 238/2014. In all such proceedings Germany has been and will
18For the text of the declaration, see Italy, ‘Declarations recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as
compulsory’, (25 November 2014), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/it; for a
comment, see Paolo Palchetti, ‘“A key institution for interpreting international law and guarantee-
ing global compliance with its provisions”: la dichiarazione italiana di accettazione della
competenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 98 (2015),
114-125.
19See Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 29 October 2015, No 43696/2015 (In the Matter of
Criminal Proceedings against Dobrivoje Opačić; Podrute Massacre case), finding Serbia liable
to pay damages to the heirs of victims of the downing of a military helicopter operating on a
humanitarian mission during the 1990s Yugoslav wars.
20See, eg, Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 6 July 2015, No 2469/2015 (Simoncioni v Germany),
3–4.
21Such a duty would most clearly emerge from the ‘hold-harmless clause’ of Art 2(2) of the
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain
Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian
version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963 No 19, 668. See also Stefan Kadelbach,
chapter ‘State Immunity, Individual Compensation for Victims of Human Rights Crimes, and
Future Prospects’, and Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
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be a respondent in absentia,22 as well as the addressee of a number of default
judgments awarding damages and costs. Germany has consistently communicated
to the courts that its decision stemmed from the consideration that such proceedings
constituted a violation of the principles of international law upheld by the 2012 ICJ
Judgment and has made reference to a diplomatic Note Verbale of 5 January 2015
from Germany’s embassy in Rome to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
further explanation.23 According to this Note Verbale, Sentenza 238/2014 ‘cannot
change anything of what has been found by the ICJ with respect to the content and
scope of the jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by Germany before Italian courts’.24
Indeed, the Note continues, pursuant to a well-settled rule of international law ‘the
principle of State immunity cannot be limited by the domestic law of a State, not
even by fundamental principles of the national constitutional order’.25 The Note
also takes the view that the plaintiffs would be able to enjoy equivalent protection
before German courts.26 It concludes with a ‘precautionary warning’27 reminding
the Italian government of the risk of further litigation and outlining the consequences
arising from the continuation of judicial proceedings in terms of state responsibility
and reparation.
Germany has thus chosen a confrontational posture vis-à-vis Italian courts, which
have at times reacted with irritation and bewilderment.28 Crucially, Germany has
also taken an uncompromising attitude by refusing to accede to the requests from
several courts to negotiate an out-of-court settlement with the plaintiffs (where the
latter were heirs of the victims) and Italy through conciliation or mediation by a
22See, eg, Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment of 28 September 2015, No 723/2015 (Rabizzoni v
Germany); Corte d’Appello di Brescia, Judgment of 6 June 2016, No 515/2016 (Currà v Germany);
Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 13 January 2017, No 762/2017 (Parrini v Germany).
23Note Verbale of 5 January 2015, 2/15, RK 553.32.
24Ibid, para 3 (translated by the author).
25Ibid, para 4 (translated by the author, emphasis added).
26Ibid, para 6. This argument is particularly difficult to follow, as Germany is perfectly aware that
all IMIs’ claims have in the past been rejected by German courts, including the Federal Constitu-
tional Court (Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277). Although such courts have
resorted to a variety of arguments for that purpose, the veritable stumbling block for IMIs’ claims—
and probably the most controversial aspect lying at the origin of the whole dispute between
Germany and Italy—was their ineligibility for compensation under the funds made available by
the German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung
und Zukunft) due to their freshly rediscovered, allegedly inalienable entitlement to prisoner of war
(POW) status at the time of their deportation (see Section 11(3) of the German Law of 2 August
2000 establishing the Foundation, Bundesgesetzblatt I 11 August 2000 No 38, 1263). For further
detail, see ECtHR, Associazione Nazionale Reduci v Germany, Decision of 4 September 2007,
Application No 45563/04, 3-8.
27Note Verbale 2/15 (n 23), para 8 (translated by the author).
28Including the Court of Cassation, which has stigmatized the unorthodox means employed by
Germany for communicating with the Court and accordingly declared inadmissible a letter from
Germany’s embassy enclosing the Note Verbale discussed in the text; see Corte di Cassazione,
Judgment of 29 July 2016, No 15812/2016 (Gamba v Germany), para 1; see also Tribunale di
Firenze, Judgment No 2469/2015 (n 20), 17.
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commission chosen by the parties and including lawyers with an expertise in public
international law. The Tribunal of Florence has been the most creative in this context
by submitting its own proposed settlements to the parties. For instance, the proposal
in the Alessi case envisaged a study or cultural visit to Germany worth €15,000 for
each of the three plaintiffs, in exchange for the withdrawal of their compensation
claims.29 In the face of Germany’s tacit dismissal of these proposals, the courts
proceeded to adjudicate the merits of the cases in favour of the plaintiffs and awarded
them substantial damages.30 On its part, the Italian government has also never
expressed any interest in participating in these non-adversarial conciliatory pro-
cedures. Given the apparent disengagement of the two governments, the Italian
courts were trying to make the best out of the ICJ’s consideration that the
unredressed grievances of Italian victims of Nazi crimes ‘could be the subject of
further negotiation (. . .) with a view to resolving the issue’.31
Despite the obiter dictum nature of this remark by the ICJ, and if only for reasons
of transparency, the Italian and German governments should clearly communicate to
the international community whether and to what extent they have carried out such
negotiations in good faith. Most significantly, do they think they have already
reckoned with the historical ‘justice/equity gap’,32 which has uniquely affected
IMIs and similarly situated victims? Are monuments and historical reports sufficient
to close in a dignified way this specific and tragic chapter of WWII?33 Since they—
as well as scholars34—disagree on the nature and scope of the labyrinthine post-
WWII regulation of reparations by Germany, why has arbitration or similar means of
dispute settlement not been contemplated?
While answers to these questions are long overdue, the present situation may be
regarded as a recipe for failure, which especially runs against the interest of the
individual direct victims who, being now in their (late) nineties, are sadly passing
away at an accelerating rate. Whereas further litigation will likely perpetuate the
‘zero-sum game’35 that the whole dispute so far has turned out to be, another key
29Tribunale di Firenze, Order of 23 March 2015 (Alessi v Germany). See the case commentary by
Serena Forlati, Italian Yearbook of International Law 25 (2015), 497-509, at 502.
30See, eg, Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 22 February 2016, No 691/2016 (Donati v
Scheungraber, Stommel and Germany).
31ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), para 104.
32Michael Bothe, ‘Remedies of Victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanities: Some
Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States’, in Anne Peters/
Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global
Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2015), 99-115, at 110-111; 113-114.
33Cf Motion No 1-01375 of the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament (n 7).
34Compare Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Case of Germany v. Italy before the ICJ’, in Peters,
Immunities 2015 (n 32), 87-98, at 95-98, with Michael Bothe, ‘The Decision of the Italian
Constitutional Court Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of Germany’, Italian Yearbook of
International Law 24 (2014), 25-35, at 31-35.
35Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice and Its Pitfalls: Reparation for War Crimes and the Italian
Constitutional Court’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 629-636, at 633.
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question remains: why have the two governments—at least throughout the past
20 years—not meaningfully embraced ‘legal peace’ as the overarching public
good guiding their actions? Broadly understood, legal peace would involve a
negotiated settlement agreement prescribing the termination of the outstanding
judicial proceedings against Germany in exchange for a reasonable compensatory
scheme available to the plaintiffs and co-funded by the two governments.
In the first place, legal peace would be in the interest of the victims, but it would
also be in the interest of the integrity of the international and national legal orders.
Taking a confrontational, unbending position is unhelpful to both sides when
national supreme courts plausibly invoke fundamental constitutional principles as
the last bulwark against international law rules. Such a position only exacerbates the
impression that international law and domestic legal orders are two irreconcilable
worlds apart. Dialogue and interaction among the relevant actors, as well as salutary
competition between and mutual reinforcement of international and domestic law,
seem necessary instead. Moreover, the achievement of legal peace has always been a
crucial consideration for German and other governments when dealing with the
outstanding problems arising from WWII reparation regimes.
III. Why the French Railroad Deportees and Not IMIs?
It is frequently suggested that the time factor runs against the soundness of the
reparation claims of IMIs and similarly situated Italian victims of Nazi crimes. For
instance, it has been stated that, as compared to state immunity litigation involving
torture and comparable crimes ‘of current or recent regimes’,36 the issue of IMIs
makes a bad case because it ‘concerns crimes committed more than one generation
ago’.37 This would imply that ‘[e]ven if we do not accept any formal prescription for
the prosecution of such egregious crimes, the lapse of time does weaken the
claims’.38
On the basis of intertemporal fairness and other grounds, I think that the lapse of
time does weaken the argument that immunity should be lost when the defendant
state is accused of grave breaches of human rights, thereby creating the possibility
that the relevant ‘ancient’ conduct might come to be reassessed through the prism of
modern legal achievements and standards. I have always had the impression that a
significant part of the criticism levelled against the Italian Ferrini jurisprudence39
36Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph—How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the





39Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/2004 (Ferrini). As is well-known,
this is the landmark decision where for the first time a foreign state was denied immunity from the
jurisdiction of Italian courts in a case involving international crimes.
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stems from these intertemporal considerations,40 where ‘intertemporal’ is not
necessarily used in a technical sense but also refers to the contemporary uneasi-
ness of Italy and Germany, and Italians and Germans alike, about discussions that
might reopen the old wounds of their respective national history. With its histor-
ical overtones, the German–Italian controversy has unduly monopolized the
‘human rights versus immunity’ debate, thus detracting attention from the legal
advancement that might result from the contemporary affirmation of a narrow
human rights limitation to state immunity, namely, one confined to the most
serious breaches of human rights that have not been, and cannot be, redressed
by the responsible state.
Conversely, I do not think that the passage of time per se constitutes a valid
reason for dismissing the substantive claim for reparation of a whole class of victims
of war crimes, even though such crimes date back to many decades ago. This is
especially true in our case where the responsibility for those crimes is acknowledged
and what is disputed is only whether Germany has fully discharged its obligation to
provide reparation for the resulting injuries. Rather, the time factor should encourage
a sense of urgency in the governments’ approaches to, at the very least, the
outstanding claims of Italian WWII direct victims, that is, the survivors who are
now in their (late) nineties.
It is precisely this sense of urgency—and the determination to attain a lasting
legal peace in the face of increasing WWII litigation before national courts—that, as
recently as 2014, led to an agreement between the US and France on compensation
for the so-called French railroad deportees who were excluded from prior French
reparation programmes.41 The basic bargain is well-known, as it builds upon
extensive US practice in this area:42 France made US$60 million available to satisfy
claims of uncompensated railroad deportees,43 while the US was obligated ‘to
40See, eg, Carlo Focarelli, Diritto internazionale (Padua: Cedam 4th ed 2017), at 332: ‘Quel che
conta è circoscrivere l’eccezione umanitaria a specifici crimini commessi oggi o che verranno
commessi in futuro—abbandonando l’idea di “punire” i crimini passati, tanto meno di un unico
Stato, tenuto conto che pressoché tutti gli Stati ne hanno commessi e non è chiaro quanto indietro
nel tempo si debba andare’ (‘What is important is to circumscribe the human rights exception to
specific crimes which are committed today or will be committed in the future, thereby abandoning
the idea of ‘punishing’ past crimes, especially crimes of a single state, taking into account that
nearly all states have committed such crimes and it is not clear how far back in time we should go’
(translated by the author)).
41Agreement on Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-Related Deportation from France
Who Are not Covered by French Programs, 8 December 2014, in force 1 December 2015, TIAS No
15-1101. See Ronald Bettauer, ‘A Measure of Justice for Uncompensated French Railroad Depor-
tees during the Holocaust’, ASIL Insights, (1 March 2016), available at https://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/20/issue/5/measure-justice-uncompensated-french-railroad-deportees-during-holo
caust. See also Filippo Fontanelli, chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, in this volume.
42For an exhaustive account by the key US negotiator, see Stuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice:
Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II (New York: Public
Affairs 2004).
43Agreement on Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-Related Deportation from France,
2014 (n 41), Art 4(1).
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recognize and affirmatively protect the sovereign immunity of France within the
United States legal system with regard to Holocaust deportation claims and, consis-
tent with its constitutional structure, to undertake all actions necessary to ensure an
enduring legal peace at the federal, state, and local levels of the Government of the
United States of America’.44
The reason for mentioning the 2014 French Railroad Deportees Agreement is
by no means to suggest that it should be taken as a template for a similar
outcome to potential negotiations on the unresolved issue of Italian victims of
Nazi crimes. The historical and legal backgrounds are obviously different.
Instead, the Agreement is an indication that states are still reckoning with their
historical wrongs and that, under the pressure of litigation and legislative initia-
tives jeopardizing their entitlement to immunity,45 they are willing to settle past
accounts.
Indeed, the French Railroad Deportees Agreement is an example of the key role
played by state immunity litigation before domestic courts in the area of human
rights and international crimes. Whichever way one leans in the ‘immunity versus
human rights’ debate, it cannot reasonably be denied that often times and for the
sake of legal peace such litigation prompts the relevant states to go back to the
negotiating table, take a fresh look at the underlying issues, and accordingly
devise fair arrangements affording a decent measure of justice to uncompensated
victims. At the time of writing, it is uncertain whether that scenario will be
replicated, even to a degree, with regard to the claims lodged by IMIs and
comparable victims before Italian courts. Nevertheless, we should not overlook
that, were it not for the Italian Ferrini jurisprudence, the tragic and paradoxical
historical trajectory of IMIs would largely have been forgotten, as has been true
for too many decades.
In this context, it is clear that US immunity practice is paradigmatic.
That practice is multifarious and constantly evolving and it would be
unwarranted to briskly marginalize it altogether as completely detached from the
international legal framework.46 Insofar as it is relevant for current purposes,
such practice includes a substantial number of WWII reparations cases that
have spurred intergovernmental settlements and were dismissed when those
settlements were finalized. The most famous examples involve Austria,47
44Ibid, Art 2(2). See also ibid, Art 5.
45For details regarding cases and bills challenging France’s jurisdictional immunity in the US, see
Bettauer, ‘A Measure of Justice’ 2016 (n 41).
46Contra Thomas Giegerich, ‘The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated
Pissarro Painting: Recent US Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity’, in Peters, Immunities
2015 (n 32), 51-69, at 69. See further, section IV of this chapter.
47Agreement Between the Austrian Federal Government and the Government of the United States
of America Concerning the Austrian Fund ‘Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation’, 24 October
2000, in force 1 December 2000, 40 ILM 523 (2001); Joint Statement and Exchange of Notes
Between the United States and Austria Concerning the Establishment of the General Settlement
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France,48 and Germany.49 In all these instances, the mounting pressure from
WWII-related litigation against certain companies and agencies of those states,
and/or against those states as such, was a fundamental factor paving the way for the
negotiations leading up to the settlement agreements.50
Although the details of the various arrangements may be significantly different,
their common rationale, or grand bargain, is a constant feature: an exclusive com-
pensatory mechanism funded by the responsible state (and often co-funded by the
companies implicated in the relevant crimes) is set up in exchange for legal peace in
the forum state; legal peace involves the termination or suspension of judicial
proceedings against the responsible state and its companies, as well as a best-
efforts obligation on the forum state’s executive to prevent and oppose any future
challenges to the responsible state’s immunity, or at least challenges arising from
claims covered by the pertinent agreement.
As to the practice concerning Germany, it is usually recalled that US Holocaust
litigation was crucial for the conclusion of the 2000 Agreement establishing the
Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft).51 By contrast, less attention is paid to an earlier
WWII reparations agreement52 stipulated in 1995 by a recently reunified Germany
in the wake of the Princz affair, which had hitherto resulted in a decade-long
diplomatic action by the US and one of the most famous cases discussing (and
rejecting) a ius cogens exception to state immunity.53 The 1995 Agreement was thus
Fund for Nazi-Era and World War II Claims, 17 January 2001, in force 23 January 2001, 40 ILM
565 (2001).
48In addition to the 2014 Agreement between France and the US discussed earlier (n 41), see
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of France
Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II, 18 January 2001, in force
5 February 2001, 2156 UNTS 281, as amended 30-31 May 2002, and 21 February 2006.
49See text accompanying notes 51 and 52.
50See Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice 2004 (n 42), 258; 321; 342: ‘[I]t cannot be doubted that, without
the suits, the pressures they generated, and the involvement of the U.S. government they
occasioned, the massive settlements would never have occurred’. Another accompanying key factor
for the successful outcome of the negotiations in question was the threat of financial sanctions
against the companies of the states concerned that were implicated in WWII crimes (eg insurance or
manufacturing companies). This threat was repeatedly made by various US federal and local
authorities.
51Agreement Concerning the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future’, 17 July
2000, in force 19 October 2000, 39 ILM 1298 (2000). See, eg, Bothe, ‘The Decision of the Italian
Constitutional Court’ 2015 (n 34), 34; Roland Bank, ‘The New Programs for Payments to Victims
of National Socialist Injustice’, German Yearbook of International Law 44 (2001), 307-352, at 309;
313-314; 321-322; 325-327; Leora Bilsky, ‘Transnational Holocaust Litigation’, European Journal
of International Law 23 (2012), 349-375, at 353-355.
52Agreement Concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States Nationals Who Were Victims of
National Socialist Measures of Persecution, 19 September 1995, and Supplementary Agreement
Effected by Exchange of Notes, 25 January 1999. The 1995 Agreement is reproduced in 35 ILM
193 (1996), with an introductory note by Ronald Bettauer.
53Princz v Germany, 26 F 3d 1166 (DC Cir, 1 July 1994). See also Sampson v Germany, 250 F 3d
1145 (7th Cir, 23 May 2001).
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a sort of ad personam arrangement (and an effective exercise of diplomatic protec-
tion) making DM (Deutsche Mark) 3 million available ‘[f]or the prompt settlement
of known cases of compensation claims’54 advanced by victims of Nazi persecution
who were US nationals at the time of the injury.55 The close link between state
immunity litigation and ensuing intergovernmental negotiation and settlement is
crystal clear.
Most important, legal peace was actually achieved as a result of such diplo-
matic activity. US courts, including the US Supreme Court,56 cooperated in good
faith to that end by rejecting all remaining Holocaust claims covered by those
agreements and lodged against the states concerned and/or their agencies and
companies. The courts justified their decisions on a variety of grounds, which
prominently feature the non-justiciability of political questions and international
comity.57
Unsurprisingly, the current residues of US Holocaust litigation precisely concern
situations involving either an absence of reparations agreements between the US and
the respondent states along the lines mentioned earlier or subject matters that were
not (or not clearly) dealt with by such agreements. The first category of situations
includes a number of high-profile disputes against Hungary and several of its state
agencies for their role in the mass deportation of Hungarian Jews towards the end of
WWII (which resulted in the extermination of more than 500,000 persons) and the
ensuing systematic deprivation of their property and assets.58 The second category
involves, most significantly, cases relating to cultural property confiscated by the
Nazis and their accomplices during the Third Reich. Thus, Germany was recently
denied immunity in a prominent dispute involving a complaint for the restitution of
precious medieval devotional objects known as the Welfenschatz and currently
housed by the Museum of Decorative Arts in Berlin.59 The plaintiffs, who are
54Agreement Concerning Final Benefits, 1995 (n 52), Art 2(1) (emphasis added). Hugo Princz and
thirteen similarly situated victims were compensated with these funds.
55Ibid, Art 1.
56American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396 (Sup Ct, 23 June 2003). The Supreme
Court struck down—although with a bare majority of 5:4—a California statute imposing on insurers
doing business in California a duty to disclose information relating to Nazi-era insurance policies.
The statute was found to be unduly interfering with the US President’s foreign affairs power as
expressed in this context by the 2000 German Foundation Agreement.
57On the German Foundation Agreement, see Ungaro-Benages v Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d
1227 (11th Cir, 3 August 2004). For the agreements involving Austria and France, see Whiteman v
Dorotheum Gmbh & Co. Kg, 431 F.3d 57 (2nd Cir, 23 November 2005), and Freund v France,
592 F.Supp 2d 540 (SDNY, 19 December 2008); Scalin v Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer
Français, No 15-cv-03362, 26 March 2018 (District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
[ND Ill] 2018).
58See, eg, Simon v Hungary, No 17-7146, 28 December 2018 (DC Cir 2018); de Csepel v Hungary,
859 F.3d 1094 (DC Cir, 20 June 2017).
59Philipp v Germany, 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 (DDC 2017). The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the
first instance decision, see Philipp v Germany, 894 F.3d 406 (DC Cir 2018). On 2 July 2020, a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari lodged by Germany was granted by the US Supreme Court.
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legal successors to the original owners, successfully claimed (so far) that these art
objects were forcibly sold to the state of Prussia (a then political subdivision of the
Third Reich) in 1935, as a result of persecution against the Jewish ‘sellers’. Cru-
cially, the courts held that the absence of any intergovernmental agreements with
Germany covering the restitution of Nazi-looted art60 was a chief reason for
dismissing all German defences based on an encroachment of the foreign affairs
power of the US President, non-justiciability, international comity, and forum non
conveniens.61 The 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated
Art,62 as implemented by Germany through the creation of an Advisory Commission
for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, were no
bar to that conclusion, given the non-binding nature of the former instrument and the
ineffectiveness of the latter remedy.
The reason for discussing this US practice is that it provides a most useful lesson
to the German and Italian governments: dialogue and non-adversarial means of
dispute settlement, transparently implemented with the involvement of the victims,
are the only avenues to achieve legal peace and resolve the current impasse. Such
conduct would also dispose of any unpleasant feelings that the US, due to its political
and economic leverage, is capable of accomplishing in this area what is beyond the
reach of other states.
Reliance on US Holocaust litigation and practice would have provided significant
support to the Italian Ferrini jurisprudence. The Ferrini Court instead preferred to
quote the controversial US terrorism exception to state immunity and related US
judicial decisions.63
IV. North American Remedies Against Immunities
The ICJ’s holding that immunity gives rise to a right enjoyed by states under
customary international law should not be taken as an obvious and granitic conclu-
sion.64 A more comprehensive and nuanced position was possible and would have
been preferable.65 Anne Peters, for instance, points out that immunities are a ‘messy
60The German Foundation Agreement, 2000 (n 51), basically ignores this subject matter.
61DDC, Philipp (n 59), 74-87; DC Cir, Philipp (n 59), 416-418.
62This set of principles was endorsed on 3 December 1998 by 44 states and 13 NGOs participating
in the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets. For a follow-up, see Terezín Declaration
on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues, adopted on 30 June 2009 by 46 states. For background,
see Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice 2004 (n 42), 187-204.
63Corte di Cassazione, Judgment No 5044/2004 (n 39), para 10.2.
64ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), paras 53 and 56.
65Riccardo Pavoni, ‘An American Anomaly? On the ICJ’s Selective Reading of United States
Practice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011),
143-159.
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affair’66 as they ‘oscillate between law, politics, and comity’;67 they are ‘bastards’,68
she insists, created by the ‘engagement of law with politics, of international law with
domestic law, of public law with private law’.69 Further, she convincingly highlights
that, ‘to the extent that immunities do pertain to the legal realm’,70 the relentless
interaction of pertinent international and national jurisprudence makes this area of
law ‘dynamic, complex, and partly inconsistent’.71
Anne Peters is in good company. In addition to a sizable scholarship,72 her views
are echoed in the Kazemi decision73 of the Supreme Court of Canada involving (and
upholding) state immunity for torture, a decision delivered a few days before
Sentenza 238/2014. The Supreme Court noted: ‘[S]tate immunity is not solely a
rule of customary international law. It also reflects domestic choices made for policy
reasons, particularly in matters of international relations’.74 The Court also made
clear that comity provides a rationale for the recognition of immunity additional to,
inter alia, sovereign equality,75 thus essentially endorsing the same approach that
famously informs US jurisprudence.76




69Ibid. See also ibid, 5 (‘international or rather trans-national law of immunities’).
70Ibid, 5.
71Ibid, 2.
72See, eg, Jasper Finke, ‘Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?’, European
Journal of International Law 21 (2010), 853-881; Riccardo Luzzatto, ‘La giurisdizione sugli
Stati stranieri tra Convenzione di New York, norme internazionali generali e diritto interno’,
Comunicazioni e studi 23 (2007), 1-21; Lee M Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus
Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory’, American Journal of International Law
97 (2003), 741-781.
73Supreme Court of Canada, Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC
62 (10 October 2014).
74Ibid, para 45. See also ibid, para 169: ‘State immunity is a complex doctrine that is shaped by
constantly evolving international relations. Determining the exceptions to immunity requires a
thorough knowledge of diplomacy and international politics and a careful weighing of national
interests’.
75Ibid, paras 2, 36-38, 62.
76Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 486 (Sup Ct, 23 May 1983); Dole Food Co
v Patrickson, 538 US 468, 479 (Sup Ct, 22 April 2003); Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 US
677, 43 ILM 1425 (2004), 1428, 1430, 1431 (Sup Ct, 7 June 2004). The unanimous opinion of the
US Supreme Court in Venezuela v Helmerich signals a more internationally friendly approach to the
rationale and operation of the doctrine of state immunity which was arguably dictated by the
increasing tensions generated by the US practice that will now be discussed in the main text; see
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S.Ct. 1312
(Sup Ct, 1 May 2017). The Supreme Court held that a non-frivolous argument by the plaintiffs is an
insufficient standard to sustain a claim that property has been taken by a foreign state in violation of
international law, as required by the expropriation exception under Section 1605(a)(3) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 USC, Sections 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), and
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These unprecedented observations by the Supreme Court of Canada were
prompted by Canada’s adoption, just a few weeks after the 2012 ICJ Judgment, of
a terrorism exception to state immunity, according to which a foreign state does not
enjoy immunity in proceedings relating to loss or damage arising from that state’s
terrorist activity (carried out on or after 1 January 1985), and provided the same state
has been included in a list of supporters of terrorism by the government.77 This
background led the Supreme Court to conclude that ‘the amendment to the SIA [State
Immunity Act] brought by Parliament in 2012 demonstrates that forum states (. . .)
have a large and continuing role to play in determining the scope and extent of state
immunity’.78
The persistent dynamism of the law of international immunities seems beyond
question. Despite the widespread impression that international court decisions like
the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment79 and the Jones Judgment80 are bound to
yield a desirable stabilization of the pertinent practice, this field of law seems more
vibrant than ever and continues to generate high-profile disputes. Two relevant cases
are pending before the ICJ. One case81 involves the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction of a senior state official and the inviolability of diplomatic premises,
whereas the other82—which is much more interesting in our context—concerns the
alleged responsibility of the US for having repeatedly denied Iran’s immunity from
adjudication and execution in the framework of the notorious legislation83 targeting
state sponsors of terrorism designated as such by the US executive (currently, Iran,
1602-1611. The Court found support for its holding in the history and basic objectives of the FSIA.
It stated that the FSIA ‘for the most part embodies basic principles of international law long
followed both in the United States and elsewhere’ (ibid, 1319 (emphasis added)), and that to
grant foreign states immunity from suit in US courts ‘recognizes the “absolute independence of
every sovereign authority” and helps to “induc[e]” each nation state, as a matter of “international
comity”, to “respect the independence and dignity of every other”, including our own’ (ibid,
quoting Berizzi Brothers Co. v S.S. Pesaro, 271 US 562 (Sup. Ct., 7 June 1926)).
The unparalleled US expropriation exception to state immunity constitutes the legal basis of an
overwhelming part of the Holocaust jurisprudence discussed in section III of this chapter. The
exception clearly implicates iure imperii acts of foreign states, although US courts often seek to
circumvent this point.
77Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA), Bill C-10, in force 13 March 2012, Section 4(1) and
SIA, as amended by the JVTA, Section 6(1) and (2).
78SCC, Kazemi Estate (n 73), para 44.
79ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2).
80ECtHR, Jones and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 January 2014, Applications
Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06.
81ICJ, Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France), Order of 7 December
2016 (Provisional Measures), ICJ Reports 2016, 1148, Judgment of 6 June 2018 (Preliminary
Objections).
82ICJ, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v United States of America), Judgment of 13 February 2019
(Preliminary Objections). It must be noted that, with the latter judgment, the ICJ has upheld the
preliminary objection to its jurisdiction raised by the US with respect to Iran’s claims involving
jurisdictional immunities, while dismissing the other objections, ibid, para 80.
83Currently codified at FSIA (n 76), Section 1605A.
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North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). In addition, the potentially powerful stabilizing
factor represented by the UNCSI is languishing in the ratification process: more than
15 years after its adoption, only 22 states have consented to be bound by this
convention, whereas 30 ratifications are necessary for its entry into force; most
worryingly, however, only one state has ratified it over the last five years, and
many ‘key’84 states, such as Germany and the UK, appear uninterested in becoming
parties. One plausible explanation is that the large majority of states are unwilling to
sacrifice their scope for manoeuvre in immunity issues to the altar of legal predict-
ability and harmonization resulting from multilateral treaty obligations.
Yet the US and Canadian terrorism exceptions to state immunity, together with
the Italian Ferrini and Sentenza 238/2014 jurisprudence, remain the most contro-
versial manifestations of the contemporary practice in the area of international
immunities. Nearly 25 years after its enactment, damages awarded under the US
exception have now reached much-feared ‘astronomic dimensions’.85 Iran is debtor
to a multitude of (largely unpaid) judgments awarding damages for over US$56
billion.86 Most significantly, a number of legislative instruments and judicial deci-
sions have targeted various types of property held by Iran or its instrumentalities in
the US, thereby paving the way for execution against them. In many instances, such
property is apparently used or intended for governmental purposes, including the
financial assets of the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi) and state cultural
objects.87 These categories of sovereign property should thus be immune under
international law.
The situation became particularly troublesome for the Iranian authorities when in
August 2012 the US Congress approved, and the President signed into law, the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act,88 which contains a section removing
any obstacle to execution against certain Iranian financial assets specifically identi-
fied as those that had already been the subject of restraining orders in a case under the
terrorism exception.89 These assets amount to some US$1.75 billion in cash pro-
ceeds of securities owned by Bank Markazi. Soon after the US Supreme Court
upheld this ad hoc legislation in the 2016 Bank Markazi decision,90 Iran filed its
84If only for the volume of state immunity practice which involves them.
85Tomuschat, ‘The Case of Germany v. Italy’ 2015 (n 34), 94.
86ICJ, Certain Iranian Assets (n 82), Application Instituting Proceedings, 14 June 2016, Appendix
2, Table 2.
87ICJ, Certain Iranian Assets (n 82), Application Instituting Proceedings, 14 June 2016, Appendix
2, Table 3. With regard to cultural property, note, however, the decision of the US Supreme Court in
the Rubin case, which effectively halted attempts of attaching priceless Persian artefacts owned by
Iran and located in the US, Rubin v Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S.Ct. 816 (2018) (Sup Ct,
21 February 2018).
88Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, 10 August 2012, 22 USC Section 8772.
89Peterson et al v Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Case No 10 Civ 4518 (BSJ) (GWG) (District Court
for the Southern District of New York).
90Bank Markazi v Peterson, 136 S.Ct. 1310 (Sup Ct, 20 April 2016). See Kristina Daugirdas/Julian
D Mortenson, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’, Amer-
ican Journal of International Law 110 (2016), 554-595, at 555-562.
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application with the ICJ. The Supreme Court merely considered, and ruled out, a
possible violation of separation-of-powers principles by the 2012 Act. It did not even
mention international law. Only Chief Justice Roberts, in his powerful dissenting
opinion, underscored that the disputed legislation ‘strips the Bank of any protection
that federal common law, international law, or New York State law might have
offered against respondents’ claims’.91
US plaintiffs holding judgments against Iran have now found a precious ally across
the northern border. One of the most salient aspects of the Canadian terrorism
exception is a provision according to which Canadian courts ‘must recognize a
judgment of a foreign court’92 in favour of a person who has suffered losses or
damages as a result of terrorist activities by a state supporter of terrorism listed as
such in Canada (presently, Iran and Syria). This provision has already been set in
motion. For instance, a major case involves twelve US judgments against Iran that
have been granted exequatur and whose enforcement proceedings in Canada are well
underway.93 Attachment has successfully been sought against two bank accounts held
in the name of Iran’s embassy and real estate allegedly hosting Iranian cultural centres
located in Ottawa and Toronto.94 To be sure, Canada’s immunity statute makes iure
imperii property held by state supporters of terrorism generally subject to execution,
with the exception of diplomatic property, property that has cultural or historical value,
and—possibly—military property.95 In the Tracy case, both the buildings hosting
Iranian cultural centres and the embassy’s bank accounts were found not to have
‘cultural or historical value’;96 nor were they diplomatic property,97 given that they
were listed on Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs website as ‘Iran’s
Non-Diplomatic Assets in Canada’. The conclusion that the Iranian property at stake
was not entitled to immunity from execution ‘under either domestic or international
91Bank Markazi (n 90), Dissenting Opinion of Roberts CJ, joined by Sotomayor J, 1336.
92JVTA (n 77), Section 4(5).
93Tracy v The Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, 2016 ONSC 3759 (Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, 9 June 2016), affirmed 2017 ONCA 549 (Court of Appeal for Ontario, 30 June
2017). On 15 March 2018, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an application for leave to
appeal from the Court of Appeal decision. By contrast, and despite Sentenza 238/2014, the Italian
Court of Cassation has refused to recognize US judicial decisions arising from the terrorism
exception, see Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21946/2015 (Flatow v Iran), and Judgment of
28 October 2015, No 21947/2015 (Eisenfeld v Iran). For a critical and paradoxical case report on
the Flatow decision, see Thomas Weatherall, ‘Flatow v Iran’, American Journal of International
Law 110 (2016), 540-547.
94ONSC, Tracy (n 93), paras 50, 127-157. Most recently, these alleged cultural centres have been
sold for some CAN$28 million and the proceeds have been distributed to several victims (or their
heirs) of acts of terrorism sponsored by Iran. Iranian authorities have depicted such developments as
a ‘clear breach of the international law’; see Dominic Dudley, ‘Iran Takes Aim at Canada over
Property Seizures in Toronto and Ottawa’, Forbes, (17 September 2019), available at https://www.
forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2019/09/17/iran-canada-property-seizures/#23c8fe251910.
95SIA (n 77), Sections 12(1) and (3), and 16.
96ONSC, Tracy (n 93), paras 127-129.
97Ibid, paras 150, 155-156.
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law’98 was, however, deceiving, insofar as it was not supported by any meaningful
discussion of the international instruments and practice covering mixed bank accounts
or, generally, property fulfilling sovereign functions. The Canadian courts never men-
tioned the ICJ’s Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, and particularly not the section
concerning the illegality of the Italian courts’ grant of exequatur to the Greek decisions
awarding damages and costs in the proceedings relating to the Distomo massacre.99
One of the latest chapters in American exceptionalism within the area of interna-
tional immunities is the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), other-
wise known informally as the ‘9/11 Victims Bill’, a statute finally passed by the US
Congress on 28 September 2016 when an earlier veto by President Obama was over-
ridden.100 JASTA amends the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by
introducing a new Section 1605B, according to which a foreign state is not immune
from the jurisdiction of US courts in compensation proceedings brought by US
nationals for physical injury to person or property, or for death caused by (i) an act
of international terrorism in the US, and (ii) a tortious act of the foreign state,
regardless where the tort occurred.101 The amendment applies to any civil action
‘arising out of an injury to a person, property, or business on or after September
11, 2001’.102 The chief reason behind the adoption of JASTA is clearly to dispose of
the requirement in the existing terrorism exception that a foreign state be listed as a
state sponsor of terrorism in order for compensation claims to be pursued against it for
terrorist acts committed in the US, especially those that were planned and/or supported
outside of US territory. Indeed, mass litigation against Saudi Arabia instigated by
thousands of victims (individuals, businesses, and insurance companies) of 9/11
is currently unfolding before US courts.103 Similarly, the amendment circumvents the
conditions for triggering the territorial tort exception of the FSIA, which is applicable
to claims for personal injury, death, or damage to property in the US, but only if the
tortious act of the defendant foreign state also occurred in the US, and provided that act
did not arise from the exercise of a discretionary function.104
98ONSC, Tracy (n 93), para 157.
99ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 2), paras 121-133.
100This is the sole veto override experienced by Obama during his eight years of presidency. See
Jennifer Steinhauer/Mark Mazzetti/Julie Hirschfeld Davis, ‘Congress Votes to Override Obama
Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill’, New York Times (28 September 2016).
101FSIA (n 76), Section 1605B(b) and (c).
102Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), 28 September 2016, Section 7.
103One such case is The Underwriting Members of Lloyd’s Syndicate 53 et al v Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia et al, Case No 17-02129 (District Court for the Southern District of New York [SDNY]).
See Jonathan Stempel, ‘Saudi Arabia Faces $6 Billion U.S. Lawsuit by Sept. 11 Insurers’, Reuters
(24 March 2017).
104FSIA (n 76), Section 1605(a)(5). See especially, In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,
538 F.3d 71 (2nd Cir, 14 August 2008) (involving Saudi Arabia); Doe v Bi Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2nd
Cir, 7 November 2011) (involving Afghanistan). For background, see Sean Hennessy, ‘In re the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: How the 9/11 Litigation Shows the Shortcomings of FSIA as a
Tool in the War on Global Terrorism’, Georgetown Journal of International Law 42 (2011),
855-878.
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How do we make sense of this North American practice? How do we square the
widespread convictions and certainties relating to immunity law as bolstered by the
ICJ with it? Is it nothing else than (North) American extravagance? It must be
pointed out that there are robust reasons why the legislation and practice at stake
cannot be equated to lawful countermeasures. It is true that in the North American
context, unlike the Italian situation, the actual denial of immunity would usually be
conditional on a prior executive’s determination of target states and that we would
not, therefore, be here confronted with an instance of misconceived judicial coun-
termeasures. It is thus tempting to interpret105 the North American practice in light of
the law of countermeasures, and there can be no doubt that troops of American
lawyers would be willing to mount a major defence on this basis within the Iran v US
case before the ICJ and/or similar future disputes. However, when one takes a closer
look at that practice and reviews it against the notion and requirements of counter-
measures, this view becomes untenable.106 For present purposes, two points would
suffice. First, as JASTA shows, the necessity of a prior executive’s determination of
the commission or support of acts of terrorism by states that may be denied immunity
(for example Saudi Arabia) is not an inflexible requirement of US practice. To the
contrary, JASTA has been adopted by the US legislature despite strong opposition
by the executive. This is an unorthodox and clumsy situation for the implementation
of veritable countermeasures. Secondly, and more fundamentally, to the best of my
knowledge there exist no statements or any other documentary evidence from the
governments concerned characterizing the terrorism legislation and practice at stake
as countermeasures, that is, as measures which would be in breach of international
obligations on state immunity were they not taken in response to wrongful acts by
the target states. Accordingly, this would be an unlikely instance of implicit coun-
termeasures. In reality, the only reasonable inference is that, at best, the governments
concerned might conceive of the practice in question in terms of acts of retorsion,
namely, as unfriendly conduct withdrawing a privilege predominantly afforded as a
matter of grace and comity, not out of respect for international legal obligations.
To be sure, if we stick to the wisdom and certainty allegedly emanating from the
2012 ICJ Judgment, there is no alternative to regarding the US and Canadian
terrorism exceptions as internationally wrongful acts sic et simpliciter. It is another
thing, though, to maintain that American immunity practice must be set aside as a
105See, eg, Andrea Gattini, ‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is
the Time Ripe for a Change of the Law?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011), 173-200,
at 183; van Alebeek, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’ 2012 (n 5), 299.
106See the excellent study by Simone Vezzani, ‘Sul diniego delle immunità dalla giurisdizione di
cognizione ed esecutiva a titolo di contromisura’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 97 (2014), 36-87,
at 82. See also Patricia Tarre Moser, ‘Non-Recognition of State Immunity as a Judicial Counter-
measure to Jus Cogens Violations: The Human Rights Answer to the ICJ Decision on the Ferrini
Case’,Goettingen Journal of International Law 4 (2012), 809-852; Giegerich, ‘The Holy See’ 2015
(n 46), 67 (the latter author, however, seems to start from the flawed assumption that the relevant
countermeasure would be the enactment of the legislation at stake in and of itself, rather than its
actual application by the governments and courts of the respective states).
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whole and given no weight whatsoever when assessing the state of the law in this
area.107 This is the radical stance taken by authors such as Thomas Giegerich. He
states: ‘The proper reaction of the international community to such instances of
ignorance or disregard of international law is to ignore or disregard them when it
comes to gathering evidence of the development of international law’.108 This
sentence proves too much. First, the North American legislation and judicial deci-
sions in question do represent state practice. Such practice may then be considered as
irrelevant for the formation of customary exceptions to state immunity, as it is not
grounded in international opinio iuris but in considerations of comity and political
convenience. Yet, it provides evidence contrary to the existence of customary rules
in the field of state immunity. As it apparently involves two states only, the same
practice is currently insufficient to override the contrary position of the majority of
states. But it remains chiefly significant because it comes from two major countries
that have been fundamental for the definitive consolidation of restrictive immunity
standards and whose courts (especially US courts) adjudge a massive volume of
immunity cases.
At the very least, the North American terrorism exceptions are a powerful
reminder of the persistent strains and paradoxes in the law of international immuni-
ties. They are a crucial component of dissident views from certain key states that
challenge common legal assumptions and debunk the myth of the universal accep-
tance of the customary status of immunity rules.
V. Conclusion
At the time of writing, the prospect of legal peace between Germany and Italy in
relation to the litigation of Nazi war crimes reignited in Italian courts in the wake of
Sentenza 238/2014 seems distant and, most worryingly, is being ignored by the
governments concerned. It is as if the governments were confident that time will pass
by and sooner or later heal the wounds left open by the loopholes and gaps in the
reparation regimes elaborated over the past 70 years, regimes that were specifically
meant to reckon with WWII crimes. However, such a failure to convincingly address
the outstanding compensation claims of IMIs and comparable victims of Nazi crimes
may also increasingly come to be regarded as staining the reputation of Germany and
Italy, two countries which are champions of European integration and supposed to
be frontrunners in the global pursuit of peace, justice, and the rule of law.
This chapter has stigmatized the opaque conduct of the governments concerned in
the aftermath of Sentenza 238/2014 and their dismissive attitude vis-à-vis meaning-
ful negotiations, which would be conducive to a just compensatory arrangement and,
107This is largely what the ICJ has done in its 2012 Judgment; see Pavoni, ‘An American
Anomaly?’ 2011 (n 65).
108Giegerich, ‘The Holy See’ 2015 (n 46), 69.
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ultimately, legal peace. It has underscored how useful lessons in this area come from
a series of WWII reparations agreements that, from the 1990s, were stipulated
between the US and a number of states (including Germany) in order to put a halt
to an expanding array of judicial proceedings before US courts that were endanger-
ing those states’ entitlement to immunity.
Pace the ICJ, there are continuing manifestations of US practice, and lately
Canadian practice, which corroborate the view that immunity for acta iure imperii
is not a universally shared, inflexible international law dogma, especially when
effective remedies for the victims, other than suits in the forum state, are absent.
Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are exerting a
sustained pressure on the law of international immunities. At the very least, history
and precedent show that when such egregious breaches of international law are at
stake the only way of appeasing turbulent domestic courts and achieving a sustain-
able legal peace is the setting up of fair and reasonable means of redress for
uncompensated victims.
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A Story of ‘Trials and Errors’ That Might
Have No Happy End
Jörg Luther{
Abstract The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Italian Constitutional Court
(ItCC) have created a deadlock between two diverging res iudicatae on state
immunities and judicial remedies as well as a tension between two republics that
do not share the same constitutional and international identities. In order to avoid a
further spiralling of decisions, judges tried to promote the negotiation of ‘a happy
outcome’ for a category of victims of war crimes that risk dying without being
entitled to any compensation. This chapter analyses the general cultural context of
‘academic diplomacy’. Both state sovereignty and human solidarity could be
maintained through a voluntary compensation for moral damages to the victims of
massacres, deportation, and forced labour during World War II. The moral-
responsibility approach suggested by the ICJ could be stronger than the legal-
liability threat backed by the ItCC. A belated common solidarity funded by both
German and Italian citizens and employers could be the best way out, but consid-
ering that many of the now elderly victims are approaching the end of their lifespans,
it might be cynically too late. This could, paradoxically, help to remind the world of
the injustices they suffered. Yet, on grounds of this tragic end, state immunity and
fundamental rights might further be delegitimized in possible wars to come.
I. The Complexity of the Reconciliation Task
The bilateral and worldwide discussion on the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)1 and the Italian Constitutional Court’s
(ItCC) Judgment 238/20142 on the right to a remedy has been conducted from
Jörg Luther was a Professor of Public Law in the Department of Law and Political Sciences,
Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Eastern Piedmont Amedeo Avogadro in
Alessandria, Italy. He passed away while this chapter was under revision, and Giovanni Boggero
and Valentina Volpe helped to finalize it.
1ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
2Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
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different viewpoints. The facts and norms in question are the object of various legal,
moral and political interests that include the victims and their heirs, the culprits, as
well as involved nation-states and domestic and international institutions. The
different views on German and Italian legal orders focus just on the reconciliation
between the two states, but the questions involved are potentially of interest also to
the former Allied Forces as well as to countries like Austria, Greece, Poland and
Israel. Furthermore, the ‘remedies against immunity’ quandary involves the whole
international legal and political order, itself shaped by a highly dynamic multilevel
governance structure. All these views need a more comprehensive reconciliation that
has to be carried out in different places and under different and changing legal and
political conditions.
The reconciliation of colliding international and domestic laws, however, has to
reckon with the specific case: the evident historical atrocities and injustices of a
dreadful ‘past that will not pass’.3 The ICJ assigned a victory to Germany that might
have been as such accepted by the Italian government, but it could not reconcile the
two states with their history nor foster a shared understanding of what human dignity
should mean for the future. The ItCC made an appeal to human dignity and in the
name of the Italian people decided in favour of human rights protection against
Germany and against those immunities that within the constitutional state have been
increasingly restricted—though not abolished—over the last decades.
The decisions of international judges as defenders of sovereign state immunity and
of national constitutional court judges as defenders of fundamental rights protection
created a legal deadlock and have somewhat benighted diplomatic relations between
Italy and Germany. In a context of amplified national passions, domestic views on the
development of international law and on ‘constitutional identities’ appear to be
diverging, if not clashing. On the one hand Germany prefers to shield behind its
sovereignty to close the books on the past, looking forward to friendly relations, while
supporting state immunity. On the other hand, Italy commits to an international order
based on ‘peace and justice’ (Article 11 of the Italian Constitution) demanding the
rights protection of still living victims of that ‘past that will not pass’. The task of
reconciliation is still in need of improvement, something different from an acquis of
diplomacy that could be self-certified by governments.
The follow-up of both judgments makes this task still uncertain in its outcome.
On the one hand there is an international res iudicata, formally opposed by Sentenza
238/2014, that invalidated both the specific provision of Article 3 of Italian Law No
5/2013 made for the execution of the ICJ Judgment and the part of Italian Law No
848/1957 implementing the UN Charter.4 Germany might address the UN Security
3Ernst Nolte, ‘Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(5 June 1986).
4This point ‘concerns the execution of Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, exclusively to the
extent that it obliges the Italian judge to comply with the Judgment of the ICJ of 3 February 2012,
which requires that Italian courts deny their jurisdiction in case of acts of a foreign state constituting
war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of inviolable human rights.’ ItCC, Judgment
238/2014 (n 2), para 1.1.
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Council under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, present a new complaint to the ICJ
for a violation of state immunity and appeal, under Article 39 of the European
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957, to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and get a two-thirds majority
for issuing ‘recommendations with a view to ensuring compliance with the (. . .)
decision’. In any case, the Italian government should reserve part of its budget for
mitigating the consequences of the execution of Italian judgments against Germany.
On the other hand, Judgment 238/2014 has a specific constitutional res iudicata:5
Article 136 and Article 137(3) of the Italian Constitution prescribe that the law
declared unconstitutional ‘ceases to have effect from the day following the publica-
tion of the decision’ and no appeal can be allowed. The constitutional res iudicata
applies also to the implicit declaration of the unconstitutionality of the international
customary law norm.6 Furthermore, it applies to the order to give execution to the
ICJ Judgment implied in the legal authorization to ratify Article 96 of the UN
Charter, and the ItCC did not restrict the decision to the first section. The imple-
mentation of decisions of international bodies aiming to reproduce the same norm
that ceased to have effect would violate Article 137(3) of the Italian Constitution and
could be rendered ineffective by a further ItCC judgement.
This describes the deadlock created by both decisions. However, they might not
be the judges’ last words, and lawmakers could try to renegotiate the treaties or
amend the Constitution.7 The ICJ Judgment could be not the first one to be
disregarded, but Sentenza risks in turn to have a merely symbolic value. On the
one hand, the ICJ Judgment’s lack of implementation could be the beginning of the
end of the customary law norm. If third-party judges were to join the Italian position,
customs could change over time. On the other hand, as the ItCC judgement allowed
only a declaratory relief in the Italian courts, the ‘victorious’ victims could not get
any of the Italian courts’ judgments enforced against the Federal Republic of
Germany unless a further declaration of unconstitutionality of the international and
national laws that still grant immunity from execution comes about.8 The lack of
effective justice for the victims and the impact on international customary law could
affect the judgment in a regrettable way.
In any case, the deadlock could be a tragedy. More than for the judges or for the
respective German and Italian states, this is true for those who still have hope in
receiving justice. These victims invested money in costly legal proceedings, but
judges could issue only symbolic, not enforceable, decisions.
5See Francesco Dal Canto, Il giudicato costituzionale nel giudizio sulle leggi (Turin: Giappichelli
2002), 30 et seq.
6See the final judgments of the Tribunale di Firenze in the aftermath of Sentenza 238/2014,
discussed by Paolo Veronesi, Colpe di stato (Milan: Franco Angeli 2017), 228 et seq.
7Stefan Rinke, Schadensersatzklagen gegen Staaten wegen schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen
im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag 2017).
8See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
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The culture of memory matters for this reconciliation and the costs of this culture
may exceed the investment done so far, which emphasized monuments building and
the work of historians. In a first step, this chapter focuses on the general context of
‘academic diplomacy’ after Sentenza 238/2014 (section II). In a second step, the
common concerns for the rights of victims of war crimes and forced labour need to
be addressed, reasoning on the opportunities and risks of a ‘belated’ solidarity
solution (sections III–V). In a third step, some conclusions for the proper use of
‘constitutional identities’ in the context of international relations will be drawn
(sections VI–VII).
II. Academic Diplomacy as a Supplement to Governmental
and Judicial Dialogues
Academic diplomacy is a new concept in peace studies and offers a means for
sustainable reconciliation. Academic culture could represent nations and become a
path finder for solutions to a deadlock created by governments and judges. Academic
legal culture could move beyond its role as adnotatores of conflicting decisions
towards a constructive and friendly cross-border dialogue based on a search for
comparative constitutional and international law solutions. But diplomacy is more a
political than a legal discourse and law professors generally lack sufficient informa-
tion regarding ongoing diplomatic dialogue and negotiations.
What is well known concerning the case at hand is that several scholars have
already been involved through expert opinions pro veritate, advocating for govern-
ments and parliaments; others might have an interest in pursuing an international
career in the judiciary. Present-day institutions fostering international academic
dialogue, including the German-Italian Constitutional Colloquium (Deutsch-
Italienisches Verfassungskolloquium), have been less engaged in currently disputed
topics. The forerunner of the concept of academic diplomacy was the German–
Italian Commission of Historians (Historikerkommission, 2009–2012).9 Its political
mandate prudently kept out all legal questions as well as the participation of legal
historians in order not to encroach upon the work of the ICJ.10 The participating
9‘Bericht der von den Außenministern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen
Republik am 28.3.2009 eingesetzten Deutsch-Italienischen Historikerkommission’, (July 2012),
available at http://www.villavigoni.it/contents/files/Abschlussbericht.pdf, 1–180, at 45: ‘Military
internees cannot disappear longer from history and end up in the grey area of Italian and German
memory; rather the remembrance of their innocent fate should symbolically unite Germans and
Italians’; (translated by the author).
10Guido Westerwelle (former German Minister of Foreign Affairs), ‘Ansprache von Außenminister
Westerwelle anlässlich der Übergabe des Abschlussberichts der Deutsch-Italienischen
Historikerkommission in Rom’, (19 December 2012), available at www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/
Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2012/121219-BM_Rom.html?nn¼360110: ‘In the name of Germany,
unjustifiable crimes were committed in Italy and against Italians in the years 1943-1945. These
crimes cannot be relativized through historical differentiation either. Also, the proceedings before
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historians were obliged to ignore the legal questions and their attendant tensions
because the governments preferred that a cultural consensus could render the legal
dispute resolution sustainable. The Foreign Ministers of the governments of Angela
Merkel and Silvio Berlusconi agreed to pay for the work of historians but not to pay
compensation to the victims of this history and excluded any consideration of this
question from the mandate of the German–Italian Commission. A number of
historians complained, feeling that they were used by statesmen engaged in a larger
political game. In unhappy times of financial crisis, diplomacy and political pru-
dence led to the conclusion that ‘making history with money’ was better than
‘making money with history’. In the end, those historians agreed that both further
historical research and memorial monuments should be financed. Domestic and
international judges had to enter into the scene to finally raise the issue of the rights
of victims.
Academic diplomacy is now required to help reconcile a deadlock that seems to
be the result of a lack of direct judicial dialogue. Transnational judicial dialogues are
already well developed among constitutional judges and within international asso-
ciations of judges, but there seems to be little dialogue between supreme courts.
After World War II (WWII), as far as the German and Italian judiciary are
concerned, a sort of a silent convention and a common interest to slow down
criminal justice for war-related crimes emerged, preventing any real cooperation
for an efficient prosecution.
Some of the tensions from the recent legal quarrels on the rights of victims need to
be remembered.
The ItCC decided already in the Priebke case (1996) to strike down a norm of the
military criminal procedure Act that excluded civilians from claiming war-crimes-
related damages in military courts.11
In the same year, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht decided that individual
claims for the years 1943–1945 were to be based not on international, but on
domestic law.12
The German Bundesgerichtshof decided then in the Distomo case (2003) that
victims of military actions abroad were not entitled to any individual compensation,
a principle that has been further developed in the more recent Kunduz case (2016).13
the International Court of Justice, which lastly created legal certainty with its judgment on the
important issue of state immunity of 3 February [2012], never pursued the goal of putting German
responsibility for these crimes into question. Legal issues and historical responsibility must be
strictly separated the one from the other’; (translated by the author).
11Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 28 February 1996, No 60/1996.
12Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 13 May 1996, 2 BvL 33/93, BVerfGE 94, 315
(Zwangsarbeit), 329 et seq.
13Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 26 June 2003, III ZR 245/98, BGHZ 155, 279 (Distomo);
Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 6 October 2016, III ZR 140/15, BGHZ (Kunduz).
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The Italian Corte di Cassazione decided in the Ferrini case (2004) that the
Federal Republic of Germany had to pay damages to citizens who were deported
and coerced into forced labour camps from the Italian territory.14
The Bundesverfassungsgericht ‘answered’ in the same year that the right of
inhabitants from an occupied territory to get international humanitarian law enforced
does not include directly enforceable individual claims to compensation. All claims
for compensation concerning torts and unlawful enrichment related to forced labour
could be protected, if not prescribed, only as property rights.15
Between 2008 and 2011, the Corte di Cassazione allowed the enforcement of the
Greek Distomo judgment and held Germany liable for massacres perpetrated during
WWII. Immunity has been further weakened by allowing war-crimes-related trials
even upon claims originating from municipalities and the National Association of
Italian Partisans (Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani, ANPI) (2014).16
These judicial dynamics show cultural differences and inner conflicts between the
two legal orders with a clear lack of a real dialogue. As a matter of fact, judicial
decisions and legal opinions adopted in one country rarely quote the judicial
decisions and legal opinions adopted in the other. The courts of Strasbourg and
Luxembourg, in turn, did not offer any common ground and even the Goethe
Institute and the Dante Alighieri Society never tried to promote academic diplomacy.
Nevertheless, the absence of judicial dialogue was not offset by national govern-
ments’ intervention. The Italian government did not intervene in German court
proceedings and, symmetrically, the German government did not intervene in the
proceeding before the ItCC. They agreed in the ICJ proceedings that Villa Vigoni
needed immunity from execution. The implementation of both the ICJ Judgment and
Sentenza 238/2014 was the object of further diplomatic dialogue, but this topic was
left out from any discussion during the Italian–German High-Level Dialogue of the
two Heads of State held in Turin in 2014 and again in 2016.17
The Foreign Ministers preferred silent diplomacy: they signed agreements with
the ANPI and the National Association of Survivors of Imprisonment, Internment
and the War of Liberation (Associazione Nazionale Reduci dalla Prigionia,
14Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/2004.
15Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 7 December 2004, 1 BvR 1804/03, BVerfGE 112, 93;
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277.
16Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 29 May 2008, No 14199/2008; Corte di Cassazione, Orders of
29 May 2008, No 14200-14212/2008; Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 21 October 2008, No
1072/2008 (Milde); Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 19 March 2014, No 329/2014: ‘[T]his
association was born, according to its statute, with the aim of continuing the work of partisan
groups, embodying their history and tradition; therefore, it should be acknowledged the right to
compensation for the crimes which directly touched upon partisan groups’; (translated by the
author).
17Bundespräsident, ‘Opening of the Italian-German High-Level Dialogue’, (11 December 2014),
available at http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/JoachimGauck/Reden/2014/
141211-Italienisch-Deutsches-Dialogforum.html; Quirinale, ‘Intervento del Presidente della
Repubblica, Sergio Mattarella, al Dialogo di Alto Livello italo-tedesco’, (13 April 2016), available
at http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/1130.
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dall’Internamento, dalla Guerra di Liberazione,ANRP) and set up a German-Italian
Fund (deutsch-italienischer Zukunftsfond) within the German Federal Foreign
Office.18 The strategy of symbolic reparation supported by historians was further
developed through a temporary exhibition in Berlin.
Parliamentary diplomacy, especially within the German–Italian parliamentary
group and within the European Parliament, could make further efforts towards
reconciliation. The majority-approved motion of the Italian parliament demanded
only the execution of the Italian judgments relating to the massacres perpetrated by
German forces, excluding therefore compensation for Italian Military Internees
(IMIs). The latter’s interests have been defended and represented by more
Eurosceptic political parties like the Lega Nord in Italy or Die Linke in Germany.19
In the context of existing governmental dialogue, the concerns of Germany and
Italy are only partially conflicting. One could even conclude that a possible common
German–Italian viewpoint could be to pay no compensation at all, and academic
diplomacy should just sustain this ‘gentle nations’ agreement’.20 The German
government recognizes a moral rather than a legal responsibility towards individ-
uals; this position vis-à-vis the victims could be summed up in the motto: ‘memory,
not money’. Following this spirit, the Italian parliament recognized already through
the enactment of Law No 269/2006 that the sacrifice made by the Italian victims of
deportation deserves a medal of honour ‘as compensation mainly for the moral
damages’.21
18Die Linke, ‘Kleine Anfrage: Arbeitsweise und Förderkriterien des deutsch-italienischen
Zukunftsfonds’, (4 March 2016), available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/077/
1807799.pdf.
19For Italy, Camera dei deputati, ‘XVII Legislatura—Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea
Seduta n 711 di martedì 6 dicembre 2016’, (6 December 2016), available at http://www.camera.
it/leg17/410?idSeduta¼0711&tipo¼stenografico. For Germany, Federal Government, ‘Antwort
der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Jan Korte, Sevim
Dagdelen, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke—Drucksache 18/3333—
Entschädigung für NS-Opfer in Italien’, (9 December 2014), available at http://dip21.bundestag.
de/dip21/btd/18/034/1803492.pdf.
20Cf Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, ‘Wir brauchen eine symbolische
Geste’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 May 2010): ‘These people have suffered. If we give them 3,000
euros now, it is not what they need (. . .) I think a symbolic gesture, such as a memorial or a museum
of remembrance that Germany and Italy can set up together would be much more important’;
(translated by the author).
21Cf Italian Law 24 October 2006, No 269, Art 1, paras 1271–1272, (translated by the author).
1271. The Italian Republic recognizes the sacrifice of its citizens deported and interned in Nazi
concentration camps in the last world conflict by entitling them to a compensation, mostly of moral
nature.
1272. It has been authorized the granting of a medal of honour to Italian citizens, both military
and civilians, deported and interned in Nazi concentration camps and destined to forced labour for
the sake of war economy, to whom, if military, has been denied by the then Nazi government the
status of prisoners of war, according to the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war
made in Geneva on 27 July 1929, and to the families of those who have died, who are entitled to
present the application for recognition of the status of forced labourer.
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However, academic diplomacy’s supporters could express some doubts: can
states ‘wash their hands’ from their responsibility and limit it to monuments and
medals? Is the decision to provide no financial compensation for the moral and
existential damages really the best way for closing this particular historical chapter?
Is it just hyper-moralism and hyper-idealism to propose a symbolic financial recog-
nition, three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as a sign of Europe’s
confidence in the future of an EU based on the respect of human rights, justice and
solidarity (Article 2 TEU)?
In a very drastic and exaggerated way one could read the conflict assessed by the
ICJ Judgment and Sentenza 238/2014 as a theatre of ‘cynicism and hypocrisy’. The
real conflict is not just between Germany and Italy, nations which sometimes
consider themselves as being each other’s victims. Instead, it is a conflict between
the governments of two former belligerent states and their victims in the context of
individual compensation for war crimes and forced labour. Moreover, it is a clash
between humanitarian ideals and populist realities in the funding of welfare. If
human and humanitarian concerns are paramount common concerns for all consti-
tutional states in the EU and for the international community at large, the response of
Germany and Italy could be to reconsider the issue of compensation for the victims
of massacres, deportation, and forced labour. In this context, academic diplomacy
would not just be a form of state-centred government support but an independent
diplomatic action for a transnational civil society.
III. Moral Responsibility and Legal Liability
Are Germany and Italy obliged to open negotiations and settle the dispute? If we
look at both the ICJ Judgment and Sentenza 238/2014 merely from a formal legal
point of view, the answer would be ‘no’. However, if we consider lifelong solidarity
towards the victims as a moral duty and we refrain from the idea of having purely
‘moral’ or ‘memory’ politics then the answer could be ‘yes’.22
The ICJ Judgment as interpreted by the ItCC pointed out that the opening of new
negotiations might be the only means available to settle the dispute in international
law.23 The ICJ made a very strong moral obiter dictum that seems to have been
neglected by the public debates: ‘The Court considers that it is a matter of surprise—
and regret—that Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims on
the ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at the relevant time,
22Hanne Leßau, Conference Report, ‘Entschädigung als Menschenrecht? Theorie und Praxis des
Umgangs mit den Opfern kollektiver Gewalt’, organizer Constantin Goschler, in H-Soz-Kult
(16 October 2012), available at http://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-
4412>. Cf Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
23ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), para 104.
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Germany had refused to recognize, particularly since those victims had thereby been
denied the legal protection to which that status entitled them.’24
The ‘surprise’ relates to an ex post recognition of protection duties for the only
purpose of denying compensation. Adolf Hitler’s order of 20 September 1943
commanded the deportation to the German Reich of the captured Italian Military
Internees (IMIs) as forced labour force for the production of arms and for the
construction of the so called ‘South-East Wall’.25 This was a deliberate violation
of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
1929: ‘Work done by prisoners of war shall have no direct connection with the
operations of the war. In particular, it is forbidden to employ prisoners in the
manufacture or transport of arms or munitions of any kind, or on the transport of
material destined for combatant units.’26 Furthermore, contrary to international
humanitarian law, any assistance from the Red Cross was denied and fundamental
social rights to adequate food and health services were violated.27 The IMIs were
mishandled and treated as traitors by both German military forces and German
civilians as well as by Italian fascists. Most of the captured did not actively resist,
and a large number was subjected to forced ‘conscription’ by German troops. When
the workers in what was then the occupied northern-Italian territory went on strike,
Joachim Ribbentrop ordered the leaders to be killed as ‘communists’ and, with an
eye towards deterrence, ordered that other thousands be deported as ‘IMIs’.28 When
Hitler decided to transform their status into a sort of fictitious ‘private’ labour force, a
concession to both Fritz Sauckel29 and Benito Mussolini’s non-sovereign Republic
of Salò, they lost their status as military personnel under Italian law and were
considered not victims of slavery under Article 600 of the Italian Criminal Code
but ‘collaborationists’. At the end of the war, the Allied Forces qualified them as ‘ex
allied of the enemy’, with the consequence that their return to Italy was delayed.
Their ex post recognition as war prisoners came first from the Italian Republic
(1945)—with regard to the period from 8 September 1943 to 1 September 1944—
and later by Germany (2001) with regard to the remaining periods, even though the
24Ibid, para 99.
25Cf Keitel Order quoted in Christian Tomuschat, ‘Leistungsberechtigung der Italienischen
Militärinternierten nach dem Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung
und Zukunft”?—Rechtsgutachten’ (2001), available at http://www.berliner-geschichtswerkstatt.de/
zwangsarbeit/imi/imi-tomuschat-gutachten.pdf, 1–37, at 2. See Jean Allain, Slavery in Interna-
tional Law—Of Human Exploitation and Trafficking (Leiden: Brill, Nijhoff 2012), 261.
26Art 31 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929,
47 Stat 2021, TS No 846.
27See ‘Bericht der Deutsch-Italienischen Historikerkommission’ 2012 (n 9), 133.
28Joachim Ribbentrop to German Embassy, December 1944, quoted in Erich Kuby, Verrat auf
Deutsch—Wie das Dritte Reich Italien ruinierte (Frankfurt: Ullstein Sachbuch 1987), 449.
29The official reconstruction of the commission of historians on the IMIs seems to be not yet
sufficient, neither on the legal qualifications nor on the facts—for example regarding the forced
conscription to military service and labour pushed by Sauckel. See Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign
Workers: Enforced Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge: CUP 1997), 286.
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recognition was exclusively for the purpose of excluding them from any social
benefits.
The ICJ’s ‘regret’ implies a clear moral condemnation of both the deportation of
IMIs to forced labour camps and their lack of compensation thereof. This neither
includes nor excludes a legal qualification as war crime, a violation of ius cogens, or
a duty to individual compensation. The judges sitting in the ICJ did not only express
their own personal concern, they also tried to embody those common human values
shared by all civilized nations by adding a second obiter dictum:
[T]he Court is not unaware that the immunity from jurisdiction of Germany in accordance
with international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals concerned. It
considers however that the claims arising from the treatment of the Italian military internees
referred to in paragraph 99, together with other claims of Italian nationals which have
allegedly not been settled—and which formed the basis for the Italian proceedings—could
be the subject of further negotiation involving the two states concerned, with a view to
resolving the issue.30
The ICJ opted for ‘could be’ because ‘should be’ would have been seen as a
declaration ultra vires, considering that its Order of 6 July 2010 had already declared
inadmissible a counterclaim presented by Italy regarding the reparation owed to
Italian victims of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by
the armed forces of the German Reich. The ICJ could not condemn Germany to
‘offer appropriate and effective reparation to these victims, by means of its own
choosing, as well as through the conclusion of agreements with Italy’.31
Nevertheless, the clear moral condemnation in paragraph 99 of the ICJ Judgment
could, in the long run, prove to be even stronger than a formal legal condemnation.
Germany’s book of legal debts may well be closed, the book of moral responsibility,
however, could remain open-ended.
IV. The Imperfect Lump Sum Agreements of 1961
When taking into consideration exemptions from state immunity, the ICJ mentions
the lump sum agreements and Germany’s strongest prima facie objection:
Moreover, if a lump sum settlement has been made—which has been the normal practice in
the aftermath of war, as Italy recognizes—then the determination of whether a particular
claimant continued to have an entitlement to compensation would entail an investigation by
the court of the details of that settlement and the manner in which the State which had
received funds (in this case the State in which the court in question is located) has distributed
those funds. Where the State receiving funds as part of what was intended as a comprehen-
sive settlement in the aftermath of an armed conflict has elected to use those funds to rebuild
30ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), para 104.
31ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July
2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 310, para 3.
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its national economy and infrastructure, rather than distributing them to individual victims
amongst its nationals, it is difficult to see why the fact that those individuals had not received
a share in the money should be a reason for entitling them to claim against the State that had
transferred money to their State of nationality.32
From the opposite Italian point of view, the ‘questions settled through the 1961
Agreements were (. . .) limited to, on the one hand, the pending economic questions
to be identified merely as those covered by the 1947 waiver clause, and, on the other,
compensation to victims of National Socialist persecution’. That implied three
objections: first, the waiver of Article 77(4) of the Peace Treaty of 194733 was not
approved by Germany under Article 34 or 36 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 and
was referred only to property-related questions, not to labour-based claims; second,
the agreements of 1961 concerned only the most important ‘specific claims’,34 not
all the reparations delayed to a final examination under Article 5(2) of the London
Debt Agreement of 1953;35 and third, the civilian massacres, deportation, and forced
labour were not specific National Socialist persecutions covered by the agreements.
Regarding the first reply, the Italian interpretation has been outlined by the former
judge of the Italian Constitutional Court Rita Saulle36 and has been adopted by the
Italian Corte di Cassazione and ordinary judges since 2008.37 It has to be added that
the Constituent Assembly authorized the ratification of the Peace Treaty of 1947,
adopting a resolution that declared the punitive reparations of the treaty as incom-
patible with the principles of international justice and thus demanded their revision.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlo Sforza, declared that Germany was obliged to
provide for reparations and to give adequate guarantees but the country should not be
excluded from a future European Community.38 The original Italian intent was thus
not at all to accept a full and binding waiver for any future reparation claim.
As for the second objection, Article 2 of the 1961 Agreement on the Settlement of
Certain Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions established a waiver
for ‘all outstanding claims’. The 1961 Agreement on the Compensation for Italian
32ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), para 102.
33Treaty of Peace with Italy, 10 February 1947, 49 UNTS 3.
34Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian
Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German
and Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No 22, 791; Agreement between
the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain Property-Related, Eco-
nomic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian version published in
Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963 No 19, 668.
35Agreement on German External Debts, 27 February 1953, UNTC No 4764 (London Debt
Agreement).
36ANRP, ‘Il libro bianco dell’A.N.R.P.’, (2001), available at http://lnx.anrp.it/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/IL_LIBRO_BIANCO_dellANRP.pdf, 1–220, 85 et seq.
37Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 21 October 2008, No 1072/2008; Corte militare d’appello di
Roma, Judgment of 25 January 2008; Tribunale di Torino, Judgments of 20 May 2010 and of
20 October 2009.
38Carlo Sforza, Assemblea Costituente (31 July 1947), available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/
Costituente/Lavori/Assemblea/sed211/sed211.pdf, 6532–6566, at 6543.
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Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Agreement on
Compensation) shows that the waiver of the first 1961 Agreement could not cover
claims for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both Agreements established
only partial waivers. The German version of ‘schwebend’ and the Italian ‘pendenti’
referred only to claims which already made an object of specific judicial or admin-
istrative proceedings, not to claims of immaterial damages for war crimes that had
yet to be prosecuted. Both lump sum Agreements were transitory, not final.
Finally, Article 3 of the Agreement on Compensation established a waiver for all
claims of victims of National Socialist persecution. This concept was defined in
section 1 of the German Federal Compensation Act (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz)
of 1953: ‘[S]omeone who on grounds of political opposition to National Socialism
or on grounds of race, belief or ideology was persecuted by violent National Socialist
measures and thereby suffered damage to life, body, health, freedom, property,
assets or in professional or economic advancement (persecutee)’.39 Should massa-
cres and deportation for forced labour of Italians be qualified as Nazi persecution?
They were violent measures conducted by the armed forces under a German
National Socialist government that ordered collective punishments for Italian polit-
ical opposition to the Axis Powers. Even an element of racism might have influenced
Adolf Hitler to urge for a ‘tabula rasa’ and a ‘brutal friendship’.40 Nevertheless in the
practice of compensation, the exploitation of forced labour seemed not to have been
qualified per se as Nazi persecution.41 What is more, the Italian legislation reduced
persecution to the repression of resistenza, adding the capture in action of
rappresaglia and coercive conscription (Article 1, Decree of the President of the
Republic No 2043/1963).
Germany after all has good arguments for considering the waivers of the lump
sum Agreements as being all-inclusive, but the Italian interpretation of the Agree-
ments as separate and partial waivers, excluding compensation for individual moral
damages caused by war crimes, is also not straightforwardly unreasonable. German
and Italian judges arrived at different conclusions, and the question was not decided
by the ICJ. The way out of the deadlock could be an arbitration on the interpretation
of the existing treaties as well as on the question of whether a relevant fundamental
change of circumstances occurred.42
39German Federal Compensation Act (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) of 18 September 1953,
Bundesgesetzblatt I 21 September 1953 No 62, 1387.
40Frederick W Deakin, Die brutale Freundschaft: Hitler, Mussolini und der Untergang des
italienischen Faschismus, (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1962), 607.
41See also Stefan Kadelbach, chapter ‘State Immunity, Individual Compensation for Victims of
Human Rights Crimes, and Future Prospects’, and Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in
Dualism’, in this volume.
42Cf Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
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V. Fundamental Legal Changes Since 1961
There is no doubt that some relevant changes regarding war crimes and forced labour
have taken place, changes which Karl Carstens and Pio Quaroni could not have
foreseen when negotiating the agreements in 1961: first, adjudication of individual
compensation to victims of war crimes has become an essential part of international
criminal justice, and solidarity with victims has been strengthened; second, the
prohibition of forced labour as a guarantee of the dignity-related human right has
become ius cogens; and third, not only has Europe witnessed German reunification
but the EU itself has enlarged both its borders and core founding values, including
solidarity and peace, though without a final decision on the reparations envisioned
by the London Debt Agreement.
‘[D]eportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or
in occupied territory’ was already punished as a war crime in the Nuremberg trials.43
British military courts exercised jurisdiction over approximately 50 German war
criminals in Italy,44 and Italian courts exercised jurisdiction on a few other cases.45
Since the German Constitution of 1949 (Article 16) ruled out extradition of
nationals (with exceptions admitted only in 1993),46 the issue of time limits for
prosecution of Nazi crimes had already been discussed in 1960.47 The prosecution of
all war crimes was guaranteed by Article 112 of the Italian Constitution, but
Quaroni, a former Italian Ambassador to Moscow, was reluctant to punish Italian
war crimes.48 The negotiators might have been informed that the Head of the
military public prosecution office in Rome decided, on 14 January 1960,49 to dismiss
provisionally around 700 proceedings for German war crimes instead of starting
43See eg the cases Erhard Milch (Milch), Friedrich Flick et al (Flick), Carl Krauch et al (IG Farben),
Alfried Krupp et al (Krupp). These are all cases from the Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals. See Kevin John Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the
Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP 2011).
44See eg the cases of Albert Kesselring, Eberhard von Mackensen and Max Simon. Cf Filippo
Focardi, ‘La questione dei processi ai criminali di guerra tedeschi in Italia: fra punizione frenata,
insabbiamento di Stato, giustizia tardiva (1943-2005)’, Storicamente 2 (2006), 1–27, at 6.
45See the cases of Herbert Kappler, Walter Reder, Wilhelm Schmalz, Joseph Strauch and Eduard
Florin. Cf Marco De Paolis, ‘La punizione dei crimini di guerra in Italia’, in Silvia Buzzelli/Marco
De Paolis/Andrea Speranzoni (eds), La ricostruzione giudiziale dei crimini nazifascisti in Italia:
Questioni preliminari (Turin: Giappichelli 2012), 63–140, at 90 et seq.
46Art 26 of the Italian Constitution admitted extradition only under conditions of reciprocity.
47Deutscher Bundestag, Zur Verjährung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen—Dokumentation der
parlamentarischen Bewältigung des Problems 1960-1979 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag Presse- und
Informationsamt 1980), et seq.
48Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘La punizione dei crimini di guerra tedeschi in Italia dopo il 1945’, in Gian
Enrico Rusconi/Hans Woller (eds), Italia e Germania 1945–2000: la costruzione dell’Europa
(Bologna: Il Mulino 2005), 75–90, at 82 et seq.
49Final report of the Italian Parliamentary Commission on the Causes of the Concealment of
Records regarding Nazifascist Crime, 8 February 2006, available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/
leg14/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/023/018/INTERO.pdf.
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trials in contumaciam. The negotiators could have relied on delays and inefficiency
in prosecution, but they could have not expected the establishment, several decades
later, of an International Criminal Court that also adjudicates on ‘reparations to, or in
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation’ (Article
75 of the Rome Statute, 1998). The compensation of victims includes the ‘moral’
damages recognized in Germany since 1970, and the ‘existential damages’ recog-
nized in Italy since 2003.50 Despite persisting WWII traumas, the two states, as
welfare states, learned that concrete solidarity compensation schemes for victims of
war crimes were needed.
The Italian Constitution (Articles 1, 4 and 35) considers free labour as a funda-
mental principle of the Republic, the German Constitution (Article 12 (2–3)) pro-
hibits forced labour, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 4 (3))
grants freedom from slavery. The Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour Con-
vention of 1957 was ratified by Germany in 1959 and by Italy in 1968,51 but the
prohibition did not amount yet to ius cogens.52 The Geneva Convention of 1929
allowed forced labour of war prisoners but granted specific rights and humanitarian
restrictions (Article 27–34) that need an extensive interpretation in the context of
international human rights law. The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law adopted in
2005 recognized the ‘victims’ right to remedies’, including equal and effective
access to justice and ‘adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered’.53
The German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft) granted individual compensation for forced labour on
the basis of a general principle of solidarity that could be transformed into a
collective duty under the common constitutional law of social market economies.
Finally, a fundamental change of circumstances can be traced in the reunification
of Germany and the transformations of the EU. The former Democratic Republic did
50Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 14 February 1973, 1 BvR 112/65, BVerfGE 34, 269
(Soraya); Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 30 June 2003, No 233/2003.
51Germany ratified the first ILO Convention on Forced Labour of 1930 in 1956, Italy in 1934. Art
2 exempted ‘any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event of war’,
see ILO Forced Labour Convention, 28 June 1930, in force 1 May 1932, 39 UNTS 55.
52Cf ILO, ‘Forced labour in Myanmar (Burma)’, 2 July 1998, available at https://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm.
53UN General Assembly, Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (16 December 2005), A/Res/60/147, paras 11, 15.
See also para 20: ‘Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as
appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case,
resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, such as: (a) Physical or mental harm; (b) Lost opportunities, including
employment, education and social benefits; (c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including
loss of earning potential; (d) Moral damages; (e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance,
medicine and medical services, and psychological and social services.’
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not sign a lump sum agreement with Italy and reparation claims have never been
settled. The EU treaties can be regarded as a surrogate for a peace treaty between
Germany and Italy, however with notorious deficits of democratic accountability.
The EU’s fundamental values could suffer if both social principles (Article 23(1) of
the German Constitution) and the ideal of ‘justice among the Nations’ (Article 11 of
the Italian Constitution) are not guaranteed for the very same generations that
inspired these human rights-centred foundational texts.
All these aspects are relevant to the question: is a (re)negotiation possible and
desirable? However, it remains profoundly questionable whether these elements
provide sufficient support for a legal claim under Article 62 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. Being such an interpretation controversial, one could argue though that engag-
ing in good faith negotiations for a new bilateral or multilateral agreement (providing
as well for an authentic interpretation and integration of the 1961 Bonn Agreements),
would not be unreasonable.
VI. A Belated Solidarity
Further objections concern time limitations for individual rights to compensation.54
Neither Italy nor Germany signed the European Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War
Crimes of 1974. Italian judges could still align with the German position and
consider that, except for genocide and murder, no international customary norm
prohibits prescription of compensation claims for war crimes (Verjährung).55 The
dispute regarding whether these or other limitations apply to individual compensa-
tion claims could be settled by way of arbitration or by a new decision of the ICJ. But
from the point of view of the last survivors, there is no more time for further
procedural delay. A ‘belated solidarity’ risks being rejected as ‘too little too late’
by those whose dignity has been violated.
At best, time might not be in Germany or Italy’s favour. Any intent to gain time
through further procedures would sound as much as a cynical solution, as an
unhappy and anachronistic evocation of the past. Again, prudence invites us not to
ignore morality in international relations, especially within the borders of suprana-
tional organizations based on common values.
The litigation on prescriptive norms, therefore, should not prevent reaching an
agreement on payments due for reasons of equity. Equitable compensation could
raise problems when it comes to finding political consensus, even though there
would not be any question of constitutional legitimacy, since full reparation is not
54Cf Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this
volume.
55For the Italian case this was the position of Tribunale di Torino, Judgment of 20 October 2009,
No 7137/2009.
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required by the Italian Constitution. To reply to the editors’ questions, the German,
as well as the Italian state, could honour the rights to compensation—as well as
duties to social solidarity for the benefit of ‘others’ with the resources of a state’s
citizens and taxpayers—as long as these ‘others’ are victims of war crimes. Even if
similar crimes and torts would not have been concretely assessed through judicial
decisions, the rule of law of a welfare state always allows for specific forms of
solidarity. The voting rights of citizens and property rights of taxpayers cannot be
violated by otherwise lawful administrative or judicial decisions that fulfil a duty to
international human solidarity.
It is a political question whether a similar gesture of a ‘belated solidarity’ would
be a good investment for Germany’s reputation in Europe and generally on the
international plane or whether it would favour a more nationalist and populist
opposition. On the one hand, there is the hope that a similar gesture could promote
reconciliation, legal peace and social cohesion between Germany and Italy, while
helping families to close the ‘memory books’. On the other hand, there is the fear that
it could become a model for other interested countries, creating a potentially
dangerous and costly precedent.
The possibility of generating a consensus will depend on the specific models of
organization, procedure and financing of this form of ‘belated solidarity’. From the
point of view of the associations of victims, Germany’s pardon request for
Marzabotto and the work towards a shared collective memory already represented
a significant degree of compensation. The public discourses and the funding of the
work of historians56 and lawyers could still be followed by the recognition of an at
least symbolic economic benefits for the victims of massacres and/or forced labour.
The rules for such compensation need to be construed in a way consistent with the
principles of solidarity, equality and democratic responsibility; the existing national
rules for solidarity with victims of violent crimes and forced labour could offer a
general framework for this compensation scheme. The territorial and personal scope
of this solidarity, the amount of compensation and the administrative procedure to be
followed, along with the necessary funding have to be defined more in details, but
some ideas could help clarify these highly complex practical problems.
1. Territorial and Personal Scope of Solidarity
Solidarity can be differentiated on the basis of criteria of proximity. One could argue
that it should be limited to the ‘former allied’ countries, but over time a new
proximity and ties of solidarity within the EU and within the Council of Europe
(CoE) have been created. European solidarity with victims of war crimes has been
strengthened through common ceremonies in and alongside war cemeteries and
56Cf on the perspective of further ‘prosopographic and social-statistical studies’ in ‘Bericht der
Deutsch-Italienischen Historikerkommission’ 2012 (n 9), 169.
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monuments. Negotiations could start with the purpose of reaching an agreement for
all victims of WWII war crimes who were citizens of the signatory states and
received no compensation. War crimes, deportation, and forced labour occurred
not only in Italy but elsewhere too. The United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC) investigations went beyond German war crimes; citizens from Austria,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, as well as 1,697 Italian citizens were
among the 19,000 suspected war criminals listed.57 Massacres among civilians, for
example, took place in Greece, the former Yugoslavia, and France, and not uncom-
monly prisoners of war from other nations, especially Poland and Russia, were the
victims. These crimes as well as those committed by Allied Forces justify neither
negationism nor oblivion. A bilateral or multilateral approach through a convention
organized by the former Axis Powers, and perhaps open to all other states from the
EU or the CoE, could be a good way for the ‘bad boys’ of the past to emerge as the
heroes of solidarity and peace in Europe.
The right to compensation of immaterial damages deriving from war crimes could
be limited to an individual una tantum to be divided among all surviving victims that
have never received any compensation and who would be willing to sign an
individual waiver.
Restrictions on the personal scope of the scheme in favour of living survivors
needs further clarification. At current, the loss of life in wartime cannot be individ-
ually compensated. As Jochen Frowein correctly argued in a hearing of the
Bundestag in 2015, recognising the suffering of surviving victims does not require
an extension of the benefits to the surviving relatives of deceased victims.58 A
‘belated solidarity’ would be de facto a restricted one, but could be justified on a
‘better late than never’ basis. Nevertheless, in order to prevent any cynical interest in
lengthy negotiations so as to possibly mitigate the financial impact of the new
compensation/reparation regime, it would not be unreasonable to accept an exten-
sion so as to include the families of victims who had survived until the date of the ICJ
Judgment. On the other hand, surviving victims of war crimes committed by Italian
forces could not be a priori excluded.
2. Calculation of the Reparation
The amount could be calculated on the basis of the average compensation recognized
by national administrations or courts or by the International Criminal Court, adapted
57Cf the proceedings of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), 1943–1949.
58Jochen A Frowein, ‘Stellungnahme zu den Anträgen auf symbolische Entschädigung noch
lebender sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener’ (13 May 2015), available at www.bundestag.de/blob/
374858/d050da4429429f261745a4e37c1970ca/prof%2D%2Ddr%2D%2Djochen-a%2D%
2Dfrowein-data.pdf.
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to the average income of the country where the victim is living and according to a
projection of the number of beneficiaries.
The case of the Italian victims of forced labour is a special one, in reason of their
exclusion from the schemes of the German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsi-
bility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft).59 The proposals
regarding Russian military internees and war prisoners presented in 2015 by the
two then opposition parties in the German Bundestag60 proposed €2,500 (Grüne) or
€7,670 (Die Linke) for each victim. The smaller sum is based on the ‘recognition
payment for former German forced labour workers’ granted by a directive of the
German Ministry of the Interior of 7 July 2016. The larger amount is equal to the
payments for forced labour granted by the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibil-
ity and Future’. Even without any specific law or constitutional obligation, the
German state, through this financial instrument, paid tribute to the hard ‘destiny’
of German citizens and people that carried out forced labour for a foreign power.
This is an important but ambiguous precedent. It could be a model of humble and
noble human solidarity, but it could also be based on a limited ideal of solidarity,
since restricted exclusively to German nationals.
Another alternative or cumulative form of solidarity could be the establishment of
a solidarity fund for charitable subsidies to all those victims who did not get a
sufficient pension treatment or who are still suffering diseases caused by war crimes
and torts in question. Even aids for concrete reconciliation initiatives in Germany
and Italy (for example travel reimbursements) could be offered by this ‘belated
solidarity’ fund.
All these benefits would need to be investigated, but no judicial decision would
be required for recognising the status of the victims of crimes and forced labour. The
benefits could be granted through a specific administrative procedure by national
administrations under the directives and control of a common international board.61
3. Financing
The main question is how to finance the different forms of solidarity and financial
recognition. All possible sources of solidarity funding should be considered, includ-
ing private donations and contributions from all those that benefitted from forced
labour, as well as military related industries and railway enterprises. Similar dona-
tions could be eligible for tax benefits. State contributions to this fund could be
59It is worth noting that the German scheme influenced also the Austrian Fund ‘Reconciliation,
Peace and Cooperation’ (Reconciliation Fund).
60See Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Plädoyer für Entschädigungen’ (19 May 2015), available at www.
bundestag.de/presse/hib/2015_05/-/375140.
61Cf Filippo Fontanelli, chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, in this volume.
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calculated on an equal basis for each state on a personal per capita solidarity basis
(specifying an amount for each citizen from the respective signatory states).
Italian participation would strengthen the principle of common European soli-
darity. Of course, Germany could ask the ICJ for an ‘equitable satisfaction’ to be
granted in an analogous application of Article 30 of the European Convention on
Dispute Settlement, and this satisfaction if granted might be allocated for funding.
Alternatively, Italy could participate spontaneously, in part due to the force of its
fundamental constitutional principle of solidarity which authorizes the Republic to
concur even in international solidarity funds. The exclusion from the existing
compensation schemes of victims of massacres and forced labour was a common
decision of both the German and the Italian governments and common funding
would therefore be the best way to render a ‘belated solidarity’ viable.62
Another exclusively political question is whether a similar project of ‘belated
solidarity’ would be rejected by a majority of taxpayers who might be no longer
willing to pay for past wrongdoings or to subscribe to forms of ‘chequebook-based-
diplomacy’. The ‘bottomless-pit’ argument is always an equity blocker, but a now
reunified Germany should not forget that the Two Plus Four Treaty63 was not the
final peace treaty envisaged by the London Debt Agreement and that a consolidation
of the lump sum agreements could be the best way to provide an acceptable
monetary limit.
VII. The Proper Use of Supreme Principles as Part
of the ‘Constitutional Identity’
The binational discussion on an equitable solution would likely not end the debate
over the question of remedies against immunity. We are moving from a traditional
dualist approach, as the likes of Dionisio Anzilotti and Heinrich Triepel, towards
neither an international nor a national monism but towards a more recent pluralist
approach.64 A way out of the deadlock might lay in searching for procedures that
could help finding ad hoc balances, while avoiding clashes between the two parties
involved. This should be done through concrete forms of communication between
the diverging legal orders and cultures rather than through an a priori hierarchy
between supreme constitutional principles of rights protection and sovereign
immunity.
62See also Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
63Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, 1696 UNTS
115 (Two-Plus-Four Treaty).
64As favoured by Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph: How to Make the Best Out of Sentenza
No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order’, EJIL: Talk! (26 December
2014), available at www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-
no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-order-part-i/.
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The ItCC’s Sentenza 238/2014 did not use the concept of constitutional identity
quoted by the Tribunal of Florence and which is not yet well established in the
ItCC’s jurisprudence.65 The Court preferred to invoke ‘the fundamental principles of
the constitutional order and inalienable human rights’, which is a mix of principles
that can serve for a coordination of the values of constitutionalism and international
rule of law.
In the interlocutory Taricco case, a new complex case of prima facie conflict
between the rule of law at the national and international level, the ItCC used the
concept of constitutional identity only in the context of EU law:66 ‘This Court would
like to stress that, whilst the aim of the interpretation set out above is to preserve the
constitutional identity of the Republic of Italy, it does not however compromise the
requirements of uniform application of EU law and is thus a solution that complies
with the principle of loyal cooperation and proportionality.’67 The use of the concept
of constitutional identity was based on a specific national tradition and constitutional
culture, aimed at giving a higher protection to the citizens’ legal certainty than to the
state (or EU) interests.
A similar solution, encouraging a harmonized interpretation of the different legal
systems, was unworkable for the ICJ Judgment because there were, and still there
are, no specific forms of dialogue between the ICJ and national constitutional
courts.68 The ItCC attempted to qualify the right of access to justice in cases of
serious violations of fundamental rights also as an international rule of law principle
to be taken seriously by all international and municipal judges. This interpretation is
based on a supreme principle of the Italian Constitution (Article 2) which should be
respected at least as a domestic exception to the rule of state immunity. Now, one
could read Sentenza 238/2014 as a plea for tolerance and respect for a supreme
constitutional principle. The Judgment outlines a distinctive Italian constitutional
65Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 19 March 2001, No 73/2001: ‘[T]his Court—as the referring
judge recalls—reaffirmed the principle that the tendency of the Italian legal order to be open to
generally recognized norms of international law and international treaties is limited by the necessity
to preserve its identity; thus, first of all, by the values enshrined in the Constitution’. In Corte
Costituzionale, Judgment of 7 October 2009, No 262/2009, the concept is still synonymous with the
whole constitutional design and system of equality and immunities. Cf Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Consti-
tutional Identity’, in Michel Rosenfeld/András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional
Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP 2012).
66Corte Costituzionale, Order of 23 November 2016, No 24/2017: ‘Naturally, the Court of Justice is
not exempt from the task of defining the scope of EU law and cannot be further encumbered by the
requirement of assessing in detail whether it is compatible with the constitutional identity of each
Member State. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, in cases in which such an assessment is not
immediately apparent, the European court will establish the meaning of EU law, whilst leaving to
the national authorities the ultimate assessment concerning compliance with the supreme principles
of the national order.’
67Ibid: ‘The Italian Constitution construes the principle of legality in criminal matters more broadly
than European law as it does not limit itself to describing the conduct constituting the offence and
the penalty, but rather covers all substantive aspects of liability to punishment.’
68See also Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume.
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identity in the international legal order, representing as well a leading case for a
moderate use of the concept of constitutional identity itself.69
On the other side and in more general terms, the invocation of a constitutional
identity could also be understood as a ‘trump card’ that weakens international
customary law and the authority of international judges, and further backs a new
nationalist monism. From this more sceptical point of view, the constitutional
identity exception could promote a national-constitutional-rights fundamentalism
and enhance the power of domestic judges. While the first interpretation, influenced
by an idealism based on tolerance, could strengthen the international rule of law; the
second interpretation, inspired by legal realism, could instead promote its decline.70
The first, ‘tolerant’ reading could be more consistent with the Italian Constitution,
but constitutional justices should acknowledge that constitutional identity includes a
fundamental principle of ‘internationality’. Among ‘fundamental principles’, the
first part of the Italian Constitution recognizes the primacy of general rules of
international customary law (Article 10(1)), the right of asylum of any ‘foreigner
who (. . .) is denied the actual exercise of the democratic freedoms’ (Article 10(3)),
the ‘repudiation’ of war as an instrument of aggression against the freedoms of other
peoples, as well as a favour for limitations of sovereignty that ‘may be necessary to a
world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations’ (Article 11). These
principles already moderate dualist readings and offer together with the other
commitments—the protection of democracy (Article 1), human rights (Article 2),
equality (Article 3), labour (Article 4), local autonomies (Article 5), linguistic
minorities (Article 6), religious peace (Article 7 and 8), cultural development
(Article 9)—substantial elements to an international constitutionalism, a design for
a future constitution in a world governed by common principles.71 Taking these
fundamental constitutional principles and human rights seriously in a pluralist
perspective, the ItCC would act not only as an organ of the national constitutional
state but of the international community.
The question of constitutional identity is not just about who and what we are; it
deals first of all with how we interact with others. Therefore, the new tool of
constitutional identity needs to be embedded in good procedures. Domestic ordinary
judges, as well as constitutional and EU judges are still learning how to conduct a
dialogue around identity questions, but even without preliminary question mecha-
nisms some instruments of indirect dialogue with the ICJ could be developed.
The rules of the ICJ allow, if necessary, to arrange for an enquiry or an expert
opinion (Article 67 ICJ Statute) on questions related to the respect of national
‘constitutional identities’ relevant for controversies on international customary
69Cf Antonio Ruggeri, ‘Conflitti tra norme internazionali consuetudinarie e Costituzione, atto
secondo: quali i possibili “seguiti” della 238 del 2014?’, Consulta Online, (5 March 2015),
available at http://www.giurcost.org/studi/ruggeri45.pdf, 34–59.
70Heike Krieger/Georg Nolte, ‘The International Rule of Law—Rise or Decline?—Points of
Departure’, KFG Working Paper Series 1 (2016), 1–23.
71Jan Klabbers/Anne Peters/Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law,
expanded edition 2011 (Oxford: OUP 2009).
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law. The ICJ ‘may request of public international organizations information relevant
to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations
on their own initiative’ (Article 34 ICJ Statute). Expert opinion as well as informa-
tion procedures could involve the Venice Commission and the World Conference on
Constitutional Justice. The same instruments could be used by national constitu-
tional judges when facing potential conflicts between constitutional identity and
international customary law.
In the Italian system of constitutional justice, there is no specific judicial proce-
dure for scrutinizing whether a national legal Act is compatible with international
law (such as the ‘Normenverifikation’ under Article 100(2) of the German Consti-
tution). The ItCC could be asked whether an Italian legislative Act is compatible
with a norm of international customary law and could then decide incidenter tantum
that the customary norm is compatible with the supreme principles of constitutional
identity. Furthermore, Sentenza 238/2014 created a new type of proceeding on the
basis of an analogy: the other judges can refer incidenter tantum to the ItCC the
question on whether or not a norm of international customary law they have to apply
is compatible with the Italian constitutional identity.72
In this regard, the constitutional identity review could require specific rules made
by the legislator through constitutional amendments (Article 137 of the Italian
Constitution). The constitutional lawmakers could decide whether the right use of
constitutional identity to international customary law implies a power to deliberately
‘nullify’ international judgments and the rules that govern their execution. If the
constitutional judges have the power to decide that an international customary norm
contrary to constitutional identity is null and void, also the European constitutional
review over legislative Acts risks being transformed into the power to annul inter-
national judgments. The best way to avoid an ultra vires exception against Sentenza
238/2014 could be a codification of this new self-made proceeding of constitutional
justice.
Finally, the right use of constitutional identity should always require the highest
possible standard of argumentation and hermeneutics. When constitutional rights
and their limitations are invoked in the name of constitutional identity, ponderation
even between the supreme principles has to be enhanced. The right to remedies can
prevail at the national level and the privileges of state immunities at the international
level, but under conditions of pluralism, ponderation in the relationship between the
rule and exception is not established once and for all.
A world where the harshest forms of injustice cannot be addressed and access to
justice is recognized to Arnold the Miller,73 but not to a forced labourer or to a victim
of war crimes would disregard its own minima moralia. Yet, a world where access to
72Following Corte Costituzionale, Order of 11 February 2015, No 30/2015, the Court had decided
the ‘inexistence (ab origine)’ of the state immunity norm insofar as it was conflicting with a
fundamental constitutional principle.
73The anecdote of the miller of Potsdam (the Miller-Arnold-Case) is famously described in Thomas
Carlyle, ‘History of Friedrich II of Prussia’, Vol 21, The Works of Thomas Carlyle, Vol 3, (Cam-
bridge: CUP 2010) 243 et seq.
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justice is used for the self-empowerment of judges to compel governments into
negotiations would lead to a reality in which fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus.
If one looks at the general usage in biology, ‘immunity’ means the capability of
multicellular organisms to resist the entrance of harmful microorganisms.74 Applied
in different biological, technical and legal contexts, immunity depicts the body of a
person or an organization with a life and a constitutional equilibrium. Subjective
rights defended in courts can be aggressive and harmful to the whole, but they can
include claims for immunities, for example the claim of soldiers to be protected by
an adequate umbrella of state immunity. In its Roman law origin, immunity did not
refer to the state but to the freedom of a citizen from public duties and, especially,
taxes. Immunity was the opposite of community—both deriving from munus—and
the idea is still that any excessive immunization could transform a protection of life
into its negation.75
The balancing between remedies and immunity needs to be handled by govern-
ments alongside judges, taking into account the specific European context. More
than sixty years after the signature of the first treaties, the permanent dialogue
between Germany and Italy has a difficult future.76
The traumas of WWII persist. The facts at the origin of the remedies v immunity
controversy constitute a living history that is still awaiting a commonly agreed
conclusion.
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State Immunity, Individual Compensation
for Victims of Human Rights Crimes,
and Future Prospects
Stefan Kadelbach
Abstract This chapter first recapitulates the state of affairs as to the principle of
state immunity and why exceptions from jurisdictional immunity for gross violations
of human rights and humanitarian law are not recognized. It explores customary law
and the global compensation treaty between Germany and Italy. Both indicate that
Italy would be obligated to indemnify Germany from individual claims raised before
Italian courts.
In a second step, the development towards individual rights in public interna-
tional law will be taken up. It appears that human beings are increasingly recognized
as holders of individual claims but, apart from human rights treaty systems, lack the
capacity under international law to invoke their rights before courts. Instead, they
depend on their home states, which have standing but are not entitled to waive the
individual rights of their citizens.
In order to reconcile the seemingly antagonistic regimes of state immunity and
claim settlement, prospects for a friendly solution of the present dilemma will be
assessed. Against the background of cases pending before Italian courts, it will be
examined whether the distinction between jurisdictional immunity and immunity
from execution opens up a way out of the impasse, which the two states and private
capital could pursue, and whether this solution would create a precedent for other
similar constellations.
Lastly, some concluding remarks will address lessons to be learnt for future
conflicts. They will deal with elements of a general regime of compensation,
drawing from the experience of both past reparation schemes and the experience
of reconciliation in post-totalitarian societies. Such elements could be a duty to seek
bona fide settlements, possible consequences of violations for domestic court pro-
ceedings, methods of assessing damages inspired by mass claim processing, the
categorization of claims according to the gravity of violations, rules on evaluating
evidence, procedures to give victims a say, and appropriate forms of monetary and
non-pecuniary compensation including the necessary institutional framework.
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In Sentenza 238/2014, the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) ruled that it was
unconstitutional for Italian courts to apply the customary principle of state immunity
to war crimes and crimes against humanity.1 In the same vein, the ItCC found that
the domestic law implementing the UN Charter2 did not form part of the Italian legal
system, as far as it obliged Italian courts to abide by a decision of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) pursuant to Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, if such a judgment
upholds state immunity for crimes under international law. The ItCC also quashed a
statute that ordered Italian courts to implement the Jurisdictional Immunities Judg-
ment.3 According to the ItCC, the fundamental rights of the Italian Constitution, and
particularly the right of access to a court, were superior to obligations under
international law. The Court thus transferred the controlimiti doctrine, which had
been developed to allow for exceptions to the priority of EU law over domestic law,
so as to allow for an exception to the obligation to abide by judgments of the World
Court.4
Irrespective of how convincing this decision is, it points towards a gap between
individual rights and the capacity to invoke these rights before domestic or interna-
tional courts. This gap (and the concomitant inconsistencies) is cause for concern.
While international law since World War II (WWII) has witnessed an increase in
norms that aim at the protection of the individual, it remains the case that states alone
have standing before courts to bring suits for violations of these rights. State
immunity reflects this concept. Apart from international human rights protection
schemes, where individuals may raise complaints if the respondent state has recog-
nized pertinent jurisdiction, traditional law by virtue of state immunity places the
respondent state on an equal level with the state that espouses the claim and bars the
holders of these rights from proceedings on their own behalf. Thus, even though
Italy and its courts have a point in stressing the human rights nature of the claims
concerned, they engage the international responsibility of the Italian state for
violation of state immunity by enforcing such claims.
The present chapter elaborates further on this contradictory legal situation and
tries to develop a notion of how contemporary international law should respond. In a
first step, the complex interplay between traditional patterns of reparation, state
immunity, and human rights in the Italian compensation cases is analysed (section
II). Subsequently, this chapter identifies some tendencies in international law that
appear to depart from this classical model (section III). These tendencies point at
possible ways to better integrate victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity
into compensation schemes (section IV)—and show that a conciliatory solution to
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2Article 1 of the Italian Law 17 August 1957, No 848.
3ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 136.
4See explicit reference in ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.2.
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the pending cases would comply better with the development through which inter-
national law has travelled in the past decades (section V).
II. Compensation, Immunity and Human Rights
In its Judgment of 3 February 2012, the ICJ once again upheld state immunity from
national jurisdiction, which applies as long as no specific treaty obligates a state to
exert jurisdiction.5 More specifically, it found that Italian courts disregarded this
principle by exercising jurisdiction over claims raised against the Federal Republic
of Germany, by declaring Greek judgments against the German state enforceable,
and by enforcing such judgments, which an Italian domestic court did by registering
a legal charge on Villa Vigoni for the purpose of securing an acknowledged claim.
After an analysis of state practice, the ICJ rejected the notion of exceptions to
immunity from jurisdiction or from enforcement, including for war crimes and
crimes against humanity.6 Accordingly, Italy was held responsible vis-à-vis Ger-
many,7 even though the Court stressed that it did not rule on any individual claim for
compensation under international law.8
Before reconstructing the rationale of this judgment (section II.2.), it appears
useful to take a look at the legal framework for the compensation of Italian victims of
persecution and crimes committed during WWII (section II.1.).
1. Compensation Agreements and German Compensation Law
After World War II
According to Article 77(4) of the Italian Peace Treaty, Italy waived ‘on its own
behalf and on behalf of Italian nationals all claims against Germany and German
nationals outstanding onMay 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other
obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939’.9 This
waiver referred to ‘all claims for loss or damage arising during the war’.
5Cf ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment
of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 3, para 51; ICJ, Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Reports 2008, 177, para 170;
ICJ, Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment
of 20 July 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 422: the obligation under Art 7 of the UN Convention against
Torture implied that immunity, even though the issue was raised in the course of proceedings before
domestic courts in Senegal (ibid, para 22), could not be invoked by the accused.
6ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 3), paras 80-97.
7Ibid, para 136.
8Ibid, para 108.
9Treaty of Peace with Italy, 10 February 1947, 49 UNTS 3.
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This provision, theoretically, did not bar Italian war victims from presenting a
claim under the German compensation law (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz).
According to the statute’s pertinent version of 1956, however, reparations depended
on the qualification of the claimant as a victim of national-socialist persecution as
well as a domicile or permanent residence in Germany until 31 December 1952.10
Claims had to be registered by 1 October 1957.
In 1961, Germany and Italy concluded two bilateral compensation agreements.
The Agreement on the Compensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National-
Socialist Measures of Persecution, according to the official reasoning, was intended
to include those Italian victims of persecution who did not qualify under the
compensation law of 1956.11 Germany agreed to pay DM (Deutsche Mark) 40 mil-
lion ‘for the benefit of Italian nationals who, on grounds of their race, faith or
ideology were subjected to (. . .) measures of persecution and who, as a result of
those persecution measures, suffered loss of liberty or damage to their health, and for
the benefit of the dependents of those who died in consequence of such measures’.
This agreement was, according to its Article 3, meant to ‘constitute final settlement’
between the two states. Germany has held ever since that victims of war crimes,
including Italian Military Internees (IMIs) or people deported and subjected to
forced labour, were beyond the ambit of the term ‘victim of Nazi persecution’.
For all other types of claims the second agreement of 1961 is of interest, which
concerns the ‘settlement of certain property-related, economic and financial ques-
tions’.12 Germany paid a further lump sum of DM 40 million for ‘outstanding
questions of an economic nature’. Italy, in turn, agreed to indemnify the Federal
Republic of Germany ‘for any possible judicial proceedings or other legal action by
Italian natural or legal persons’ in relation to claims ‘based on rights and circum-
stances which arose’ during WWII.13 Article 24 of this agreement states that
Germany considered the settlement agreed therein as final. The accompanying
exchange of notes between both sides make no mention of Article 24. As a
consequence, Germany considers it to be the responsibility of the Italian state to
compensate claims within the scope of this agreement, including victims of war
crimes and persons deported and subjected to forced labour.14
10Third German Law Amending the Additional Federal Compensation Act of 29 June 1956,
Bundesgesetzblatt I 29 June 1956, No 31, 559; the statute had retroactive effect as of
1 January 1953.
11Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian
Nationals Subject to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and
Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963, No 22, 791; official reasoning in
Bundestagsdrucksache IV/438, 9.
12Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain
Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian
version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963, No 19, 668.
13Original in German and Italian; English translation taken from ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities
(n 3), para 24.
14Cf ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 3), para 102.
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This, however, did not happen. With the German Law of 2 August 2000
establishing the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’
(Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft), a further effort was made15 with the
intention to cover damages for people who had not been compensated under the laws
enacted or agreements concluded previously. However, it did not encompass pris-
oners of war (POW) for whom the allied forces had already set up a compensation
scheme shortly after the war. The fact that the German Reich denied POW status to
IMIs did not prevent German authorities from placing forced workers under that
category. The ICJ noted that it was ‘a matter of surprise—and regret—that Germany
decided to deny compensation’ for that reason.16
2. Immunity As a Part of the System
The ICJ cited ample state practice, particularly judgments of domestic courts, to
support its conclusion that there is no exception from immunity even for particularly
grave violations of international law.17 This is in line with the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has repeatedly held that no
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) would ensue
were courts to grant immunity from jurisdiction, including for claims against a
state whose agents were accused to have committed human rights crimes such as
torture and crimes against humanity.18 The rationale behind this reasoning has two
aspects: a reciprocity and a policy argument.
The reciprocity argument refers to the traditional concept of state immunity. It
derives from the principle of the sovereign equality of states, which implies that no
state’s institutions may sit as judges over the conduct of other states.19 The historical
motive to exempt the monarch from the jurisdiction of courts has ceded over time to
the rationale of guaranteeing the exclusive competence of the respondent state to
determine its policies.20 Once an exception to the rule is made, the concern is that
this would open the door for retaliation of a similar kind before other states’ courts
and for a politicization in the administration of justice.21 This concept seems all the
15German Law Instituting the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft) of 2 August 2000, Bundesgesetzblatt I 11 August 2000 No 38, 1263.
16ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 3), para 99.
17Ibid, paras 81-97.
18ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No
35763/97; ECtHR, McElhinney v Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001,
Application No 31253/96; ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany, Decision
of 12 December 2002, Application No 59021/00.
19ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 3), para 57.
20Hazel Fox/Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: OUP 3rd ed 2013), 26-28.
21Burkhard Hess, ‘Kriegsentschädigungen aus kollisionsrechtlicher und rechtsvergleichender
Sicht’, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 40 (2003), 107–212, at 189.
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more difficult to accept when the conduct in question amounts more clearly to
serious and large-scale human rights crimes.22
The policy argument addresses the possible consequences of exceptions to
immunity. With respect to reparation after war and other types of conflict, opening
the path to domestic courts has a potentially detrimental effect on the incentive to
arrive at an agreement through compromise, because victims would prefer to go to
court and seek full compensation.23 Court judgments would discourage negotiated
compensation schemes, which are typically accompanied by lump sum and final
settlement clauses. If obtaining such judgments is a realistic option, then state parties
would be even more hesitant than they currently are to engage in such treaties.
Moreover, forum-shopping might be an unwanted consequence.
3. A Human Rights Perspective on Sentenza 238/2014
It should not go uncommented that the solution defended by the ItCC in Sentenza
238/2014 also raises serious concerns of a more general nature. To compromise the
normativity of international law and even the UN Charter at the discretion of
domestic courts comes as an invitation to actors in systems that do not primarily
honour the protection of individual rights. In adapting the approach the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) developed in the Kadi case,24 in which the ECJ subjected
sanctions by the UN Security Council to its judicial review,25 the ItCC on the face of
it made an effort to align with European fundamental rights standards. However, a
similar approach was also followed with regard to the ECtHR,26 so that the ItCC has
aligned with other constitutional courts that formulate caveats to the implementation
of ECtHR judgments. In an environment less prone to fundamental rights, the
Russian Constitutional Court cited such jurisprudence with approval when it held
that compliance with ECtHR judgments could be made conditional on a decree of
22Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights (The Hague: Nijhoff 1997),
189-215; Fox/Webb, State Immunity 2013 (n 20), 44-48.
23The opinion that compensation treaties implicitly exclude individual claims before national courts
per se, as held by German authorities for some time, however, was rejected by the German Federal
Constitutional Court in the forced workers claims case, Order of 13 May 1996, 2 BvL 33/93,
BVerfGE 94, 315, at 328-334.
24Cited in ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.4.
25Cf CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of 3 September 2008, Joined Cases Nos
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, paras 316; 320–326.
26Corte Costituzionale, Judgments of 22 October 2007, Nos 348 and 349/2007, para 6.1; for a
similar approach to the ECtHR, see the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the
Görgülü case: Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judgment of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE
111, 307, at 329.
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the President of the Russian Federation.27 Thus, probably against its own intentions,
the ItCC has contributed to a dwindling fidelity to international law, of which human
rights form an essential part.
In sum, also from a human rights perspective, albeit not in an obvious way,
Sentenza 238/2014 entails ambivalent consequences. To conclude from this obser-
vation that fundamental rights are best served if the lines drawn by traditional
international law were further followed, however, would drive the point too far. In
a way, Sentenza 238/2014 goes in the direction of another trend in international law,
namely the progressive development towards individualization.28 In order to better
understand the dilemma of the ItCC and to put forward an informed suggestion for
possible future arrangements, it should be asked what that trend means for the
compensation of victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
III. The Individualization of Claims Under International Law
The Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment reaffirms a distinction between substantive
and procedural law,29 which is also visible in the emancipation of individual rights
from mediatisation by state interests in post-war compensation systems. In the law
governing injuries against aliens, the violation of the rights of an individual foreign
national was considered ‘in reality’ an infringement on the said individual’s home
state to assert its own rights.30 This so-called Vattelian fiction,31 however, has been
modified. In those crucial areas of international law in which the individual is at the
centre—that is in human rights law, international criminal law and in international
humanitarian law—compensatory schemes for violations of the individual’s rights
form part of the regimes.
27Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-П/2015 on request of State Duma
deputies, translation by Maria Smirnova, available at http://transnational-constitution.blogspot.
com/2015/08/russian-constitutional-court-decision.html. See also Heike Krieger, chapter ‘Sentenza
238/2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform?’, in this volume.
28Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law
(Cambridge: CUP 2016); see also Anne Peters, ‘Immune against Constitutionalization?’, in Anne
Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global
Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill 2015), 1-19.
29For a critique, see, among others, Jerzy Kranz, ‘L’affaire Allemagne contre Italie ou les dilemmes
du droit et de la justice’, in Peters, Immunities 2015 (n 28), 116–127; Andrea Gattini, ‘Immunité et
souveraineté dans l’arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l’affaire Immunités
juridictionnels de l’État’, ibid, 223–235; Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘Serious Human Rights
Violations as Potential Exceptions to Immunity: Conceptual Challenges’, ibid, 236–243.
30PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK), Judgment of 30 August 1924, PCIJ
Reports Series A, No 2, 12.
31ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, adopted by the Commission at
its fifty-eighth session in 2006, UN Doc A/61/10, Art 1, commentary, para 3.
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In international human rights law, the 1984 UN Convention against Torture
demands that member states provide an individual right to compensation invokable
by victims before domestic courts; this right must include means for comprehensive
rehabilitation.32 In other protection systems such an obligation of redress is framed
in more general terms. Regional human rights courts use different powers to decide
on reparations. The wording of Article 41 ECHR aims at pecuniary compensation,
but it is the obligation to comply with ECtHR judgments (Article 46 ECHR) which is
read to encompass non-pecuniary consequences, such as the duty to halt violations
and, if necessary, to amend statute law or to reopen judicial and administrative
proceedings.33 The language of Article 63 of the American Convention on Human
Rights goes further than Article 41 of the ECHR in spelling out that a breach of rights
‘be remedied and that fair compensation is made’.34 The African Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights may ‘make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, includ-
ing the payment of fair compensation and reparation’.35 The reach of these Conven-
tions coincides with the ‘jurisdiction’ of the respondent state party, which is
understood to refer to its territory and also covers exterritorial acts if the state
exercises control, for example through an army in occupied territory.36
The central compensation clause in international criminal law is Article 75 of the
Rome Statute.37 The International Criminal Court can develop guidelines for repa-
ration and may order compensation for victims to be paid either by the perpetrator or
by a trust fund that the state parties can establish (Article 79 Rome Statute). Victims
have no right, as a party to the proceedings, to direct a claim against the accused.
However, they may file an application with the registrar of the court which has the
power to order pecuniary reparation if the accused is convicted.38
In humanitarian law, Article 91 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 declares that states that violate the Conventions are liable for
32Art 14 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, in force 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS, 85.
33International Law Association, Johannesburg Conference, International Human Rights Commit-
tee, ‘Final Report International Human Rights Law and the International Court of Justice (ICJ): The
Domestic Implementation of Judgments/Decisions of Courts and Other International Bodies that
Involve International Human Rights Law’, Part Two, (2016), para 15.
34American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969, UNTS 1144, 123.
35Art 27 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 9 June 1998, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/
AFCHPR/PROT III; a similar formula is used in Art 45 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights of 1 July 2008, reprinted ILM 48 (2009), 334, though not yet in
force.
36ECtHR, Ilascu v Moldova and Russia, Judgment of 8 July 2004, Application No 48787/99, paras
387-394; ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v UK, Judgment of 7 July 2011, Application No 55721/07,
paras 138-142; for acts outside occupied territory, see ECtHR, Bankovic and Others v Belgium and
Others, Decision of 12 December 2001, Application No 52220/99, paras 67-73.
37Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, UNTS 2187, 3.
38William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute
(Oxford: OUP 2010), 879-882.
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damages.39 The official commentary of the International Committee of the Red
Cross is sympathetic to a reading that this provision presupposes a claim of the
individual and to reparation, but the matter remains disputed. At least there is a
tendency in customary law to recognize standing of individuals to invoke these
rights before courts.40 Even though it appears that domestic courts, at least in
Germany, are still reluctant to accept the individual orientation of humanitarian
law when it comes to its being integrated into the domestic concept of state
responsibility,41 they rarely rule out this possibility.42 At any rate, as of now the
standing of the individual before courts to invoke these rights is not yet generally
recognized. All that humanitarian law explicitly prescribes is that neither protected
persons nor their home states may waive the rights guaranteed in the Geneva
Conventions.43
A development towards individualization can also be observed in the processing
of mass claims. In the administration of damages after the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) dealt with different
categories of individual claims.44 Eligibility for compensation included any direct
loss and damage arising from this incident, which could have been a breach of
humanitarian law. The home states were not regarded as holders of these claims but
as agents of their nationals (and stateless persons which they represented). The
UNCC also monitored payments to the claimants made by the recipient states that
had an obligation to report.
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility
likewise recognize the possibility of individual rights to reparation. Their Article
33(2) states that the rules on the content of responsibility are ‘without prejudice to
any right, arising from the international responsibility of a state, which may accrue
39First Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977, UNTS 1125, 3.
40Jean de Preux, ‘Article 91—Responsibility’, in Claude Pilloud et al, Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 in Yves
Sandoz/Christophe Swinarski/Bruno Zimmermann (eds), (Geneva: Nijhoff 1987), 1053-1058, at
1056-1057; Jean-Marie Henckaerts/Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law (Volume I: Rules), (Cambridge: CUP 2005a), 541-545.
41Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 13 August 2013, 2 BvR 2260/06 (Bridge of Varvarin);
Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 6 October 2016, III ZR 140/15, NJW 2016, 3656 (Kunduz).
42See reference in Jean-Marie Henckaerts/Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Human-
itarian Law (Volume II: Practice), (Cambridge: CUP 2005b), 3560-3609.
43Cf Arts 7 and 8 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12 August 1949, UNTS 75, 135; Arts 7 and 8 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, UNTS 75, 287.
44Cf Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Staatenverantwortlichkeit für Angriffskriege und Verbrechen gegen die
Menschlichkeit’, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 40 (2003), 63-105, at 90-92.
See also Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, and Filippo Fontanelli,
chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, in this volume.
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directly to any person or entity other than a state’.45 According to the ILC commen-
tary thereto ‘the individuals concerned should be regarded as the ultimate beneficia-
ries and in that sense as the holders of the relevant rights’.46
Thus, the traditional concept of state responsibility appears to be ceding to a
model of split entitlement: the victims are recognized as holders of the claims, but
the procedural right to espouse these claims on their behalf is still in the hands of the
states. This notion is also taken up in the work of the ILC project on diplomatic
protection, which recognizes that a state in presenting such a claim ‘“in reality” (. . .)
also asserts the rights of its injured national’.47
IV. Prospects for Future Regimes of Compensation
and Reconciliation
What would a compensation regime have to look like in order to absorb the
developments sketched out in the preceding section? There can be no doubt that
such a scheme would be based on the concept that individuals are the holders of
claims to restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. The question is how these
claims can be administered in a way that recognizes them without discouraging
other efforts to reach a constructive settlement.
The central issue is who may present such claims. It is still the practice that states
act on behalf of their nationals or other persons for whom they are responsible. The
power of the UNCC to monitor the transfer of compensation by the victim’s home
state pays tribute to the fact that this state does not espouse its own claim and may
serve as a model solution to the problem that victims frequently do not receive any
payment. The need to concentrate the process and to administer it effectively
advocates in favour of maintaining the mechanism of diplomatic protection in
principle. The question is whether this model should as a matter of policy48 prevent
individuals from bringing suits before domestic courts. As far as treaty systems
address this point, they provide for the exclusiveness of the established scheme, such
as the peace treaty between Ethiopia and Eritrea of 2000.49 Another path would be
45ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.
46Ibid.
47ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006 (n 31), Art 1, commentary, para 3; cf also
Peters, Beyond Human Rights 2016 (n 28), 161-164; 389-407.
48Compensation agreements are not a legal obstacle; see FCC, Order of 13 May 1996 (n 23).
49Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation
and peacebuilding in both countries (Algiers Agreement), 12 December 2000, 2138 UNTS 93, Art 5
(8).
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mutual exclusion such that the registration of a claim requires that no other pro-
ceedings are pending.50
A second crucial point is whether there can be an upper ceiling to the total amount
of compensation, as it is one of the rationales of a lump sum agreement. Examples in
history to the contrary seem discouraging and atypical. They include past genera-
tions of peace treaties, but also the compensation obligations Iraq incurred following
its invasion of Kuwait. In that case reparation was not mutually agreed but
one-sidedly imposed and financed by the sequestrated proceeds of the Iraqi oil
production.51 These examples notwithstanding, however, contemporary human
rights law points at a distinction between damages resulting from serious crimes
against life, integrity and personal liberty on the one hand, and other types of claims
on the other hand. Whereas claims of the latter kind may still be negotiable, there is
little space for limiting claims for serious human rights violations. It is widely
recognized that serious crimes must entail investigations and, where the proceedings
yield pertinent evidence, the indictment of the persons responsible.52 It would
contravene the strict stance human rights law takes in this respect to exclude claims
altogether, be it only by limiting the funds at a court’s disposal.
However, it seems possible to provide for time limits for the registration of
claims, if these limitations are not unduly short and made public in a way that the
entitled can come to know of their rights. Recent models of mass claim processing
are therefore compatible with the need to provide adequate reparation. They have the
advantage of accelerating the procedure and of establishing unified methods for
evaluating evidence. For that reason, the UNCC distinguished between different
types of claims and typified the outcomes in the form of fixed amounts. There have
also been inbuilt time constraints, in that deadlines for registration were set and an
end to the proceedings was envisaged as a predefined point in time. In more complex
proceedings one might also think of fixed time limits for every step in the procedure,
as is the practice before some arbitral tribunals. Such efforts to speed up the
procedure would be one lesson from past lump sum settlements, as it can take
decades between the taking up of the claim and payment to the injured person.
For the financing of reparation claims, funds have been created or are foreseen
which are administered by claims commissions, arbitral tribunals, or courts. Exam-
ples are national foundations in Austria and Germany and the victims trust fund
mentioned in Article 79 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Finally, remedies other than financial compensation, which are covered by the
concept of satisfaction, may help to overcome serious human rights violations. One
50Cf Hess, ‘Kriegsentschädigungen’ 2003 (n 21), 163.
51See Kadelbach, ‘Staatenverantwortlichkeit’ 2003 (n 44).
52IACtHR, Barrios Altos v Peru, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Ser C 75, operative para 4; IACtHR,
Almonacid Arellano et al v Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Ser C 154, para 119; ECtHR,
Mocanu and Others v Romania, Judgment of 17 September 2014, Applications Nos 10865/09,
45886/07 and 32431/08, para 321.
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might profit from the experience of national reconciliation efforts53 but also from the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has ordered
official apologies, memorials, the naming of streets and other measures of that
kind.54
V. Conclusions
If there is an inter-temporal dimension to the case, it does not show primarily in the
fact that the law of compensation was different at the time of WWII compared to the
present. Rather, it is to be seen in the antagonism between subject matter and
procedural law: whereas we are witnessing an increasing empowerment of the
individual with respect to his or her rights in international law, the modes of
implementing these rights are still strictly consensual. The individual has no stand-
ing before international courts or national courts of a foreign state unless states are
willing to grant it, be it by agreement or by the waiver of immunity. Two different
layers in the ‘geology of international law’55 overlap, with the result that the ICJ has
made it clear that immunity is still an obstacle to domestic jurisdiction for individual
compensation claims. Therefore, Italy is under an obligation to indemnify Germany,
both by virtue of this judgment and the bilateral compensation agreement of 1961, in
case a domestic court should grant an order of execution.
This outcome is counter-intuitive and raises the concern of how convincing
political statements embracing human rights really are. It is therefore necessary to
find a conciliatory solution as it is also suggested in the obiter dictum to the ICJ
judgment, which stresses that claims by Italian victims of war crimes whose entitle-
ments to reparation have not yet been recognized ‘could be the subject of further
negotiations between the two States concerned with a view to resolving the issue’.56
The state of proceedings in Italy appears to open a window of opportunity. Some
interpret Sentenza 238/2014 as abstract in nature, without entailing cogent conse-
quences for pending and future cases. In particular, the distinction was stressed
between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement. The fact that
the ICJ held that the latter ‘goes further than the jurisdictional immunity’57 should be
53See also the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the National Association of
Japanese Canadians of 22 September 1988, reported by Henckaerts/Doswald Beck, CIHL Rules
(n 40) 542 and CIHL Practice (n 42), 3602.
54Cf, inter alia, IACtHR, González et al v Mexico, Judgment of 16 November 2009, Ser C 205, para
471 (Cotton Field).
55To borrow a term used by Joseph H H Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law: Governance,
Democracy and Legitimacy’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 64 (2004), 547-562.
56ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 3), para 103.
57Ibid, para 113.
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a reason for Italian courts to reflect on the matter and halt procedures.58 The two
governments, in turn, might use the period of suspension to engage in a conciliatory
solution.
How could the issue be resolved? One suggestion has been to create a fund in
which both states take a share:59 Germany for obvious reasons and Italy because it
failed to identify victims and take care of their fate. Companies which profited from
forced labour and other private donors could be encouraged to participate. The total
amount available should be dependent on the number of victims still alive; claims
could be restricted to direct victims and their spouses. Payment should be made
directly to the entitled persons. The total sum of money to be paid out in the end
would certainly not be high, considering the shrinking number of claimants, the
more so if compared to other expenditures that figure prominently in state budgets. If
experience with past settlement procedures and reconciliation commissions is rep-
resentative, the pecuniary aspect is not even the most important. Perhaps more
relevant are the ways to provide some form of recognition of the injuries suffered
and the consequences they had on the lives of victims and their next of kin.
Since the affected persons lives’ are approaching their end, both structure and
procedure must be organized in such a way as to allow for speedy processing. This
consideration points in favour of a commission rather than an arbitral tribunal,
composed of representatives from both states or even independent experts who are
familiar with such procedures, as they may be found, for example, in the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration. Procedures could follow the experience with mass
claim proceedings as far as the categorization of claims and evidence are concerned.
To lower the threshold, the constitutive agreement could stress that the solution
found would constitute no prejudice for claims raised by other states and would not
imply the recognition of a legal commitment beyond the immanent logic of the
system created.
VI. Epilogue
It is only a ten-minutes’ drive away from Frankfurt University, where this chapter
has been written, to the cemetery of Westhausen. A section of this cemetery is
known as the Cimitero di Guerra Italiano, where 4,788 Italian men, women and
58For pertinent jurisprudence, see Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The Italian Court
of Justice—The Italian Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity’,
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 76 (2016), 193-202, at 197-198; Giovanni Boggero, ‘The
Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional Court for Italian Municipal
Judges: Is Overcoming the “Triepelian Approach” Possible?’ Heidelberg Journal of International
Law 76 (2016), 203-224, at 219-221. See also Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter
‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
59See Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume. See also
Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
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children were buried. They died between 1943 and 1945, either from illness,
starvation, exhaustion, or during hostilities and air raids. A number of them had
come to Germany in the 1930s as workers and were interned for forced labour in
1943 after Italy had changed sides in the war; many were soldiers, and had been
captured as IMIs, others were partisans, political prisoners or victims of deportation.
It still happens that a family discovers the name of a grandfather, a sister or a cousin
who had been missing for decades. If they wish, the Italian Consulate General
organizes for the remains to be transferred back home. A plate with the inscription
‘rimpatriato’ is then attached to the tombstone.
The conviction that the horrors of the past must be overcome has inspired many
ambitious projects, a common and unified Europe being amongst the most impor-
tant. Germany and Italy have contributed to this European success for more than
60 years. To continue to do so is an obligation that goes beyond positive law.
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Sketches for a Reparation Scheme: How
Could a German-Italian Fund for the IMIs
Work?
Filippo Fontanelli
Abstract Given the deadlock in the current negotiations between Germany and
Italy and the unavailability of judicial remedies for the victims, the two states could
set up a reparation scheme. This chapter sketches some of the main features of such a
hypothetical scheme, considering existing internal or international arrangements in
the context of transitional justice (the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility
and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft) scheme; the Australian
DART scheme; the deal between Japan and South Korea on reparations to ‘comfort
women’; the US/French schemes for reparations and restitution to holocaust victims;
the Eritrea/Ethiopia reparations scheme; and the Iraq/Kuwait scheme). In particular,
the emphasis is on the system of identification of the eligible victims, the question of
financing and the fate of pending and future judicial claims. Assuming the states’
willingness to explore this project, the chapter outlines some of the ways the scheme
could operate in practice, drawing from existing models.
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Should Germany and Italy decide to set up a joint compensation (or reparation)1 fund
for Italian Military Internees (IMIs) and other victims of Nazi crimes (referred to,
when taken together, as the ‘Italian victims’) who have yet to obtain any reparation,2
what would this fund look like? This chapter’s analysis takes for granted some of the
conclusions and findings explored more fully in the other chapters in this volume. It
therefore does not seek to determine whether the two states—as a matter of law,
comity or pragmatism—must, should, or even could3 accept the establishment of a
joint fund.4 The working assumption here is that there nevertheless exists the
political will to make such a choice.5 Arguably, this resolution would constitute an
elegant way to cut the Gordian knot of the immunity deadlock and grant overdue
reparation to the victims. It might also be that the operation of such a fund could
suffice for the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) to revise its stance on the granting
of immunity to Germany in civil proceedings before Italian courts. This prospect
remains subject to speculation, and is more fully explored by Paolo Palchetti and
Riccardo Pavoni in their respective chapters.6 Furthermore, this chapter will also not
1Words matter, and in this case the reference to reparation rather than compensation might be
appropriate, both to second Germany’s inclination to consider any payment made as a matter of
comity rather than obligation, and to account for the lump-sum nature of any potential payment
(as opposed to payments measured upon the actual extent of damage suffered by each victim). A
similar switch is discernible, for instance, in the formulation of the Australian Defence Abuse
Response Taskforce (DART) scheme, which was envisioned as a compensation scheme but ended
up being officially labelled as a reparation scheme. See, for more details, Simone Degeling/Kit
Barker, ‘Private Law and Grave Historical Injustice: The Role of the Common Law’, Monash
University Law Review 41 (2015), 377-413, at 380 et seq, in particular note 9.
2Alongside IMIs, who are the majority of potential applicants, other groups could be covered by the
compensation scheme, including civilians subjected to forced labour and victims of mass killings.
3On the legal regime on the granting of compensation under German law, see Andreas von Arnauld,
‘Damages for the Infringement of Human Rights in Germany’, in Ewa Bagińska (ed), Damages for
Violations of Human Rights (Heidelberg: Springer 2016), 101-136.
4In short, whether Germany owes such reparation as a matter of law is disputed. The ICJ decided
not to admit Italy’s counterclaim in the Jurisdictional Immunities dispute and, therefore, has not
addressed the issue. Germany claims that compensation for the IMIs was already included in the
sums paid under the bilateral treaty of 2 June 1961.
5On the political opportunity of reparation movements, and how it affects their rate of success, see
Stephanie Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations and Apologies (Heidelberg: Springer 2014), 11-12.
6See Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume, who notes that ‘[t]here are
sound reasons for believing that the setting up of a meaningful compensatory procedure would lead
to the suspension or termination of the remaining cases pending against Germany before Italian
courts’, at 94. On this point, see also Paolo Palchetti, ‘Italian Concerns after Sentenza 238/2014:
Possible Reactions, Possible Solutions’, VerfBlog, (11 May 2017), available at https://
verfassungsblog.de/italian-concerns-after-sentenza-2382014-possible-reactions-possible-solutions/
: ‘[A] political initiative involving Germany and Italy and aimed at establishing a mechanism for
addressing the reparation claims of the victims might be regarded by the Constitutional Court as an
adequate alternative route for providing protection to the rights of the victims, thereby justifying a
limitation to the right of access to court and the recognition of Germany’s immunity’. In the chapter
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address the chronological conundrum regarding the victims’ characterization under
international humanitarian law.7 Instead, it will be assumed that, under the prevailing
approach, Italian victims should receive some reparation irrespective of the legal
characterization of Germany’s conduct at that time.
In light of these assumptions, the narrow focus of this chapter will be on certain
practical features and arrangements of the possible joint scheme to come (the ‘Joint
Scheme’). Selected matters will be addressed, such as the funding of the Joint
Scheme, procedures for the distribution of compensation (including the criteria of
eligibility and the appointment of a competent authority for the review of individual
applications), and the waiver of judicial claims.
An attempt is made to draw on extant schemes without presuming any significant
similarity between them. Quite simply, the idea is to look at existing solutions and
provide the architects of the Joint Scheme with a range of options that could be
utilised alongside a handful of warnings. As this chapter ends the substantive section
of this volume, it marks an opportune moment to point the way (or ways) ahead for
the Italian and German authorities.
Sections II and III concern two domestic schemes implemented by Germany and
Australia respectively. Section IV addresses selected payment schemes established
at the interstate level. Section V concludes the chapter by drawing the threads
together and sketching some features of the Joint Scheme. Although section V
provides a distilled checklist, the intermediate sections account for its composition.
This chapter’s intention is to identify some valid principles that could inform the
Joint Scheme’s construction and compose a roadmap. Ultimately, however, the
conviction is that a Joint Scheme for reparations, whatever its make-up, is preferable
to none. This chapter builds on both these intuitions, which Adrian Vermeule
effectively juxtaposed when concluding upon the desirability of less-than-perfect
reparation schemes:
Viewed in the concrete, both transitional and nontransitional programs or awards of com-
pensation are often disastrously unprincipled. We must step back a mile or three, to reflect
that in many cases the only other option not ruled out by political constraints—doing nothing
at all—would be even worse.8
A Joint Scheme would be, therefore, a vessel of ‘rough justice’, a device
preferable to inaction albeit inevitably flawed under the prevailing standards of
‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, of this volume, Palchetti reiterates the underlying
question: ‘It is not clear (. . .) whether an interstate agreement on compensation might be regarded
by the ItCC as an adequate alternative route for providing protection to the rights of the victims,
thereby justifying a limitation to the right of access to court and the recognition of Germany’s
immunity’, at 50. This question raises the issue of Italian constitutional law, which exceeds the
scope of this chapter.
7Their status as victims of war crimes was recognized after the conduct took place, in the III and IV
Geneva Conventions of 1949. See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in
this volume.
8Adrian Vermeule, ‘Reparations as Rough Justice’, University of Chicago Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper 105 (2005), 1-18, at 15.
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justice.9 While roughness is both inevitable and acceptable, the Joint Scheme should
not be unprincipled. This chapter gathers, and expatiates on, the appropriate princi-
ples. While designed to address the unresolved status of IMIs, this chapter could as
well work as blueprint for any mechanism of financial reparations in the wake of
historical injustice, mutatis mutandis.
In particular, the Decalogue-redolent list of section V does not lay the ground
rules for a reparation scheme (for IMIs), but for any reparation scheme.
II. Next of Kin: The RRF Foundation
A useful template to shape the Joint Scheme is the law establishing the Foundation
‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und
Zukunft) (RRF).10 Germany entrusted the RRF with the payment of compensation
to applicants who were victims of forced labour and other ‘injustices’ perpetrated by
the Nazi regime.11 IMIs were unable to obtain compensation under this law, which
expressly excluded prisoners of war from its application.12 Other victims of Nazi
crimes, including the victims of mass killings, were altogether outside the scheme’s
reach. The point here is not to question the Foundation’s decision to reject the IMIs’
applications or the scope of application of the RRF but rather to consider the
functioning of the compensation system established under the RRF Law. It is quite
detailed and might serve as a model for the Joint Scheme’s machinery.
The financing for the RRF fund was provided by the German federal government
and a consortium of German companies.13 The government and German industry
each made a one-off contribution to the RRF fund of DM (Deutsche Mark) five
9Ibid, describing rough justice as ‘the intuition that sometimes it is permissible, even mandatory, to
enact a scheme of compensatory reparations that is indefensible according to any first-best criterion
of justice. Rough justice is indefensible; it seems attractive only when compared to no justice–when
it is recognized that the status quo of inaction is also a proposal, one that may fare even worse,
according to the same criteria that would condemn the relevant reparations proposals’.
10German Law Instituting the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft) of 2 August 2000, Bundesgesetzblatt I 11 August 2000, 1263. For a
commentary, see Bardo Fassbender, ‘Compensation for Forced Labour in World War II: The
German Compensation Law of 2 August 2000’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
3 (2005), 243-252. See also Peer Zumbansen (ed), Zwangsarbeit im Dritten Reich: Erinnerung
und Verantwortung—NS-Forced Labor: Remembrance and Responsibility (Baden Baden: Nomos
2002).
11RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 2, para 1.
12Ibid, Art 11, para 3. On the application of this carve-out, see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012,
99, para 26. The commentary to the law specified that ‘the rules of international law allowed a
detaining power to enlist prisoners of war as workers’.
13RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 3, para 1.
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billion.14 A board of trustees, composed of 27 members, obtained responsibility for
its management. These included, besides a number of German officials, one repre-
sentative for each country, ethnic or national group amongst the prospective appli-
cants (namely Israel, the US, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic,
Roma and Sinti, and Jews) and other institutional members (from the UN and other
international institutions).15
The Foundation did not directly carry out the distribution of compensation. The
funds were made available to a series of non-profit ‘partner organizations’, each
responsible for receiving claims from a specific group of applicants. These organi-
zations were tasked with the liquidation of successful claims16 and with the estab-
lishment of an appeal process for the review of first instance determinations.17
Specific provisions required payments to be suspended or only partially made
until the exhaustion of applications, in order to prevent the Fund from depleting its
resources and becoming insolvent, thus failing to satisfy all eligible applications
after paying out early processed claims.18 For instance, the maximum payable
amount to each applicant eligible as ‘slave labourer’ was set initially at 50% of the
amount owed. The outstanding portion was paid out ‘after conclusion of the
processing of all applications pending before the respective partner organization,
to the extent possible within the framework of the available means.’19
The RRF Law contained a specific provision detailing the eligibility of applicants
for compensation.20 It covered persons subjected by German authorities or commer-
cial companies to forced labour, and subjected to detention or harsh living condi-
tions.21 It also stipulated the possibility of compensating property losses if
the applicants had been unable to seek compensation under previous schemes.22
The burden of demonstrating eligibility lay primarily with the applicants, although
the competent partner organization would normally provide and consider available
14Ibid, Art 3, paras 2 and 3. The current value of this 2001 donation, adjusted for inflation, would be




18Ibid, Art 9, paras 9-10.
19Ibid, para 9. The clause also requires that 5% of the monies allocated be set aside as a financial
reserve for appeals, and that the second round of payments be made only after such reserve has been
set up.
20Ibid, Art 11. In other words, the Law made hardship a necessary requirement for compensation
alongside that of forced labour. See Fassbender, ‘Compensation’ 2005 (n 10), 249: ‘Parliament’s
attention focused on persons detained in concentration camps on the one hand and deportees on the
other–and not on forced labourers as such.’
21RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 11, para 1, numbers 1 and 2.
22Ibid, Art 11, para 1, number 3. Liquidation of these claims was only residually possible, that is,
‘only after all applications pending before the competent commission have been processed’.
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aggregate information to complement the evidence provided by the individuals.23
The competent organization was authorized to accept, on a case-by-case basis,
applications deprived of supporting documentation. For the most part, claims were
strictly personal and, if the application related to the loss of property, heirs could
bring it only if the victims had died after February 1999.24
As for the amount of compensation granted to successful applicants, the RRF
Law set a cap of DM15,000 (approximately €7,600) for internees in concentration
camps (‘slave labourers’)25 and DM5,000 (approximately €2,530) for applicants
who, outside of concentration camps, were subjected to other forms of harsh
treatment, confinement and detention (‘forced labourers’).26 A total of DM8.1 billion
was ear-marked for compensating slave (and forced) labour, with DM50 million and
DM1 billion budgeted, respectively, to compensate other personal injuries and
property losses.27 DM700 million were instead reserved for separate projects of
the Foundation other than compensation.28
The transfer of funds awarded under the compensation scheme was conditional
on a previous declaration of ‘legal peace’made by the German parliament, certifying
the dismissal of all lawsuits pending abroad.29 The Law also prescribed that com-
pensation claims could only be brought under the procedures established thereunder,
to the exclusion of all other claims.30 Applicants would waive all other avenues of
redress, and the waiver would take effect at the moment of payment.31 To endorse
the unilateral preclusion of other claims effected by Germany, the US government
issued a statement of interest in every dispute brought before US courts—effectively
validating the choice of forum made in the Law and requesting that the individual
claim be redirected to the RRF.32
To ascertain the viability of adopting similar solutions in a Joint Scheme, a few
essential traits of this compensation scheme should be isolated. Some elements seem
23Ibid, Art 11, para 2: ‘Eligibility shall be demonstrated by the applicant by submission of
documentation. The partner organization shall bring in relevant evidence. If no relevant evidence
is available, the claimant’s eligibility can be made credible in some other way.’
24Ibid, Art 13, para 1.
25This terminology is employed in Libby Adler and Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Forgetfulness of
Noblesse: A Critique of the German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers
of the Third Reich’, Harvard Journal on Legislation 39 (2002), 1-62, at 2.
26RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 9, para 1.
27Ibid, Art 9, paras 2-4.
28Ibid, Art 9, para 7. The Foundation has carried out several ‘Funding Activities’, especially in the
field of historiography and the remembrance of victims, through the building of an online database,
the organization of encounters with former forced labourers and other victims, the funding of
educational projects, etc. See ‘Funding Programmes of the Foundation EVZ’, available at www.
stiftung-evz.de/eng/funding/.
29RRF Law, 2000 (n 10), Art 17, para 2.
30Ibid, Art 16.
31Ibid, Art 2.
32See Adler and Zumbansen, ‘The Forgetfulness’ 2002 (n 25), 4.
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fit for transplant: the quid pro quo nature (dismissal and waiver of lawsuits in
exchange for compensation), the administrative process of claims liquidation, the
intentional ambiguity regarding the legal basis for addressing injustices, entrusting
the governance of payment processes to non-profit organizations, the flexible evi-
dentiary principles, and the prescription of a possibility to challenge liquidation
decisions and obtain their review.
Other elements of the RRF scheme appear less appropriate. The non-eligibility of
heirs would frustrate the effectiveness of the Joint Scheme, given the timeframe of
the crimes for which reparation is due. Some commentators criticized the Law for
showing, on the part of Germany, ‘no remorse, no confession, and no sense of debt
for the merciless treatment’ of the victims.33 The quantification of compensation
caps is also an obviously delicate matter. Forced labourers employed outside con-
centration camps (non-slave labourers) received a sum that could be considered low
against several plausible baselines (for instance, the DM5,000 cap meant, for most
applicants, that the amount awarded was lower than what they would have received
had they been paid the minimum wage for the labour service supplied at that time).
III. DART: The Australian Solution
Since 2011, Australia has been coping with a barrage of individual complaints
relating to sexual and other forms of abuse allegedly perpetrated by personnel of
the Australian Defence Force.34 After evidence emerged of systemic problems, the
government established the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce (DART), which
was to assess individual complaints and determine the appropriate response
thereto.35
A range of possible responses were offered, including restorative justice/confer-
encing processes, counselling, compensation capped at A$ (Australian Dollars)
50,000,36 and the referral of matters to criminal prosecution and/or the military
33Ibid, 5-6.
34The cut-off date for the alleged actions was 11 April 2011, when the law firm DLA Piper, upon the
government’s commission, completed an investigation into the matter, see Garry A Rumble/
Melanie McKean/Dennis Pearce, Report of the Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse
in Defence: Facing the Problems of the Past, Volume—General Findings and Recommendations
(Canberra: DLA Piper 2011).
35For a positive assessment of DART, see Alikki Vernon, ‘The Ethics of Appropriate Justice
Approaches: Lessons from a Restorative Response to Institutional Abuse’, Law in Context
35 (2017), 139-158.
36Approximately €32,700 at the rate prevailing at the time of writing.
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justice system.37 Nearly all applicants requested monetary reparation.38 The focus of
this study will only be on the monetary reparation system. Nonetheless, the scheme
was remarkable for providing a diverse set of remedies. In particular, the DART
process acknowledged the need for victims to have their complaints heard and their
grievances accepted by the Australian Defence Force, while also devising a specific
engagement procedure to that effect.39
It is important to note that although DLA Piper (the law firm tasked with carrying
out the initial investigation) recommended establishing a ‘compensation’ plan and
the ministry initially agreed, the resulting plan was re-branded as a ‘reparation’
scheme. As it is expressly stated in the reparation guidelines, payments made should
not be understood to represent compensation, nor to imply an assumption of state
liability.40 Moreover, participation in the reparation scheme does not foreclose the
right to resort to domestic courts. Tribunals are merely reminded to take into account
the amount of reparation granted under the DART scheme to liquidate damages in
tort or statute.41
The DART reparation scheme was handled as a purely administrative process.42
Eligible applicants were all persons who were employed in the Australian Defence
Force and alleged to have suffered abuse effected by Defence Force personnel,
subject to certain deadlines for the presentation of the complaint.43 Applications
consisted of a reparation form, a personal account of the alleged abuse (and any
related follow-up procedure exhausted within the Defence Force), and proof of
37See Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, ‘Report of the
DLA Piper Review and the Government’s Response’, (27 June 2013), available at https://www.aph.
gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Com
pleted_inquiries/2010-13/dlapiper/report/index, para 2.50, referring to an action plan announced on
26 November 2012 by the Minister for Defence, the Honourable Stephen Smith MP, in response to
the DLA report.
38The breakdown of remedies granted is as follows (out of 1,751 processed complaints):
‘[A] reparation payment (1,723 complainants at a total cost of US$66.63 million); counselling
(577 complainants); participation in the Restorative Engagement Program (715 complainants);
referral to police for possible criminal investigation and prosecution (133 complainants); and
referral to the Chief of the Defence Force for consideration of possible administrative or disciplinary
action (132 complainants)’. See Australian government, ‘Defence Abuse Response Taskforce Final
Report’, (31 March 2016), available at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51343294.pdf, 11.
39Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 146, records the motivation of establishing the so-called
Restorative Engagement Conferences: ‘The consistent request from complainants was to: have
their personal account of abuse listened to by Defence; have their personal account accepted as true;
be given acknowledgement that the abuse was wrong and should not have happened’.
40Australian government, ‘Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme Guidelines’, available at www.aph.
gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id¼7d8a8c38-f721-42cf-baed-3538593a3ee4, para 1.6.1: ‘A payment
to a person under the Reparation Scheme is not paid as compensation or damages for any asserted,
perceived, or possible legal liability on the part of the Commonwealth, or for any injury, disease or
impairment, and does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the Commonwealth.’
41Ibid, para 1.6.2.
42Ibid, para 2.1.6: ‘[H]earings, negotiations or appeals’ were not envisaged for its functioning.
43Ibid, para 3.1.4.
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identity. Reparation was not available for applications made regarding deceased
persons.44
The evidentiary standard required of applicants is worth careful analysis. The
individual account of the abuse is expressly presumed to correspond to the ‘person’s
personal experience of alleged abuse’ unless evidence emerges to contradict it.45
Additional information might be sought from either the applicant or the Defence
Force. The Defence Force’s failure to submit documents requested by the taskforce
would result in a presumption that the Defence Force is unable to contradict the
information provided by the applicant,46 though it would ultimately be for the
competent assessor47 to form an opinion on the merits as to the ‘plausibility’ of
the applicant’s allegations.48 There is no classic treatment of the burden and standard
of proof, nor is there a precise system of reversals; the assessor’s opinion, based on
any available evidence, is the controlling criterion of any payment determination. In
the words of the assessor:
The plausibility test was also pivotal in humanely considering complaints from many
individuals who were aged, frail or in a vulnerable state of health or wellbeing or otherwise
reluctant or unable to recount often very traumatic instances of abuse.49
DART-awarded reparations were classified in pre-fixed amounts corresponding
to the varying gravity of the alleged abuse.50
The DART scheme, insofar as it did not preclude the victims’ access to judicial
redress, is not a pertinent model for the Joint Scheme because it did not ensure legal




47The Reparation Payment Assessor was appointed by the Minister of Defence to review abuse
applications and determine whether a payment would be made, and the amount thereof. The
designated assessor was Robyn Kruk, a retired senior Australian public servant.
48Ibid, para 4.5.1: The plausibility standard entailed that individual applications were upheld when
the allegations had ‘the appearance of reasonableness’; see Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 146.
49Australian government, ‘DART Final Report’ 2016 (n 38), 62, Appendix I—Comments by the
Reparation Payments Assessor.
50Categories 1 to 4 attract, respectively, a payment of A$5,000 (approx. €3,200); A$15,000
(approx. €9,600); A$30,000 (approx. €19,200); A$45,000 (approx. €28,800); see Australian
government, Defence Abuse Reparation Scheme Guidelines (n 40), para 4.6.1. More than half of
the applicants received payments relating to the most serious category of abuse. The types of abuses
are reported in Annex 10 to the DLA Piper Report and are further grouped to facilitate the task of the
taskforce into four genres (sexual abuse, sexual harassment, physical abuse, and harassment and
bullying). Somewhat counter-intuitively, the four categories used for reparation purposes have little
descriptive value and do not correspond to the type of abuse, but they are supposed to correspond to
different degrees of gravity. As explained by the taskforce: ‘A single incident of physical assault
with no serious injury might fall in Category 1 or 2 (depending on the individual circumstances),
while a serious sexual assault, such as a rape, would be expected to fall within Category 4.’ See
DART taskforce, ‘Seventh Interim Report to the Attorney-General and Minister for Defence’,
(September 2014), 19.
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of pre-fixed reparation amounts relating to certain recurring abuses and the use of a
flexible standard of evidence are two solutions that might fit well with the operation
of a Joint Scheme.
IV. Other Compensation Schemes
1. Eritrea/Ethiopia
Within the regime of the Algiers Agreement, which put an end to the border war
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the parties provided for the establishment of an
independent Claims Commission. Such a Commission was competent to decide
through arbitration the claims brought by either state party, including claims made
on behalf of individual citizens.51 The Commission’s jurisdiction extended, inter
alia, on claims for damages relating to breaches of international humanitarian law
committed during the conflict by either party.52 The Commission was entitled to
draft its own rules of procedure.53
Insofar as the Commission functioned as an arbitral tribunal, it does not seem to
provide an adequate model for the Joint Scheme. The great advantage of the Joint
Scheme would be that Germany does not object to the assumption of responsibility
for the injustices perpetrated against IMIs. A review of compensation claims under
the Joint Scheme would not implicate or require a determination of state responsi-
bility for breaches of ius in bello or ad bellum—a determination that the
51Note that individuals were not afforded access to arbitration, which remained an interstate
affair only.
52Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation
and peacebuilding in both countries (Algiers Agreement), 12 December 2000, 2138 UNTS 93, Art
5.1: ‘1. Consistent with the Framework Agreement, in which the parties commit themselves to
addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population including the
impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral Claims Commission shall be
established. The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims
for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both
natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of the other party or entities
owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of the
Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law. The Commission shall not hear claims
arising from the cost of military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of force,
except to the extent that such claims involve violations of international humanitarian law.’
53Which are available at the dedicated website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; see Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission, ‘Rules of Procedure’, available at https://pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/774.
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Commission, controversially enough, resolved to make.54 The Eritrea/Ethiopia
experience, in other words, is mostly instructive a contrario. The Joint Scheme
should not hinge itself on the ascertainment of Germany’s responsibility through
judicial or arbitral proceedings but only on the administrative review of the
pre-determined eligibility criteria of the applicants and their claims.
In one respect, however, the experience of the Claims Commission can be
relevant. The Commission established, alongside single claims warranting ad hoc
scrutiny on the merits, certain categories of claims for which a mass-claim procedure
would be used instead. Applicants whose claims were aggregate into mass claims
would be entitled to a fixed amount of compensation.55 In essence, once state
responsibility for a certain breach of international law is determined, a random
sample of individual claims hinging on the invocation of that breach would proceed
to a review on the merits. Through this exercise, the Commission would determine
(within the sample) the percentage of claims supported by adequate evidence. It
would then order compensation to all claimants in the class, reduced in amount to
match that percentage.56 For instance, if only 50% of claims in the sample are
meritorious, each claimant in that class would receive half of the
compensation owed.
Neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea used this mass-claim mechanism, a choice that
revealed the limits of subjecting individual claims to state espousal and the con-
straints imposed by a severe deadline.57 The state parties opted for a fast-track
process with a predetermined conclusion date: they allowed 3 years for the exhaus-
tion of all arbitration proceedings, and consequently envisaged a tight 1-year dead-
line to present the claims. These time constraints certainly had a chilling effect on the
possibility to orchestrate mass claims.58
54Christine Gray, ‘The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its Boundaries: A Partial
Award?’, European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), 699-721.
55Claims Commission, ‘Rules of Procedure’ (n 53), Art 30. The sub-categories refer to unlawful
displacement, unlawful expulsion, unlawful treatment of prisoners of war, unlawful detention and
other instances of loss, damage and injuries.
56Ibid, Art 32.3: ‘If the Commission makes all of the determinations in paragraph 1, the claims in
that sub-category for each of the two levels of compensation shall be subject to random sampling of
their evidence to ascertain the percentage of such claims for which the evidence is inadequate to
establish the claim. The compensation for all claims in that compensation level of that sub-category
is automatically reduced by that percentage, and the Commission shall issue an award of such
compensation for all claims in that sub-category.’
57See Ari Dybnis, ‘Was the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a Zero-Sum Game:
Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational Conflict’, Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 33 (2010), 255-286, at 268: ‘[D]espite the
availability of this mass claims option, the parties chose only to file government-to-government
claims, with the exception of six claims which Eritrea filed on behalf of six individuals whom
Ethiopia had expelled.’
58Ibid, ‘[i]f not for this deadline, then the parties might have considered collecting individuals’
claims and utilizing the mass claims procedure’.
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The automatic reduction in the compensation paid to the individual applicants,
commensurate with the percentage of unmeritorious claims in the sample, would
likely have encouraged the states to exercise diligence in the collection and presen-
tation of claims. A similar mechanism would be inherently unfair in a system where
individuals can present the applications in their own name, a model that is most
appropriate for a potential Joint Scheme. To the contrary, the adoption of a sample
review might be an efficient solution, especially if applications share a common
factual matrix and certain gateway issues are positively established for each claim
(the identity of the claimant or the plausibility of their involvement in the chrono-
logical and geographical scenario of the injustice).
2. Iraq/Kuwait Reparations
After the end of the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the UN Security Council issued
Resolution 687 in which it reaffirmed Iraq’s liability for all damages caused by the
unlawful occupation of Kuwait.59 It also called for the creation of a fund and a
commission for the compensation of claims relating to such liability, including those
brought by individuals.60 The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)
was thus created.61 Some of its operational features are of interest to our current
purposes.
In particular, the UNCC had jurisdiction over an enormous number of individual
claims for damages up to US$100,000 (‘C’ claims, referring to its dedicated cate-
gory). It noted in its first decision that ‘[t]he complexities associated with the
processing of “C” claims, requiring the resolution of myriad legal, factual, eviden-
tiary and valuation issues, are compounded by the massive number of claims in this
category—in excess of 415,000’.62 Since these complexities are, in part, comparable
to those with which a Joint Scheme might have to cope, if the eligibility criteria are
wide enough, it is helpful therefore to observe the solutions adopted by the UNCC.
The UNCC started from an assumption of Iraq’s responsibility, and
circumscribed its review to the issue of causality and quantum.63 With a view to
process all ‘C’ claims in an expedited way, the rules provided for the possibility to
resort to a sample analysis of the merits of the individual claims.64 The Panel of
59UN Security Council, Resolution 687, S/RES/687, 3 April 1991, para 16.
60Ibid, paras 18 and 19.
61For more information see United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC); see www.uncc.
ch/.
62UNCC, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First
Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages up to US$100,000 (Category ‘C’ Claims), S/AC.26/
1994/3, 21 December 1994, 6.
63Ibid, 9.
64Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, S/AC.26/1992/10, 26 June 1992, Art 37(b): ‘With
respect to claims that cannot be completely verified through the computerized database, if the
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Commissioners, moreover, made its recommendations based on the documents
submitted.65 This approach suggested the possibility that full evidence would not
be required for every claim; indeed, the applicable rule suggests that ‘C claims’must
satisfy a relatively low evidentiary threshold, and that the smaller claims among
them might be treated even more leniently:
With respect to “C” claims, Article 35(c) of the Rules provides that the claims must be
documented by appropriate evidence of the circumstances and amount of the claimed loss.
Documents and other evidence required will be the reasonable minimum that is appropriate
under the particular circumstances of the case. A lesser degree of documentary evidence
ordinarily will be sufficient for smaller claims such as those below US$20,000.66
The Panel of Commissioners, explaining what documents might suffice to
achieve a ‘reasonable minimum’ of evidence, stressed the importance of the claim
form—corroborated by the self-declaration of veracity of the applicant and the
sanctions that domestic law attaches to false statements. Alongside the claim form,
the Panel considered identification documents, personal and witness statements, and
other documents that could be probative of the loss claimed.
The Panel, called to consider the ‘particular circumstances of the case’, in
determining the standard of proof required, noted all the reasons, in the circum-
stances of the invasion, why the applicants might not have been able to withhold,
conserve and present fuller evidence in support of their claims.67 It was also noted
that the scarcity of evidence in support of mass claims ‘is not a phenomenon without
precedent’ in international practice. Therefore, the upholding of claims that, taken
individually, present less than optimal evidentiary support is acceptable, owing to
the circumstances in which the applicants had to gather the evidence and the nature
of the UNCC’s mandate.68
This is a lesson that might apply all the more plausibly to a hypothetical Joint
Scheme, given that the general elements of the injustices attributed to Germany are
known and that the applicants would probably not seek precise amounts of com-
pensation relating to material losses. A Joint Scheme might be spared the difficult
volume of claims is large, the Panel may check individual claims on the basis of a sampling with
further verification only as circumstances warrant.’
65Ibid, Art 37(c).
66Ibid, Art 35(c), reproduced in UNCC, Report, 1994 (n 62), 22 (emphases added).
67Ibid, 26.
68Ibid, 29. The panel also recalled the remark made in the Study Concerning the Right to
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, presented by Theo van Boven, the Special Rapporteur appointed by
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN
Commission on Human Rights (UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July
1993, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/demo/van%20Boven_1993.pdf. In particular, para
137 of the Study states that ‘[a]dministrative or judicial tribunals responsible for affording repara-
tions should take into account that records or other tangible evidence may be limited or unavailable.
In the absence of other evidence, reparations should be based on the testimony of victims, family
members, medical and mental health professionals.’
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determination of causation and quantum that complicated the task of the UNCC. A
system based on eligibility through status (eg, the applicant’s condition as IMI, or
heir of a victim of mass killings) and pre-fixed compensation amounts would render
the review of applications significantly easier.
3. Comfort Women
In December 2015, Japan and South Korea reached an agreement aimed ostensibly
at resolving interstate tensions with regard to Japan’s practice of enforced prostitu-
tion during World War II (the so-called ‘comfort women’ phenomenon).69 The issue
of ‘comfort women’ has plagued relations between the two states for decades,70
along with several other historical disputes,71 in part due to Japan’s unflinching
stance.
Japan, indeed, has openly accepted only its ‘moral responsibilities’,72 and tried to
assuage the victims through monetary contributions ex gratia channelled through a
newly established Asian Women’s Fund (AWF). Such emoluments have not always
been so well received; NGOs urged victims to boycott the AWF73 and many
survivors refused to accede the payments, noting Japan’s refusal to own up to its
historical responsibility and provide full reparation.74 In short:
The women who would become military sex slaves have uniformly indicated that they are
unsatisfied with Japan’s engagement with the comfort women issue. This has been largely due
to the lack of an apologetic stance by Japan. The consistent denial, acknowledgment, and then
blaming the victims for the injustices experienced, has lent credence to the viewpoint that the
Japanese government is insincere in its efforts to come to terms with the past.75
69See a recent account of the controversy in Torsten Weber, ‘Apology Failures: Japan’s Strategies
Towards China and Korea in Dealing with Its Imperialist Past’, in Berber Bevernage/Nico Wouters
(eds), The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History After 1945 (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan 2018), 801–816, at 804 et seq.
70See, for instance, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and Mass
Violence’, in Eric Stover/Harvey M Weinstein (eds), My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: CUP 2010), 121-140, at 128-129;
Cheah Wui Ling, ‘Walking the Long Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case Study of the Comfort
Women Movement’s Deployment of Human Rights Discourse’, Harvard Human Rights Journal
22 (2009), 63-107.
71Spanning across trade disputes, territorial disputes, disputes on the reparations for World War II
forced labourers.
72Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Letter to the Former Comfort Women, [exact day
unspecified] 2001, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter.html.
73Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations 2014 (n 5), 275.
74Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: OUP 2005),
437 (recounting also Japan’s initiative in 1995 to establish an Asian Women’s Fund, financed by
private donations, which made approximately US$19,000 available to each comfort woman).
75Wolfe, The Politics of Reparations 2014 (n 5), 276.
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Alongside an overdue acknowledgement of generic ‘responsibilities’,76 and
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s conveyance of ‘his most sincere apologies
and remorse’,77 the 2015 agreement contemplated a Japanese contribution of a
modest sum (approximately US$8.8 million) towards the establishment of a Korean
foundation supporting former comfort women. The Foundation for Reconciliation
and Healing was effectively created in July 2016 and received the promised amount
by the Japanese government. The Korean government looked after the payment of
approximately US$18,000 to the families of deceased comfort women and US
$90,000 to those still alive.78 It might be worth noticing that, out of an estimated
80,000 to 200,000 victims, only 238 Korean women have come forward to register
with the scheme, of whom just 46 were alive at the time of the 2015 agreement,79
37 in July 2017,80 31 in January 2018,81 27 in November 2018,82 22 in March
2019,83 19 in January 2020, and 17 in August 2020.84
In spite of the payments, the deal attracted criticism in South Korea. It was widely
perceived as a diplomatic defeat for Korea and as Japan’s successful attempt at
76The wording of the statement is carefully crafted to mention the notion of responsibility without
attaching it to anyone in particular: ‘The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the
Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large
numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this
perspective.’ See the full text of the Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic
of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion of 28 December 2015, available at www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/
page4e_000364.html.
77Ibid, point 1.
78Benjamin Lee, ‘South Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement: Where Do We Go from Here?’,
The Diplomat, (6 September 2016), available at https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/south-korea-
japan-comfort-women-agreement-where-do-we-go-from-here/.
79Benjamin Lee, ‘South Korea, Japan Agree to Irreversibly End “Comfort Women” Row’,
The Diplomat, (28 December 2015), available at www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-
southkoreacomfortwomen/south-korea-japan-agree-to-irreversibly-end-comfort-women-
rowidUSKBN0UB0EC20151228.
80‘Head of South Korean “Comfort Women” Foundation Resigns; Survivor Who Testified in
U.S. Dies’, The Japan Times, (23 July 2017), available at www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/
23/national/politics-diplomacy/head-south-korean-foundation-comfort-women-steps/#.
WhoBQkqnHIU.
81Hyonhee Shin, ‘Japan Rejects South Korean Call for Extra Steps over “Comfort Women”’,
Reuters, (9 January 2018), available at www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-japan-comfortwomen/
japan-rejects-south-korean-call-for-extra-steps-over-comfort-women-idUSKBN1EY0F6.
82‘South Korea Says It Will Dissolve Japan-funded “Comfort Women” Foundation’, The Japan
Times, (21 November 2018), available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/21/national/
politics-diplomacy/south-korea-says-will-dissolve-japan-funded-comfort-women-foundation.
83‘Another Comfort Woman Survivor Passes Away without Apology from Japanese Government’,
Hankyoreh, (4 March 2019), available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_interna
tional/884479.html.
84‘Another Korean sexual slavery victim dies, number of survivors at 19’, The Korea Herald,
(23 January 2020), available at http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud¼20200123000650&
ACE_SEARCH¼1; ‘Commemorative ceremony marking Int’l Memorial Day for Comfort Women
to be held in Cheonan’, Arirang, (14 August 2020), available at http://www.arirang.com/News/
News_View.asp?sys_lang¼Eng&nseq¼263353.
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resolving ‘finally and irreversibly’ the row with South Korea without trying to
meaningfully engage either with the victims or with its own responsibility.85 The
deal came under severe scrutiny and the newly incumbent Korean government
announced that it would revise its terms, causing the head of AWF to resign.86
The impression that the agreement did not take into account the voice of the victims
has been compounded by Japan’s attempts at silencing protests and condemning the
erection of memorials. These actions are perceived as furthering an intention to erase
the memory of the victims and, as a consequence, the country’s full assumption of
past responsibility.87 Japan’s refusal to issue a letter of apology after the 2015
agreement and South Korea’s refusal to remove statues paying tribute to comfort
women installed in the vicinity of Japanese embassies paved the way for the current
renewal of diplomatic tensions.88
In late 2017, the Korean minister of foreign affairs requested a revision of the
agreement, but his Japanese counterpart, hinting at its interstate nature, refused to
re-open the deal:89
The Japan–South Korea agreement is an agreement between the two governments and one
that has been highly appreciated by international society (...). If the South Korean govern-
ment (...) tried to revise the agreement that is already being implemented, that would make
Japan’s ties with South Korea unmanageable and it would be unacceptable.90
85The ambiguity of monetary payments in restorative efforts—especially when compensation is
inherently incommensurable with the harm suffered and is inevitably low—is a known phenome-
non. See Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 10: ‘Offering an apology for some wrong one has
committed would usually become a more offensive gesture, rather than a more credible expression
of remorse, were a $100 bill to be thrown in—although this may be a strictly interpersonal point that
does not hold for government payments.’ The South Korean case shows that the point can hold, at
least in certain circumstances, also in respect of government payments, although the interstate
dimension and the memory of war scenarios might exacerbate the problem. Wolfe, The Politics of
Reparations 2014 (n 5), 274, remarked on the dichotomy between the domestic and the interna-
tional take on the atrocities committed by Japan. In spite of the reparation scheme established, the
prevailing view in Japan has remained one of denial: ‘[T]he tension between the international
memory and the domestic memory indicates that acceptance is still contentious within Japan.’
86See Lee, ‘South Korea, Japan Agree’ 2017 (n 79).
87See, for instance, the letter sent on 1 February 2017 by the Mayor of Osaka to the Mayor of San
Francisco to protest the instalment of a Comfort Women Memorial. This action is described as
being ‘adverse to the spirit of the agreement [with South Korea]’, available, in full, at https://ww2.
kqed.org/arts/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/09/Ltr-of-Osaka-mayor-opposing-CWM-2-1-2017.
pdf.
88Ilaria Maria Sala, ‘Why Is the Plight of “Comfort Women” Still So Controversial?’, The New York
Times, (14 August 2017), available at www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/comfort-women-
japan-south-korea.html.
89Annemarie Luck, ‘No Comfort in the Truth: It’s the Episode of History Japan Would Rather
Forget. Instead Comfort Women Are Back in the News’, Index on Censorship 47(1) (2018), 19-21.
90‘Japan Says Revising Comfort Women Agreement with South Korea Unacceptable’, Reuters,




Korea back-pedalled somewhat on its threat to denounce the agreement, but
refused to use the funds provided by Japan, opting instead to inject the necessary
funds to replace them from its own budget.91
The 2015 agreement has been ‘effectively abandoned’92 and in December 2019
the Constitutional Court of South Korea has determined that, since it did not
establish clear rights and duties for the two countries, it cannot be set aside for
infringing on the victims’ constitutional rights. In January 2021, a Seoul Central
District Court condemned Japan to pay approximately $92,000 each to the 12
surviving victims.93 The non-agreement remains, and so does the disagreement
between the two countries.
As of early 2021, Japan has not obtained irreversible closure, and the South
Korean government has received criticism from its own citizens for its mishandling
of the negotiation and having to pay its way out of the mess. Furthermore, the
victims have expressed no feeling of satisfaction, and the citizens of both countries
have grown increasingly uneasy about the issue. None of the sought-after goals of
the agreement have materialized. The circumstances evince the faux pas of the
respective state authorities, who have struck a deal without consulting nor paying
meaningful considerations to the victims.94
There are certain obvious differences between the Japan–South Korea tensions
and the prospect of providing reparation to IMIs and other victims. The most evident
is that Japan is hesitant to embrace its full responsibility and actively tries to erase the
memory of the injustices (or at least what it believes to be exaggerated representa-
tions thereof), whereas Germany has unquestionably accepted legal responsibility
for war crimes committed. This crucial difference might contribute to reducing the
risk of a Joint Scheme being rejected by the beneficiaries on the grounds that it
merely represents a buy-out. However, the lesson learnt from the fragile fate of the
91‘South Korea Not Seeking Renegotiation over Comfort Women Deal with Japan’, Reuters,
(9 January 2018): ‘South Korea’s Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said it was “undeniable”
the two governments formally reached the settlement, under which Japan apologised to victims and
provided 1 billion yen ($8.8 million) to a fund to support them. Seoul will set aside its own budget to
bankroll the fund and consult with Tokyo on what to do with the 1 billion yen it had given, she said’,
available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-09/s.korea-not-seeking-to-renegotiate-comfort-
women-deal-with-japan/9315556.
92‘South Korea court upholds Japan ‘comfort women’ deal’, The Straits Times, (28 December
2019), available at https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korea-court-upholds-japan-
comfort-women-deal.
93Seoul Central District Court, Judgment of 8 January 2021, No 2016 Ga-Hap 505092; see Daniel
Franchini, ‘South Korea’s denial of Japan’s immunity for international crimes: Restricting or
bypassing the law of state immunity?’, Voelkerrechtsblog, (18 January 2021), available at https://
voelkerrechtsblog.org/south-koreas-denial-of-japans-immunity-for-international-crimes/
94Weber, ‘Apology Failures’ 2017 (n 69), 804: ‘Instead of offering an “apology” (shazai or owabi
in Japanese), the terms used to convey notions of self-critical reflection were “true regret” (makoto
ni ikan) in the Korean case, as well as “deep remorse” in both the Korean and Chinese cases (. . .).
These phrases were apparently regarded as sufficient by the respective state leaders, who prioritized
receiving Japanese economic assistance over emphasizing Japan’s historical guilt’ [notes omitted].
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2015 agreement is that the two states concerned must involve the victims or their
representatives during the negotiation stage, and make sure that the outcome is at
least reflective of their voices and acknowledges their requests. In this respect, the
mere allocation of monetary awards might fall short of satisfactory reparation if the
victims are cut out of the process. Reparation cannot function independently of
reconciliation, and reconciliation is not solely an interstate matter.
There is, however, a striking similarity between the two scenarios. Given the
shared factual taxonomy of the two underlying injustices (occurring between 80 and
70 years ago), the surviving victims are now few in numbers and are dying at an
accelerating rate. A provision for the compensation of deceased victims’ families, at
a reduced rate, might prove acceptable. Alternatively, the Joint Scheme might
provide for the descendants’ right to seek full compensation on behalf of deceased
IMIs if death occurred after a specific cut-off date, which might very well be set in
the past (eg 2004, the date of the first Ferrini judgment,95 or February 1999, the
cut-off date established in the RRF Law). Safeguards such as these would defuse the
obnoxious result that any delay in fulfilling the moral duty of providing reparation
might directly diminish the burden of its realization, due to the shrinking pool of
beneficiaries.
4. The US/France Agreements on Banks and Railroad
Deportees
a) The 2001 Banks Agreement
In 2001, France and the US stipulated an agreement regarding the restitution of sums
held on bank accounts opened with certain French banks that had been frozen as a
result of anti-Semitic legislation (the Washington Agreement).96 France committed
to obtaining from the banks a US$100 million contribution for a dedicated founda-
tion.97 The banks also committed themselves to pay restitution claims approved by
the Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation (Commission pour
l’indemnisation des victimes de spoliations, or CIVS).98 The US pledged to inform
95Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/04 (Ferrini).
96See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War II (the Washington
Agreement), 18 January 2001, 2156 UNTS 281, as amended 30 and 31 May 2002, 21 February
2006 (entered into force 5 February 2001).
97Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah (Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah), created in
France on 26 December 2000.
98For more information see www.civs.gouv.fr/. With decree No 99–778 of 10 September 1999, the
French Government created a Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spoliation Resulting
from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force during the Occupation, available at https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte¼LEGITEXT000005628500&dateTexte¼20081229.
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US courts that any claims against the French banks should be dismissed as
contradicting US foreign policy interests,99 effectively designating the CIVS proce-
dure as the preferred avenue for such claims.100
Annex B to the Washington Agreement defined the working procedure of the
CIVS as one of considering the individual claims. Of particular interest is the
indication that ‘[t]he Commission will investigate and consider claims on relaxed
standards of proof. A claimant’s application or a simple inquiry by the claimant to
the existence of a bank asset is sufficient to trigger an investigation’.101 The
operation of this relaxed standard of proof is further explained when the recommen-
dation powers of the Commission are addressed:
Following such an investigation and after communication with the claimant or their repre-
sentative (. . .) if an account can be verified by any means, including because the claim
matches a name or account on a list or other document available to the Commission, the
Commission makes a recommendation on an award together with the reason(s) for that
recommendation (. . .) the Commission will recognize as sufficient evidence to make an
Award any of the following four categories: proof, presumption, indication, and intimate
personal conviction.102
In other words, the Commission procedure hinged on a highly favourable stan-
dard of proof (‘any means’ including a plausible affidavit by the applicant103 could
be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an expropriated account) and a
favourable burden of proof (the evidence might be provided by the CIVS itself
rather than by the applicant). First instance decisions by the CIVS could be
appealed.104
The scheme was strictly restitutory in nature, and the Commission was not
entitled to reduce the amount of compensation for any reason other than double
recovery:105 the balance on the accounts would have to be repaid in full, subject to
certain rounding adjustments. Until 2005, it was also possible to receive compensa-
tion of up to US$3,000 merely on the basis of an affidavit, even if the Commission
was unable to ascertain the existence of the account claimed by the applicant.106
99Washington Agreement, 2001 (n 96), Art 2.
100Consider, however, point 9 of Annex C to the Washington Agreement, which reproduces the
Statement of Interest of the US to be submitted in the domestic proceedings: ‘The United States
does not suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an
independent legal basis for dismissal.’ This language is perhaps obligatory to preserve the separa-
tion of powers between the executive and judicial branches.
101Washington Agreement, 2001 (n 96), Annex B.
102Ibid, principles B and D.
103Ibid, principle F.1. See also Exhibit 2 for a model of the affidavit.
104Ibid, principle K.
105Ibid. The Commission was also prevented from offsetting part of the compensation against other
payments received by the applicants in the form of material or non-material damages.
106An overview of the liquidation principles is available at www.civs.gouv.fr/en/getting-
compensation/specific-provisions-relating-to-bank-related-compensation/; ‘Soft-claims’ (ie, those
deprived of sufficient evidence) would be paid out of a dedicated fund, capped at US$22.5 million.
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Since the claims submitted to the CIVS under the Washington Agreement were
only for restitution, the scheme might be a poor template for any future Joint
Scheme, which would presumably focus on reparation or quasi-compensation.
However, the technical provisions relating to the evidentiary regime used by the
CIVS to review claims are worth taking into account, as they aimed at addressing
evidentiary complications that are similar to those the IMIs and other victims might
encounter.
The imposition of forced labour or the occurrence of mass killings, similar to the
blocking of the French bank accounts, is not a controverted fact; several decades
have passed since the unjust actions occurred and the affected individuals’ age and
personal history might undermine attempts to retrieve a full documentation of the
harms suffered. In this respect, the value of individuals’ affidavits as presumptive
evidence is a possible solution that would respond to the need to afford applicants
with fair treatment in the operation of a Joint Scheme for compensation.
b) The 2014 Railroad Deportees Agreement
In December 2014, the governments of France and the US stipulated an agreement
regarding the treatment of certain holocaust victims—those deported from French
territory who had not been covered by previous reparation schemes.107
The explicit purpose of the agreement and the compensation mechanism
established therein was to achieve ‘legal peace’ with respect to all claims against
France asserted in US courts.108 France pledged US$60 million to a US account,
from which the US government would draw funds to pay individual claimants. In
return, the US would recognize French immunity, terminate legal actions pending in
US courts and ensure that the beneficiaries of the compensation schemes would
execute waivers of further action against France.109 The US and its affiliated
authorities would take full responsibility for the distribution of the funds to the
See, for a discussion of the restitution scheme, Michael J Bazyler, ‘The Holocaust Restitution
Movement in Comparative Perspective’, Berkeley Journal of International Law 22 (2002), 11-44, at
18-19.
107See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume. Agreement between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic on
Compensation for Certain Victims of Holocaust-Related Deportation from France Who Are Not
Covered by French Programs (Railroad Deportees Agreement), 8 December 2014, 55 ILM
339 (2016), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/us_france_agreement.
pdf.
108Railroad Deportees Agreement, 2014 (n 107), Art 4.1: ‘The Parties agree that this payment
constitutes the final, comprehensive, and exclusive manner for addressing, between the United
States of America and France, all Holocaust deportation claims not covered by existing compen-
sation programs, which have been or may be asserted against France in the United States of America
or in France.’ See also Art 4.2.
109Ibid, Art 5. An Annex to the Agreement spells out the waivers and relinquishments that all
applicants will be required to sign in order to access the payment.
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victims and establish the appropriate procedure without French input;110 the US
established a Deportation Claims Program that is currently processing claims.111
The programme reaches widely ratione personae. Alongside those individuals
deported from France who remain alive, the programme covers their spouses and
thus envisages two main categories of beneficiaries: survivors and surviving
spouses. Furthermore, estates (heirs or assigns) of either category are entitled to
receive compensation if the death occurred between 1948 and the date of the
application. Subject to the territorial link inherent in the requirement of deportation
from France, there is no nationality requirement. Whilst the incompatibility of the
programme with other pre-existing compensation schemes rules out claims from
citizens of certain nationalities,112 anyone can apply (ie, not just US nationals).
The US provided applicants with a statement of claim form, which required them
to provide ‘all available identifying information and documentation regarding the
relevant individual’s deportation from France during World War II, including if
possible the date, convoy, and place of departure and arrival of such deportation’.
The form also reminded applicants of the criminal implications in making a false
statement.
The amount of compensation envisaged was significantly higher than those
awarded in the schemes discussed thus far. According to the estimates released by
the claims programme, survivors would receive US$204,000 and all surviving
spouses whose deported spouse died prior to 1948 would receive US$51,000.
Surviving spouses of deportees who died in or after 1948 would receive US$750
for each year after the deportee’s death. Estates of survivors or surviving spouses
would receive a fraction of the amounts above, calculated on the period of survival of
the eligible individual during the 1948–2015 period.113
A comment on the size of the payments is in order.114 The negotiating history
shows that the allocated amount of US$60 million was arrived at by knowing an
estimate of the number of beneficiaries (486) and that the resulting average com-
pensation of US$100,000 would correspond to roughly 3 years of disability pension
110Ibid, Art 6.
111For more information see https://www.state.gov/notice-regarding-holocaust-deportation-claims-
program-under-u-s-france-agreement/.
112Namely, those of France, Belgium, Poland, the UK, and the former Czechoslovakia. See FAQ
page of the Claims Programme, available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/
deportationclaims/250658.htm.
113More specifically, ‘estates of survivors and estates of surviving spouses [would receive] a yearly
percentage of the full $204,000 and $51,000 amounts, respectively. Estates of survivors will receive
$3,000 for each year that the survivor lived, beginning with 1948 and ending in 2015. Estates of
surviving spouses will receive $750 for each year that the surviving spouse lived after the year of the
deportee spouse’s death, again beginning with 1948 and ending in 2015.’ See Claims Programme,
FAQ page (n 112).
114A fuller analysis, providing the basis for the brief remarks in the text, is offered in Ronald
Bettauer, ‘A Measure of Justice for Uncompensated French Railroad Deportees during the Holo-
caust’, ASIL Insights, (1 March 2016), available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/5/
measure-justice-uncompensated-french-railroad-deportees-during-holocaust.
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under French law.115 Though it is difficult to assess the congruity of these calcula-
tions in the abstract, it is possible to note their large relative amount, as well as the
low number of expected beneficiaries, which permitted the adoption of a quasi-
compensatory approach (as opposed to the merely reparatory scheme adopted, for
instance, in the RRF Law).
This scheme is interesting because it has a residual character: it expressly covers
beneficiaries that were excluded from previous schemes. In this light, it might be
comparable to a future Joint Scheme insofar as the latter would essentially cover
IMIs and other victims expressly excluded from the application of the 2001
RRF Law.
V. A Ten-Step Sketch of a Future German-Italian Joint
Scheme
The previous sections sought to provide an overview of selected payment schemes.
While the comparative analysis is beside the point (as the schemes differ widely
along several variables), it is nonetheless possible to identify certain solutions that,
with all due caution, appear appropriate also for the Joint Scheme. In what follows, I
recapitulate some of the lessons learnt from this anthological survey into a ten-step
sketch.
1. Reparation or Compensation
The Joint Scheme would plausibly grant reparation falling short of full compensa-
tion. A reasonable approach would be to consider it an extension of the RRF
payment scheme. Since the whole IMI issue apparently flows from war prisoners
being excluded from the RRF Law, a reliable starting point would be to ensure that
the Joint Scheme produces the effects that the RRF Law could have produced had it
applied to IMIs. Along these lines, it might be helpful to recall the number of IMI
applications that were rejected under the RRF scheme if we are to have a working
estimate of the number of beneficiaries of the Joint Scheme.116 Full compensation
might be an ambitious but impracticable target, let alone a conceptually thorny issue
115Ibid, drawing extensively from the reports of the French National Assembly and the French
Senate.
116According to Italy’s Counter-Memorial in the Jurisdictional Immunities case before the ICJ,
127,000 such applications were rejected; see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v
Italy), Counter-Memorial of Italy of 22 December 2009, para 2.21.
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when (and if) reserved to heirs and descendants.117 The express language of the
DART scheme, which opted for the reparation label, could serve as a template.
2. Funding
That Germany and Italy will both contribute to the finances of the Joint Scheme can
at this stage only be assumed. Multi-source funding is not unprecedented (the
German government and industry both supported the RRF Fund, for instance) and
would facilitate the accumulation of a decently sized budget. Ideally, Germany
would pledge to match Italy’s contribution, so that an example of virtue rather
than strained negotiations might ensure the scheme’s financial capacity. An alterna-
tive method of quantifying the contributions to the fund, suggested by Jörg
Luther,118 could be to measure them against the size of the respective national
populations (roughly 82 million for Germany and 60 million for Italy). A raw
equivalence of 1 person ¼ €x would be tenable and acknowledges population
differences between the two countries in setting the criterion for a comparable
economic contribution. With x ¼ €1, this calculation would roughly amount to a
€140 million fund, which could ensure the payment of roughly €1,000 to a number
of claimants similar to those who saw their applications rejected under the RRF
Law.119 It appears preferable that x > 1 (see next step), unless the estimated number
of applicants is much lower. Interestingly, in one twist of the Japan–South Korean
feud over the issue of comfort women, Korea has strived to increase the legitimacy
of the reparation scheme by unilaterally financing the budget and announcing that
the funds provided by Japan will not be used. In other words, the contribution from
the state to whom the nationality of the victims belong is a powerful gesture: it
avoids the impression that any agreement between the states reflects a political sell-
out.120
117See, generally, Tyler Cowen, ‘How Far Back Should We Go? Why Restitution Should Be
Small’, in Jon Elster (ed), Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge:
CUP 2006), 17-32. Whilst the author mostly refers to restitution, the legitimacy of intergenerational
compensation is similarly dubious. See also Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter
‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
118See Jörg Luther, chapter ‘A Story of “Trials and Errors” that Might Have No Happy End’, in this
volume.
119See n 12.
120See also Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
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3. The Amount Paid to Each Victim
It is perhaps inevitable that IMIs and other victims receive a lump sum rather than
compensation reflecting the specific damage suffered. Most systems described above
adopt this lump-sum approach and the benefits in terms of expediency seem to
outweigh a concern for accuracy, insofar as fair treatment is assured to all applicants.
It is difficult to tell whether the system should envisage only one lump sum or a range
of amounts, corresponding to several types of injustice suffered (for instance, long-
lasting conditions caused by forced labour might warrant a more generous repara-
tion). The DART and RRF schemes opted for graduated amounts, but the latter
essentially lumped all victims into two macro-groups (‘concentration camps’ and
‘others’). The reparation offered to comfort women was also undifferentiated in
amount. In the interest of expediting the processing of claims, the adoption of a
one-size-fits-all quantum should be favourably considered. As to the magnitude of
the payment, it will inevitably depend on the size of the available fund and the
number of eligible applicants. Of the schemes described above, the ones that directly
provided reparation for personal harms (rather than restitution) converged around a
figure of US$50,000 (the DART scheme, the reparation offered to comfort women,
and railroad deportees), but the number of eligible individuals was much smaller
than that of eligible IMIs and other victims. A lump sum in the €10,000–€20,000
bracket might be considered fair given the circumstances. A system of partial
payment mechanisms could be set up, when the estimate of the number of applicants
is particularly difficult and, accordingly, the amount available to each is difficult to
pin down in advance. Partial payments could ensure the possibility of paying late
applications and prevent the premature depletion of funds when the number of
applicants is unexpectedly high or the available budget is insufficient to cover full
payment to every applicant. Once all applications are processed, the residual funds
can be distributed to make up for what reparations remain, or even fund further
projects if any money is left unallocated.
4. The Management of the Fund and the Organs Overseeing Its
Distribution
Again, it might be worth looking at the RRF scheme as a template. The Joint Scheme
would be run by a body participated in equal measure by the German and Italian
governments, that might decide to integrate its structure with representatives from
civil society, victims’ associations, and technical experts. The body tasked with the
review of applications and liquidation of claims would reflect this balanced make-
up, and operate as an administrative office, as in the DART experience, with an
internal capacity to perform, upon request, the review of individual decisions.
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5. The Eligibility Criteria
Specific criteria should be drafted to ensure that beneficiaries correspond to the
categories left out of the RRF Law: primarily war prisoners subjected to forced
labour, but other internees and victims of mass killings should also be included.
Limiting reparation to Italian citizens (unlike the French banks scheme) might be
understandable since Italy would be responsible for the Scheme’s funding. A
possibility worth discussing is that claims be aggregated into mass claims (as in
the Eritrea/Ethiopia scheme), or at least that the governing body make available
partially pre-filled application forms for prospective applicants. Forms could be
divided into categories, according to the distinguishing features of the crime at
stake and the factual coordinates (provenance of the applicant, timeframe, location,
and conditions of the killing/internment/forced labour). The Joint Scheme would
have the same advantage as the UNCC, which reviewed the claims against Iraq: the
issue of responsibility would not be in question. Since the Joint Scheme would most
probably warrant reparation rather than compensation for specific damages, the issue
of causation and the determination of quantum would also be minimized in the
proceedings. A mere scrutiny of eligibility could suffice.
6. The Treatment of Heirs
The notion of descendants being eligible for compensation is not immediately
intuitive. On the one hand, it defies the immediate realization that compensation
should benefit the individual harmed and provide a modicum of relief for the direct
victim rather than material enrichment for their family. On the other hand, two
circumstances might militate in favour of providing reparation to heirs as a means to
achieve fairness. First, the death of the victim might be a precise consequence of the
injustice—especially in the case of mass killings, but also when the suffering of
forced labour takes a permanent toll on a person’s health. Second, the legal deadlock
has inevitably entailed that the death of multiple victims might have occurred before
the granting of reparation, which is an odious side effect of the slow course of justice
(a second-order instance of injustice). In that light, ‘the rough intuition is that, in
strictly comparative terms, there is no better stand-in for the deceased payees—a
view that seems vague and difficult to defend, but that strikes many as superior to the
alternative of awarding no money at all’.121 Moreover, relatives of the Italian victims
have arguably suffered directly from the crimes committed, especially those causing
death or permanent bodily harm. In some respect, therefore, the heirs are also direct
victims of the injustice. The Joint Scheme would be too little too late, but it could be
understood as a form of ‘rough justice’122 and its shortcomings might be acceptable
121Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 8.
122Ibid.
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if certain safeguards were implemented. One such safeguard concerns the eligibility
of heirs: Italian victims are either dead or elderly. Without a specific mechanism to
avoid delays frustrating its goal, the whole exercise would be emptied of meaning. If
anything, this scenario would exacerbate rather than remedy the injustice. Reduced
payments to victims’ heirs and assigns are common (for instance, consider the
calculation used in the liquidation of US/French Railroad Deportees’ claims and
the pay-outs to the families of Korean comfort women) and might represent an
acceptable compromise. Another solution might be to establish a cut-off date (for
instance, February 1999, on the model of the RRF scheme) and allow the heirs to
claim reparation on behalf of eligible persons deceased thereafter.
7. The Standard and Burden of Proof
One recurring feature of the payment schemes described above is the bestowment
upon the claimants of evidentiary duties that are softer than normally expected in
litigation (see, eg, the UNCC, the DART, the Eritrea/Ethiopia scheme and the US
Banks and Railroads schemes). This staple of reparation processes is certainly fit for
the Joint Scheme. More to the point, Germany could pledge to retrieve the applica-
tions filed with the RRF competent organizations by IMIs and process their claims
automatically. In any event, applicants shall be expected to provide evidence of their
identity and nationality and a template form reporting their account of the relevant
circumstances of internment and forced labour. The form might facilitate the task by
providing some pre-determined choices as regards places and dates, relating to
known historical patterns of wrongdoing and documented flows of IMIs and other
forced laborers. Applicants should be warned of the sanctions attached to the making
of false statements; conversely, their affidavits, if complete, plausible and not
contradicted, should warrant reparation even in the absence of other supporting
documentation.
8. The Involvement of Victims
The Joint Scheme should include specific safeguards for offering satisfaction to the
Italian victims, besides and independently of any monetary payment.123 Specific
means to do so could include: issuing official declarations and individual letters to
123Satisfaction is listed among the basic forms of reparation that states should warrant in the UN
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitar-
ian Law, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/147, 16 December
2005; see, in particular, principle 22. See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in
Dualism’, in this volume.
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restore the victims’ dignity and assume responsibility (possibly, and when appro-
priate, on the part of both states), establishing commemorations and tributes to the
victims, and including an account of the injustices in educational materials.124 It is
equally important that the victims—possibly through the representative associa-
tions—are consulted during the negotiation stage and subsequently involved in the
governance of the scheme. Involvement of victims might be the critical element
making an otherwise unpalatable payment acceptable.125 The offer of multiple
non-monetary remedies proved beneficial in the DART scheme and catered effec-
tively to the victims’ fundamental need for closure and reconciliation.126 The
opposite might be said of the comfort women scheme, in which monetary repara-
tions were perceived to be unsatisfactory by some of the victims and a large share of
South Korean public opinion. As Korea and Japan have learnt the hard way, memory
and respect for victims might save the day when reparation cannot make the victims
whole.127
9. Legal Peace
Germany will likely insist on the insertion of language specifying that any payment
under the Joint Scheme would be made out of comity and a sense of moral and
historical justice, rather than under any legal obligation. Moreover, in the current
scenario Germany is satisfactorily shielded from individual actions by the law of
sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, it would be reasonable to consider the Joint
Scheme an adequate opportunity to provide legal peace to Germany from the claims
of Italian victims brought before any alternative forum.128 The system of individual
waivers, state commitment to redirect court actions and express relinquishment,
common to some of the schemes described above (check, in particular, the language
of the two US/French agreements), would serve as an appropriate model for the Joint
Scheme.
124See ibid, lets d), e), g), h).
125Vermeule, ‘Reparations’ 2005 (n 8), 11: ‘[W]hether partial payment is better than nothing should
depend on the political process by which the payment is accomplished, on the perceived alterna-
tives, and on the accompanying symbolism.’
126Vernon, ‘The Ethics’ 2017 (n 35), 147, recorded the beneficial effects of the engaging confer-
encing sessions offered by the DART programme: ‘[C]omplainants reported immediate therapeutic
benefits and a high level of satisfaction that their concerns had been thoroughly acknowledged and
addressed.’ These effects were recorded in the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce, Seventh Interim
Report; see n 50.
127Christopher Kutz, ‘Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk’,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004), 277-312, at 312.
128See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
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10. Speed
This element explains itself. Beating around the bush is an indecent strategy given
the age of the victims who are still alive.
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Part IV
European Perspectives
Waiting for Negotiations: An Italian Way to
Get Out of the Deadlock
Alessandro Bufalini
Abstract The outcome of Judgment 238/2014 does not directly rely on the fact that
the international dispute on state immunity involves two member states of the
EU. Also, it is difficult to envisage at the European level any normative development
on the international rules on state immunity. It seems, however, that some useful
lessons can be learnt from the judicial dialogue between the European Court of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and constitutional courts. In very
general terms and for many reasons, the relationship between constitutional courts
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) cannot rely on particularly sophisticated
techniques of judicial dialogue.
This encourages us to consider the importance of involving state-level political
organs as one of the counterparts to the dialogue. The potential power of judges to
address these political organs in order to find a diplomatic solution raises the thorny
question of whether this availability of alternative means of dispute settlement at the
international level might impact on (or somehow restrict) the right of access to
justice for Italian victims. Since both ICJ and the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC)
seem to agree that negotiation is the alternative dispute settlement par excellence
(and the only means available to settle the present dispute at the international level),
the ItCC might have given more importance to the availability of alternative means
of redress—in the form of negotiations between the two states—in order to wear
down the absolute character of the principle of judicial protection enshrined in
Article 24 of the Italian Constitution.
Of course, a negotiated solution depends upon the willingness of both parties,
whereas an Italian political initiative aimed at unilaterally granting reparation to the
victims is always possible. Moreover, the latter solution may stop the enforcement of
Judgment 238/2014 and reduce Italy’s exposure to international responsibility for
non-compliance with the 2012 ICJ Judgment. So long as Italian victims and their
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heirs are compensated, the restriction on their right to seek justice through the courts
might become more tolerable for the Italian tribunals.
I. The EUMembership of Italy and Germany: Is It Relevant?
In its order of 21 January 2014, which raised questions about the constitutionality of
the international rule on state immunity, the Tribunal of Florence emphasized the
supranational and universal character of the principle of the absolute guarantee of
judicial protection. According to the Tribunal of Florence, the importance of this
common and collective value should be considered even more essential between
member states of the EU (‘tanto più (. . .) tra Stati dell’Unione Europea’) than in a
universal dimension.1 The same Tribunal, when enforcing the effects of Judgment
238/2014,2 was even more categorical. In its judgment of 6 July 2015, the Tribunal
of Florence considered a customary international rule that precludes not only Italian
judges but all ‘European’ judges from determining state responsibility for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity to be incompatible with
fundamental human rights protections, as enshrined in the Italian Constitution and in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter).3 In a more
recent Judgment of 22 February 2016, the Tribunal, recalling the centrality of human
dignity in the EU Charter, concluded that, at least in the relationships between EU
member states, the restriction on state immunity envisaged by the Italian Constitu-
tional Court (ItCC) is reasonable. This conclusion is supported by the fact that,
although the EU Charter ‘shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union
as defined in the Treaties’ (Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union), the high
degree of human rights protection provided therein cannot but distinguish the very
essence of the EU.4
The EU membership of Italy and Germany obviously does not affect the content
of international norms. However, according to Tribunal of Florence, the fact that
Italy and Germany built, together with many other states, a new and different legal
order—the EU—cannot be irrelevant from an international law perspective.5 This
conclusion raises the question of whether the EU membership of both states is
relevant at all in an assessment of the current dispute raised after Judgment
1Tribunale di Firenze, Order of 21 January 2014, No 84/2014, 6.
2Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
3Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 6 July 2015, No 2468/2015, 13. For an account on these
decisions, see Elena Sciso, ‘Brevi considerazioni sui primi seguiti della sentenza della Corte
costituzionale 238/2014’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 98 (2015), 887-897, at 895-897.
4Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 22 February 2016, No 14740/2009, 12 et seq.
5Ibid, 12: ‘It cannot be irrelevant, also from an international law perspective, the fact that Germany
and Italy—while in force an international customary rule on state immunity, as the one identified by
the ICJ—have contributed, together with an increasing number of other states, to the creation of a
new supranational legal order’ (translated by the author).
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238/2014, as suggested by the Tribunal of Florence. And if so, why should it be so?
In the reasoning of the Italian tribunal, the reference to a European dimension serves
the purpose of emphasizing the absolute centrality of human rights protections both
in the constitutional traditions of EU member states and in the EU legal order itself.
From this perspective, the existence of a common European dimension—character-
ized by the importance attached to human rights protections—may have the effect of
strengthening the legitimacy, and eventually the acceptability, of the solution spelt
out in Judgment 238/2014. From a strictly international law perspective, however, it
is difficult to see how EU membership could affect the application of the interna-
tional rule on state immunity.
The European dimension of the dispute has also been invoked from a different
viewpoint. The argument goes that Italy and Germany’s EU membership may play a
role at the political level by facilitating the possibility of reaching a negotiated
settlement. In other words, this context of regional integration ‘should (. . .) help to
settle a dispute which keeps alive conflictual relations originating from the Second
World War’.6
The outcome of Judgment 238/2014 does not directly rely on the fact that the
international dispute on state immunity involves two member states of the EU, and
nor did the ItCC place any relevance on this aspect. Still, a European perspective
may add some food for thought to the present debate. With this in mind, this chapter
focuses on two different issues. In the first part, I will assess possible European
normative developments in the field of state immunity (section II). I will evaluate
whether Judgment 238/2014 may be seen as a contribution to the formation or
consolidation of a European judicial practice on state immunity in the case of
human rights violations. At the same time, I will try to assess whether the creation
of a regional exception to the international rule on state immunity would or indeed
should be desirable. Moreover, I will endeavour to verify whether, and to what
extent, it is possible to envisage an EU legislative intervention on the scope or
the application of the international customary rule on the jurisdictional immunity of
the state. The second part of the chapter will appraise what we can learn from the
dialogue between judges at the European level. In particular, I will try to shed some
light on some of the drawbacks to the application of both the counterlimits doctrine
and the equivalent protection technique in the relationship between constitutional
courts and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (section III). I will then explore
how the availability of alternative means of dispute settlement at the international
level may impact on the need to award redress for Italian victims (section IV). In the
last paragraph, I will offer some concluding remarks (section V).
6Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The International Court of Justice—The Italian
Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of
International Law 76 (2016), 193-202, at 202.
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II. At What Stage of Development is the EU’s Law on State
Immunity?
Judgment 238/2014 does not make any reference to the possible existence or
development of a ‘European’ customary law on state immunity. The ItCC does not
even examine the ICJ’s qualified interpretation of the customary international law on
state immunity from the civil jurisdiction of other states for acts considered iure
imperii.
Nevertheless, one may consider the idea of an evolution to the rule on state
immunity at the European level. For example, Pasquale De Sena has wondered
whether Judgment 238/2014 could contribute to the formation of a ‘regional cus-
tomary rule, according to which European States may invoke constitutional pro-
visions on access to justice, as a circumstance capable of precluding the
wrongfulness of their failure to comply with conflicting international legal duties’.7
Following this line of reasoning, Judgment 238/2014 could be seen as an invitation
for all EU member state judges to give prevalence to their own constitutional norms
on human rights protections even when this implies a violation of international
obligations. The Tribunal of Florence has also referred to the idea that supreme
principles on human rights protections enshrined in the Italian Constitution (and
common to both Germany and Italy as members of the EU) would represent an
exception to the inability to invoke national law as a justification for non-observance
of international obligations (Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and Article 32 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility8).9 However,
the Italian Tribunal did not allude to the existence or development of a regional
custom of this kind.
The possible existence of regional customary international rules has been recently
reasserted by the International Law Commission (ILC).10 The practice in this area,
however, is scarce. One may only note the well-known case related to the particular
practice of diplomatic asylum in Latin America, although the very existence of that
regional custom was eventually denied.11 Apart from that, any exception to the
irrelevance of domestic law as a justification for non-compliance with international
7Pasquale De Sena, ‘The Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court on State Immunity in Cases
of Serious Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: A Tentative Analysis under
International Law’, Question of International Law: Zoom-Out 2 (2014), 17-31, at 31.
8ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.
9Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment No 14740/2009 (n 4), 25.
10ILC, Draft Conclusions on identification of customary international law with commentaries,
adopted by the ILC at its seventieth session, in 2018, and submitted to the General Assembly as
a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/73/10) (see, in particular,
draft conclusion 16).
11ICJ, Haya de la Torre (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports
1950, 266.
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law is also not supported by state practice or any international decision.12 This
appears to be true also for constitutional provisions. In particular, it is still difficult to
counter the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice that ‘a State
cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading
obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force’.13
Moreover, compared to general customary law, ‘stricter criteria apply’ to the
formation of regional customs: the relevant practice has to be accepted as law by
each state concerned. In addition, particular customs require clearly established
practice and greater evidence of the acceptance of that practice as law.14 As things
stand, these elements are far from being in existence, and even the Italian position on
the emergence of an exception to the general rule remains unclear.15
More generally, customary international law has not only an elusive nature but it
is typical of primitive legal systems, where there is no formal legislature. As a highly
developed regional legal order, the EU can rely on more sophisticated modes of
law-making. In the EU’s legal order, a crucial choice—such as reconciling the
traditional rule on state immunity and the scope of the individual’s right of access
to court—should be the result of a legislative process rather than based on the
initiative of national judges. No doubts, judicial decisions often encourage legisla-
tive intervention. In the context of state immunity, however, (national) judicial
activism may more likely increase legal uncertainty and raise diplomatic tensions.
The issue has in fact already been discussed, at least in relation to the adoption of
a European regulation on the enforcement of judgments between member states. In
its application to the ICJ, Germany recalled that recognition and enforcement of
judgments between EU member states ‘does not comprise legal actions claiming
compensation for loss or damage suffered as a consequence of acts of warfare’.16
This would be a consequence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)’s interpretation
of the Brussels Regulation on the jurisdiction of courts and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters in EU countries.17 In the
Lechouritou case,18 the ECJ clarified that the ‘civil matters’, referred to in Article
1 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
12The commentary to Article 32 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility does not refer to any
exception to the rule; cf ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility 2001 (n 8), 94.
13PCIJ, Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in Danzig
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 4 February 1932, PCIJ series A/B No 44, 24.
14ILC, Draft Conclusions (n 10), 35.
15See Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, and Andreas
Zimmermann, chapter ‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to Adopt a European
Approach to State Immunity?’, in this volume.
16ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), Application Instituting Proceedings
Filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 December 2008, para 6.
17Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L12.
18ECJ, Lechouritou and Others v the Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 15 February 2007,
Case No C-292/05, I-1540, paras 17-19.
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Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968,19 do not include legal actions ‘for compen-
sation in respect of the loss or damage suffered by the successors of the victims of
acts perpetrated by armed forces in the course of warfare’ in the territory of another
state.20 The reference to the sole ‘successors’ may suggest that civil actions brought
by direct victims may have a chance to succeed. However, the ECJ also referred to
Regulation No 805/2004, which creates a European Enforcement Order for
uncontested claims,21 and to Regulation No 1896/2006, which establishes a
European order for payment procedures.22 These regulations confirm, more gener-
ally, the idea of an exclusion of acta iure imperii from the ‘civil and commercial’
scope of the regulations, regardless of ‘whether or not the acts or omissions are
lawful’ (Article 2(1) of both regulations).
Indeed, the creation of the European Enforcement Order was originally aimed at
completely abolishing the exequatur procedure whereby national judges could
decide to grant leave to any enforceable judgment obtained in another member
state. A European Enforcement Order would have been automatically enforceable,
without any kind of new examination of the case, as if the judgment was issued by
another judge belonging to the member state where the execution is pursued. The
explicit exclusion of acta iure imperii from the civil and commercial scope of
Regulation No 805/2004 was actually due to the will of the German delegation
within the Council of the EU. The initiative of the German delegation overtly aimed
at ensuring that ‘titles on the liability of the Federal Republic of Germany for war
crimes committed during World War II should not be certified as a European
Enforcement Order’.23
The German proposal was not opposed by other EU member states. This may be a
sign of a common understanding between EU member states regarding all claims for
compensation related to the acta iure imperii, including crimes committed in the
course of World War II. Certainly, this does not preclude a different regulation
intended to recognize a right to enforcement of any judgment granting compensation
19Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 27 September 1968, OJ L 299, 31 December 1972.
20Ibid, para 46. On this point, see Giovanni Boggero, ‘The Legal Implications of Sentenza
No. 238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional Court for Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the
“Triepelian Approach” Possible?’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 1 (2016), 203-224, at
222-223.
21Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No 805/2004 of 21 April 2004
creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims [2004] OJ L 143.
22Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No 1896/2006 of 12 December
2006 creating a European order for payment procedure [2006] OJ L 399.
23On this aspect see, eg, Veronika Gärtner, ‘The Brussels Convention and Reparations–Remarks on
the Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Lechouritou and others v. the State of the Federal
Republic of Germany’, German Law Journal 8 (2007) 417-442, at 439; Nerina Boschiero, ‘Juris-
dictional Immunities of the State and Exequatur of Foreign Judgments: A Private International Law
Evaluation of the Recent ICJ Judgment in Germany v. Italy’, in Nerina Boschiero/Tullio Scovazzi/
Cesare Pitea et al (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in
Honour of Tullio Treves (The Hague: Asser Press 2013), 781-824, especially at 798 et seq.
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for victims of human rights violations. Despite being technically possible, such a
normative development seems at the moment to be far from reach. So, is there still
something we can learn from the European legal order?
III. Techniques of Dialogue Between Judges at the European
Level: What Lessons Can We Learn?
The relationship between EU law and national legal orders relies significantly on a
continuous dialogue between judges. In this sometimes complicated interaction,
constitutional courts play an essential role. Of course, this dialectical relationship
between judicial organs takes place using a number of means. For our purposes, two
techniques of judicial dialogue deserve particular attention: the counterlimits doc-
trine (dottrina dei controlimiti), applied by the ItCC, and the test of equivalent
protection, often employed by national and European judges to ensure respect for
fundamental rights. The key issue here is to evaluate the effects of using these
techniques in the relationship between the ItCC and the ICJ.
Admittedly, the counterlimits doctrine presents an intrinsic contradiction. The
contradiction stems from the recognition of a constitutional judicial power that
prevents the entrance of international norms into the national system, for the
purposes of safeguarding the supreme principles of the Italian Constitution. This
power would be in conflict with the openess to international law granted by the
Constitution itself (especially by those rules aimed at granting compliance with
international obligations, for example Articles 10, 11, and 117 of the Italian
Constitution).
It may be the existence of this contradiction that has seen the counterlimits
doctrine often invoked in the past but never concretely applied, at least until
Judgment 238/2014. What is more interesting here, however, is a more latent aspect
to this technique. As pointed out by Stefano Battini, so long as the application of the
counterlimits doctrine remains a mere threat, the collision of legal orders continues
to be an abstract scenario.24 The effects of the potential application of the
counterlimits doctrine may even be seen as a constructive one. First, the
non-application of the counterlimits doctrine confirms the existence of common, or
at least compatible, values between legal systems: if the counterlimits are not
applied, it means that the ‘external rule’ is in compliance with national legal
principles. Secondly, the possibility that the counterlimits doctrine can be applied
may provide a warning to judges of other legal orders about the existence of a
potential systemic collision. The threat of this clash may force them to take into
account the interests that are conflicting and to look for acceptable, balanced
24Stefano Battini, ‘È costituzionale il diritto internazionale?’, Giornale di diritto amministrativo
3 (2015), 367-377, at 372-373.
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solutions. The problem is that when the doctrine is in fact concretely applied, as in
Judgment 238/2014, the contrast between legal orders becomes irreconcileable.
Admittedly, the judicial dialogue between constitutional courts (or the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)) and the ECJ has often relied on a different
technique, one that favours a more dialectial interaction between legal systems: the
test of equivalent protection.25 In the application of this technique, the degree of
judicial control over the ‘external law’ is loosened by the fact that the protection does
not need to be exactly the same but comparatively adequate or generally accept-
able.26 It is the admissibility of an imperfect accordance between the two systems
that specifically enhances ‘the potentialities of equivalent protection as a technique
for the balancing of interests’.27 The counterlimits doctrine instead precludes this
adaptability, since it rests on a purely hierarchical logic. In Judgment 238/2014, the
ItCC has created an irremovable barrier to safeguard the supreme and non-derogable
principles of the Italian Constitution. As a consequence, the balance between
competing interests can be done only in light of national parameters. One may
argue that the resulting and contested absence of a real balancing in Judgment
238/2014 is a consequence of the particular (national) perspective assumed by the
ItCC,28 although the above-mentioned constitutional provisions may have led to a
different result.
A further distinction between the counterlimits doctrine and the equivalent
protection test concerns the absence in the former of any presumption of conformity
between the international rule or decision and national law.29 The main idea behind
25Judgment 238/2014 is indeed often compared to other decisions that allowed constitutional courts
(Frontini and Solange I and II concerning the Italian and German Constitutional Courts respec-
tively) and the European Court of Human Rights (Bosphorus) to somehow limit the impact of EU
law within their own systems. See Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 18 December 1973, No
183/1973; Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271
(Solange I), and Order of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II); ECtHR,
Bosphorus v Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 June 2005, Application No 45036/98.
26See, generally, Veronika Bílková, ‘The Standard of Equivalent Protection as a Standard of
Review’, in Lukasz Gruszczynski/Wouter Werner (eds), Deference in International Courts and
Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (Oxford: OUP 2014), 272–288; Maura
Marchegiani, Il principio della protezione equivalente come meccanismo di coordinamento tra
sistemi giuridici nell'ordinamento internazionale (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica 2018).
27Maurizio Arcari, ‘Forgetting Article 103 of the UN Charter?: Some perplexities on “equivalent
protection” after Al-Dulimi’, Questions of International Law: Zoom-In 6 (2014), 31–41, at 37:
Arcari criticizes the excessively demanding level of protection required in the more recent juris-
prudence of the ECtHR on UN Security Council targeted sanctions (see, in particular, 39 et seq).
28On the absence of a real balancing in Judgment 238/2014, see Pasquale De Sena, ‘Spunti di
riflessione sulla sentenza 238/2014 della Corte Costituzionale’, SIDIBlog, (30 October 2014),
available at www.sidiblog.org/2014/10/30/spunti-di-riflessione-sulla-sentenza-2382014-della-
corte-costituzionale/.
29On this point see Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph: How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza
No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order’, EJIL:Talk!, (22 December
2014), available at www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-
no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-order-part-i/.
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the equivalent protection technique lies precisely in the general assumption that
safeguarding fundamental rights is normally considered a cornerstone of both the
legal order making the norm or decision to be implemented and the system that
should give effect to that norm or decision. This presumption is not supposed to be
easily rebuttable, although judges have used the equivalent protection test in order to
assess the degree of human rights protections provided by international organiza-
tions.30 In this respect, one can note that this more dialogical technique has proved to
be useful in the context of highly integrated and institutionalized systems, whereas it
may be difficult to conceive of a judicial recourse to this method by constitutional
courts in their relationship with the ICJ.
Despite these criticisms regarding the application of the counterlimits doctrine,
Judgment 238/2014 may be seen as an ‘episode in a more general tendency to return
to dualistically colored practices in the relationship between the legal orders’.31
However, Jugdment 238/2014 and the counterlimits doctrine therein applied display
some specific features. One cannot ignore the particular context in which Judgment
238/2014 operates. In this regard, some scholars have highlighted that it is one thing
to apply a national ‘filter to a European supranational organization, such as the EU,
and quite another to use it to scrutinize global institutions and universal rules’.32 The
difference would lie in the lower level of integration and the more varied array of
legal values, principles, and intepretations characterizing international rules com-
pared to the high degree of integration and sophistication reached by the EU. The
application of a national filter may also cause tension within the EU system. But any
claim for a protection of national identity has a wider and more dangerous impact at
the international level, namely heavily weakening the application and enforcement
of international law and decisions.33
Admittedly, an assessment of states’ compliance with human rights has recently
occurred in the case law related to the implementation of other international legal
acts, that is the UN Security Council’s targeted sanctions. The ItCC itself recalled,
albeit in very general terms, the Kadi jurisprudence of the EU courts.34 As for the
30See, eg, ECtHR, Michaud v France, Judgment of 6 December 2012, Application No 12323/11;
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v Switzerland, Judgment of 26 November 2013, Appli-
cation No 5809/08; AL v Italy, Decision of 11 May 2000, Application No 41387/98.
31Robert Kolb, ‘The Relationship between the International and the Municipal Legal Order:
Reflections on the Decision no 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, Questions of Inter-
national Law: Zoom-Out 2 (2014), 5-16, at 6.
32Nico Krisch, ‘The Backlash against International Courts’, VerfBlog, (16 December 2014),
available at http://verfassungsblog.de/backlash-international-courts-2/.
33See also Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case’, in this volume.
34ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), para 3.4.
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Strasbourg Court, one could refer to the Nada35 and Al-Dulimi36 cases. However, in
this case-law, the courts were essentially talking to the political organs of the UN in
order to improve the level of human rights protection of that legal system.
Intersystemic dialogues do not always involve judicial organs only. If one takes
into account the different counterparts of the dialogue, a clear consequence of
Judgment 238/2014 is the ‘more serious damage to the normativity of the interna-
tional legal system’.37 The judgment of the ItCC, in fact, questions the decision of
another judicial organ and does not react—as in Kadi, Al-Dulimi, and similar
cases—to the potential arbitrariness of political organs, whose acts directly impinge
on individual rights.
All in all, both the counterlimits doctrine and the equivalent protection test suffer
from additional inherent limitations, if applied to the relationship between constitu-
tional courts and the ICJ. For example, in the thoroughly debated Taricco saga, the
ItCC envisaged an application of the counterlimits doctrine against the ECJ without
causing an insurmountable conflict or stalemate.38 The ItCC, in fact, did not clarify
the exact scope of the supreme principle (of legality in criminal law) endangered by a
previous ECJ decision. This was likely a ‘pure strategic choice’, aimed at leaving
some leeway to the ECJ in its eventual attempt to reconcile EU law with the Italian
35ECtHR, Nada v Switzerland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 12 September 2012, Application No
10593/08. For comments, see Nicolas Hervieu, ‘La délicate articulation des engagements onusiens
et européens au prisme de la lutte contre le terrorisme’, (21 September 2012), available at https://
revdh.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/lettre-adl-du-credof-21-septembre-2012.pdf, 1–11; Marko
Milanovic, ‘European Court Decides Nada v. Switzerland’, EJIL:Talk!, (14 September 2012),
available at www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-nada-v-switzerland/; Maria E Gennusa,
‘Nada c. Svizzera: sulle orme di Kadi?’, Quaderni costituzionali 1 (2013), 164-167, at 164 et seq.
36ECtHR, Al-Dulimi v Switzerland (n 30). See, among others, Anne Peters, ‘Targeted Sanctions
after Affaire Al-Dulimi et Montana Management Inc. c. Suisse: Is There a Way Out of the Catch-22
for UN Members?’, EJIL:Talk!, (4 December 2013), available at www.ejiltalk.org/targeted-
sanctions-after-affaire-al-dulimi-et-montana-management-inc-c-suisse-is-there-a-way-out-of-the-
catch-22-for-un-members/; Maura Marchegiani, ‘Le principe de la protection équivalente dans
l’articulation des rapports entre ordre juridique des NU et CED après l’arrêt Al-Dulimi’, Questions
of International Law: Zoom-In 6 (2014), 3-14, at 3 et seq.
37See Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph’ 2014 (n 29); see also Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian
Constitutional Court and “Constructive Contestation”: A Miscarried Attempt?’, Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 621-627, at 626.
38Corte Costituzionale, Order of 26 January 2017, No 24/2017; in its request for a preliminary
ruling, the ItCC explained both reasons for the contrast between a previous ECJ’s decision and a
supreme constitutional principle and the consequences in the event that the conflict persists: the
non-application of the ECJ’s decision (ECJ, Taricco and Others, Judgment of 8 September 2015,
Case No C-105/14). For an account on the extensive doctrinal debate over this Order, see
Alessandro Bernardi/Cristiano Cupelli (eds), Il caso Taricco e il dialogo tra le Corti: L’ordinanza
24/2017 della Corte costituzionale (Naples: Jovene Editore 2017).
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Constitution.39 And the ECJ took the chance40 ‘by emphasizing (. . .) the language of
common constitutional [traditions] rather than one of constitutional identity’,41
thereby finding a way to accommodate both domestic and EU law. This case
shows that the relationship between national courts and the ECJ is both sophisticated
and highly developed, and provides judges with several ‘means of dialogue’ to solve
normative conflicts. A wise use of the preliminary reference procedure may be one of
these means and methods. The judicial dialogue within the EU’s judicial order is
built on these strategic, refined, and subtle choices.
The relationship between constitutional courts and the ICJ cannot rely on these
kinds of means and subtleties. There is no preliminary reference procedure on which
constitutional courts may rely upon. More generally—as the ItCC itself has actually
recognized in Judgment 238/2014—the ICJ should have the last word on interna-
tional law matters. As far as this word might be wrong, a purely confrontational
attitude from national courts will likely only have the effect of undermining respect
for international law, especially if one takes into account the infrequent opportunities
for dialogue between constitutional courts and the ICJ.
There is another element that might be worth briefly recalling here. In the cases of
Nada and Al-Dulimi,42 the Strasbourg Court partly departed from the test of equiv-
alent protection and relied on the idea that states enjoy a degree of discretion in the
implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. In practice, states
can decide how to give effect to Security Council resolutions, provided that they
comply with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). This approach can also be problematic, since it might be difficult to assess
if and to what extent there is any real discretion left to the state by a Security Council
decision. What matters more here, however, is that the ECtHR not only assumes that
it is possibile to comply with the Security Council decisions while protecting human
rights but leaves states free to decide how to achieve this goal. For our purposes, a
remarkable aspect of this approach is that it transfers the burden of solving potential
conflicts between legal orders to state-level political organs.
At the end of the day, even in the undesirable scenario of an application of the
counterlimits doctrine, the ItCC should try to leave some leeway for other actors—
39See Davide Paris, ‘Carrot and Stick: The Italian Constitutional Court’s Preliminary Reference in
the Case Taricco’, Questions of International Law: Zoom-In 5 (2017), 5–20, at 10–11. See also
Giacomo Rugge, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court on Taricco: Unleashing the Normative Potential
of National Identity?, Questions of International Law: Zoom-In 5 (2017), 21-29.
40ECJ, M.A.S. and M.B. (Taricco II), Judgment of 5 December 2017, Case No C-42/17. For a
critical analysis, see Francesco Viganò, ‘Melloni Overruled?: Considerations on the Taricco II
Judgment of the Court of Justice’, New Journal of European Criminal Law 9 (2018), 18-23.
41See Marco Bassini/Oreste Pollicino, ‘Defusing the Taricco Bomb through Fostering Constitu-
tional Tolerance: All Roads Lead to Rome’, VerfBlog, (5 December 2017), available at https://
verfassungsblog.de/defusing-the-taricco-bomb-through-fostering-constitutional-tolerance-all-
roads-lead-to-rome/.
42ECtHR, Nada v Switerzland (n 35); ECtHR, Al-Dulimi v Switzerland (n 30).
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particularly political organs of the Italian state—to find alternative solutions.43 In
more general terms, the ItCC should not jeopardize the quest for alternative and
perhaps political solutions and could even suggest ways to resolve the deadlock. In
Judgment 238/2014, the ItCC appears to have neglected this promising facet of its
role. As we shall see, however, Sentenza does not preclude the viability of alternative
means of dispute settlement and redress.
IV. The Existence of Alternative Means of Dispute Settlement
and a Reasonable Way to Award Redress to the Victims
In reconciling human rights protections with immunity from jurisdiction, the inter-
action between legal systems may take different forms. As for state immunity, the
ECtHR heavily relied on the importance of the principle par in parem non habet
iurisdictionem, that is, equals have no jurisdiction over each other. As a conse-
quence, restrictions on access to a judge (Article 6(1) ECHR) have often been
considered legitimate and proportionate to the aim of complying with international
law and respecting state sovereignty.44 In light of the ‘principled approach’ adopted
by the Court of Strasbourg, recognition of state immunity would not require any
assessment on the protection granted to individuals in other legal systems and,
particularly, on the very existence of alternative means of protection. In practice,
as Luigi Condorelli has critically pointed out, the international law of state immunity
is in no way connected, balanced or reconciled with human rights law, so far.45
By contrast, the existence of alternative means of protection has played an
important role in relation to the jurisdictional immunities of international organiza-
tions. According to the ECtHR, in order to establish whether an international
organization enjoys immunity from municipal jurisdiction, a relevant factor relates
to the availability to the applicants of ‘reasonable alternative means to protect their
rights under the Convention’.46 Rare exceptions to this test, as in the well-known
43In this sense, see Paolo Palchetti, ‘Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court: In
search of a way out’, Questions of International Law: Zoom-Out 2 (2014), 44-47.
44ECtHR, Fogarty v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001,
Application No 37112/97, para 34; ECtHR, McElhinney v Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of
21 November 2001, Application No 31253/96, para 35; ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom,
Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No 35763/97, para 52.
45Luigi Condorelli, ‘Conclusions générales’, in Hervé Ascensio/Jean-François Flauss (eds), La
soumission des organisations internationales aux normes internationales relatives aux droits de
l’homme (Paris: Pedone 2009), 127-142, at 132 (translated by the author).
46ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany, Grand Chamber Judgment of 18 February 1999,
Application No 26083/94, para 68; ECtHR, Beer and Regan v Germany, Grand Chamber Judgment
of 18 February 1999, Application No 28934/95; ECtHR, Naletilić v Croatia, Decision of 4 May
2000, Application No 51891/99; ECtHR, Gasparini v Italy and Belgium, Decision of 12 May 2009,
Application No 10750/03.
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Mothers of Srebrenica case,47 are normally justified by the unique and imperative
nature of the functions of the United Nations Security Council in mantaining or
restoring international peace and security.48
The issue of the availibility of alternative means of protection was also addressed
before the ICJ. Italy argued that the denial of immunity to Germany was justified by
the failure of all other attempts to obtain reparation for the victims involved. The
Italian argument however, was rejected, since the ICJ was unable to determine the
existence of a customary international rule that ‘makes the entitlement of a State to
immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing
redress’.49
From its side, the ItCC, in Judgment 238/2014, rested on the assumption that no
access to justice was granted to Italian victims. This impression is discernable, for
example, in the statement that it ‘would indeed be difficult to identify how much is
left of a right if it cannot be invoked before a judge in order to obtain effective
protection’.50 Later on, the ItCC also affirmed that ‘the completely disproportionate
sacrifice of two supreme principles of the Constitution’ (Articles 2 and 24) stems
from ‘the denial of judicial protection’.51
Italian military internees indeed tried to bring their case before German judges,
going all the way up to the German Constitutional Court.52 Their legal action did not
meet with success. According to some scholars, however, the individuals did not
lack access to justice but to a judge who could grant them compensation.53 Be that as
it may, the ItCC should have scrutinized whether access to justice was effectively
granted to victims instead of assuming, as an automatic consequence of the
unachieved reparation, the denial of judicial protection. After all, one of Italy’s
47Supreme Court of The Netherlands, Mothers of Srebrenica et al v State of The Netherlands and
the United Nations, Judgment of 13 April 2012, Case No10/04437.
48See Beatrice Ilaria Bonafé, ‘L’esistenza di rimedi alternativi ai fini del riconoscimento
dell’immunità delle organizzazioni internazionali: la sentenza della Corte suprema olandese nel
caso Madri di Srebrenica’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 95 (2012), 826-828.
49ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 101.
50ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), para 3.4.
51Ibid.
52Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277;
Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, Judgment of 9 September 2004, 9 A 336.02. In this context see also
the Distomo cases where German courts dismissed claims brought by Greek victims of WWII
massacres: Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, BVerfGK
7, 303.
53Battini, ‘È costituzionale il diritto internazionale?’ 2015 (n 24), 375. See also Christian
Tomuschat, ‘The National Constitution Trumps International Law’, Italian Journal of Public
Law 2 (2014), 189-196, at 191-192; Sabino Cassese, Dentro la Corte: Diario di un giudice
costituzionale (Bologna: Il Mulino 2015), at 260-261; see also Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The
Illusion of Perfect Justice’, and Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume.
For a different perspective, see Valerio Onida, chapter ‘Moving beyond Judicial Conflict in the
Name of the Pre-Eminence of Fundamental Human Rights’, in this volume.
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arguments before the ICJ was specifically aimed at demonstrating that many Italian
victims ‘were not included in any postwar reparation scheme agreed upon between
Italy and Germany nor were they included in the reparation schemes set up unilat-
erally by Germany’.54 This would lead to the conclusion that ‘the remedies available
under German law provided no reasonable possibility of obtaining effective
redress’.55
Yet, in the event that judicial means were considered unsatisfactory or
unavailable, the ItCC’s evaluation could then have dwelt upon the existence of
interstate negotations as a possible alternative means of redress. The Tribunal of
Florence, for example, in evaluating the effectiveness of the protection granted to
Italian victims, gave decisive relevance to the fact that Germany did not attempt to
undertake negotiations with Italy.56 In other words, besides an assessment of the
effectiveness of the right to a judge granted to Italian victims, the ItCC may have
inquired as to the viability of other (diplomatic) means of protecting the rights of the
victims. This would have implied that political organs, and especially the Italian
government, could have become a counterpart of the dialogue.
As is well-known, the ICJ was ‘not unaware’ that the customary rule on state
immunity ‘may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals concerned’, and, on
this basis, the international judge envisaged ‘further negotation involving the two
States concerned, with a view of resolving the issue’.57 The ICJ seems therefore to
suggest that negotiation is the alternative dispute settlement par excellence. Even the
ItCC interpreted this paragraph as indicative of the fact that the ‘opening of new
negotiations is the only means available to settle the dispute in international law’.58
More generally, Judgment 238/2014 on no less than three occasions recalls the fact
that the ICJ referred to the opening of new negotiations as the only appropriate
method of finding a solution on the international plane.
If this is the only path to a solution at the international level, then the ItCC could
have given more importance to the availability of alternative means of redress—in
the form of negotiations between the two states—in order to wear down the absolute
character of the principle of judicial protection enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution. In its jurisprudence, after all, the ItCC itself considers the promotion of
54ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), Rejoinder of Italy, 10 January 2011,
para 4.22.
55Ibid.
56Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment No 14740/2009 (n 4), 13: ‘[I]n order to find a proper balance, in
the present case, between the rationale behind the customary rule on State immunity with the
effectiveness of human rights protection, one must consider that the radical choice of the Italian
Constitutional Court was determined by the conduct of the Federal Republic of Germany. The latter,
although admitting to be responsible for the crimes committed by the Third Reich, has not only
invoked its jurisdictional immunity before Italian judges, but it did not undertake any negotiations
with the victims and their heirs, or with Italy’ (translated by the author).
57ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 49), para 104.
58ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), para 3.1.
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alternative means of dispute settlement as a public interest apt to temporarily restrict
the right of access to a judge.59
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s auspices, it is unclear whether the two states
genuninely attempted to find a negotiated solution to the dispute. In that light, the
ItCC may have scrutinized adverse human rights impacts resulting from a reluctance
of the Italian government to pursue diplomatic initiatives. Scrutiny of Italy’s behav-
iour in granting human rights protection to its citizens may have encouraged the
government to look either for a diplomatic settlement or for any other internal
solution capable of addressing the unanswered claims of the victims.
An interesting example in this regard comes from the South Korean Constitu-
tional Court. In light of a duty to protect citizens abroad (Article 2 of the Korean
Constitution) and to respect the dignity of the victims of human rights violations, the
Korean government was deemed liable for the negative consequences affecting
Korean comfort women as a result of both the content of the bilateral agreement
concluded with Japan in 1965 and the failure to pursue economic compensation from
Japan through diplomatic channels.60 More pointedly, the Constitutional Court
decided that the Korean government had not done enough to obtain reparations for
the violence suffered by its own citizens, and that this inaction represented a breach
of constitutionally enshrined individual rights. Eventually, the Korean Constitu-
tional Court asked the government to activate all diplomatic means at its disposal
in order to solve the interpretive disputes concerning the content of the peace treaty
signed in 1965 by the two states.61 While the ItCC cannot impose such an obligation
on the Italian government, the consequences of the enforcement of Judgment
238/2014 might still exert a certain pressure on Italian political organs to either
find a means to settle the dispute at the international level or to directly award some
means of redress to the victims. The point is that a negotiated solution depends of
course upon the willingness of both parties, whereas an Italian political initiative
aimed at unilaterally granting reparation to the victims is always (and immediately)
possible.
My suggestion is that, while waiting for a negotiated solution, Italy should
compensate its own nationals. From a legal viewpoint, such a political choice
59Remo Caponi, ‘A Fresh Start: How to Resolve the Conflict between the ICJ and the Italian
Constitutional Court’, VerfBlog, (28 January 2015), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/fresh-
start-resolve-conflict-icj-italian-constitutional-court/. See especially the reference to the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision No 276/2000, para 3.4.
60Korean Constitutional Court, Determination of the constitutionality of the inaction with respect to
Article 3 of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems concerning Property and Claims and the
Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan, Anonymous (64 former Japanese
military sex slaves) v Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Individual constitutional complaint,
23-2(A) KCCR 366, ILDC 1880 (KR 2011), 2006 Hun-Ma 788, 30 August 2011. See also Filippo
Fontanelli, chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, in this volume.
61The Korean Constitutional Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Korean
government had provided for economic compensation to Korean victims and had made the decision
to focus its diplomatic efforts ‘only’ on obtaining Japanese apologies and a recognition of all
committed violations.
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would confine the question of compensation within the Italian legal order. It would
possibly arrest the enforcement of Judgment 238/2014 and reduce Italy’s exposure
to international responsibility for non-compliance with the 2012 ICJ Judgment.
From a diplomatic perspective, Italy’s engagment in compensatation—even if not
full compensation—would be a gesture of goodwill toward Germany. This ges-
ture—while stopping domestic proceedings against Germany—could potentially
foster the resumption of negotiations. From a humanitarian point of view, compen-
sation may partially restore the victims’ dignity, many of whom have been waiting
too long and might yet die while waiting.
Finally, the risks of failing to find a settlement at the international level and the
costs of a lack of protection for its nationals should be temporarily borne by Italy. As
long as Italian victims and their heirs are compensated, a restriction on their right to
seek justice through the courts might become more tolerable for the Italian tribunals.
V. Conclusions
To date, it is hard to envisage any rapid development regarding the evolution of
international rules on the jurisdicitional immunity of the state. Despite all the
attention paid to the rights of the individuals, the European legal order does not
seem to be an exception to the actual state of affairs. However, judicial dialogue at
the European level shows many different ways to solve normative conflicts. In
particular, the need to reconcile the international rules on state immunity with the
norms for the protection of human rights seems to make it necessary to involve state-
level political organs and to look at the existence of alternative non-judicial means of
dispute settlment.
Maybe it is no accident that both the ICJ and the ItCC suggest that the best option
to solve the conflict lies in negotiation. But however trite it may be to say, a
negotiated solution might never materialize. Thus, in order to get out of the actual
deadlock—and to avoid the consequences of an inability to reach a political solution
at the international level falling back onto the victims—Italy should grant its own
citizens compensation and thereby restore their dignity.
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Sentenza 238/2014: EU Law and EU Values
Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella
Abstract The relationship between Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional
Court and EU law is, at first glance, apparently weak, as the subject matter of the
former is not governed by the latter, nor there have been any judgments from EU courts
regarding the case. However, if one considers the origin and purpose of the EU itself
and the state of relations between Italy and Germany, one cannot help but examine the
case from a European law perspective. Judgment 238/2014 is relevant to European law
in several ways, all of which concern not only military cooperation in the EU but also
the protection of human rights, the risk of forum shopping and, above all, how reliable
member states are in their mutual relations. European law in turn is relevant to the
present case not so much because it offers solutions but because it shows a method for
settling clashes between legal systems and illustrates its inherent difficulties. Sentenza
238/2014 is an unpersuasive judgment and can be criticized from different angles: the
legal one (international and constitutional law), the factual reconstruction and the
judgment’s likely effects. There are, however, two possibilities of resolving the
situation that Sentenza has produced: firstly the legal one, which involves the use of
all possible tools to limit its effects; and secondly the diplomatic one, which implies
further negotiations. European law does not provide a ground for a preference between
these two options, but it suggests that none of these ways is neglected.
I. Introduction
Neither the protection nor reparations for the victims of Nazi crimes committed
during World War II (WWII) are governed by European law, nor are there EU
courts’ decisions regarding them. Therefore, one could simply give a negative
answer to the four key questions raised by the editors: that Judgment 238/2014
does not have legal implications for European military operations, that it is not an
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application of a particular national approach to European issues, that there is not a
European special way to state immunity, and that European law is of little help in the
issues related to this Judgment.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe that European law is irrelevant to
Judgment 238/2014, and vice versa. Indeed, some background facts need to be taken
into consideration: the European integration process started after WWII precisely to
ensure peace in Europe by creating ties, not only economic in nature, between
European countries. More than 70 years after the end of the war and 60 years after
the foundation of the European Communities, we are still discussing reparations for
war crimes. Is this a failure for the EU?
Maybe not. The fact that such issues are peacefully negotiated between govern-
ments, with legal proceedings before courts and with friendly discussions among
scholars, seems to me a success. One reason for optimism is that what has been said
so far shows the high standard of human rights protection in the EU. Italian courts, in
the cases that we are discussing, have broadly, though possibly improperly, applied
the principles of human rights protection that are part of the common legal heritage
of all EU member states. Judgment 238/2014 undoubtedly demonstrates that there is
a problem between two founding member states of the Union. This is certainly a
cause for concern, which should not, however, overshadow the otherwise excellent
relations between Germany and Italy. It is in this context that we can reflect both on
the implications of Sentenza for EU law and on the indications that EU law can
provide for the issues that we are discussing.
II. Implications for EU Law
As for the implications of Judgment 238/2014 for EU law, it can easily be affirmed
that there is no regional customary policy on state immunity cases in which EU
member states are involved. Nor is Sentenza likely to have specific legal implica-
tions, for instance concerning European military operations.1 There are, however,
broader legal implications, both substantive and procedural, that inter alia concern
respect for human rights in the EU. On the one hand, the way in which the issue of
reparations for war crimes is dealt with in this case could become an important
precedent for other violations of human rights, for example concerning immigration
and asylum. A violation of human rights, for example, could be found by a national
court in the rejection or expulsion of migrants, who could therefore be entitled to
compensation. On the other hand, Judgment 238/2014 raises the issue of universal
jurisdiction, which could give rise to forms of forum shopping.2
1See also Andreas Zimmermann, chapter ‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to Adopt
a European Approach to State Immunity?’, in this volume.
2See also Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in
this volume.
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In theory, one consequence of this ruling could be the attraction of multiple
human rights cases directed towards Italian courts. Such a prospect would be terrible
for Italy, whose courts are already heavily engaged in too much litigation. It would
be even worse for Europe if a jurisdiction not recognizing state immunity were to be
established within its borders, with unforeseeable effects, for example, on the free
movement of capital (if the courts of a member state become particularly keen in
granting compensation for offenses related to human rights, potential defendants
could move their assets out of that state). Nevertheless, these risks should not be
overestimated. We must consider the peculiarities of the case, influenced as it is by
the special perception in Europe of WWII and Nazi crimes. It is also necessary to
take into account the circumstances of this particular case and of this Judgment,
which was decided by the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) with a difficult and not
unanimous deliberation.3
The risks, in fact, are not the worst consequence of the Judgment. More worrying
is its effect on the predictability of negotiations on this matter and on the reliability of
the negotiating parties. In any negotiation there is always the risk that one of the
parties plays according to the rules for as long as it finds it convenient. Such an
attitude would be particularly harmful for the EU, where the very idea of the
unreliability of a founding member state is unacceptable. Even in this respect,
however, the risk should not be overestimated. We must consider, once again, the
peculiarities of the case. It is necessary to take into account, above all, the experience
of more than 60 years of fruitful negotiations and fair implementation of European
law. Overall, we should not overrate the implications of Judgment 238/2014 for
European law.
III. The Suggestions Provided by EU Law
What indications can European law provide for the case at hand? First of all,
customary law does not offer clear indications for this case and a legislative solution
is at present quite difficult. Hence, there are a few alternatives to further negotiations.
Secondly, there is the theme of the dialogue between courts and of the conditional
approach; in this respect, European law provides important indications that demon-
strate the complexity of the matter.
European law implies a certain degree of mutual trust between national courts and
between these national courts and European courts; trust is necessary for the
implementation of European law, which requires coordination and responsibility.
However, coordination is more difficult to achieve between courts than between
governments because courts cannot negotiate and agree on individual cases. Con-
sequently, the possibility that government decisions are ruled out by court decisions
is a risk that needs to be eliminated.
3See Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume.
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Coordination and accountability in the EU are necessary for all actors, including
courts, which, in turn, must safeguard the rule of law and protect individual rights
without infringements or compromises. Within this framework, we can deal with the
‘barking or biting’ issue, which is raised by the ‘Solange approach’, by the
counterlimits doctrine, and by the theory of equivalent protection. Barking is useful
as long as a court does not need to bite, but is effective only if everyone knows that
the court has teeth enough to bite. One bite, from time to time and in exceptional
circumstances, can be appropriate and necessary. Of course, an inappropriate bite
would be harmful. 4
IV. Law and Negotiations
An evaluation of whether Judgment 238/2014 is right or wrong is necessary in order
to outline the future path to follow. There are many arguments suggesting that the
ItCC’s Sentenza is wrong from the point of view of both international law and
constitutional law. The Judgment seems to be based on a questionable contrast
between the international law principle of immunity and the protection of the rights
of the individual granted by national law. It also seems incorrect on the merits
because the right to a judge had actually been granted by Germany.5 In this respect,
though we may have doubts about German legislative and judicial decisions, we
must consider Germany’s efforts to compensate the victims. We must also acknowl-
edge that the ItCC acted beyond its remit by syndicating those decisions: it did not
share the views of German courts and thus stated that there had been no judgments.
The ItCC may also have sinned by vanity, searching the ‘great judgment’,6 and may
have underestimated or overlooked the effects of its decision, doing little good to
constitutional adjudication.7
It seems to me, however, that the main task ahead is to identify possible solutions
in order to limit the negative effects of Sentenza 238/2014 and to highlight the
positive elements of the case. The Judgment must be circumscribed as a unique
decision: it is unlikely that a similar judgment will be adopted in the future, but it is
equally unlikely a revision of the Constitutional Court’s position. We cannot real-
istically expect an overruling, but we can expect a different decision in the future,
when based on different facts. There are two different ways out of the current
deadlock: legal and diplomatic.
4See also Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case’, in this volume.
5For a different perspective, see Valerio Onida, chapter ‘Moving beyond Judicial Conflict in the
Name of the Pre-Eminence of Fundamental Human Rights’, in this volume.
6Guido Calabresi, Il mestiere di giudice: Pensieri di un accademico americano (Bologna: Il
Mulino 2014).
7See Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume.
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The legal route is to wait and use all possible legal means to limit the effects of the
Sentenza, counting on non-execution of any further judiciary decisions. It seems to
me that exclusively choosing this route would be offensive to the dignity of the
victims and also to the dignity of constitutional adjudication: Judgment 238/2014
may be criticized, but it is a judgment of a constitutional court and must be executed.
The diplomatic route involves new negotiations, which could be carried out by
exploiting the peculiarities of this case, in which there was a certain lack of
negotiation—the International Court of Justice had called for ‘further negotiations’
and the ItCC complained of their absence. The case poses a relatively small issue in
financial terms, which could also be addressed by involving the Italian government:
Judgment 238/2014, in fact, is rigid on the side of the victims, not on that of the
possible payers, so it should not prevent the Italian government from allocating
resources in an effort to resolve the case.8 Of course, money is not the most
important thing in this case; more important is the recognition due to the victims.
However, allocating financial resources could be a form of recognition of their
suffering and of their rights.
European law does not provide clear indications for either the legal or the
diplomatic route: the EU is a community of law, but it is also a community of
values. Both ways are eligible, both can be loyally and legally taken.
Reference
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The Consequences of Sentenza 238/2014:
What to Do Now?
Doris König
Abstract This chapter illustrates the two ways in which national constitutional
courts can deal with a conflict between international or European law on the one
hand and national constitutional law on the other hand. The dualist approach of not
complying with international or European law comes at the risk of undermining
respect for an external legal order and in the author’s view should thus be used in
exceptional cases only. The chapter argues that the test of equivalent protection is
more constructive but requires a close relationship between the legal orders
involved. Therefore, this option is difficult to apply in cases which are about
conflicts with international and not with European law. In Sentenza 238/2014, the
Italian Constitutional Court chose a dualist approach. Although the legal path has not
been exhausted yet (Germany could bring another case before the International
Court of Justice), the author advocates negotiations with the aim of achieving a
political solution which takes into account the interests of all parties involved.
I. Introduction
This concise chapter elaborates on two issues: it firstly focuses on the techniques
national constitutional courts have to tackle a conflict between international or
European Union law on the one hand, and national constitutional law on the other
hand. It then offers some thoughts on the way forward to solve the conflict between
Italy and Germany after Sentenza 238/2014.
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II. Techniques of Judicial Dialogue
As Alessandro Bufalini states in his chapter, there are basically two techniques of
judicial dialogue between national constitutional courts and international or
European courts—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European
Court of Human Rights—in case of a conflict between national, constitutional and
international or European law.1 The first technique is the more confrontational one,
namely the decision not to apply or comply with international or European law in the
national legal order due to constitutional reasons. The Italian Constitutional Court
uses the counterlimits doctrine (dottrina dei controlimiti),2 and the German Federal
Constitutional Court uses the identity review (Identitätskontrolle)3 to examine
whether international or European law is compatible with fundamental principles
and inalienable human rights of the national constitutional order. This approach led
to the conflict at hand, and triggered numerous legal proceedings before Italian
courts which make it extremely difficult to come to a satisfactory solution of the
problems raised. Nevertheless, from a constitutional law perspective based on the
dualist theory, this technique is sometimes necessary for national constitutional
courts to protect the very essence or the ‘identity’ of the national constitutional
order they are the guardians of.
The more constructive technique is the test of equivalent protection which is often
applied in cases where the protection of human rights at different legal levels is at
stake. In these cases, constitutional courts do not control the compliance with human
rights guarantees themselves as long as exists an equivalent human rights protection
including judicial review at the international or European law level.4 In Germany,
this technique is called Solange-Rechtsprechung (‘as long as’ jurisprudence).5
Bufalini rightly points out that this more dialogical second technique usually
requires a close relationship and similarity of the two legal orders concerned and
also a sophisticated relationship between the courts involved to develop the pertinent
means and methods of the necessary ‘judicial dialogue’.6 This is the reason why this
technique is often used in the context of European Union law and human rights
protection guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights.7 This also
1See Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume.
2See eg Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 27 December 1973, No 183/1973 (Frontini).
3See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317.
4See, generally, Veronika Bílková, ‘The Standard of Equivalent Protection as a Standard of
Review’, in Lukasz Gruszczynski/Wouter Werner (eds), Deference in International Courts and
Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation (Oxford: OUP 2014).
5See FCC, Order of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange II).
6See Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume.
7For a thorough analysis of the principle of equivalent protection, see Elisa Ravasi, Human Rights
Protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ—A Comparative Analysis in Light of the Equivalency
Doctrine (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff 2017).
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explains why it is not used very often in genuine international law cases such as the
one at hand.
If constitutional courts make use of the more confrontational technique, men-
tioned above, thereby blocking off the applicability or enforcement of international
or European law in the national legal order, they should do so in a very cautious and
responsible way. This technique should only be used rarely in exceptional cases,
and—if possible—the language used in such judgments should not be too rigid and
confrontational in order to leave some room for the political actors to find a solution
to the conflict afterwards. National courts should take into account that decisions to
openly disobey international or European law are always apt to undermine respect
for the external legal order and also for the rule of law in general.
III. Possible Ways to Solve the Conflict Between Germany
and Italy
The case at hand is an illustrative example for the difficulties that arise from
judgments that apply the counterlimits doctrine, thus preventing the enforcement
of the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in Italy.8 When it comes to finding a solution to the conflict between Germany and
Italy, there are, as Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella points out in his chapter, basically
two paths to follow, namely the legal path and the political opportunity (and
diplomatic) path.9 The legal path has not yet been exhausted completely; several
options are left, especially with a view to the question of the execution of the
judgments now rendered by Italian courts against Germany.10 If bad comes to
worst, Germany could once again bring the case before the ICJ asking for compen-
sation for reparation payments she was forced to make. In my view, to follow that
path would not lead to a sensible solution of a conflict between two countries which
are both members of the European Union and work together closely in many ways.
Therefore, both states should choose the preferable option to once again take up
negotiations and find a political solution which is apt to close the wounds of the past
and takes into account the position and the feelings of the victims. There are many
different options concerning how such negotiations could be made, what the aims
could be, who should initiate them and who should participate. It is not for me to
give advice in this regard. These negotiations do not have to start from scratch; much
has been done already. It is clear, however, that such negotiations and their success
are dependent on the mutual political will and a certain sense of generosity on both
8ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99; ItCC, Judgment of 22 October 2014. No 238/2014.
9See Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, chapter ‘Sentenza 238/2014’, in this volume.
10See Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume. See
also recently, Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 25 June 2019, No 21995/2019.
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sides. In my view this would be the most sensible way to finally solve the problem in
the best interests of both states and the victims.
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Would the World Be a Better Place If One
Were to Adopt a European Approach
to State Immunity? Or, ‘Soll am
Europäischen Wesen die Staatenimmunität
Genesen’?
Andreas Zimmermann
Abstract This chapter argues not only that there is no European Sonderweg
(or ‘special way’) when it comes to the law of state immunity but that there ought
not to be one. Debates within The Hague Conference on Private International Law in
the late 1990s and those leading to the adoption of the 2002 UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States, as well as the development of the EU Brussels
Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, as amended in 2015, all demonstrate
that state immunity was not meant to be limited by such treaties but ‘safeguarded’.
Likewise, there is no proof that regional European customary law limits state immu-
nity when it comes to ius cogens violations, as Italy and (partly) Greece are the only
European states denying state immunity in such cases while the European Court of
Human Rights has, time and again, upheld a broad concept of state immunity. It
therefore seems unlikely that in the foreseeable future a specific European customary
law norm on state immunity will develop, especially given the lack of participation in
such practice by those states most concerned by the matter, including Germany. This
chapter considers the possible legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian
Constitutional Court for European military operations (if such operations went
beyond peacekeeping). These implications would mainly depend on the question of
attribution: if one where to assume that acts undertaken within the framework of
military operations led by the EU were to be, at least also, attributable to the troop-
contributing member states, the respective troop-contributing state would be entitled
to enjoy state immunity exactly to the same degree as in any kind of unilateral military
operations. Additionally, some possible perspectives beyond Sentenza 238/2014 are
examined, in particular concerning the redress awarded by domestic courts ‘as long
as’ neither the German nor the international system grant equivalent protection to the
victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during
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World War II. In the author’s opinion, strengthening the jurisdiction of international
courts and tribunals, bringing interstate cases for damages before the International
Court of Justice, as well as providing for claims commissions where individual
compensation might be sought for violations of international humanitarian law
would be more useful and appropriate mechanisms than denying state immunity.
I. Introduction
Although this chapter addresses a somewhat colourful bundle of questions, all of
them, one way or the other, relate to one overarching question: do specific European
perspectives exist de lege lata—or at least should such perspectives exist de lege
ferenda—when it comes to the law of state immunity in situations where serious
violations of international law have been committed or where, more realistically in
current circumstances, such violations are being alleged by the claimant? To get
straight to the point, the blunt answer is a clear and simple ‘no’. There is no European
Sonderweg (or ‘special way’) when it comes to the law of state immunity, and there
ought not to be one either. Rather, member states of the EU, and contracting parties
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) more broadly, should
continue to abide by universally recognized principles of state immunity, as having
been confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Jurisdictional
Immunities Judgment on the matter.1 Accordingly, relevant treaty norms, including
the ECHR and applicable secondary legislation of the EU,2 should continue to be
interpreted and applied in line with currently applicable norms of customary and
treaty law on the matter.
Having thus set the scene for the perspective adopted in this chapter, the follow-
ing sections will delve into more specific issues surrounding the topic. First, a
somewhat technical aspect will be addressed: the enforcement, in individual
European states, of domestic judgments rendered contrary to traditional concepts
of state immunity (section II). In particular, the debate within the Hague Conference
on Private International Law in the late 1990s will be summarized since it was also of
relevance for the debate on the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property (UN Convention on State Immunity)3 and the
1ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 56 et seq.
2Cf Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004
creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims, OJ vol 47, L143; Regulation
(EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a
European Order for Payment Procedures, OJ vol 49, L399; Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ vol 55, L 351. For details on
the latter, cf section II.2.
3UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004), UN
Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
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development of the Brussels Regulation. Second, the possible development of
specific rules of regional customary law on the matter will be discussed (section
III). Third, the legal implications of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional
Court (ItCC) for European military operations, and in particular for military opera-
tions under the auspices of the EU, will be analyzed (section IV). Finally, the chapter
will conclude with some remarks on possible European perspectives beyond
Sentenza 238/2014 (section V).
II. Enforcing Foreign Judgments That Have Not Respected
State Immunity
1. The Hague Conference on Private International Law4
It was in 1996 that the Hague Conference on Private International Law, with
important input from European states and from the EU, decided to ‘include in the
agenda of the 19th session the question of (. . .) recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters’.5 This led to the creation of a
Special Commission to come up with a first draft for a convention. The Special
Commission’s 1999 draft included Article 18(3) that, if adopted, would have
provided, as one option, for the possibility of exercising universal jurisdiction in
civil matters with respect to conduct constituting genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, or other serious crimes against a natural person under international law,
respectively with regard to ius cogens violations.6 It is worth recalling that the draft
provision had also provided that the envisaged broad acceptance of jurisdiction
would only apply, at least as far as the two latter categories of violations of
international law are concerned (namely serious crimes under international law
and ius cogens violations other than genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity), ‘if the party seeking relief is exposed to a risk of a denial of justice
4Cf, generally on the conference, www.hcch.net/en/home.
5Cf Catherine Kessedjian, ‘International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters’, Preliminary Document No 7 (April 1997), para 26, available at https://assets.hcch.net/
docs/76852ce3-a967-42e4-94f5-24be4289d1e5.pdf.
6Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 30 October 1999, text to be found in Stefan
Rinke, Schadensersatzklagen gegen Staaten wegen schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen im
Europäischen Zivilprozessrecht, (Berlin: BWV Verlag 2016), 128 or the Report by Peter Nygh/
Fausto Pocar concerning the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission, Preliminary Document No
11 (August 2000), available at https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf, 10.
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because proceedings in another state are not possible or cannot reasonably be
required’.7
This draft provision thus foreshadowed the last-resort argument made later by
Italy during the ICJ proceedings brought by Germany for alleged violations of
Germany’s state immunity.8 It ought to be noted, however, that this provision, as
Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar’s underlying explanatory report had made clear,9 was
only meant to govern jurisdictional issues while state immunity was not meant to be
limited by the envisaged treaty. This was confirmed by its draft Article 1(4), which in
broad terms had provided that ‘[n]othing in this Convention affects the privileges
and immunities of sovereign States or of entities of sovereign States, or of interna-
tional organizations’.10 It also ought to be noted that the International Law Com-
mission (ILC) was, during the very same period, working on a draft convention on
the jurisdictional immunities of states,11 which, as is well known, later led to the
adoption of the UN Convention on the matter.12 The ILC’s draft convention
similarly did not include any reference to a possible limitation on state immunity
in cases of serious violations of international law.13 Notwithstanding this develop-
ment within the ILC, the 2001 draft Hague convention, as submitted to and discussed
by The Hague diplomatic conference, had retained, mutatis mutandis, identical
language to the same effect as the 1999 draft by the then Special Commission. In
other words, it had retained the concept of state immunity even when it comes to
instances of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of ius cogens.
What is brought to light by this development is that even a possible acceptance of
the exercise of universal jurisdiction in matters such as genocide, crimes against
humanity or war crimes, in the envisaged future convention on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, would not have been meant to curtail traditional
concepts of state immunity even when it comes to serious violations of international
law. What is more, as is evident from the fate of the draft, is that even on those issues
no consensus could be reached which led in 2005 to the adoption of a mere
convention on choice of court agreements.14
7Ibid.
8ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (n 1), para 98 et seq.
9Cf Nygh/Pocar, ‘Report concerning the Preliminary Draft Convention’ 2000 (n 6).
10Ibid, 4.
11Yearbook of the International Law Commission II, part 2 (1999), chapter VII, 127 et seq.
12UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, 2004 (n 3).
13Cf Rinke, Schadensersatzklagen 2016 (n 6), 128 et seq; see also Gerhard Hafner, ‘Das
Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über die Immunität der Staaten und ihres Vermögens
von der Gerichtsbarkeit’, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 61 (2006), 381–395, at 394.
14Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, The Hague Conference on Private International
Law, 30 June 2005, available at www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid¼98.
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2. Brussels Ia Regulation
Turning now to developments within the framework of the EU more specifically, as
is well known, the Brussels Regulation was amended in 2015. Commonly referred to
as the Brussels Ia Regulation, it built on the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,15 as
well as earlier versions of the Brussels Regulation itself,16 and significantly facili-
tates the enforcement of judgments on civil and commercial matters rendered in
another EU member state by providing for a quasi-automatic system of enforcement
of such judgments.17 This raises the question of whether under the Brussels Ia
Regulation a judgment by a domestic court of one member state denying state
immunity when it comes to alleged violations of ius cogens committed by a foreign
armed force is enforceable in other EU member states. If that were the case, this
would clearly be indicative of an acceptance by the EU of a special regime of a more
limited concept of state immunity.
Before entering into details, it should be noted that the preambular paragraph
38 of said Regulation confirms—in the view of its drafters—that it ‘respects
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to an effective remedy
and to a fair trial guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter’. After having thus
confirmed that the Regulation stands in line with the right to an effective remedy,
the Regulation, as amended in 2015, now expressis verbis settles that it ‘shall not
extend, in particular, to (. . .) the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the
exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii)’.18
The amended version, therefore, now also expressis verbis reiterates what the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) had already decided in 2007 under the then
applicable (older) version of the Brussels Regulation in the Kalavryta case brought
by Ms Lechouritou against Germany, and involving a claim for damages related to a
massacre committed by the German army in 1943 against Greek civilians.19 The ECJ
had then decided that such claims do not amount to civil and commercial claims
within the meaning of the Brussels system providing for the intra-Union enforce-
ment of judgments.
However, what is brought out by the interplay between the preamble of the
amended Regulation and the exclusion from its scope of acta jure imperii—such
15Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 27 September 1968, Official Journal of the European Communities L 299, 31 December
1972; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 16 September 1988, Official Journal of the European Communities, vol 31, L
319, 25 November 1988.
16Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2001] OJ L12.
17Cf, for details, preambular para 2, Arts 36(1), 39, and 40 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (n 2).
18Art 1 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (n 2).
19ECJ, Lechouritou and Others, Judgment of 15 February 2007, Case No C-292/05, I-1540.
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as acts of armed forces, in particular when they take place within the framework of
armed conflicts20—is that the Brussels Regulation, as amended, wanted to ‘safe-
guard’ traditional rules of state immunity. What is more, the drafters of the amended
Regulation were obviously aware of the then recent judgment of the ICJ in the
Jurisdictional Immunities (Germany v Italy) case. They were also aware of the
previously unsuccessful attempts to use the Brussels Regulation to enforce Greek
court decisions in Italy,21 which had set aside Germany’s state immunity in cases
involving war crimes but which could not be enforced in Greece itself for lack of
consent by the Greek Minister of Justice.22 Accordingly, the amendment of the
Brussels Regulation in 2015, when read in conjunction with the above-mentioned
preamble to the Regulation, must be seen as evidence of the conviction of EU
member states that the traditional rules of state immunity, including when it comes
to ius cogens violations, are indeed compatible with the international and European
rule of law.
III. Regional European Customary Law on State Immunity?
International law since the judgment of the ICJ in the Asylum (Colombia v Peru) case
recognizes—be it only as a matter of principle—the concept, the notion, and the
possibility of regional customary law.23 Yet, as the Court stated, the existence of any
such rule presupposes that ‘[t]he Party which relies on a custom of this kind must
prove (. . .) that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform
usage practised by the States in question’, and that this statement, the Court
confirmed, ‘follow[ed] from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to
international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”’.24
Accordingly, in the case at hand, in order to argue in favour of a rule of regional
customary law limiting state immunity when it comes to ius cogens violations, one
would have to show coherent and consistent state practice by European states and
thus confirming the existence of such a rule (or the emergence thereof). Yet, even if
one were to limit oneself to the practice of EU member states, which in itself would
be problematic since EU member states presumably do not even constitute a ‘region’
for purposes of general international law, there are only singular cases where no state
immunity has been granted even where the underlying issues related to serious
20During the ICJ proceedings leading to the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, neither of the two
parties argued that such acts did not amount to acta iure imperii; see ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities
(n 1), 99, para 60 et seq.
21Cf ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, para 33 et seq.
22Enforcement against a foreign state requires the consent of the Minister of Justice under Art
923 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, which was not granted.
23ICJ, Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950,
266, 276 et seq.
24Ibid.
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violations of either international humanitarian law or human rights law. Even in the
case of Italy, the Italian government and Italian courts continue to take the position
that Germany enjoys immunity when it comes to the execution of the underlying
judgments,25 while the judgment of the ItCC26 did not base its decision on interna-
tional law but rather exclusively on domestic Italian law.27
Moreover, the 2012 ICJ Judgment in turn had made frequent reference specifi-
cally to decisions of European courts, including judgments by Polish,28 Slovenian,29
Belgian30 and Serbian courts,31 and on that basis had upheld Germany’s state
immunity even in the face of serious violations of the laws and customs of war.32
Hence, at most there is practice by only two European states denying state immunity
in cases of ius cogens violations, namely Italy and possibly Greece (notwithstanding
the Greek government not granting the necessary permission to enforce a judgment
of Greek courts against Germany, which then led to an attempt to have the said
judgment enforced in Italy). Even in those instances, this practice is limited to the
practice of national courts, rather than that of either the executive or the legislative
branch, which in and of itself raises fundamental questions as to the notion and
concept of state practice within the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.33
Furthermore, four European states—Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Italy—also
made it clear when ratifying the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity that in their
respective understanding the foreign tort exception to state immunity under the
Convention does not apply when it comes to activities of armed forces during an
25ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, para 112; Cf also Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘ANever-Ending
Story: The International Court of Justice–The Italian Constitutional Court–Italian Tribunals and the
Question of Immunity’,Heidelberg Journal of International Law 76 (2016), 193–202, at 195 et seq.
26Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
27Ibid, Conclusions in Point of Law, para 3. For details on the approach taken by the Constitutional
Court cf, eg, Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and “Constructive Contestation”: A
Miscarried Attempt?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 621–627, at 623 et seq.
28Supreme Court of Poland, Natoniewski v Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 29 October
2010, Polish Yearbook of International Law, vol XXX, 2010, 299.
29Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Decision of 8 March 2001, Case No Up-13/99, Constitutional
Court, para 13.
30Court of First Instance of Ghent, Botelberghe v German State, Judgment of 18 February 2000.
31Court of First Instance of Leskovac, Judgment of 1 November 2001.
32ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, cites: ECtHR, McElhinney v Ireland, Grand Chamber
Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No 31253/96; ECtHR, Grosz v France, Decision of
16 June 2009, Application No 14717/06; and Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany,
Decision of 12 December 2002, Application No 59021/00. Cf also the ICJ’s conclusion in para 78.
33The implications of inconsistent state practice in the identification of customary international law
are also addressed in Draft Conclusion 7 and the accompanying commentary adopted by the ILC in
its sixty-eighth session in the framework of its on-going project on the ‘Identification of customary
international law’, cf Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-Eighth Session (2 May-10
June and 4 July-12 August 2016), General Assembly Official Records, Seventy-First Session
Supplement No 10 (A/71/10), 92 et seq. See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to
(Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
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armed conflict, and indeed even beyond as far as ‘activities undertaken by military
forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties’ are concerned.34 Besides, one
might also recall the well-known Article 31 of the European Convention on the
matter35 which expressis verbis contains the very same idea.36 Finally, the regional
European human rights institution, namely the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), has also time and again upheld a broad concept of state immunity. As a
matter of fact, it did so even in the face of ius cogens violations like torture.37
Put otherwise, one might be tempted to say that if there is one region in the world
where the traditional concept of state immunity has been upheld the most, it is
Europe. If one were to take a different position, be it only arguendo, namely that
there indeed was a European tendency to restrict state immunity when it comes to
violations of international humanitarian law or human rights law, the necessary
requirements for the creation of a new and more limited rule of customary interna-
tional law on the matter within both a short period of time and the parameters of the
ICJ’s North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Netherlands) case are clearly not
fulfilled.38 Indeed, this is true not only for lack of a virtually uniform practice but
also for lack of participation in such practice by those states most concerned by the
matter, which in the case at hand would have to include Germany as being partic-
ularly concerned by issues of state immunity relating to war crimes and other similar
violations of international law committed during World War II (WWII).
Given this situation, it seems barely imaginable that in the foreseeable future a
specific European customary law norm on state immunity could develop. Rather, it
seems that the EU and its member states, as well as other member states of the
Council of Europe, like Norway, Turkey, or the Russian Federation, continue to rely
on a broad concept of state immunity. This is also brought out, inter alia, by the
recent démarches of the EU against the so-called US Justice Against Sponsors of
34Cf UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, 2004 (n 3), Declarations and Reservations
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20III/III-13.
en.pdf.
35Art 31 of the European Convention on State Immunity, 16 May 1972, ETS No 074, reads:
‘Nothing in this Convention shall affect any immunities or privileges enjoyed by a Contracting State
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by, or in relation to, its armed forces when on the
territory of another Contracting State.’
36It should also be mentioned that, as noted by the ICJ in its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment,
courts in Belgium (Court of First Instance of Ghent, Botelberghe v German State, Judgment of
18 February 2000), Ireland (Supreme Court, McElhinney v Williams, Judgment of 15 December
1995, 3 Irish Reports 382), Slovenia (Constitutional Court, Case No Up-13/99, para 13), Greece
(Margellos v Federal Republic of Germany, Case No 6/2002, ILR, vol 129, 529) and Poland
(Supreme Court of Poland, Natoniewski v Federal Republic of Germany, Polish Yearbook of
International Law, vol XXX, 2010, 299) all held that that the immunity of a state for torts committed
by its armed forces is unaffected by Art 11 of the Convention by virtue of its Art 31; cf ICJ,
Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, at para 68.
37ECtHR, Jones and Others v The United Kingdom, Judgment of 14 January 2014, Applications
Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06, para 93.
38ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of
20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, at para 74.
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Terrorism Act (JASTA),39 which, by way of amending the US Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, significantly narrows the scope of foreign sovereign immunity
under domestic US law—and it does so in violation of international law.40
As a matter of fact, out of the 14 European states having so far ratified UN
Convention on State Immunity,41 only Switzerland has formally taken the position
that the said treaty is without prejudice to developments in international law regard-
ing pecuniary compensation for human rights violations;42 while Italy, when ratify-
ing the Convention, merely referred to the necessity to interpret the treaty in line with
human rights law.43 This acceptance by the vast majority of ratifying European
states of the 2004 UN Convention, which does not contain an ius cogens or some
other form of human rights exception, once again confirms the general European
perspective on the matter, as outlined above. It is even more telling that six of those
ratifying European states have done so after the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment
between Germany and Italy had been rendered44—and they did so without entering
any reservation or formal declaration as to the ‘conservative’ interpretation of the
current status of the rules of state immunity by the ICJ.
IV. Possible Legal Implications of the Jurisprudence
of the Italian Constitutional Court for European Military
Operations
The jurisprudence of the ItCC might have particular implications for European
military operations, namely for military operations under the auspices of the EU,
given that EU states might face a denial of their state immunity when their troops
39US, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 28 September 2016, Public Law No 114-222,
available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114s2040enr/html/BILLS-114s2040enr.htm.
40EU, Delegation to the United States of America, note to the US Department of State of
9 September 2016, available at www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp-content/uploads/
sites/47/2016/09/EU-on-JASTA.pdf. See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in
this volume.
41Those are: Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Cf UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities, 2004 (n 3).
42Ibid, upon ratification on 16 April 2010, Switzerland declared: ‘Switzerland considers that article
12 does not govern the question of pecuniary compensation for serious human rights violations
which are alleged to be attributable to a state and are committed outside the state of the forum.
Consequently, this Convention is without prejudice to developments in international law in this
regard.’
43Ibid, upon ratification on 6 May 2013, Italy declared: ‘[T]he Italian Republic wishes to underline
that Italy understands that the Convention will be interpreted and applied in accordance with the
principles of international law and, in particular, with the principles concerning the protection of
human rights from serious violations.’
44Ibid, those are Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein and Slovakia.
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allegedly commit violations of international humanitarian law during such opera-
tions. It should first be noted, however, that it is highly unlikely that European armed
forces and their member states will commit violations of international humanitarian
law amounting to ius cogens violations akin to the war crimes that gave rise to the
jurisprudence of the Italian courts in the first place. Hence, most probably, the issue
of a possible ius cogens exception will hopefully remain a mere academic issue when
it comes to the realities of current European military operations.
Secondly, and this is a somewhat more difficult question to answer, it is doubtful
whether the result reached by the ICJ in its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment
confirming state immunity for belligerent acts45 would also apply to activities of
armed forces not amounting to participation in an armed conflict as a belligerent
party but rather, for example, to acts forming part of a peacekeeping operation. This
would then bring back the issue of the scope and status under customary law of the
foreign tort exception. Again, it ought to be noted that several European states,
including Italy, have taken the position that the counter-exception to the foreign tort
exception should be broadly defined as covering all forms of military activities and
even those beyond the scope of armed conflicts.46
In any case, any debate about the extent of state immunity when it comes to
European military operations would first and foremost, and as a preliminary matter,
have to tackle the issue of attribution.47 If European military operations, conducted
under the auspices of the EU, were to be attributed to either the EU or, in the case of
an underlying mandate by the Security Council, to the UN48 in line with the
somewhat problematic jurisprudence of the ECtHR in the Behrami and Behrami v
France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway cases,49 the question of state
responsibility would obviously not arise. Yet, as the domestic proceedings in the
Netherlands concerning the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
have confirmed, mutatis mutandis, parallel issues to the immunity of international
organizations might nevertheless come to light.50 It ought to be noted, however, that
the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, annexed to the
45ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, at para 139, findings (1) and (3).
46Those are Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden. See Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities,
2004 (n 3).
47Cf Aurel Sari/Ramses A Wessel, ‘International Responsibility for EU Military Operations:
Finding the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime’, in Bart Van Vooren/Steven
Blockmans/Jan Wouters (eds), The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension
(Oxford: OUP 2013), 126–141.
48Cf Terry D Gill, ‘Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations’, Nether-
lands Yearbook of International Law 42 (2011), 37–68, at 53 et seq.
49ECtHR, Behrami and Behrami v France, Grand Chamber Decision of 31 May 2007, Application
No 71412/01 and ECtHR, Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, Grand Chamber Decision of
2 May 2007, Application No 78166/01.
50ECtHR Behrami and Behrami v France (n 49) and ECtHR, Saramati v France, Germany and
Norway, (n 49). Cf Gill, ‘Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations’ 2011
(n 48), 39.
228 A. Zimmermann
Treaty of Nice,51 does not as such provide for a general immunity of the EU at least
when it comes to civil proceedings for damages brought before civil courts of an EU
member state.
If one were to assume, however, that acts as part of military operations led by the
EU were to be at least also attributable to the troop-contributing member states, as
was the position taken by German courts concerning military operations conducted
off the coast of Somalia within the framework of the European Union Naval Force
(EU NAVFOR),52 no specific issues of state immunity would arise. Rather, the
respective troop-contributing state would be entitled to enjoy state immunity to the
same degree as in any kind of unilateral military operation. It is again interesting to
note that Italy, when ratifying the 2004 UN Convention on State Immunity,
expressly reiterated that—in its view—the Convention does not set aside ‘special
immunity regimes, including the ones concerning the status of armed forces and
associated personnel following the armed forces’53 and it is submitted that this is
completely in line with customary law. Accordingly, given that European armed
forces would in most cases and including those like Afghanistan, where they are
involved in actual fighting, act within the framework of a status of forces agreement
concluded with the relevant territorial state specifically providing for the immunity
of the respective European state, the issue would be moot since any such European
state involved in a military operation would then continue to be entitled to fully-
fledged immunity as a matter of treaty law.
Besides, to the extent that a domestic court of the territorial state with which a
status of forces agreement providing for immunity has been concluded would have
to decide the matter, setting aside such treaty-based immunity would not only require
arguing that there is no state immunity in such cases but would have to argue that the
alleged customary rule setting aside state immunity in case of alleged war crimes was
in and of itself also of an ius cogens character. Such an argument, while being in line
with the general thrust of the judgment of the ItCC,54 would, however, necessarily
assume another bold step not supported by actual state practice.
In any case, it is worth noting that at least when it comes to European military
operations in the strict sense, namely those undertaken under the auspices of the EU
rather than operations within the framework of NATO but involving European
states, the respective status of forces agreements concluded by the EU provide as a
matter of routine for an individual right to seize a claims commission, followed by
some form of arbitration. For example, the Agreement between the European Union
51Protocol (No 7) on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, annexed to the Treaty
on European Union (‘Treaty of Nice’), 13 December 2007, Official Journal of the European Union,
vol 55, C 326/266.
52Cf, inter alia, Higher Administrative Court of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Judgment of 18 September
2014, 4 A 2948/11, DVBl 2015, 375–379, findings (Leitsätze) (1), (2) and (3).
53Declaration by the Italian Republic concerning the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities,
2004 (n 3), made upon ratification in date of 6 May 2013, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20III/III-13.en.pdf.
54ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 26).
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and the Republic of Uganda on the Status of the European Union-led Mission in
Uganda,55 regulating the legal status of the European Union Training Mission
Somalia (EUTM) in Uganda, while confirming in its Article 5(3) that EUTM
Somalia ‘shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process’ at the same time
provides in its Article 15 for the setting up of a claims commission, where claims by
individuals can be brought, as well as for the creation of an arbitral tribunal, should
the claims process fail to adequately address alleged individual damages. In such a
scenario the last resort argument, as submitted by Italy in the ICJ proceedings
brought by Germany,56 and somewhat also reflected in the judgment of the ItCC
here under consideration,57 would no longer be of relevance, given the alternative to
setting aside state immunity. In most situations with a deployment of troops under
the auspices of the EU, the issue underlying Sentenza 238/2014 is thus somewhat
academic in nature.
V. Further Perspectives Beyond Sentenza 238/2014
Obviously, the unfortunate approach chosen by the ItCC of disregarding the
international legal obligations of Italy to implement a binding judgment of an
international court or tribunal is not unique. It suffices to refer to the examples of
the 2008 judgment of the US Supreme Court inMedellín v Texas58 (setting aside the
effects of the ICJ judgment in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Mexico v United
States of America),59 or the more recent decision of the Russian Constitutional
Court in the Yukos case.60 Just like the German Federal Constitutional Court,
which had unfortunately in the past—albeit as a matter of principled approach
only—mutatis mutandis chosen the collision course with the ECJ61 and later the
55Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Uganda on the Status of the
European Union-led Mission in Uganda, entered into force 12 August 2010, OJ L221/2, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?
step¼0&redirect¼true&treatyId¼9781.
56ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, at paras 98-104.
57ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 26), Conclusions in Point of Law, para 3.4.
58US Supreme Court, Medellín v Texas, Judgment of 25 March 2008, No 06–984, available at
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/552/491/.
59ICJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), Judgment of
31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 12.
60Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment of 19 January 2017, No 1-П/2017. See also, on the
decision, Matthias Hartwig, ‘Vom Dialog zum Disput? Verfassungsrecht vs. Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention–Der Fall der Russländischen Föderation’, Europäische Grundrechte-
Zeitschrift 44 (2017), 1-23.
61Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange
II), English version: (1984) Case 345/82, [1987] 3 CMLR 225; Bundesverfassungsgericht, Judg-
ment of 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 (Maastricht Judgment).
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ECtHR,62 the course chosen by the ItCC has similarly not (yet) led to a concrete
collision with the principal judicial organ of the UN. Such a collision would only
occur if concrete steps were now taken to execute judgments for damages against
German state property located in Italy and if Germany were to then start renewed
proceedings before the ICJ, which could possibly lead to another ICJ judgment most
probably reconfirming the 2012 ICJ Judgment. Hopefully such a collision can be
avoided.
This leads to the question of whether the redress awarded by domestic (Italian)
courts ‘as long as’ neither the German nor the international system grant equivalent
protection to the victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed during WWII is necessary or at least tolerable. For instance, this raises
the issue of whether indeed such individual claims do exist in the first place as a
matter of the current international lex lata, which one might say is doubtful. Even if
this were the case, such individual claims might have already been satisfied under
previous interstate agreements or in the meantime might have been subject to some
other form of prescription one way or the other.
While these questions would go beyond the scope of this chapter, one has to ask
more broadly whether it truly makes sense at the current stage of international law
and currently prevailing political developments to take bold steps like recognizing an
individual right to compensation for such violations (and even where such violations
have been committed more than 70 years ago) combined with denying immunity to
the state concerned. The Pandora’s box argument, while having been repeated time
and again,63 is obvious: does it really make sense, for example, to have Georgian
courts decide cases against the Russian Federation for alleged violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law during the 2008 armed conflict—and then obviously also
vice-versa—with almost ‘automatic’, yet completely contrary, results on the merits?
Would this constitute an improvement of the international legal order, and would
such a development truly foster the international rule of law?
Rather, the way forward—be it only for future cases—should be to enlarge and
strengthen the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, either those that
provide access to individuals or that have some form of compulsory jurisdiction. The
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes certainly forms part of
such an attempt, which could not be invoked by Italy as a jurisdictional basis for its
counter-claim for reasons ratione temporis.64 That is to say: if a similar scenario of
violations of international humanitarian law was to arise again today between two or
more of the contracting parties of the said Convention, and it is hoped that this will
62Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, BVerfGE 111, 307
(Görgülü); English translation by the Court, available at www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/
rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html.
63Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Das Völkerrecht stärken!’, Die Tageszeitung (13 September 2011),
available at http://www.taz.de/!5112119/.
64ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), 99, para 44.
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not happen, the underlying interstate case for damages could be brought, and rightly
so, before the ICJ. It is submitted that this might be the right way forward.
In the same vein, providing for claims commissions might also be a useful and an
appropriate mechanism provided the parties involved are indeed able and willing to
follow up on such a process.65
This leads to a final question: what lessons ought to be learned when it comes to a
possible dialogue between domestic and constitutional courts on the one hand, and
international courts on the other? In the author’s understanding, international courts
not only constitute a capstone but also a cornerstone of the construction of interna-
tional law. Once such a cornerstone is removed or damaged—and unfortunately, we
currently see many instances, benevolent or not, to that effect throughout the
world—the danger arises that the whole edifice if not collapses then at least begins
to crack. Hence, every attempt should be made not to question their authority even
more so since such international judicial institutions by their very nature have the
clear advantage of being by far furthest away from domestic political pressures and
sentiments.
In summary, one might say that European states, as well as European (constitu-
tional) courts, should not straightforwardly follow Frank Sinatra’s tempting exam-
ple, who in his 1969 song ‘MyWay’ told us that he had not acted ‘in a shy way’, that
he ‘had to say the things he truly felt’ and not ‘the words of one who kneels’, and that
‘the record therefore showed that he had to take the blows’ in order to ‘do it my
way’.66 Domestic courts, and even more so the highest courts of democratic and
rule-based countries, do not only have a responsibility to their own constitutional
order but also more broadly to the international legal order. Hence, such courts, but
also Europe more generally, should try to avoid deciding matters of state immunity
‘their own way’ because it is not only them that would have to take the blow, but
such blows could threaten to undermine international law and the international rule
of law at large.
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Part V
Courts
A Dangerous Last Line of Defence: Or, A
Roman Court Goes Lutheran
Christian J. Tams
Abstract The chapter addresses questions of international law implicated by
Sentenza 238/2014. It begins by revisiting the longstanding debate about state
immunity and its limits, arguing that notwithstanding decades of discussion, a
‘grave breaches’ exception has never had more than marginal support in positive
international law. Against that background, it comes as no surprise that the Italian
Constitutional Court (ItCC), in Judgment 238/2014, did not assert the existence of a
grave breaches exception as a matter of international law. Instead, the ItCC relied on
what might be termed a ‘foreign relations law’ approach, holding that Italian
constitutional law required it not to give domestic effect to the international law of
state immunity. This ‘foreign relations law’ approach offers a last line of defence for
those seeking to limit the reach of rules of state immunity. As is set out in this
chapter, it is an effective line of defence because international law does not ‘by itself,
possess the force to amend or repeal internationally unlawful domestic (. . .) acts’
(Antonio Cassese). At the same time it is a dangerous line, as it risks weakening
international law generally and not just in the area of immunity. This chapter
suggests that, when read as a foreign relations law decision, Sentenza 238/2014 is
not as such unusual: it is one of many decisions accepting some form of ‘constitu-
tional override’ that limits the effects of international law within domestic legal
orders. However, Sentenza 238/2014 stands out because—unlike other decisions—it
seems to refuse international law any place in the construction of constitutional law:
in the ItCC’s ‘separatist treatment’ (Kolb) international law is denied a directive
function (‘Orientierungswirkung’); it is not factored into the equation. Seen in that
light, Sentenza 238/2014 (counter-intuitively, for a ‘Roman’ decision) has a
‘Lutheran’ quality; it is informed by a stubborn ‘here I stand, I can do no other’
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aspect, which limits the potential for a constructive dialogue between domestic and
international judiciaries.
I. Introduction
This chapter situates Judgment 238/20141 in the wider debate on immunity and
human rights. It does so by analysing the argumentative strategy adopted by the
Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) and assessing how it could influence the devel-
opment of international law. My key argument is that the judgment’s influence is
likely to be limited, and that this is largely for the better. More specifically, Judgment
238/2014 contributes fairly little to the long-standing debates about the scope of
immunities enjoyed, under international law, by states responsible for grave
breaches of international law.
To set the stage, I begin by revisiting those long-standing debates and argue that
notwithstanding decades of discussion and fervent support among some commen-
tators, a ‘grave breaches’ exception has only ever been endorsed by a small number
of states and international organizations (section II). Against that background, it
comes as no surprise that the ItCC, in Judgment 238/2014, did not assert the
existence of a grave breaches exception as a matter of international law. Instead,
the ItCC relied on what might be termed a ‘foreign relations law’ approach,2 holding
that Italian constitutional law required it not to give domestic effect to the interna-
tional law of state immunity (section III). This foreign relations law approach offers a
last line of defence for those seeking to limit the reach of rules of state immunity. As
is set out in section IV, this approach is an effective line of defence, as international
law does not ‘by itself, possess the force to amend or repeal internationally unlawful
domestic (. . .) acts’.3 At the same time, it is a dangerous line, as it risks weakening
international law generally and not just in the area of immunity. The chapter suggests
that, when read as a foreign relations law decision, Judgment 238/2014 is not as such
unusual: it is one of many decisions accepting some form of ‘constitutional override’
that limits the effects of international law within domestic legal orders. However, it
stands out because—unlike decisions of other domestic courts preserving the pos-
sibility of a constitutional override—it seems to refuse international law any place in
the construction of constitutional law: in the ItCC’s ‘separatist treatment’,4
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2Put simply the term ‘foreign relations law’ is used to denote ‘the domestic law of each nation that
governs how this nation interacts with the rest of the world’ without, however, itself making a
determination of the state’s international rights and obligations, Curtis A Bradley, ‘What is Foreign
Relations Law?’ in Curtis A Bradley (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations
Law (Oxford: OUP 2018).
3Antonio Cassese, ‘Towards a Moderate Monism’, in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The
Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP 2012), 187–199, 199.
4Robert Kolb, The Law of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016), 180.
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international law is denied any ‘directive function’ (‘Orientierungswirkung’); it is
not factored into the equation.5 Seen in that light, Judgment 238/2014 (perhaps
counter-intuitively, for a ‘Roman’ decision) has a ‘Lutheran’ quality; it is informed
by a stubborn ‘here I stand, I can do no other’ mindset, which limits the potential for
constructive dialogue between domestic and international judiciaries (section V).6
Section VI briefly comments on the implications of this ‘Roman-Lutheran’ approach
to international law.
II. Immunity and Grave Breaches of International Law: The
State of Play in Late 2014
Much of the initial reaction to Judgment 238/2014 viewed it as yet another contri-
bution to the debate about immunity and grave breaches of international law
affecting the rights of individuals.7 That, no doubt, is the substantive focus of the
5According to Kolb, Judgment 238/2014 adopts a stance of ‘robust dualism’ (ibid); see also Filippo
Fontanelli, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’s Challenge to the Implementation of the ICJ’s
Germany v Italy Judgment’, iLawyer, (30 October 2014), available at http://ilawyerblog.com/
italian-constitutional-courts-challenge-implementation-icjs-germany-v-italy-judgment/, asserting
that the judgment ‘produced the most spectacular display of dualism this side of Medellin’.
6On this ‘multi-level’ judicial dialogue and its benefits for both the international and the domestic
legal orders, see Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue in Multi-level Governance: The
Impact of the Solange Argument’, in Ole K Fauchald/André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of
International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Oxford: Hart
2012), 185–215; ILA, ‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law’, Final
Report of the Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International
Law, (Johannesburg, 2016), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups?study-
groupsID¼57; see also the collection of essays in Christian J Tams/Antonios Tzanakopoulos,
‘International Law and Practice: Symposium on Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of
International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (2013), 531–540; Alessandro Bufalini,
‘Judgment 238/2014 and the Importance of a Constructive Dialogue’, VerfBlog, (12 May 2017),
available at http://verfassungsblog.de/judgment-2382014-and-the-importance-of-a-constructive-
dialogue/.
7See, eg, Theodor Schilling, ‘The Dust Has Not Yet Settled: The Italian Constitutional Court
Disagrees with the International Court of Justice, Sort of’, EJIL:Talk!, (12 November 2014),
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-dust-has-not-yet-settled-the-italian-constitutional-court-
disagrees-with-the-international-court-of-justice-sort-of/; Andrea Pin, ‘Tearing Down Sovereign
Immunity’s Fence: The Italian Constitutional Court, the International Court of Justice, and the
German War Crimes’, OpinioJuris, (19 November 2014), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2014/
11/19/guest-post-tearing-sovereign-immunitys-fence-italian-constitutional-court-international-
court-justice-german-war-crimes/; Felix Würkert, ‘No Custom Restricting State Immunity for
Grave Breaches: Well Why Not?’, VerfBlog, (11 December 2014), available at http://
verfassungsblog.de/no-custom-restricting-state-immunity-grave-breaches-%E2%80%92-well-
not-2/; Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph: How to Make the Best Out of Sentenza No 238 of
the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal Order’, EJIL:Talk!, (22 December 2014),
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-
sentenza-no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-global-legal-order-part-i/; Remo Caponi,
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decision: the ItCC declared unconstitutional domestic rules intending to give effect
to international law principles of immunity, insofar as they covered certain grave
breaches of international law, and to the decisions of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), insofar as they concerned the application of the Jurisdictional Immu-
nities Judgment of 3 February 2012. In taking a stand on these matters, the ItCC
joined a major, decades-long debate that had, in fact, been one of international law’s
grands débats of the 1990s and 2000s: whether sovereign immunity should shield a
state, and its representatives, from civil claims in foreign courts with respect to
conducts that (if established) would amount to grave breaches of international law,
notably violations of fundamental human rights.8
Many contributions to this controversy, until recently, followed a fairly predict-
able script. Those arguing that sovereign immunity could not—or no longer—be
invoked, argued for a reform of international law that should recognize an immunity
exception for grave breaches.9 Those defending immunity, even for grave breaches,
‘A Fresh Start: How To Resolve the Conflict between the ICJ and the Italian Constitutional Court’,
VerfBlog, (28 January 2015), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/fresh-start-resolve-conflict-icj-
italian-constitutional-court/.
8See, eg, Adam C Belsky/Mark Merva/Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Implied Waiver under the FSIA: A
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law’,
California Law Review 77 (1989), 365–415; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Denying State Immunity to Violators
of Human Rights’, Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 45 (1994), 195–229; Mathias
Reimann, ‘AHuman Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v Federal
Republic of Germany’, Michigan Journal of International Law 16 (1995), 403–432; Andreas
Zimmermann, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Violations of Jus Cogens: Some Critical Remarks’,
Michigan Journal of International Law 16 (1995), 433–440; Richard Garnett, ‘The Defence of
State Immunity for Acts of Torture’, Australian Year Book of International Law 18 (1997), 97–126;
Susan Marks, ‘Torture and the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’, Cambridge Law
Journal 56 (1997), 8–11; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’,
European Journal of International Law 10 (1999), 237–277; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘State
Immunity and International Public Order’, German Year Book of International Law 45 (2002),
227–268; Lee M Caplan, ‘State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the
Normative Hierarchy Theory’, American Journal of International Law 97 (2003), 741–781;
Thomas Giegerich, ‘Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State
Immunity for the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?’, in Christian Tomuschat/Jean-Marc Thouvenin
(eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order (Leiden: Brill 2006), 203–238;
Lorna McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Jus Cogens’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly
55 (2006), 437–446; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the
House of Lords Got it Wrong’, European of Journal International Law 18 (2008), 955–970;
Sevrine Knuchel, ‘State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens’, Northwestern Journal of
International Human Rights 9 (2011), 149–183.
9See, eg, Reimann, ‘AHuman Rights Exception’ 1995 (n 8); Knuchel, ‘State Immunity’ 2011 (n 8);
Lorna McGregor, ‘Torture and State Immunity: Distorting Sovereignty’, European Journal of
International Law 18 (2008), 903–919; Andrew Clapham, ‘The Jus Cogens Prohibition of Torture
and the Importance of Sovereign State Immunity’, in Marcelo Cohen (ed), Promoting Justice,
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Through International Law: Liber Amicorum Lucius
Caflisch (Leiden: Brill 2007), 151–169.
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claimed that no such exception was recognized in international law—that the case
for it had not been made out.10 Just as the script was predictable, so too were the roles
assigned to the discussants: the call for reform was one of progress and optimism that
emphasized the centrality of human rights;11 to this the sceptics typically responded
by insisting on the careful application of the sources of law and by warning against
overzealousness. Less predictable were the manifold arguments advanced in support
of an immunity exception; these were diverse and at times both ingenious and
creative. They were also frequently used in combination with one another in order
to present as far as possible a strong case against the granting of state immunity.
For the sake of simplicity, they can be grouped into five broad and overlapping
categories:
1. Normative hierarchy/ius cogens: sovereign immunity would have to yield to
superior rules of international law recognized as peremptory from which no
derogation is permitted (such as rules prohibiting torture or war crimes);12
2. A duty to exercise jurisdiction deriving from other fields of international law,
such as international conventions to which the state is party: immunity would be
superseded by state obligations to exercise jurisdiction, or to give effect to the
human right to an effective remedy;13
3. Refusal to extend immunity to egregious acts: state conduct amounting to grave
breaches could not be qualified as an ‘official’ or ‘sovereign act’ benefiting from
immunity, or in any case such behaviour would constitute an ‘implied waiver’ on
behalf of the state; alternatively, reliance on immunity would be considered
abusive and ineffective;14
10For example, Zimmermann, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Violations’ 1995 (n 8); cf Giegerich,
‘Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens’ 2006 (n 8).
11Judge Cançado Trindade’s dissenting opinion in the Jurisdictional Immunities case before the ICJ
is a powerful example in point: ‘Individuals are indeed subjects of international law (not merely
“actors”) and whenever legal doctrine departed from this, the consequences and results were
catastrophic. Individuals are titulaires of rights and bearers of duties which emanate directly from
international law (the ius gentium). Converging development, in recent decades, of the international
law of human rights, of international humanitarian law, and of the international law of refugees,
followed by those of international criminal law, give unequivocal testimony to this (. . .). The
doctrine of sovereign immunities (. . .) unduly underestimated and irresponsibly neglected the
position of the human person in international law’ (paras 180–181).
12For academic claims to this effect, see Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and International Public
Order’ 2002 (n 8); Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and the Hierarchy of Norms’ 2008 (n 8);
Bianchi, ‘Immunity versus Human Rights’ 1999 (n 8).
13Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and the Hierarchy of Norms’ 2008 (n 8); McGregor, ‘State
Immunity and Jus Cogens’ 2006 (n 8), 439.
14Caplan, ‘State Immunity’ 2003 (n 8); Belsky/Merva/Roht-Arriaza, ‘Implied Waiver’ 1989 (n 8);
Bianchi, ‘Immunity versus Human Rights’ 1999 (n 8).
A Dangerous Last Line of Defence: Or, A Roman Court Goes Lutheran 241
4. A justified response: the denial of immunity could be considered lawful as a
reprisal or countermeasure to the previously unlawful conduct of the defendant
state;15
5. Acceptance of an exception in international practice: cutting across these sub-
stantive considerations, the simplest argument has always been that international
practice had come to accept an immunity exception, either for all grave breaches
or at least for those qualifying as territorial torts.16
By October 2014, when the ItCC rendered its decision, all of these arguments
were well known and had been tried out, mostly unsuccessfully, dozens of times.17
They did not, of course, go away. But it is probably fair to say that they showed
significant signs of wear and tear.18 No doubt, ‘the cause endured, the hope still
lived, the dream would never die’;19 but in seeking to translate their claims into
winning legal arguments, supporters had made limited headway. So rare had been
their successes, and so frequent and resounding their defeats, that the project of a
grave breaches exception seemed to have either lost steam or stalled altogether. To
illustrate:
1. The concept of an immunity exception for grave breaches of international law had
not been, by 2014, recognized in an international treaty. In the course of the
international community’s most significant law-making project on jurisdictional
15Giegerich, ‘Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens’ 2006 (n 8); Antonios Tzanakopoulos,
Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures Against Wrongful Sanctions (Oxford: OUP
2011), 194; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law: The International
Judicial Function of National Courts’, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law
Review 34 (2012), 133–168, at 149 and note 53 therein.
16McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Jus Cogens’ 2006 (n 8), 438.
17For example, in Princz v Germany, 26 F 3d 1166 (DC Cir, 1 July 1994); ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The
United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No 35763/97; ICJ, Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports 2002, 3; Court of
Appeal of Ontario, Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran, (2004) 71 OR (3d) 675; Al-Adsani v The
Government of Kuwait and Others (No 2), CA 29 March 1996, (1996) 107 ILR 536; Corte di
Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/04 (Ferrini); Maria Gavouneli/Ilias Bantekas,
‘Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Case no 11/2000’, American Journal of
International Law 95 (2001), 198–204; Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS
Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) [2006] UKHL 26; ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
18To my surprise, this is often not recognized, at least not expressly. In response to this, the
following section sets out my view in rather blunt terms. It draws on points made forcefully by
Roger O’Keefe in ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds’,
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44 (2011), 999–1045; see also Andrea Bianchi, ‘On
Certainty’, EJIL:Talk!, (16 February 2012), available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/on-certainty/.
19To adapt the terms of a brave, defiant concession speech: see Ted Kennedy, Concession Speech at
the Democratic National Convention in New York City, 12 August 1980, available at www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tedkennedy1980dnc.htm.
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immunities, the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property (UN Convention),20 the drafters considered the introduction of a limited
immunity exception for grave breaches affecting peremptory norms,21 but
decided the time was not ‘ripe’ enough to do so.22
2. Regional human rights courts, like the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), faced with claims by victims alleging grave breaches amounting to,
inter alia, torture and war crimes, as well as an impairment of their right of access
to justice, repeatedly accepted the right of contracting states to uphold immunity.
This was neither affected by the peremptory character of the norms allegedly
breached nor by the victims’ right of access to justice and an effective remedy. In
particular, the ECtHR construed Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in light of (and limited by) the principles of
sovereign immunity, therefore not requiring the recognition of a grave breaches
exception. In a series of cases, the ECtHR accepted that Article 6 was not
disproportionally restricted by the grant of sovereign immunity and largely
deferred to the judgment of the contracting states.23
3. Relatively little pressure towards admitting a ‘grave breaches’ exception came
from domestic legislation; state immunity statutes on balance do not offer much
support for a ‘grave breaches exception’.24 Reforms at the domestic level mainly
aimed to align national law with the UN Convention and in some instances to
20UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property (2 December 2004), UN
Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
21ILC, Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
Report on the Work of the Fifty-first Session (1999), UN Doc A/54/10, paras 471–484.
22The proposal was not taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property in its reports. See, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immu-
nities of States and Their Property (GAOR 57th session, Suppl No 22, A/57/22, 4–15 February
2002); Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
(GAOR 58th session, Suppl No 22, A/58/22, 24–28 February 2003); Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (GAOR 59th session, Suppl
No 22, A/59/22, 1–5 March 2004). See also, Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, Report of the Chairman of the Working Group, UN Doc A/C.6/54/L.12
(12 November 1999), para 47; cf McGregor, ‘State Immunity and Jus Cogens’ 2006 (n 8); see
also Andreas Zimmermann, chapter ‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to Adopt a
European Approach to State Immunity?’, in this volume.
23ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom (n 17), paras 53–67; ECtHR, Fogarty v The United
Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Application No 37112/97, paras
33–39; ECtHR, McElhinney v Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001, Applica-
tion No 31253/96, paras 34–38; ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany,
Judgment of 12 December 2002, Application No 59021/00.
24See, eg, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC §§1330, 1602–1611; UK, State Immunity
Act 1978, 17 ILM (1978) 1123; Canada, State Immunity Act 1982, 21 ILM (1982) 798; Australia,
Foreign States Immunity Act 1985, 25 ILM (1986) 715.
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facilitate judicial proceedings against states accused of supporting terrorism.25
Yet, to my knowledge, there was not in the years prior to 2014 any concerted
attempt by states to enshrine a grave breaches exception via domestic law. This is
worth noting because it sets apart the controversies about immunity from, for
example, debates about universal jurisdiction, where claims towards effective
remedies have resulted in law reforms at the national level—the gradual assertion,
by states, of extraterritorial jurisdiction over international crimes being the most
prominent example.26
4. Domestic courts asked to adjudicate on claims brought in response to grave
breaches by a foreign state upheld in their overwhelming majority that foreign
state’s immunity: in so doing they rejected arguments based on ius cogens, on the
right to an effective remedy, on abuse of rights, or on the nature (official or
otherwise) of the impugned conduct. As for ius cogens in particular, the over-
whelming majority of courts across jurisdictions accepted the superiority argu-
ment in principle but did not think it relevant. In line with the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence, courts in Canada,27 Australia,28 England,29 New Zealand,30
France,31 and the US,32 among others, did not consider there to be a clash, in
the main because in their view, despite the presumably peremptory nature of the
rules violated, the remedial rights of victims did not qualify as peremptory
themselves. Domestic courts in Greece and, notably, Italy took a different
25That was the case with the ‘Flatow’ amendment to the US FSIA, which was introduced to allow
suits against state sponsors of terrorism in US courts. See FSIA, 28 USC §1605A.
26In a survey published in 2012, Amnesty International concluded that ‘147 (approximately 76.2 %)
out of 193 states [whose legislation was assessed] have provided for universal jurisdiction over one
or more of [the] crimes’ recognized under international law (which Amnesty took to mean war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture); see Amnesty International, Universal jurisdic-
tion: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World: 2012 Update, available at https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior53/019/2012/en/.
27Court of Appeal of Ontario, Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran, (2004) 71 OR (3d) 675; Supreme
Court of Canada, Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 SCR 176.
28New South Wales Court of Appeal, Zhang v Zemin [2010] NSWCA 255.
29UK Court of Appeal, Al-Adsani v The Government of Kuwait and Others (No 2), CA 29 March
1996, (1996) 107 ILR 536; UK House of Lords, Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka
Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) [2006] UKHL 26.
30New Zealand, High Court, Fang and Others v Jiang Zemin and Others, (21 December 2006),
141 ILR 702.
31Court of Cassation, Réunion Aérienne v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (Civil
Chamber I, 9 March 2011), Case no 09-14743 150 ILR 630.
32Princz v Germany, Judgment of 1 July 1994 (n 17).
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(heretical or progressive—depending on one’s perspective) view,33 but they too
faced domestic opposition.34
5. Finally, in its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, the ICJ rejected arguments
advanced in support of an immunity exception for grave breaches. It did so after a
rather detailed perusal of international practice (which, in view of the Court, did
not support an immunity exception, not even for territorial torts) and following a
full analysis of the various arguments set out above.35
None of this, however, settled the debate (what debate is ever settled in interna-
tional law?). And of course, the largely negative response did not invalidate the
arguments set out in support of an immunity exception: they remain plausible, and
who knows, they might one day find greater acceptance.36 However, even from the
briefest summary just offered, it should be clear that to argue for an immunity
exception as a matter of existing international law—at the time of the ItCC’s
decision in October 2014—was the argumentative equivalent of embarking on a
very steep, and very long, uphill struggle. The argument had been made in dozens of
settings, and almost invariably rejected—by states, by international courts, and by a
large majority of domestic courts and tribunals called upon to address claims. What
is more, the argument had been rebuffed comprehensively in its different manifes-
tations, from the ius cogens variant to the ‘abuse of rights’ doctrine. Support for it
was never more than marginal. Decisions such as Ferrini or Prefecture of Voiotia
met with approval in some sectors but clearly deviated from a fairly solid mainstream
approach. Viewed from that perspective, the 2012 ICJ Judgment could plausibly be
described at the time as the ‘final nail in the coffin of attempts to circumvent state
immunity in domestic civil proceedings’.37
III. Judgment 238/2014 of 22 October 2014: Changing Tack
Several years after the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, we know that it was not
the ‘final nail’. But the grand controversy of the past two decades does yield
important lessons. It testifies to the resilience of traditional concepts of international
33Corte di Cassazione, Ferrini (n 17); Maria Gavouneli/Ilias Bantekas, ‘Prefecture of Voiotia v
Federal Republic of Germany’ 2001 (n 17), 198–204; Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of
24 July 2008, No 31171/2008 (Lozano); Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 21 October 2008,
No 1072/2008 (Milde).
34Greek Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio), Margellos and Others v Federal
Republic of Germany, Decision of 17 September 2002, Case No 6/2002.
35ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 17), 99, paras 52 et seq, especially paras 60–61, 65–79 for the
rejection of the territorial tort exception; paras 81–106 for the rejection of the grave breaches
exception and the normative conflict between ius cogens and state immunity argument.
36See, in that respect, ‘Debate: “Remedies against Immunity?”’, Verfblog, (11 May 2017), available
at http://verfassungsblog.de/category/debates/remedy-against-immunity/.
37O’Keefe, ‘State Immunity’ 2011 (n 18), 1032.
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law (such as immunity) and to the difficulty of seeking to rewrite international law
through domestic judicial activism and academic commentary. As regards the
former, in particular, domestic courts can be powerful agents of legal develop-
ments,38 and have been so in the field of immunity.39 But as regards the debate
about immunity and human rights, few domestic courts have embraced that role, and
their arguments persuaded few others.
Perhaps more than anything else, the debate about an immunity exception
illustrates the weakness of deducing concrete legal consequences from abstract
concepts such as ius cogens, abuse of rights, the right to a remedy, or even the
international rule of law. While all of these concepts have a sound foundation in
international law, deductions from them simply do not take us far; the specific legal
consequences are a matter of balancing and debate.
As regards the ius cogens argument, years of debate have demonstrated the
fragility of deductive reasoning. Yes, torture and war crimes are prohibited by
peremptory norms—and perhaps, in litigation about war crimes committed during
World War II, one could even (somehow) argue that they were prohibited with
peremptory force in the 1940s. But from this it in no way necessarily follows that the
right of victims to seek damages was peremptory in nature too, and less still that the
right to seek damages before foreign domestic courts was peremptory. To be sure,
such an argument can be made—but it actually has to be made, as this is not a mere
matter of deduction from an abstract legal principle. The experience of the last two
decades suggests that when the argument was made, it only ever convinced a
minority of listeners: perhaps because its implications were undesirable; perhaps
because, once admitted, the argument was so difficult to reign in; perhaps because
the time was not ‘ripe’. Many might have preferred a different result and would have
been happier had a more ambitious construction of ius cogens been endorsed by
more than a small minority. (‘What a pity!’, began one of the dissents appended to
the ECtHR’s Al-Adsani judgment). Whatever the reasons for its inability to convince
more than a minority, Roger O’Keefe, commenting on decades of legal argument,
had a strong point when encouraging proponents of the reform movement to take
stock and accept (or at least entertain the possibility) that their initial arguments had
been ‘heading nowhere’.40
Perhaps the ItCC, in Judgment 238/2014, accepted as much. While continuing the
struggle against immunity, it opted for a new approach. The Court now sidestepped
debates about the scope of immunity under international law; in fact, it accepted
(albeit grudgingly, one can assume) the ICJ’s construction of international law as set
out in Jurisdictional Immunities: ‘It has to be recognized that, at the international
level, the interpretation by the ICJ (. . .) is particularly qualified and does not allow
further examination by national governments and/or judicial authorities, including
38See the collection of essays in Tams/Tzanakopoulos, ‘International Law and Practice’ 2013 (n 6).
39Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of International Immunity
Rules’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (2013), 559–578.
40O’Keefe, ‘State Immunity’ 2011 (n 18), 1012.
246 C. J. Tams
this Court’.41 The claim that international law should recognize an immunity
exception for grave breaches is all but abandoned: the international rules of immu-
nity have been ‘defined by the ICJ’, and as rules of international law they reach into
the Italian legal order (as the ItCC observes in a remarkable passage) ‘as interpreted
in the international legal order’.42 Not even an echo, then, in Judgment 238/2014, of
the clarion calls of Ferrini, in which the Italian Supreme Court had boldly refused to
give effect to immunity rules if these ‘would hinder the protection of values whose
safeguard is to be considered (. . .) essential to the whole international community’.43
And no serious attempt, unlike in Prefecture of Voiotia, to apply the ‘territorial tort’
exception to the conduct of armed forces (and to free it from the shackles of the ICJ’s
restrictive reasoning). The ItCC, while persisting in its struggle for an immunity
exception, displays a remarkable argumentative flexibility.
Instead of rehearsing the international law debates, the ItCC approached the
matter from the perspective of (Italian) foreign relations law: in its words, it was
‘clear that another issue has to be examined and resolved, namely the envisaged
conflict between the norm of international law (. . .) incorporated and applied in the
domestic legal order, as interpreted in the international legal order, and norms and
principles of the [Italian] Constitution’.44 This is a significant change of tack. As
noted by Filippo Fontanelli, the ItCC ‘deploy[s] its judicial authority in foro
domestico’.45 In rather plainer terms, one might state that the ItCC prefers home
games to away games; and on Italian home ground, the ‘human rights cause’
(battered in The Hague, Strasbourg, London, and elsewhere) triumphed. The Italian
constitutional right to an effective remedy in case of infringements of ‘the inviolable
rights of the person’, said the ItCC, was not to be construed in light of immunities ‘as
interpreted in the international legal order’; it had an autonomous existence and is
limited by competing constitutional principles only.46
Whether or not that construction is convincing as a matter of Italian law is for
others to judge.47 From an international law perspective, the ItCC’s approach calls
41ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), section 3.1.
42Ibid.
43See Corte di Cassazione, Ferrini (n 17), section 9.1.
44ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), section 3.1.
45Filippo Fontanelli, ‘Damage Assessment on the Building of International Law after the Italian
Constitutional Court’s Decision no. 238 of 2014: No Structure Damage, Just Wear and Tear’,
VerfBlog, (15 December 2014), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/damage-assessment-
building-international-law-italian-constitutional-courts-decision-no-238-2014-no-structural-dam
age-just-wear-tear-2/.
46As far as competing constitutional principles are concerned, the ItCC briefly mentions immunity
but holds that it could only justify restrictions that are ‘connected—substantially and not just
formally—to the sovereign function of the State’; see ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), section 3.4.
47Alessandro Bufalini, ‘Judgment 238/2014 and the Importance of a Constructive Dialogue’ 2017
(n 6); see also Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume. Christian
Tomuschat, ‘No Consensus—but Hope at Villa Vigoni’, VerfBlog, (18 May 2017), available at
http://verfassungsblog.de/no-consensus-but-hope-at-villa-vigoni/.
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for two comments. The first is fairly obvious and taken up in many chapters in this
volume: by refusing to give effect to sovereign immunity as construed by the ICJ, the
Constitutional Court puts Italy on a collision course with international law.48
Judgment 238/2014 may not itself amount to a breach of international law, but
with the highest judicial authority directs Italian state organs towards such a breach,
and towards non-compliance with the 2012 ICJ Judgment. The second comment
concerns the implications of the ItCC’s reasoning for future debates about immunity
and human rights. In this respect, the Court’s argumentative change of tack is
seemingly clever (as it takes the argument to a different level), but also potentially
dangerous (as it is based on a problematic understanding of the relationship between
domestic and international legal orders). The remainder of this chapter addresses
these aspects in turn.
IV. A Clever Move and Its Implications
On the face of it, the Italian Constitutional Court’s change of tack is indeed rather
clever. It shields Judgment 238/2014 from the obvious criticism: that the ItCC
thought it knew international law better than the ICJ, the ECtHR, and the majority
of states and other domestic courts. The ItCC does not make such a claim. Rather, it
claims to know Italian constitutional law better. And who would fault it for that? Put
differently, on the ‘home turf’ of the Italian Constitution, the scope of immunities
depends on the status of international law within the Italian constitutional order.
Unless one ignores the ItCC’s reasoning,49 this argumentative move limits the
significance of Judgment 238/2014 to the long-standing debate about immunity
and grave breaches sketched out above—with two related consequences.
First, based on Italian constitutional law, Judgment 238/2014 is (dare one say)
‘immune’ from the usual arguments developed in the long-standing international law
debates. There is little point in a further round of discussion about the impact of ius
cogens, or the scope of the territorial tort exception, or the proper way of character-
izing egregious conduct—the ItCC has conceded the international law argument.
Second, and conversely, based on constitutional law, Judgment 238/2014 has
relatively little to contribute to the international law debate about immunity and
48Cf, inter alia, Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, Heike Krieger,
chapter ‘Sentenza 238/2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform?’, and Andreas Zimmermann, chapter
‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to Adopt a European Approach to State
Immunity?’, in this volume.
49Some have suggested that where constitutional and international rules are ‘con-substantial’,
domestic decisions addressing questions of foreign relations law should be viewed as international
law decisions cloaked in constitutional law language—and treated as contributions to international
legal debate: see Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law’ 2012 (n 15), 143. But this
risks to overlook the strategic choice of ‘going domestic’, which at least in the proceedings before
the ItCC seemed a conscious one.
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grave breaches. In order to do that it would have had to play the ‘away game’. Or
rather, in the words of Filippo Fontanelli:
[T]he Italian ruling cannot possibly hope to persuade the international community about the
correctness of its conclusion under international law, because it expressly avoided a
re-consideration of the international legal custom. Unlike the previous Ferrini judgment,
the Constitutional Court’s decision confined itself to deploy judicial authority in foro
domestico. There is ample literature of how effective national courts can be in shaping
international law through interpretation. This judgment did not try to do that, thus it cannot
succeed.50
It might still be argued that, irrespective of its (international or constitutional)
reasoning, Judgment 238/2014 should matter as international practice: it stands, after
all, for the proposition that domestic courts in fact are prepared to accept an
immunity exception.51 Yet that argument only goes so far. The judgment indeed is
relevant for the assessment of customary international law; but in an assessment of
international practice, it should not carry much weight. It helps assess the practice of
precisely one state, and one state that had previously deviated from the international
law mainstream at that: Italy.52 What is more, Sentenza 238/2014 is not really a
reliable guide to the approach of Italy as such. Over the past decades, Italian practice
has been anything but uniform—with parliament and the executive leaning more
towards the international law mainstream and the courts remaining divided.53 In line
with recent attempts to clarify the process of custom formation, such domestic
discord affects the weight to be accorded to Italy’s practice: as noted in the ILC’s
recent work on custom, ‘where different organs or branches within the State adopt
different courses of conduct on the same matter or where the practice of one organ
varies over time (. . .), that State’s contribution to “a general practice” may be
reduced’.54
That still leaves open the possibility that Judgment 238/2014 is followed by other
actors of international law, whose practice would then matter. In this respect,
Fontanelli’s aforementioned statement needs to be qualified. Perhaps in retrospect
Judgment 238/2014 will come to be seen as the beginning of a trend: perhaps we will
see a wave of domestic court decisions all relying on constitutional law guarantees,
as their ‘last line of defence’, to keep immunity at bay. While such a possibility
cannot be excluded, trends in international practice sketched out above suggest this
to be remote. Remote not only because (so far) a clear majority of domestic courts
have been inclined to uphold immunity for grave breaches55 but also because the
50Fontanelli, ‘Damage Assessment’ 2014 (n 45).
51Cf ILA, ‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts’ 2016 (n 6), paras 5–6.
52Ibid, paras 5, 6, and 8.
53Cf Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, and Riccardo Pavoni,
chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
54ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 70th session (2016), UN Doc
A/73/10, ‘Identification of Customary International Law’, Conclusion 7, para 4 of the commentary;
see also ILA, ‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts’ 2016 (n 6), para 7.
55See n 27 and n 32.
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ItCC’s reasoning in Judgment 238/2014 is firmly based on Italian constitutional law,
and depends on so many premises: the acceptance of a robust constitutional right to a
remedy, a refusal to construe that remedial right in light of competing principles such
as those protecting immunity, and not least (to foreshadow a point addressed in
section V) a preparedness to play havoc with international law. Thus, Italian
constitutional law both enables the clever change of tack and limits the probable
impact of the decision. In short, whether one looks at its reasoning or its outcome, it
seems that precisely because the ItCC opted to ‘go constitutional’, Judgment
238/2014 will have a limited impact on the international law debate on sovereign
immunities.
V. ‘Here I Stand, I Can Do No Other’: A Problematic Last
Line of Defence
The relative loss of influence on future international law debates is not the only price
of ‘going constitutional’. Judgment 238/2014 also—and the point has been hinted at
already—plays havoc with international law. It does so in two respects: its outcome,
and the process by which that outcome is reached. Regarding the former, by refusing
to give effect to the duty to respect the immunity of foreign states, as concretized in a
binding ICJ judgment, the ItCC pushes Italy towards breaching international law,56
and this in a setting where the international law dispute had been referred to court in
an attempt (in the words of the two governments) ‘to clarify a complex question’.57
The fact that many will sympathize with the ItCC’s conduct does not make that
breach any less blatant.
The second point is less obvious, but systemically more relevant. By construing
constitutional law in splendid isolation from international law, and by giving it
primacy, the ItCC displays an inward-looking mindset that shields constitutional
guarantees from international law. This of course has not escaped commentators,
including those who might have looked favourably on the outcome of Judgment
238/2014: Anne Peters has criticized the ItCC’s ‘Triepelian understanding’,58 and
56Under Art 94 (1) of the UN Charter, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, member states of the UN
have to comply with the decisions of the ICJ in a case to which they are party; See also Art 4 of the
ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43; cf
Constantin Eustathiadès, La responsabilité internationale de l’État pour les actes des organes
judiciaires et le problème du déni de justice en droit international, Vol 1 (Paris: Pedone 1936).
57Italy–Germany Summit, Trieste, 18 November 2008, Joint Declaration, available at www.esteri.it/
mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2008/11/20081119_dichiarazionecongiunta.
html.
58Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph’ 2014 (n 7).
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Robert Kolb seems to go further when warning of a ‘shattering schism between
internal and international law’.59 Underlying these and similar statements is a feeling
that by opting to decide the case on constitutional grounds, the ItCC has taken a new,
and highly dangerous argumentative path, which other domestic actors engaging
with international law will happily take to avoid international legal constraints.
Upon reflection, the stark language warning of ‘schisms’ and ‘Triepel’s triumph’
seems unduly dramatic. For a domestic court to emphasize the primacy of constitu-
tional law over international law is not as such unusual. Most domestic legal
systems, even those that profess an openness towards the international or suprana-
tional level, preserve the option of some constitutional override.60 To mention but
the most obvious override strategies, within many domestic legal orders parts of
international law have some status but are ranked below constitutional law (so that
they yield in the event of a clash); in others, domestic law (including constitutional
law) may have to be construed in light of international law principles but with the
caveat that such enlightened interpretations should not fall foul of overarching
constitutional principles; still elsewhere, domestic legal systems limit the number
of international law rules that can be invoked before domestic courts (for example by
requiring them to be recognized by domestic law as ‘self-executing’). High-profile
decisions from the Solange jurisprudence and its follow-up,61 to Görgülü,62
Medellin,63 and Kadi64 (to name but a few) are attempts to strike the right balance,
but they all insist on the possibility of some constitutional overrides. All of them,
even the internationally-minded ones, assume that constitutional law determines just
how intrusive international law should be, and that, where domestic and international
59Robert Kolb, ‘The Relationship between the International and the Municipal Legal Order:
Reflections on the Decision 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, Questions of Interna-
tional Law: Zoom-Out 2 (2014), 5–16.
60In this respect, Anne Peters rightly characterizes ‘Sentenza No. 238 [as] just one more building
block in the wall of “protection” built up by domestic courts against “intrusion” of international law,
relying on the precepts of their national constitution’, Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Triumph’ 2014 (n 7).
For a detailed comparative account, see the contributions to Dinah Shelton, International Law and
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation and Persuasion (Oxford: OUP 2011).
Antonio Cassese’s Hague lectures remain highly instructive, ‘Modern Constitutions and Interna-
tional Law’, Recueil des Cours 192 (1989), 331–476. The different ‘avoidance techniques’
employed by domestic legal orders are summarized in ILA, ‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic
Courts’ 2016 (n 6), paras 38–40; See also Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World Court Makes
a Bad Case’, in this volume.
61Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange I);
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 (Solange
II).
62ECtHR, Görgülü v Germany, Judgment of 26 May 2004, Application No 74969/01.
63US Supreme Court, Medellín v Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
64CJEU, European Commission, Council of the European Union, and United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi and French Republic, Judgment of 18 July
2013, Joined Cases No C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, and C-595/10 P, [2013] ECR I-0000 (Kadi II
CJEU).
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law clash, ‘any change in national laws still remains contingent upon the will of the
failing state’.65 Perhaps this is international law’s real Achilles heel in the era of
inward-looking obligations:66 outside niche areas, international law does not ‘by
itself, possess the force to amend or repeal internationally unlawful domestic (. . .)
acts’.67 But cases like Kadi and perhaps now Judgment 238/2014 should give even
some die-hard internationalists pause: it is easy to call for international law to be
strong, robust, and intrusive when one likes its prescriptions, and rather more
difficult when it prescribes outcomes that are unpopular. In areas such as immunities
and draconian sanctions, but also in investment protection, international law has
recently appeared on a collision course with constitutionally protected values. In
these and other fields, international law deserves engagement rather than ‘blind
faith’. Constitutional overrides may every now and then serve as a necessary safety
valve,68 and it is certainly a very common technique for protecting international law
from itself.
If few domestic courts or domestic legal orders are free from protectionist
leanings, Judgment 238/2014 stands out for its bluntness. The constitutional override
comes without niceties, with an almost ‘Lutheran’ directness to it. ‘Here I stand, I
can do no other’ seems to be the motto: international law is refused effect without
regrets, and without any balancing or the pretence of a constructive dialogue.
International law and constitutional law are neatly separated, and in the ItCC’s
‘separatist treatment’69 the former plays no role in the construction of the latter.
(In fact, international legal rules are denied any ‘directive function’
[‘Orientierungswirkung’70], even though they were authoritatively ‘defined by the
ICJ’71 in a case directed against Italy). In the discussion of constitutional law,
international law no longer features, at least not expressly: neither as part of a
balancing exercise (weighing the need to grant an effective remedy against the
need to comply with international law), nor as part of a ‘Solange II construction’
in which non-compliance with international law remains an option but is the
exception to the default position.
65Cassese, ‘Towards a Moderate Monism’ 2012 (n 3), 191.
66The term ‘inward looking’ is used here to denote international obligations that ‘specifically enjoin
States to undertake certain conduct within their own domestic legal order: to adopt a specific legal
framework, to accord individual rights, to abstain from taking specific actions’, ILA, ‘Mapping the
Engagement of Domestic Courts’ 2016 (n 6), para 12.
67Cassese, ‘Towards a Moderate Monism’ 2012 (n 3), 199.
68For a cautious (and important) German perspective on these themes, see Stefan Talmon, ‘Die
Grenzen der Anwendung des Völkerrechts im deutschen Recht’, Juristenzeitung 68 (2013), 12–21.
As Talmon notes on page 21, referring to Security Council sanctions in particular, ‘blind faith in
international law ignores the realities’ (translated by the author).
69Kolb, ‘International and Municipal Legal Order’ 2014 (n 59).
70Cf Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 19 September 2006, 2 BvR 2115/01, BVerfGK 9, 174
(Wiener Konsularrechtsübereinkommen), para 61.
71ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), section 3.1.
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The problem with Judgment 238/2014, then, is not that it insists on the primacy of
constitutional law over international law but that it refuses to factor international law
into its constitutional law reasoning.72 The principle of a constitutional override may
be fine (though it is international law’s Achilles heel), but the process by which the
ItCC overrides international law is highly problematic. To speak of ‘high peak
dualism’73 may be one way of looking at it. More than anything else, however, it
is the refusal of balance—the ‘here I stand, I can do no other’—that disturbs and
disappoints.
VI. Concluding Thoughts
Judgment 238/2014 is an interesting case because it forces us to question some easy
and cheap ‘truths’ in the way that earlier foreign relations decisions did not. To
illustrate, it was easy (and perhaps a bit cheap) to chide the US Supreme Court for its
Medellin judgment, in which constitutional law trumped an ICJ judgment and
resulted in the execution of José Medellin: international law was on the side of
progress after all, and so—of course!—it should be robust and intrusive.
Judgment 238/2014 is trickier because opinion is at best mixed on whether
international law—as presented in section II—is on the side of progress. Many
would say it is not (or, in fact, that it impedes progress), hence the constant
incantations that immunity were ‘archaic’. But then again, only very stubborn pro-
gressivists will be able to ignore the resilience of that archaic notion, and there is no
way of denying that in this particular case the archaic notion was confirmed and
crystallized in a binding ICJ judgment.
In Judgment 238/2014, as noted in the preceding sections, the ItCC adopted a
straightforward approach. Faced with an international legal rule that it considered
regressive, it took the debate to its ‘home turf’. It conceded the international law
arguments and opted to stop international law at the last, constitutional, line of
defence, and all this without giving it the benefit of any constructive engagement. All
this, as noted above, it did with a stubborn determination: like Martin Luther at the
Diet of Worms, it ‚‘could do no other’.
So, what should be done about Judgment 238/2014? Criticism, protest and
scandalization are all obvious responses, and of course they are trusted strategies
for dealing with non-compliance and of keeping up the pressure. Since 2014 they
72See also Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume. After all, interna-
tional law does not contain a rule prescribing its superiority over domestic law in the domestic legal
orders of the states. See André Nollkaemper, ‘The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law’ in Christian
J Tams/Antonios Tzanakopoulos/Andreas Zimmermann (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of
Treaties (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2014), 123–150, at 130.
73Kolb, ‘International and Municipal Legal Order’ 2014 (n 59).
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have informed many responses to the judgment and are still being articulated.74 The
preceding sections suggest that criticism and protest remain crucial: the judgment is
a fairly blatant case of ignoring the demands of a clearly worded international
decision, not an instance of minimalist compliance or muddling through. At the
same time, the preceding sections also yield a number of insights that argue for a
more nuanced, perhaps cautious, approach. Three of these stand out.
First, while refusing to give effect to international law, Judgment 238/2014
employs a last line of defence that is prima facie effective. International law has
no means of compelling ‘rogue’ domestic courts to fall back in line, not least because
it values the judicial independence that makes decisions like this possible. And
Judgment 238/2014 is not the only domestic court decision that ignores international
law. Domestic disobedience is a fact of international legal life: not welcome but
common. This does not mean international lawyers should ‘keep calm and carry
on’—but suggests that Judgment 238/2014 has to be engaged with, not just
scandalized.
Second, while the judgment‘s ‘Lutheran’ refusal to engage with international law
is unfortunate, it is difficult to take issue with the ItCC’s starting-point: domestic
legal actors (governments, parliaments, courts) in most countries insist on some form
of constitutional override, and in an era of inward-looking international law75 this is
plausible. The difference between Kadi, Medellin, the various Solanges, and Judg-
ment 238/2014 is one of degree, not of principle. In this sense, most domestic and
regional courts have some ‘Triepelian’ leanings; some occasionally choose to be
more openly ‘Triepelian’ than others. Again, this is not a plea for a non-committal
‘anything goes’ but an attempt to more clearly define the focus of debate.
Third, as international lawyers reflect on their strategy of engaging with the rogue
decision, they (we) should be mindful of the character of the particular legal rule that
is being defended. In section II, I have offered a purposefully robust dismissal of the
grave breaches exception to immunities, which in my view has never enjoyed much
support among states and international organizations. But of course, whatever its
status in international law, the grave breaches exception has wide appeal among
groups on whose support international law regularly counts in its pursuit of progres-
sive causes. In Judgment 238/2014, the ItCC failed to give effect to state immunity,
but in so doing disregarded a fairly unpopular rule of international law—a discipline
that often reflects the hopes of many, and that typically benefits from being a
projection of hopes. Perhaps, in fact, it should give international lawyers pause
that in Judgment 238/2014 the ItCC effectively gives up on international law as a
means of protecting remedial rights of victims.
74For examples of primarily critical perspectives, see Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of
Perfect Justice’, Andreas Zimmermann, chapter ‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to
Adopt a European Approach to State Immunity?’, and Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm,
chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
75See n 66.
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In offering these three considerations, I do not mean to undermine the interna-
tional law argument set out in sections II–V of this chapter. But there is some scope
for argumentative disarmament, and for moving away from the ‘holier than thou’
attitude that continues to characterize much of the debate.
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Teaching the World Court Makes
a Bad Case: Revisiting the Relationship
Between Domestic Courts and the ICJ
Raffaela Kunz
Abstract Sentenza 238/2014 once more highlights the important role domestic
courts play in international law. More than prior examples, it illustrates the ever
more autonomous and self-confident stance of domestic courts on the international
plane. But the ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) also shows that more
engagement with international law does not necessarily mean that domestic courts
enhance the effectiveness of international law and become ‘compliance partners’ of
international courts. Sentenza 238/2014 suggests that domestic courts, in times of
global governance and increased activity of international courts, see the role they
play at the intersection of legal orders also as ‘gate-keepers’, ready to cushion the
domestic impact of international law if deemed necessary. The judgment of the ItCC
thus offers a new opportunity to examine the multifaceted and complex role of these
important actors that apply and shape international law, while always remaining
bound by domestic (constitutional) law. This chapter does so by exploring how
domestic courts deal with rulings of the World Court. It shows that despite the fact
that in numerous situations domestic courts could act as compliance partners of the
International Court of Justice, in reality, more often than not, they have refused to do
so, arguing that its judgments are not self-executing and thus deferring the imple-
mentation to the political branches. Assessing this practice, the chapter argues that
domestic courts should take a more active stance and overcome the purely interstate
view that seems at odds with present-day international law. While it seems too
far-reaching to expect domestic courts to follow international courts unconditionally,
the chapter cautions that there is a considerable risk of setting dangerous precedents
by openly defying international judgments. Domestic courts should carefully bal-
ance the different interests at stake, namely an effective system of international
adjudication on the one hand and the protection of fundamental domestic principles
on the other hand. The chapter finds that the ItCC’s attempt to reintroduce clear
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boundaries between legal orders lacks the openness and flexibility needed to effec-
tively cope with today’s complex and plural legal reality.
I. Introduction
Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC)1 is worth exploring
from an international law perspective. Besides the obvious questions it raises in
relation to state immunity, it also touches upon the role of domestic courts in
international law. Sentenza 238/2014 is yet another illustration of how domestic
courts in recent years increasingly became important actors on the international
plane.2 Not only do they contribute to the creation of new rules of customary
international law;3 they also fill certain gaps in the existing international legal
order by applying and giving effect to international law. In this sense, and in line
with Scelle’s theory of dédoublement fonctionnel,4 domestic judges also fulfil an
international judicial function,5 and by doing so not only serve the domestic but the
international rule of law as well.6 The ruling of the ItCC, more than prior examples
of domestic court engagement with international law, illustrates the ever more
autonomous and self-confident role domestic courts play on the international
plane—they do not even seem anymore to shy away from contradicting their
governments, a development that seemed nearly impossible only years ago.7 In
this sense, Sentenza appears to suggest that the quest of the Institut de Droit
1Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
2See ILA, Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International
Law, Conference Study Group Report Johannesburg: ‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic
Courts with International Law’, 2016, available at http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/study-groups?
study-groupsID¼57.
3See Antonios Tzanakopoulos/Christian J Tams, ‘Introduction: Domestic Courts as Agents of
Development of International Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law 26 (2013), 531–540, as
well as the other contributions in the same issue.
4Georges Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’, in Walter Schätzel/Hans-
Jürgen Schlochauer (eds), Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation. Festschrift für Hans
Wehberg (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Klostermann 1956), 324–342.
5Yuval Shany, ‘Dédoublement fonctionnel and the Mixed Loyalities of National and International
Judges’, in Filippo Fontanelli/Giuseppe Martinico/Paolo Carrozza (eds), Shaping Rule of Law
Trough Dialogue: International and Supranational Experiences (Groningen: Europa Law Publish-
ing 2010), 29–42.
6André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford: OUP 2011).
7The Italian government intended to comply with the judgment and passed a law implementing it. It
was this law, among others, that the ItCC declared unconstitutional. See Art 3 of the Italian Law No
5 of 14 January 2013, Accession of the Republic of Italy to the UN Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property. On the traditional deference of domestic courts towards
the executive on the international plane, see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The
Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’, American Journal of
International Law 102 (2008), 241–274, at 241; Eyal Benvenisti/George W Downs, Between
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International, which claimed in 1993 ‘to strengthen the independence of national
courts in relation to the Executive and to promote better knowledge of international
law by such courts’,8 is becoming reality.
But Judgment 238/2014 also illustrates that greater engagement with interna-
tional law does not necessarily mean that domestic courts enhance the effectiveness
of international law. In the same vein, they are not automatically ‘partners’ of
international courts and contribute to compliance with their judgments, as has
been suggested.9 To the contrary, the ruling of the ItCC shows that domestic
courts—maybe increasingly—see the role they play at the intersection of legal
orders also as one of ‘gate-keepers’, controlling the effects of international law at
the domestic level and ready to cushion its impact if deemed necessary.10 And
whereas compliance has always been considered the Achilles’ heel of international
adjudication,11 Judgment 238/2014 stands out for yet another feature. It is an
example of what has been termed ‘principled resistance’,12 that is an instance of a
case where a domestic court deals with an international judgment and deliberately
decides to reject it.13
Sentenza is thus yet another illustration of the dual—and often delicate—role
domestic courts perform at the intersection of legal orders.14 They are ‘servants’ to
international law within the domestic realm and act as pivotal safeguards for its
effectiveness. At the same time, they of course remain ‘answerable to the dictates of
Fragementation and Democracy: The Role of National and International Courts (Cambridge: CUP
2017), at 105.
8Institut de droit international, ‘The Activities of National Judges and the International Relations of
their State’, 7 September 1993, available at www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1993_mil_01_en.
pdf.
9Cf Eyal Benvenisti/George W Downs, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution
of International Law’, European Journal of International Law 20 (2009), 59–72.
10Nollkaemper calls this the ‘shield’ function. See André Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality of Direct
Effect of International Law’, European Journal of International Law 25 (2014), 105–125, at
115–117.
11Andrea Gattini, ‘Domestic Judicial Compliance with International Judicial Decisions: Some
Paradoxes’, in Ulrich Fastenrath/Rudolf Geiger/Daniel-Erasmus Khan et al (eds), From Bilateral-
ism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford: OUP 2011), 1168–1188,
at 1168.
12This term has been used in the context of the European Court of Human Rights. See Fiona de
Londras/Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Mission Impossible? Addressing Non-Execution through
Infringement Proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights’, International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 66 (2017), 467–490. For a critical answer, see Alice Donald, ‘Tackling
Non-Implementation in the Strasbourg System: The Art of the Possible?’, EJIL:Talk!, (28 April
2017), available at www.ejiltalk.org/tackling-non-implementation-in-the-strasbourg-system-the-
art-of-the-possible/. In June 2017, the University of Konstanz held a conference on the topic of
‘Principled Resistance against ECtHR Judgments—a New Paradigm?’.
13Formally speaking, the ItCC did not ‘reject’ the ICJ judgment and only decided on the domestic
legislation implementing the relevant treaties. Nonetheless, the ruling might entail the responsibility
of Italy under international law.
14Cf, Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality’ 2014 (n 10).
Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case: Revisiting the Relationship Between. . . 261
applicable domestic law’.15 Domestic courts are, and in times of global governance
probably increasingly will be, torn between the sometimes not easily reconcilable
commands of domestic and international law: between an effective system of
international adjudication on the one hand and key values of pluralism and consti-
tutionalism on the other hand. Against this backdrop, Judgment 238/2014 offers a
new opportunity to examine the role of domestic courts in international law, and,
more concretely, in the implementation of the rulings of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ/World Court). Recalling some famous instances in which domestic
courts have been confronted with judgments of the ICJ, this chapter shows that
despite the fact that in numerous situations domestic courts could act as compliance
partners and help the ICJ to give effects to its rulings in the domestic sphere, in
reality, more often than not, they have refused to do so (section II). After offering
some possible explanations for this practice, the chapter moves to the normative
level and tries to contribute to the important debate on what role domestic courts
should play at the intersection of legal orders and vis-à-vis their international
counterparts (section III). It first argues that, given the development of international
law, the very state-centred view many domestic courts take is no longer adequate and
that domestic courts should take a more active role in the implementation of ICJ
judgments. On the other hand, even though good reasons can be brought forward to
allow domestic courts to disobey the ICJ in extreme cases where a conflict with core
principles of the domestic order seems unavoidable, the risk of setting dangerous
precedents that may damage the authority of the World Court demands a careful
balancing of the different interests at stake. The chapter concludes by finding that the
ItCC’s attempt to reintroduce clear boundaries between legal orders lacks the
openness and flexibility needed to effectively cope with today’s complex and plural
legal reality (section IV).
II. The Dual Role of Domestic Courts at the Intersection
of Legal Orders
1. Domestic Courts as Law Enforcers
Although international adjudication is often seen as a form of law enforcement,
international judgments also need to pass the ‘acid test of inforcement [sic]’.16 In
fact, given that international courts lack the capability to take action within the
15Rosalyn Higgins, ‘National Courts and the International Court of Justice’, in Mads Andenas/
Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Tom Bingham and the Transformation of the Law: A Liber Amicorum
(Oxford: OUP 2009), 405–418, at 417.
16Robert Jennings, ‘The Judicial Enforcement of International Obligations’, Heidelberg Journal of
International Law 47 (1987), 3–16, at 3; Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Compliance with Judgments and
Decisions’, in Cesare Romano/Karen J Alter/Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Inter-
national Adjudication (Oxford: OUP 2014), 437–463, at 437.
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domestic realm, the question of the enforcement of international judgments is as old
as international courts themselves.17 Whereas the enforcement of international
judgments has traditionally been considered to be a political matter, best confined
to the executive,18 some have long suggested that domestic courts could fill the
enforcement gap at the domestic level and play a role in giving effect to international
judgments.19
With regard to the World Court, domestic courts can play a role as ‘enforcers’ in
two constellations.20 First of all, a victorious state can bring an ICJ ruling before a
domestic court to oblige the debtor state to comply. So far, however, it seems that no
state has ever attempted to enforce an ICJ judgment against another state before a
domestic court.21 Not so, however, with regard to actions brought by private parties.
In several instances private parties have called on domestic courts in order to bring a
state to comply with an ICJ judgment.22 That this constellation has been more
relevant in practice is unsurprising despite the interstate nature of the procedure
before the World Court, given that non-state actors and particularly individuals can
have a strong interest in the effective enforcement of international judgments
affecting their interests, which has often been the case even before the ICJ.23 Driven
by their interest, individuals operate in a ‘private attorney-general’ fashion and
enhance the effectiveness of international law.24
However, most of the attempts by private parties to enforce ICJ judgments before
domestic courts have hitherto failed. The following examples suggest that domestic
courts are reluctant to assume a role in the direct enforcement of judgments of the
ICJ, and that they adhere to the old paradigm according to which domestic and
international courts are ‘courts of a different legal order’.25 In this dualist view, the
obligations from international judgments remain purely international obligations.
Either they are not self-executing—that is they are directed at the state as a whole,
17Richard Frimpong Oppong/Angela M Barreto, ‘Enforcement’, in William A Schabas/
Shannonbrooke Murphy (eds), Research Handbook on International Courts and Tribunals (Chel-
tenham: Edward Elgar 2017), 273–298, at 273.
18Ibid, at 276; 286.
19Wilfred C Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication (London/New York:
Stevens&Sons/Oceana Publications 1964), at 706–715; Jennings, ‘Judicial Enforcement’ 1987
(n 16), 8–9.
20For an overview, see Sarita Ordonez/David Reilly, ‘Effect of the Jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice on National Courts’, in Thomas M Franck/Gregory H Fox (eds), Interna-
tional Law Decisions in National Courts (New York: Transnational Publishers 1996), 335–371. See
also Gattini, ‘Domestic Judicial Compliance’ 2011 (n 11), 1171–1178.
21Ordonez/Reilly, ‘Effect of the Jurisprudence’ 1996 (n 20), 349.
22For an overview, see ibid, 351–353.
23Gattini, ‘Domestic Judicial Compliance’ 2011 (n 11), 1173.
24Yuval Shany, ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New
International Judiciary’, The European Journal of International Law 20 (2009), 73–91, at 79.
25PCIJ, Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland), Judgment of
25 August 1925, PCIJ Reports Series A No 6, 3, at 20.
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and it is not up to the judiciary to directly give effect to them26—or individuals
simply have no standing to enforce them.
An early example of a private party unsuccessfully seeking to enforce a judgment
of the World Court—in this case the predecessor to the ICJ—is the case of Socobel v
Greece. In this case the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) had con-
firmed the validity of a previously rendered arbitral award.27 Based on the finding of
the PCIJ, the Société Commerciale de Belgique sought to enforce the award and filed
a claim to attach Greek assets before a Belgian court. The Tribunal Civil de
Bruxelles, however, denied the possibility of giving effect to the findings of the
PCIJ. It concluded that the plaintiffs needed an exequatur to enforce the judgment
and held that ‘in the absence of an independent power of execution belonging to that
Court [the PCIJ], which would enable litigants before it to execute its decisions de
plano, these decisions are not exempt from the servitude imposed on Belgian
territory on decisions of other than Belgian tribunals’. Furthermore, it concluded
that the judgment of the PCIJ could not be considered a judgment in favour of the
plaintiff because it was ‘inconceivable that a party which, by definition, is not
admitted to the bar of an international court should be able to rely on a judicial
decision in a case to which it was not a party’.28
Another well-known example where a higher court was confronted with an
enforcement action occurred in the course of the Nicaragua case. In its judgment
the ICJ had found that the support of the Contra rebels by the US government had
violated international law and ordered both the cessation of the illegal actions and the
payment of reparations.29 The US had vehemently opposed the bringing of the case
before the ICJ and subsequently boycotted the proceedings on the merits stage. This
was not a good basis for compliance. Not surprisingly, the US for several years
continued its actions and openly defied the judgment of the World Court.30 Against
this backdrop, a group of private individuals tried to bring the US to comply with the
judgment via domestic litigation. The domestic court they addressed, however,
found that ‘neither individuals nor organizations have a cause of action in an
American court to enforce ICJ judgments. The ICJ is a creation of national govern-
ments, working through the UN; its decisions operate between and among such
governments and are not enforceable by individuals having no relation to the claim
that the ICJ has adjudicated.’31 More recently, the Constitutional Court of Colombia
26For terminology, see Yuvji Iwasawa, ‘Domestic Application of International Law’, Recueil des
Cours 378 (2016), 9–261.
27PCIJ, The ‘Société Commerciale de Belgique’ (Belgium v Greece), Judgment of 15 June 1939,
PCIJ Series A/B No 78.
28Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, Socobel v Greek State, ILR 18 (1951), 3, at 4–5.
29ICJ,Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14.
30See, for an overview of the US reaction to the proceedings, Constanze Schulte, Compliance with
Decisions of the International Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP 2004), 190–192.
31United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Committee of United States Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (1988), 932.
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decided that a judgment of the ICJ concerning the territorial limits between Nicara-
gua and Colombia in the Caribbean Sea32 needed to be implemented, in this case
through the executive, by means of a treaty.33
This reluctance and the underlying dualist view of these courts to a certain extent
find their basis in international law itself.34 Traditionally, international judgments are
treated no differently than other international obligations and are formulated as
‘obligations of result’, stopping ‘short at the outer boundaries of the State machin-
ery’.35 The UN Charter states that ‘[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes
to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which
it is a party’ (Article 94(1)), from which it is generally concluded that the judgments
of the World Court address the state as a whole and do not require a direct effect as a
matter of international law.36 For a long time, this was also the line followed by the
ICJ, which limited itself to stating whether or not there was a violation of interna-
tional law, without giving any indication about concrete steps to be undertaken as a
consequence thereof. More recently, however, the ICJ cautiously began formulating
more concrete obligations in its judgments, which led some observers to conclude
that the Court might soon ‘pierce the veil’ and ask states to give direct effect to its
judgments.37 Unsurprisingly, several of these cases directly dealt with rights of
individuals, and even less surprisingly some of these judgments subsequently
ended up before domestic judges.
A milestone in this development was undoubtedly the LaGrand judgment, in
which the ICJ famously stated that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations38
also contained individual rights. It decided that the US had infringed upon these
rights by not informing two German nationals, the LaGrand brothers—who had each
32ICJ, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012,
ICJ Reports 2012, 624.
33Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment of 2 May 2014, No C-269/14.
34See also Gattini, ‘Domestic Judicial Compliance’ 2011 (n 11).
35ILC, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Twenty-Ninth
Session, Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ‘Breach of an International
Obligation Requiring the Achievement of a Special Result’, 9 May–29 July 1977, ILC YB 1977
(II), Art 21, para 1. Cf Ward Ferdinandusse, ‘Out of the Black Box? The International Obligation of
State Organs’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 29 (2003), 45–127.
36Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94’, in Bruno Simma/Daniel-Erasmus Khan/Georg Note et al (eds),
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP 2012), para 12; Fulvio
Palombino, ‘Les arrêts de la Cour internationale de Justice devant le juge interne’, Annuaire
français de droit international 51 (2005), 121–139, at 122; Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘La mise en oeuvre
des décisions des tribunaux internationaux dans l’ordre interne’, Recueil des Cours 386 (2017),
267–428, at 361–362.
37Vladen Vereshchetin, ‘On the Expanding Reach of the Rulings of the International Court of
Justice’, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy (ed), Völkerrecht als Wertordnung. Festschrift für Christian
Tomuschat (Kehl: Engel Verlag 2006), 621–633.
38Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, UNTC 596 261.
Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case: Revisiting the Relationship Between. . . 265
received the death penalty in the US—of their rights under the Convention.39 But the
case that provoked a flurry of subsequent domestic proceedings was Avena, which
involved 54 Mexican nationals on death row. In this instance, the ICJ had found that
the US had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by having not
properly informed the concerned Mexican nationals of their rights. Whereas in the
operative part of the judgment, the Court limited itself to state that the appropriate
reparation would consist in the ‘review and reconsideration’ of the convictions by
means of the US’s choosing,40 in the ratio decidendi the ICJ specified that it
considered that ‘it is the judicial process that is suited to this task’.41
Following this ruling, an individual petitioner not explicitly listed in Avena but in
a situation similar to the one dealt with in the judgment, relied on the ICJ to have his
sentence reconsidered. The US Supreme Court found that the ICJ deserved ‘respect-
ful consideration’; this, however, did not mean that ‘its interpretations were intended
to be binding on US courts’.42 The Supreme Court thus considered itself incapable of
giving effect to the conclusions of the ICJ in this case. It was only in Medellín that
the US Supreme Court was confronted with a claim by an individual directly
benefitting from the ruling in Avena. The petitioner, José Ernesto Medellín, was
backed with a memorandum by the then president George W Bush, which ordered
the courts of the US to give effect to the ruling of the ICJ.43 However, the Supreme
Court concluded that ‘neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes
directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions’.44 It interpreted the phrase ‘undertake to comply’ in
Article 94(1) of the UN Charter as a ‘commitment by member states to take future
action through their political branches (. . .)’.45 The consequence of the lack of direct
effect in this case is well known. José Ernesto Medellín was executed shortly
thereafter.
39ICJ, LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports
2001, 466, para 77: ‘Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Art 36, para
1, creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Art 1 of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in
this Court by the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the present
case.’ Cf, Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International
Law (Cambridge: CUP 2016), 348–387.
40ICJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), Judgment of
31 March 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, operative para 153, No 9.
41Ibid, para 140.
42US Supreme Court, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 (2006), 4.
43‘I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its international
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.’ See US Supreme Court, José Ernesto




A very different stance has been taken by the German Federal Constitutional
Court (FCC). This court affirmed a certain direct effect of international judgments
before German courts. Equally confronted with claims by foreign individuals—in
this case Turkish nationals—that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations had
been violated, it extensively relied on LaGrand and Avena. It declared that German
courts were in principle bound by the findings of the ICJ also in the absence of a
formal act of ‘execution’ by the political branches. Building upon its jurisprudence
on the effects of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and
the constitutional principle of openness towards international law, the FCC stated
that German courts had a duty to take into account ICJ judgments.46 It came to this
conclusion even though Germany had not been a party to the proceedings before the
ICJ in this case and was therefore not legally bound by the judgments’ inter partes
binding effect. The FCC thus accepted that any judgment of the ICJ (or any other
international court) issued against another state deploys a ‘normative directing
function’.47
Called upon to clarify the obligations flowing from Avena in light of the different
possible solutions, the ICJ subsequently had the chance to give its view on the
matter. However, the World Court did not accept Mexico’s invitation to unequivo-
cally ‘lift the veil’ and directly address state organs. Instead, it took a classical ‘black
box’ stance, making clear that it does not require domestic courts to give effect to its
judgments directly as a matter of international law.48
2. Domestic Courts as ‘Gate-Keepers’
In most of the examples described above, domestic courts have thus denied the
possibility to directly give effect to judgments of the ICJ and considered the political
branches to be the organ most suited for their implementation. By contrast, in the
judgment of the ItCC, the ‘self-executingness’ of the ICJ judgment was not
at stake—the Italian parliament had enacted legislation implementing the 2012
ruling.49 The reasons the ItCC brought forward were rather substantive. It argued
46Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 19 September 2006, 2 BvR 2115/01.
47Ibid, para 62.
48ICJ, Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America), Judgment of 19 January 2009,
ICJ Reports 2009, 3, para 44: ‘The Avena judgment nowhere lays down or implies that the Courts in
the United States are required to give direct effect to par. 153 (9). (. . .) [T]he judgment leaves it to
the United States to choose the means of implementation, not excluding the introduction within a
reasonable time of appropriate legislation, if deemed necessary under constitutional law. Nor
moreover does the Avena judgment prevent direct enforceability of the obligation in question, if
such an effect is permitted by domestic law.’
49Italian Law No 5/2013 (n 7).
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that the enforcement of the ICJ judgment, obliging Italian courts to uphold state
immunity—and deny jurisdiction—in cases of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, would violate core principles of the Italian Constitution, namely the
guarantee of judicial protection under Articles 2 and 24. Another difference between
Judgment 238/2014 and the abovementioned examples is that the Italian Constitu-
tional Court did not argue that implementation would still occure and that it is merely
up to another state organ to give effect to the ICJ judgment. The ItCC rather held that
the enforcement of the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment would altogether be
contrary to the Italian Constitution, and therefore that no state organ should give
effect to it. It therefore declared, inter alia, the law implementing the ICJ judgment
unconstitutional.50
Sentenza 238/2014 is a telling example of how the Italian Constitutional Court
perceives its role at the intersection of legal orders, and vis-à-vis its international
counterparts. In other cases, it took a similar position. Towards the ECtHR, the ItCC
stated in 2015 that it did not consider itself a ‘passive recipient of an interpretative
command issued elsewhere in the form of a court ruling (. . .)’.51 In this judgment, it
restricted its hitherto open and friendly position towards the ECtHR52 and made
clear that it is keeping an active eye on Strasbourg, reserving the option not to follow
the jurisprudence beyond what is strictly required under Article 46 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).53 Most recently, the ItCC even spoke
up against the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In a preliminary reference ruling,
it argued that the application of the Taricco jurisprudence of the ECJ would violate
fundamental rights under the Italian Constitution as well as the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and threatened the ECJ to raise the controlimiti bar in case
the latter insisted on its position.54 To widespread astonishment, the ECJ yielded and
adjusted its position,55 a move that has been read by some as a successful example of
judicial dialogue56 and by others as ‘the first of many other humiliating and
inevitable concessions to national constitutional courts in the near future.’57
50ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), operative paras.
51Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 26 March 2015, No 49/2015, para 7.
52Corte Costituzionale, Judgments of 22 October 2007, Nos 348 and 349/2007.
53See, for a good summary, Andrea Pin, ‘A Jurisprudence to Handle with Care: The European Court
of Human Rights’ Unsettled Case Law, its Authority, and its Future, According to the Italian
Constitutional Court’, I-CONnect. Blog, (30 April 2015), available at www.iconnectblog.com/
2015/04/mini-symposium-on-cc-judgment-49-2015.
54Corte Costituzionale, Order of 23 November 2016, No 24/2017.
55CJEU, Taricco II (M.A.S. and M.B.), Judgment of 5 December 2017, Case No C-42/17.
56Giacomo Rugge, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court on Taricco: Unleashing the normative poten-
tial of “national identity”?’, QIL, Zoom-In 37 (2017), 21–29.
57Daniel Sarmiento, ‘To Bow at the Rhythm of an Italian Tune’, Despite our Differences,
(5 December 2017), available at https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2017/12/05/to-
bow-at-the-rhythm-of-an-italian-tune/. For a good analysis of the case, see Dana Burchardt, ‘Belit-
tling the Primacy of EU Law in Taricco II’, VerfBlog, (7 December 2017), available at https://doi.
org/10.17176/20171207-180534.
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These examples illustrate that the ItCC sees itself as an active player on the
international plane, willing to participate in the shaping of international law. In the
Sentenza this also becomes clear by the fact that the ItCC refers to the Kadi decision
of the ECJ,58 explicitly expressing the ambition that its judgment, like Kadi,59 may
contribute to a development of international law in a direction more attentive to
fundamental rights.60
But these examples also show that the ItCC increasingly sees itself as a gate-
keeper positioned at the intersection of legal orders, ready to step in and ‘shield’ the
domestic order from effects of international law it considers negative. Of course,
compliance with international law has always been an issue and a certain resistance
against the World Court is nothing new. Even though the overall compliance rate of
the ICJ is quite good61 and the enforcement mechanism of Article 94(2) of the UN
Charter has been activated only once,62 there are several well-known examples
where compliance with a judgment on the merits has posed problems. One recurring
issue is late compliance,63 another cases in which states boycott the whole proceed-
ing before the ICJ, or openly defy a ruling by other means.64 It is, however, a
different matter if domestic courts start to control international judgments and verify
their constitutionality as a matter of principle, and therefore systematically ‘judge’
them anew, as the ItCC has started to do.65 Despite the fact that a certain reservation
58CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05
P and C-415/05 P.
59In Kadi, the CJEU engaged the fundamental rights standards of the European Union to scrutinize
measures implementing anti-terrorist sanctions ordered by the UN Security Council. This decision
eventually led to an improvement of the fundamental rights protections within the United Nations
sanctioning regime. See, eg, Katja S Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting
International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights’, Human
Rights Law Review 9 (2009), 288–305.
60ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.3.
61Schulte, Compliance 2004 (n 30), 271–276.
62Irène Couzigou, ‘Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions and ICJ Judgments: The
Unreliability of Political Enforcement Mechanisms’, in András Jakab/Dimitry Kochenov (eds), The
Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (Oxford: OUP 2017),
363–378, at 374.
63An example for this is the Haya de la Torres case. This dispute between Peru and Colombia gave
rise to three ICJ judgments: Asylum case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950;
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20th, in the Asylum Case (Colombia v
Peru), Judgment of 27 November 1950; Haya de la Torre case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of
13 June 1951. For an overview, see Schulte, Compliance 2004 (n 30), 99–108.
64According to Schulte, this has happened in at least four instances, namely in the Corfu Channel,
Fisheries Jurisdiction, Teheran Hostages and Nicaragua cases. See Schulte, Compliance 2004
(n 30), 271. For more examples, see Aloysius P Llamazon, ‘Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent
Decisions of the International Court of Justice’, European Journal of International Law 18 (2007),
815–852, at 825–840.
65Cf Fulvio Palombino, ‘Compliance with International Judgments: Between Supremacy of Inter-
national Law and National Fundamental Principles’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law
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towards international law and institutions as such is nothing new and that other
constitutional courts have always reserved the right to step in and protect their
constitutional orders, especially in more integrated orders such as the EU—the
FCC possibly representing the most famous example66—the important difference
is that the ItCC no longer limits itself to issuing warning shots. This recent devel-
opment clearly shows that it has started to actually apply the constitutional barriers
and that it accepts the price of Italian responsibility under international law.
III. Which Role for Courts at the Intersection of Legal
Orders?
How can this development be explained? It is argued here that it is neither surprising
that clashes between international and domestic (constitutional) law seem to happen
more frequently in recent times, nor that they often emerge with regard to judgments
of international courts. This has not only to do with a quantitative change of
international law, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, and more
generally the growing importance of international regulation in times of global
governance, but also with a qualitative change of the norms. Whereas in the past,
international law often remained vague and gave states considerable leeway for its
implementation, the concrete orders of international courts reduce this leeway and
make tensions or even frictions more likely.67 Chances remain high that this
development continues. The consequence is that domestic courts in the near future
might be confronted more often with international judgments. This is also true for
the ICJ which has started to formulate more concrete obligations.68
This brief analysis thus shows once more the difficult—and arguably highly
political69—role domestic courts assume at the intersection of legal orders. The
examples illustrate that the question of whether and how to give effect to
75 (2015), 503–529; Stefano Battini, ‘È costituzionale il diritto internazionale?’, Giornale di diritto
amministrativo 3 (2015), 367–377.
66Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 29 May 1974, BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271. See, for more
examples, Anne Peters, ‘The Globalization of State Constitutions’, in Janne E Nijman/André
Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law
(Oxford: OUP 2007), 251–308, at 266–267; Anne Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law
Meets Domestic Constitutional Law’, Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law
3 (2009), 170–198.
67See also Nico Krisch, ‘Pluralism in International Law and Beyond’, (3 June 2015), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2613930, 1–18, at 3.
68See section II.1 of this chapter.
69Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality’ 2014 (n 10), 121.
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international law is far from being a technical question.70 Giving effect to interna-
tional judgments rather involves complex constitutional questions and requires the
balancing of sometimes conflicting but equally important interests like the effective-
ness of international adjudication and the protection of fundamental constitutional
principles, both of which can be considered aspects of the rule of law in a general
sense. When asked to give effect to international judgments, domestic courts may
even face the dilemma of, on the one hand, abiding by judicial decisions based on
international law, which contradict fundamental protections in the domestic legal
system, or, on the other hand, adhering to national (constitutional) law, which risks
defying international law. More than as instances of backlash, much of the resistance
to international courts by their domestic counterparts can thus be seen as an
illustration of today’s complex and plural legal reality.71
This raises the question of how domestic courts should deal with international
judgments. It is submitted here that good reasons support a solid place for domestic
courts in the enforcement of the judgments of the ICJ. First of all, the practice of the
ICJ—hitherto considered the archetype of an ‘old style’ international court72—is
changing. To be sure, the ICJ refrained from claiming that its judgments enjoy a
direct effect in the domestic legal orders, as seen above.73 Nonetheless, the position
of the World Court has undeniably evolved: it is no longer exclusively a ‘Court of
sovereign States’, becoming ‘also a court concerned with human rights, as human
rights law has finally found its proper place within international law’.74 The ICJ is
now even said to contribute to a ‘humanisation in international adjudication’.75
The purely state-centred view that some domestic courts still adopt seems to be at
odds with this development. Whereas it might have made sense with regard to the
70Peters, Beyond Human Rights 2016 (n 39), 495; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect,
and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional
Law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2008), 397–413, at 398.
71See for a differentiated view on the phenomenon of backlash Mikael Rask Madsen/Pola Cebulak/
Micha Wiebusch, ‘Backlash against International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of
Resistance to International Courts’, International Journal of Law in Context 14 (2018), 197–220.
72Karen J Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton:
Princeton University Press 2014), 81.
73See section II.1 of this chapter.
74Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Human Rights in the International Court of Justice’, Leiden Journal of
International Law 20 (2007), 745–751, at 746. Cf Gentian Zyberi, The Humanitarian Face of the
International Court of Justice: Its Contribution to Interpreting and Developing International
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Rules and Principles (Antwerpen: Intersentia 2008);
Bruno Simma, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The Contribution of the ICJ’, Journal of Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement 3 (2012), 7–29.
75International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law, Conference
Report Washington: ‘International Human Rights Law and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)’, 2014, available at www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees, para 86.
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‘traditional’ international law which treated mainly interstate issues,76 this is no
longer the case for the ‘inward-looking’ international law of today.77 Accordingly,
the ‘fiction’ of the unitary state is increasingly being considered an obstacle to
compliance with international requirements. In the words of Rosalyn Higgins,
‘compliance with the findings of international tribunals is made the more difficult
exactly because while “the state” carries the international obligation to comply, the
necessary action to achieve that must internally be performed by organs of state
(. . .).’78 This is even more so if the judgments directly touch upon rights or interests
of individuals. Both the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have
stated that effective compliance with judgments is the materialization of justice for
the concrete case,79 and represents an important aspect of the right to have access to
justice and the rule of law.80 For individuals benefitting from a judgment of the ICJ,
domestic courts are likely to be the only avenue open to reach compliance.81 The use
of classical ‘avoidance techniques’82 seems inadequate in such situations.
However, this does not mean that domestic courts should follow the ICJ blindly.
Given the increasing impact of international law on domestic systems and its
persisting deficits, the claim for its absolute supremacy, and thus a rigid rule
favouring the precedence of international law, seems neither normatively desirable
nor to correspond to legal reality.83 A growing body of scholarship argues that, given
the lack of democratic legitimacy and effective safeguards for fundamental rights in
certain areas of international law, at least the highest domestic courts should in
exceptional cases have a ‘constitutional right to resist’ international law.84 This
means that they may exceptionally disregard international law where its application
in the specific circumstances would result in a violation of core principles of the
76Allot speaks of ‘structural duality’. See Philip Allot, ‘The Emerging Universal Legal System’, in
Janne E Nijman/André Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and
International Law (Oxford: OUP 2007), 63–83, at 82.
77Cf, Ferdinandusse, ‘Out of the Black Box’ 2003 (n 35); Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘The Reception by
National Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals’, in Thomas M Franck/Gregory H Fox
(eds), International Law Decisions in National Courts (New York: Transnational Publishers 1996),
21–35, at 23.
78Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Concept of “the State”: Variable Geometry and Dualist Perceptions’, in
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes/Vera Gowlland-Debbas (eds), The International Legal System in
Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff 2001), 547–561, at 547.
79IACtHR, Case of Baena Ricardo et al v Panama, Judgment of 28 November 2003, Series C No
104, para 72.
80ECtHR, Hornsby v Greece, Judgment of 19 March 1997, Application No 18357/91, para 40.
81Cf Oppong/Barreto, ‘Enforcement’ 2016 (n 17), 286.
82ILA, ‘Engagement of Domestic Courts’ (n 2), para 21.
83Cf André Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law’, Zeitschrift für
öffentliches Recht 65 (2010), 65–85.
84Thomas Cottier/Daniel Wüger, ‘Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf das Verfassungsrecht:
Eine Diskussionsgrundlage’, in Beat Sitter-Liver (ed), Herausgeforderte Verfassung: Die Schweiz
im globalen Kontext (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag Freiburg 1999), 241–281, at 263.
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domestic constitutional order or the ‘constitutional identity’.85 Under these narrow
circumstances, disobedience is a tool that helps to moderate the negative side-effects
of multilevel governance and to facilitate—and not disrupt—the interplay between
different legal orders. In this vein, it might, in the long run, foster rather than weaken
the ideal of the rule of law also at the international level.86
This shows that seeing domestic courts in a binary fashion as either ‘gatekeepers’
or ‘compliance partners’ does not capture the complex role they play today at the
intersection of legal orders. It has thus been suggested that it is at the same time more
accurate descriptively and normatively preferable to view courts as bearers of
‘multiple identities’.87 In this sense, domestic courts are now part of a wider
network, a ‘global community of courts’,88 and should have in mind the ‘overall
systemic interest in creating an interlocking system of adjudication.’89 Domestic
courts should take into account that to abide by judgments resulting from disputes
that the parties voluntarily submitted to an international court belongs to the very
foundations upon which the system of binding international adjudication is built.90
Non-compliance imperils ‘the raison d’être for the functioning’91 of international
courts, and arguably the (rather fragile) international rule of law. Rather than as
guardians of one particular order, in today’s complex legal reality courts should thus
see themselves as mediators between orders.92 More than strict conflict rules and
hierarchies, what better fits to the complex reality is an approach that allows to take
into account the different interests at stake and to balance them. This again does not
require to follow international courts at any prize, but at least to seriously engage
with them and consider their rulings. This flexible, procedural solution thus reflects
the fact that many different interests and claims are at play and to a certain extent
allows to reconcile the multiple roles played by domestic courts.
The middle-ground position some courts such as the FCC take, requiring to take
into account international judgments, seems most suited to reconcile those multiple
85Anne Peters, ‘Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur Neubestimmung der
Verhältnisse’, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 65 (2010), 3–63, at 61; von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism,
Direct Effect’ (n 70), 398.
86See, on these ‘feedback loops’, Machiko Kanetake/André Nollkaemper, ‘The International Rule
of Law in the Cycle of Contestations and Deference’, in Machiko Kanetake/André Nollkaemper
(eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestation and Deference
(Oxford: Hart 2016), 445–460.
87Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford:
OUP 2010), at 291–294.
88Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, Harvard International Law Journal
44 (2003) 191–219.
89Paul S Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge:
CUP 2012), 294.
90Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94 UN Charter’, in Andreas Zimmermann/Karin Oellers-Frahm/
Christian Tomuschat et al (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary
(Oxford: OUP 2nd ed 2012), para 1.
91IACtHR, Baena Ricardo v Panama (n 79), para 72.
92Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism 2010 (n 87), 294.
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roles of courts.93 Certainly, this jurisprudence has been extensively criticized,
especially in the context of the European human rights system, precisely because
it widens the scope of possibilities to disregard binding judgments.94 The Russian
Constitutional Court even called it an ‘emblematic’ example of deviation from
judgments of the ECtHR.95 However, this line has thus far allowed German courts
to reconcile claims of the different legal orders with few frictions. The reason is that
the FCC reads this requirement generally in a result-oriented and international law
friendly way, seriously engaging with its international counterparts.96 By contrast,
for the US Supreme Court in order to satisfy the requirement of taking into account
international judgments, a mere reference to the relevant judgment seems to suf-
fice.97 Such merely formal cross-referencing certainly does not allow a serious
engagement and lacks the openness needed to effectively cope with today’s complex
legal reality.
How is Judgment 238/2014 to be read against this backdrop? Two aspects of the
judgment deserve to be highlighted in this regard. First of all, and despite the fact that
the ItCC stresses that the effect of its judgment remain limited to the Italian legal
order,98 its aim is not only to avoid legal consequences it deems intolerable, but
furthermore to contribute to the evolution of the law of immunities in a way more
considerate of human rights.99 It thus considers that it enters into a form of judicial
dialogue with the ICJ with the aim to push for a change it deems necessary.100
93See section II.1 of this chapter. See also ILA, Committee on International Human Rights Law,
Resolution No 2/2016: ‘The impact of international human rights law on the International Court of
Justice’, 2016, No 9 a): ‘They [Constitutional and supreme courts] take the pertinent judgments and
decisions of courts and quasi-judicial bodies, also in those cases to which the state was not a party,
fully into account and integrate them in their reasoning in good faith’, available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees.
94For an overview, see Matthias Hartwig, ‘Much Ado about Human Rights: The Federal Consti-
tutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights’, German Law Journal 5 (2005),
869–894.
95Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment of 14 July 2015, No 21-П/2015, para 4.
96See, for a paradigmatic example of adjustment to the ECtHR, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of
4 May 2011, 2 BvR 2365/09, BVerfGE 128, 326 (Sicherungsverwahrung). See, on the stance of the
FCC towards the ECtHR, Eckart Klein, ‘Germany’, in Janneke Gerards/Joseph Fleuren (eds),
Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the Judgments of the
ECtHR in National Case Law (Cambridge: Intersentia 2014), 185–216; Elisabeth Lambert-
Abdelgawad/Anne Weber, ‘The Reception Process in France and Germany’, in Helen Keller/
Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems
(Oxford: OUP 2008), 107–164. Cf Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism 2010 (n 87), 109–152.
97US Supreme Court, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon (n 42).
98ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 1), para 3.3.
99Ibid.
100See on judicial dialogue Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’, Harvard
International Law Journal 44 (2003) 191; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 20 (2000), 499–532; Sujit Choudry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a
Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’, Indiana Law Journal 74 (1999), 819–892.
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Especially in the European human rights system, domestic courts have sometimes
successfully entered into such a dialogue,101 which enhances the ‘shared responsi-
bility’ for the standards of the ECHR102 and provides ‘a constructive way for
channeling substantive disagreement or criticism (. . .)’.103 However, it is submitted
here that to enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the ICJ seems less fruitful from the outset.
Other than the human rights courts, the World Court is much less flexible and does
not have the same possibilities to react.104 In the case of the ECtHR, for instance, the
Grand Chamber can correct a judgment. Furthermore, in the European system a
change of jurisprudence is much easier to undertake due to the rich case-law of the
ECtHR. This is different for the World Court, which only deals with a handful of
cases per year. The risk of damaging its authority seems thus even bigger.105 In fact,
in cases of legal conflict such as in the one at hand, where a domestic court (at least
de facto) contests a final and binding international judgment with the consequence
that enforcement of this judgment becomes difficult or even impossible, the term
‘dialectical review’ seems to fit better than ‘judicial dialogue’.106
The second point relevant from the viewpoint of the interaction of different legal
orders is that Sentenza 238/2014 indicates a move towards a more national and
‘gatekeeper’ type of understanding of the ItCC’s role at the intersection of legal
orders. Even though it would be too far-fetched to read Sentenza as an instance of
nationalism trumping multilateralism and as an inevitable sign of crisis and decline
of the international judiciary, the judgment clearly indicates a certain shift of the
ItCC to a more dualist vision of the relationship between legal orders. Whereas
several of the recent judgments of the ItCC touching upon the relationship of the
Italian legal order with international or European law show that the Corte pursues a
101In the European system, several cases are known where the ECtHR adjusted its position. See, eg,
ECtHR, Case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of
15 December 2011, Applications Nos 26766/05 and 22228/06.
102On the notion of shared responsibility, see ECtHR, ‘Implementation of the Judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights: a Shared Judicial Responsibility?’, (31 January 2014), available
at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2014_ENG.pdf. See also High Level
Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Copenhagen Declaration’,
12–13 April 2018, available at https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-declaration/16807b915c, paras 6–11.
See, for the legitimizing effect of court interaction, Armin von Bogdandy/Ingo Venzke, In Whose
Name? A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication (Oxford: OUP 2014), 196.
103Sarah Lambrecht, ‘Assessing the Existence of Criticism of the European Court of Human
Rights’, in Patricia Popelier/Sarah Lambrecht/Koen Lemmens (eds), Criticism of the European
Court of Human Rights. Shifting the Convention System: Counter-Dynamics and the National and
EU Level (Cambridge: Intersentia 2016), 505–554, at 549.
104See also Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume.
105See, in more detail, Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and “Constructive Contes-
tation”: A Miscarried Attempt?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 621–627.
106Cf Robert B Ahdieh, ‘Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts’,
New York University Law Review 79 (2004), 2029–2163.
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more substantive check and makes the application and enforcement of legal norms
from other orders dependent on their compatibility with Italian law,107 in the
Sentenza it becomes particularly clear that by neatly distinguishing the ‘inside’
from the ‘outside’, the ItCC attempts to reintroduce clear boundaries between legal
orders. And while this might be seen as a reaction to some of the problems and
controversies surrounding global governance, it is submitted that such a stance lacks
the openness and flexibility needed to effectively cope with the challenges of today’s
complex and plural legal reality. Rather than shielding off their legal orders, domes-
tic courts should acknowledge that they are important actors at the intersection of
legal orders, and that the functioning of the overall system in the long run to large
extents will depend on them.108 Moreover, they should be aware that their judgments
are indeed read and that nowadays their audience is global. The danger of setting
dangerous precedents is thus a real one. The fact that the Russian Constitutional
Court justified its disregard for judgments of the ECtHR explicitly relying, among
others, on the ItCC109 indicates that Pandora’s box is already wide open.
IV. Conclusion
Judgment 238/2014 is a good occasion to explore once more the role of domestic
courts in international law. This chapter has done so with regard to the particular
question of the relationship between domestic courts and international courts, and
more concretely the ICJ. As the case studies show, though domestic courts could act
as enforcers of judgments of the World Court, in many instances they have not
assumed such a role and deferred implementation to the political branches. This
chapter argues that in light of the current state of international law and the important
role the individual now plays—however indirectly—before the ICJ, the very dualist
stance many domestic courts take is inadequate. Often, domestic courts can be the
only avenue available for individuals to enforce judgments rendered in their favour.
That this can be a matter of life or death is highlighted by the Avena saga. On the
other hand, in light of the growing impact of international law and its persistent
deficits, it seems too far-reaching to expect domestic courts to follow international
courts blindly. A certain control undertaken by domestic courts might compensate
for these deficits and in the long run even contribute to the international rule of law.
However, in the face of today’s plural legal reality, domestic courts should take into
account and carefully balance the different interests at stake, namely an effective
system of international adjudication and the protection of fundamental constitutional
107Section II.2. of this chapter.
108See also Paul S Berman, ‘Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism: Procedural Principles for Managing
Global Legal Pluralism’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20 (2013), 665–695.
109Russian Constitutional Court, Judgment No 21-П/2015 (n 95), para 4. See also Heike Krieger,
chapter ‘Sentenza 238/2014: A Good Case for Law-Reform?’, in this volume.
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principles. Only in very exceptional circumstances should they contradict their
international counterparts. This is even more so in the case of the ICJ, which after
all barely has a chance to react. The danger of damaging its authority seems
significant. Domestic courts should recognize that they are crucial actors at the
intersection of legal orders, and that a functioning system of adjudication across
levels and orders at the end of the day will to large extents depend on them.
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Abstract In this chapter we focus on the consequences of Sentenza 238/2014 for
the Italian judiciary. The judgment of the Corte Costituzionale obliges the Italian
tribunals to admit claims for the reparation of victims or the heirs of victims and to
decide on the merits. In this context, a series of difficult legal questions arise that
require consistent answers. The practice shows, however, that consistent answers
cannot be taken for granted as long as the decision is in the hands of lower-level
tribunals. The questions to be solved concern, firstly, who can bring a claim: the
victims only or—in cases where they are no longer alive—also their spouses,
children, or even grandchildren and other family members? This raises a second
question namely whether there is any time limit for bringing claims, which of course
touches upon more general concerns, such as intertemporal law, statutory limita-
tions, prescriptions, forfeiture and inadmissibility due to reparation agreements.
Thirdly, there is the question as to the specific nature of the reparations: for example,
financial reparations and their calculation standards, or satisfaction only? A further
question arising from all decisions granting reparation relates to the execution of the
judgments, as it seems rather illusory that Germany will comply voluntarily with
such judgments. An additional aspect the chapter addresses is the broader impact of
the decisions of the Italian judiciary: the non-recognition of state immunity before
Italian tribunals will make Italy an attractive forum for similar claims, evidence of
which has already emerged. Furthermore, the decisions of the tribunals will serve—
although certainly involuntarily—as precedents in similar cases not only in Italy.
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Such effects will concern issues such as (a) the reparation of war-related claims on an
individual basis and (b) their consequences for the readiness of states to terminate
armed activities by concluding peace treaties and reparation agreements on a lump
sum basis. With a view to actual armed conflicts that are mostly not international
armed conflicts the question has then to be asked (c) whether individual reparation
claims will lead to discriminatory consequences as reparation will probably only be
realizable for victims of war crimes committed by state organs and not those
committed by non-state actors. The chapter will then conclude by trying to assess
more in general the task of constitutional and/or supreme courts to balance the
consequences flowing from their decisions against their power or intent to enhance
the development of (international) law.
I. Introduction
Sentenza 238/20141 resulted in a grave dilemma for the Italian judiciary, which is
expected to comply with the judgment. In particular, cases already pending—or
cases that will be brought in the future before a court concerning reparation for war
crimes committed by Germany during World War II (WWII) against Italian citi-
zens—will no longer be dismissed on the basis of jurisdictional immunity of
Germany. As a matter of principle,2 they have to be decided on the merits.
This implies that courts have to decide on a series of complicated issues that have
hitherto remained unanswered, such as who may bring a claim, whether there is a
time limit for bringing claims and what the specific reparation scheme might look
like. A further and highly delicate question relates to the execution of those judg-
ments awarding compensation or reparation. Under general international law states
do not only enjoy immunity from adjudication but also immunity from execution3—
and Sentenza 238/2014 only explicitly denies in the Italian legal order the existence
1Cf Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Das italienische Verfassungsgericht und das Völkerrecht—eine
unerfreuliche Beziehung, Anmerkung zur Entscheidung des italienischen Verfassungsgerichts
vom 22. Oktober 2014’, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 42 (2015), 8-16; Stefan Raffeiner,
‘Jenseits der Staatenimmunität im deutsch-italienischen Staatenimmunitäten-Fall: Wege und
Hürden nach dem Urteil der Corte Costituzionale’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law
76 (2016), 451-473; Marco Longobardo, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court’s Ruling Against State
Immunity When International Crimes Occur: Thoughts on Decision No. 238 of 2014’, Melbourne
Journal of International Law 16 (2015), 255-269; Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘La Corte costituzionale e il
ricorso ai “contro-limiti” nel rapporto tra consuetudini internazionali e diritti fondamentali’, Diritti
umani e diritto internazionale 9 (2015), 41-50.
2Giovanni Boggero, ‘The Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional
Court for Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the ‘Triepelian Approach’ Possible?’, Heidelberg
Journal of International Law 76 (2016), 203-224, at 215 et seq, where the author refers to the means
available for Italian judges to decide not in conformity with the Constitutional Court’s judgment.
3Xiaodang Yang, ‘Immunity from Execution’, in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Hand-
book on Jurisdiction and Immunities in International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2016),
372-422.
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of the customary rule of state immunity from adjudication for acta iure imperii
involving serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law. At the same time,
the 2012 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment remains binding upon Italy
under international law, with the consequence that Italian tribunals disregarding that
judgment commit a violation of international law that is attributable to the Italian
state because the judiciary is an organ acting on behalf of the state (Article 4 of the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility);4 such violations would occur, in particular,
when acts of execution concerning the relevant adjudicatory judgments were
adopted.
The following considerations will firstly concentrate on questions to be answered
by Italian courts and tribunals and the effect that such decisions may have more
generally under international law and, secondly, address the (problems related to)
execution. This will lead to a number of reflections concerning potential political
solutions, such as reparation agreements between Italy and Germany, and the
question of the constitutionality of such solutions.
II. Attempts by Italian Courts to Cope with the Contrasting
Obligations Stemming from International and Domestic Law
After the delivery of Sentenza 238/2014, the Italian tribunals had to decide on the
cases suspended during the proceedings before the ICJ. It was the Tribunal of
Florence5—though not the same judge that had referred the question of constitu-
tionality to the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) leading to Judgment 238/20146—
that took the first decision following Sentenza.7 That decision is clearly characterized
by the Tribunal’s attempt to find a way between Scylla and Charybdis, namely to
comply at the same time with the ICJ Judgment and the Judgment of the ItCC. In its
Order of 23 March 2015,8 the Tribunal explicitly mentioned the risk that the Italian
4ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.
5‘Tribunal’ is used as translation for ‘Tribunale’, which generally is a court of first instance in the
Italian civil judiciary system. A ‘Corte d’Appello’ generally reviews the judgment made by the
courts of first instance.
6It was the Tribunal of Florence that in 2014 referred three questions to the Constitutional Court,
leading to Sentenza 238/2014: (1) whether the rule of jurisdictional state immunity applies also in
cases of grave human rights violations; (2) whether the law ratifying the UN Charter is constitu-
tional with regard to Art 94 of the Charter concerning the obligation to comply with decisions of the
ICJ; and (3) whether the Italian Law No 5 of 14 January 2013 concerning the implementation of the
2012 ICJ Judgment was constitutional.
7Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014.
8Tribunale di Firenze, Order of 23 March 2015, No 2012/1300, where not the victim himself but
family members of the victim had brought the claim. Cf Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending
Story: The International Court of Justice—The Italian Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and
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state would violate international law if it were to disregard the customary rule on
state immunity, and the Tribunal thus attempted to find a subtler solution. This
solution was linked to paragraph 104 of the ICJ Judgment in which the Court
mentioned the advantage, or rather desirability, of renegotiations between Italy
and Germany.9 On the basis of this approach the Tribunal found that in the case at
stake it should proceed by seeking a conciliatory solution. However, as paragraph
104 of the ICJ Judgment could not serve as a legal basis for imposing conciliation,
the Tribunal found that ‘considering that the dispute at hand implies the risk for Italy
of committing an international wrongful act (. . .), an attempt of conciliation between
the applicants and the Federal Republic of Germany but also between Italy and
Germany (. . .) should be made in accordance with Article 185 of the Code of Civil
Procedure’.10 At the same time, the Tribunal itself presented a concrete proposal of
conciliation. This proposal provided that Germany grants financial support
amounting to €15,000 to the family members of the victims to enable them to
temporarily live in Germany for educational or other cultural purposes and that the
plaintiffs in return withdraw their claim. Failing the adoption of this conciliation
proposal, formal mediation before a special body would occur.11 This approach was
followed by the Tribunal of Piacenza in its sentenza non definitiva (‘non-final
judgment’) of 25 September 2015,12 which was somewhat more cautious as it did
not itself present a proposal for conciliation but only ‘invited’ Italy and Germany to
consider the opportunity of depositing a note containing a proposal for an amicable
solution. The Tribunal mentioned, however, that the attitude of the parties would be
a decisive factor in the regulation of the costs of the procedure—thus trying to put
some pressure on the parties to follow the ‘invitation’ for conciliation. The concil-
iation solution would in fact have presented an elegant way out of the dilemma with
the Question of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of International Law 76 (2016), 193-202; Boggero,
‘Legal Implications of Sentenza No. 238’ 2016 (n 2).
9ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 104, where the ICJ stated ‘the claims arising from the
treatment of the Italian military internees (. . .) together with other claims of Italian nationals which
have allegedly not been settled—and which formed the basis for the Italian proceedings—could be
the subject of further negotiations involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving this
issue.’
10Tribunale di Firenze, Order No 2012/1300 (n 8), 2-3, (translated by the authors).
11Ibid, 3.
12Tribunale di Piacenza, Decision of 28 September 2015, No 1462/2015. See also, however,
Tribunale di Sulmona, Order of 2 November 2017, No 20/2015, 8. Here judge Giovanna Bilò
states that ‘five years after the judgment of the Court of The Hague the existence of such a far
reaching customary law (eg immunity from jurisdiction without any exception) in the international
legal order may be doubted’ (translated by the authors). Cf in this context, Giovanni Boggero,
‘Ancora sul seguito della sentenza n. 238/2014: una recente pronuncia del Tribunale di Sulmona’,
(20 November 2017), available at www.diritticomparati.it/ancora-sul-seguito-della-sentenza-n-
2382014-una-recente-pronuncia-del-tribunale-di-sulmona/ and also: Maria Irene Papa/Alessandra
Zanobetti, ‘Eccidio di Roccaraso: giurisdizione italiana e immunità degli Stati dalla giurisdizione
civile’, in Il Corriere giuridico 6 (2018), 788–798.
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which the Italian tribunals were confronted, namely that of disregarding neither the
decision of the ItCC nor international law as stated by the ICJ. But this attempt failed
for two reasons: first, Article 185 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure was not the
proper legal basis, as it provides for negotiations between the plaintiff and the
defendant—that is, the individual claimant and Germany—and not between the
defendant and a third party—that is, Germany and Italy.13 Secondly, Germany
unsurprisingly did not react to the decision.
III. Issues to Be Decided by the Italian Courts
1. Who Can Bring a Claim and Who Is a Victim?
The first question that had to be answered following the failure to find a conciliatory
solution concerned the issue of who can bring a claim. The war crimes committed
against Italian nationals that represent the origin of the claims were committed by
Germany between 1943 and 1945, a time frame that already indicated that a large
number of the directly affected persons would not be in a situation to bring their
claims personally. Thus, the question arose as to who could bring a claim besides the
victims themselves: whether family members, spouses, children, grandchildren or
even nieces, nephews and cousins were entitled to claim compensation for the
suffering inflicted upon them due to the loss of the family member. As already
mentioned, the Italian tribunals did not address this topic at all in a first approach
following Sentenza 238/2014, but admitted without further discussion claims
brought by any family member and tried to circumvent a decision on the merits by
referring the parties to conciliation.14 When this attempt failed, the Italian tribunals
were bound to decide on the merits, namely to award or decline compensation, and
in this context they had to define in more detail who is entitled to bring a claim and
receive compensation.
Today there is no question that direct victims are entitled to bring a claim.
However, most of the cases were brought by family members as the victims
themselves were no longer alive. And as the practice of the Italian courts was
unanimous in finding that claims cannot lead to reparation of material damages but
only to compensation of immaterial (moral) damages, even where victims them-
selves brought a case,15 the way was open to admitting claims from secondary or
indirect victims. Such damage resulting from family links/family solidarity was
13Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 8), 198.
14See section II.
15Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 9 May 2011, No 10107/2011.
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defined as danno parentale, and could in principle be claimed whenever a family
link existed with regard to the victim.16 This very general definition of the danno
parentale seemed to give leeway for claims brought by any family member without
any further requirement. In 2017, however, it was again the Tribunal of Ascoli
Piceno, although in a different but similar case decided on by a different judge than
the one that delivered the Order of 8 March 2016,17 examining in more detail the
issue of who is entitled to compensation for danno parentale. Following the Order of
8 March 2016 it was confirmed in general terms that the danno parentale is, in
principle, not submitted to prefixed limits, but that having a family link in itself is an
insufficient justification for a claim to compensation. Rather, it is incumbent on the
claimants to prove that the loss of the family member had a relevant impact on them
personally. In the case before it, the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno found that neither the
brothers nor a nephew of the victim could prove any personal damage and thus
dismissed their compensation claim. As other aspects had been dismissed as inad-
missible by the Italian tribunals (such as a statutory limitation, forfeiture or limiting
claims for compensation),18 the requirement of proving substantive personal damage
constitutes a necessary and welcome limitation for future claims. This also means,
however, that the tribunals will have to investigate the claimants family life and
personal relationships dating back, potentially, more than 70 years, which is not only
a difficult task but leaves much room for discretion and—as the Tribunal of Ascoli
Piceno explicitly stated—for the ‘skill of the advocates’.19 Nevertheless, this case-
law is promising in the sense that there will be some personal limits for bringing
claims whereof the Court of Cassation will have to ensure a uniform interpretation.
In this context it is worth mentioning that the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno in the
same Order of 24 February 2017 awarded a financial reparation of €30,000 to the
Comune di Castignano—the municipality where the crimes were committed—for
the moral damage produced and inflicted on the public life of the Comune, and this
claim was not subjected to any limiting considerations. In particular, this final
section of the decision raises the fundamental question of the kind of reparation
which comprises restitution, compensation and satisfaction,20 what seems especially
significant with regard to the reparation accorded to a collective entity, in this case a
municipality, rather than individual family members.
16Cf Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order of 8 March 2016, No 112/2015 (partial admittance),
22, Judge Foti relying on Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 12 July 2006, No 15760/2006; Corte
Costituzionale, Judgment of 6 May 1985, No 132/1985; Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 14 July
1984, No 184/1984.
17Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order of 24 February 2017, No 523/2015 (final admittance).
18See section III.2.
19Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015 (n 17), 51, referring to Corte di Cassazione,
Judgment of 8 October 2007, No 20987/2007. The original terms used by the Tribunal read:
‘[S]petta alle vittime ed alla intelligenza dei loro difensori, apprestare una difesa adeguata’.
(‘[I]t lies with the victims and the skill of their advocates to present an adequate defence’ (translated
by the authors)).
20See sections III.3. and V; Cf ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2001 (n 4), Art 34.
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2. Time Frame for Reparation Obligations
The question of who can bring a claim involves the more general issue of the time
frame for compensation claims. There are rules in national and international law
reflecting the idea that legal peace can only be assured if after a certain lapse of time
claims can no longer be raised.21 Such rules concern intertemporal law, statutory
limitation, and forfeiture; each one was tackled by the Italian tribunals, but they were
all dismissed as not applicable.
According to the principle of intertemporal law,22 only the law in force at the time
when the controversial action occurred is applicable. This principle guarantees the
certainty and stability of law, which is of utmost importance in both national and
international law. It finds reflection in the idiom nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
praevia lege poenali, which prohibits the retrospective application of criminal
sanctions. In this context, the Italian tribunals rightly referred furthermore to the
fact that ‘since ever’ international actors had tried to put limits to war crimes.23 They
mention the International Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929, and reaffirmed
by those of 1949, which all substantially sanctioned crimes of war or what is now
classified as crimes against humanity. While these arguments are plausible, the
question remains whether criminal responsibility also implies civil responsibility:
an obligation of individual reparation. In this context the Italian judges were
categorical in stating that at the time the crimes were committed the ‘possibility of
criminal—and even civil—sanctions was generally accepted’.24 This statement
seems rather controversial as individual redress for war-related crimes was certainly
21Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Judicial Redress of War-Related Claims by Individuals: The Example of
the Italian Courts’, in Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest:
Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford: OUP 2011), 1055-1078, at 1070; Carlo
Focarelli, ‘Diniego dell’immunità giurisdizionale degli Stati stranieri per crimini, jus cogens e
dinamica del diritto internazionale’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 91 (2008), 738-757; Alexander
Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity and International Public Order Revisited’, German Yearbook of
International Law 49 (2006), 327-365.
22Cf Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law’, in
Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century (The
Hague: Kluwer 1996), 173-181; Mieke van der Linden, ‘The Inextricable Connection between
Historical Consciousness and International Law’, Select Proceedings of the ESIL 5 (2014),
447-460.
23Cf Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015 (n 17), 19 et seq; Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno,
Order No 112/2015 (n 16); Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment of 25 September 2015, No 723/2015.
24Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015, (n 17), 25 stating that: ‘[L]a possibilità di
sanzionare penalmente—e, ancor più, civilmente—fatti che (. . .) erano considerati criminosi (. . .)
deve reputarsi norma internazionale comunemente accettata e riconosciuta’ (translated by the
authors).
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not an issue at the time at stake, namely before the adoption of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, and is under discussion, and thus not generally accepted, still today.25
With regard to prescription, the Italian judges are unanimous and refer, without
further explanations, only to the Ferrini judgment of the Court of Cassation stating
that there is no prescription for the ‘credito risarcitorio da crimine di guerra’,
meaning that claims for reparation and compensation in such cases are, in principle,
not submitted to time limitations.26 This follows from the fact that such claims
‘reside in a principle of constitutional value, namely the right of the victims to
complete compensation of damages, material or immaterial, resulting from the
violation of fundamental human rights’.27 Although this statement seems to imply
that there is no time limit for bringing reparation claims, it nevertheless refers to the
right of ‘victims’, and this reference in combination with the more detailed interpre-
tation of the ‘danno parentale’ given by the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno sets a
(biological) time limit, although not in the form of a prescription.
Furthermore, the objection concerning forfeiture of the claims28 was dismissed by
the Italian judges. Forfeiture or ‘implied waiver’ of rights can be seen in the attitude
of the Italian state after WWII, in particular in its renunciation to claim further
reparation in the Peace Treaty of 1947 and later once more in the Bonn Agreements
of 1961. This argument is, however, constantly dismissed by the Italian tribunals,
arguing instead that the actual claims for reparation only concern immaterial damage
and that such damage was not the subject matter of the Peace Treaty or the reparation
agreements.29
In sum it may be stated that ‘legal peace’, requiring, inter alia, respectively a
definition of those who constitute the secondary victims of the crimes committed by
Germany during WWII, will depend on the jurisdictional practice of the ordinary
tribunals (in the last instance, the Court of Cassation) in interpreting what exactly
amounts to ‘danno parentale’. In this context the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno’s Order
of 24 February 2017 sets a positive signal in the sense of requiring not only a mere
25Cf section III.1. See Christian Marxsen, ‘What do Different Theories of Customary International
Law Have to Say about the Individual Right to Reparation under International Humanitarian Law’,
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 78 (2018), 581-586, giving an introduction to the
following 19 reports on that subject matter.
26Cf Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment No 723/2015 (n 23), para 4; Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment
of 6 July 2015, No 2469/2015 (Furio Simoncioni) referring to Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of
11 March 2004, No 5044/04 (Ferrini); Cf for further decisions, Raffeiner, ‘Jenseits der
Staatenimmunität’ (2016) (n 1), 468.
27Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015 (n 17), 48, referring to Corte di Cassazione,
Judgment No 15760/2006 (n 16); ItCC, Judgment No 132/1985 (n 16); ItCC, Judgment No
184/1984 (n 16).
28Cf Burkhard Hess, ‘Kriegsentschädigungen aus kollisionsrechtlicher und rechtsvergleichender
Sicht’, in Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg (ed), Entschädigung nach bewaffneten Konflikten: die
Konstitutionalisierung der Welthandelsordnung (Heidelberg: Müller 2003), 107-205, at 146 et seq;
Andrea Gattini, Le riparazioni di guerra nel diritto internazionale (Padua: CEDAM 2003), 247.
29Tribunale di Piacenza, Judgment No 723/2015 (n 23).
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family link, but also the proof of a concrete damage in order to have a claim
admitted.
3. Type of Reparation
Finally, as a consequence of Sentenza 238/2014, the tribunals had to decide on the
kind of reparation: either financial reparation or compensation—and the parameters
of calculation—or mere satisfaction and/or a lump sum compensation to primary
victims still alive or also to victims’ family members. With a view to the first
decisions of the Italian tribunals it has to be stated that no uniform scheme has
been developed and that the decisions awarding monetary compensation raise
serious concerns.
The cases where the victims themselves bring a claim may seem uncontroversial
in justifying financial compensation. The few cases decided thus far demonstrate,
however, that the amount of compensation awarded varies significantly. This raises
questions not only with regard to the ‘justice to be done’ in the assessment of the
suffering of the victim but also with regard to the lack of transparency concerning the
calculation of the compensation amount. For example, two cases may be mentioned
where the victims themselves brought a claim and where a compensation was
awarded.30 In one of the cases an amount of €50,000 was awarded, in the other an
amount of—only—€30,000 (plus interests of 4% since 1945) was accorded without
any explanation on how the amount was calculated. With a view to this opaque
practice it might be preferable to award a prefixed amount of money as satisfaction or
symbolic compensation because compensation is not only difficult to calculate but,
as stated by the Italian tribunals, making good the suffering of the victims is
impossible. Significant differences between the amounts of compensation awarded
may raise further problems instead of leading to appeasement.
A second and rather more severe concern resulting from the first set of decisions
following Sentenza 238/2014 relates to the proportionality of compensation awarded
to the victims and the amount of compensation awarded to ‘secondary victims’,
namely the heirs of victims. In this context a decision of the Tribunal of Florence is
worth mentioning, which was delivered after the attempted conciliation solution
under Article 185 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure failed.31 In this case, the
Tribunal of Florence fixed an amount of €325,000 (plus interests of 4% running from
1945) as compensation for each of the daughters of the victim.32 In another case,
30Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 6 July 2015, No 2468/2015 (Duilio Bergamini) and Judgment
No 2469/2015 (Furio Simoncini) (n 26). Cf Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 8),
199. In the same vein, Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 13 January 2017, No 762/2017 and
Judgment of 29 July 2016, No 15812/2016.
31See section II.
32Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment of 22 February 2016, No 144740/2009 (Donati).
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decided by the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno, the spouses and children of a victim were
each awarded compensation of between €130,000 and €150,000.33 Already these
two examples raise the question of ‘doing justice’, in that it is extremely problematic
and hardly tolerable that family members of a victim, more than 70 years after the
underlying crime, were awarded a compensation amount significantly higher than
that awarded to the victims themselves. It demonstrates that justice requires a fair
balance between the compensation awarded to the primary and the secondary
victims and that those who directly suffered the crime, and the compensation
awarded to them, should set the standard for compensation awarded to family
members.
These considerations support the proposals concerning a general limitation of
financial compensation in two directions, first to award financial compensation to
primary victims only, and second to provide for a prefixed amount, as has been done
with regard to Russian prisoners of war.34 If, however, the next of kin should be
accorded a right to compensation, the amount should in any case not exceed the sum
fixed for a primary victim. As ‘reparation’, in the original sense of the term, cannot
be made, satisfaction and a symbolic amount of financial compensation seems more
adequate, not least when considering the length of time that has elapsed. From this
perspective, the idea of a fund established by both Germany and Italy35 would
probably best serve the aim of giving voice to the victims and their heirs without
raising new problems by awarding financial compensation on grounds that lack
sufficient transparency,36 as well as striking a fair balance between the compensation
awarded to primary and secondary victims. The creation of a fund would, however,
require the consent of Germany, which as things stand seems rather unlikely.
4. Implications of the Italian Decisions
a) Precedential Effects
The denial of immunity from jurisdiction resulting from Sentenza 238/2014 will
have implications also beyond the Italian context since questions of reparation for
war-related claims remain unsettled also with regard to other armed conflicts.37 Such
cases are not only on the docket of national courts but of international courts as well,
33Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015 (n 17).
34On 20 May 2015 the German government decided to pay a financial compensation of €2,500 to
each of the approximately 4,000 Russian prisoners of war still alive, which is explicitly character-
ized as symbolic compensation. Cf section VI.
35See Stefan Kadelbach, chapter ‘State Immunity, Individual Compensation for Victims of Human
Rights Crimes, and Future Prospects’, and Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial
Conundrum’, in this volume.
36See section V.
37Cf Christian Tams, chapter ‘A Dangerous Last Line of Defence’, in this volume.
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in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR). These issues can only summarily be addressed
in the present context, but they are of high relevance not only on the national, but
also on the international level because they gain significance as precedents particu-
larly regarding the following issues.38
In the first place there is the fundamental question of whether individuals have at
all a right to claim compensation or reparation for war-related crimes, a question that
is not explicitly settled in international law.39 State practice resulting from the
history of ending wars shows that peace treaties (usually) provided for reparation
schemes covering all claims of any kind in order to foster peaceful future relations.
There are only a few precedents where victims of war crimes were seeking or even
accorded reparation for their personal suffering during war.40
Only recently can a development be observed concerning individual claims
requiring reparation or compensation for war-related crimes brought before national
courts, but also before international human rights courts, as there is no clearly
defined demarcation between human rights and humanitarian law.41 Although
these developments have some merit, because war-related crimes should not go
unpunished, the fundamental question remains: whether this is an acceptable way to
cope with war-related claims as thousands of claims originating from all sides of the
38Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘Immunités juridictionnelles des Etats étrangers et droit de l’homme: quel
équilibre entre les valeurs fondamentales de l’ordre national et le droit international coutumier?’, in
James Crawford et al (eds), The International Legal Order: Current Needs and Possible Responses
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2017), 571-590.
39Christian Tomuschat, ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Vio-
lations: The Position under General International Law’, in Albrecht Randelzhofer/Christian
Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individuals (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1999),
1-25; Alessandro Bufalini, ‘La riparazione per gravi violazioni dei diritti umani e del diritto
umanitario tra rinuncia dello stato e diritto individuale’, in Andrea Spagnolo/Stefano Saluzzo
(eds), La responsabilità degli stati e delle organizzazioni internazionali (Milan: Ledizioni 2017),
375-391; Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Is There an Individual Right to Compensation?’, in Denis Alland et al
(eds), Unité et diversité du droit international (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2014), 495-502. See also
Christian Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, in this volume; Marxsen, ‘Different
Theories of Customary International Law’ 2018 (n 25) and the other reports referred to in n 25.
40See Roland Bank/Elke Schwager, ‘Is There a Substantive Right to Compensation for Individual
Victims of Armed Conflict against a State under International Law’ German Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 49 (2006), 367-411, who propose to combine the conclusion of reparation agreements
between the states concerned with a waiver of individual claims what seems to indicate a feasible
solution; the individual claims were thus merged with the reparation provisions in the peace treaties
and the individuals were then compensated by the state which received the reparation payments.
41In its Advisory Opinion concerning Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ had stated in this context: ‘As regards the relationship
between international humanitarian law und human rights law, there are thus three possible
situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of
international law’, (ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, 13, para 106).
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involved actors may put at risk peaceful relations between former enemies.42 This
question, which is still pending before the ECtHR,43 was met with silence by the
Italian tribunals as they merely referred to the Ferrini Judgment of the Court
of Cassation, which did however, not concern this issue as such but only the question
of statutory limitation.44 A further consequence of admitting individual redress of
war-related violations of human rights may be that states involved in a war or armed
conflict would abstain from accepting lump sum agreements when facing additional
individual claims.
The fact that the Italian tribunals did not address the issue of admissibility of
individual claims at all may be understood in the sense that this question is not
controversial and will not play a role in Italian courts and tribunals inviting thus
victims of war crimes to claim reparation, particularly because Italy admits such
claims as it does not feel bound by the rule of state immunity or other relevant issues,
such as intertemporal law, statutory limitation, forfeiture or waiver. These principles
have not been admitted as limiting factors to individual claims, so that Italy may
appear as an El Dorado for individuals seeking redress for war-related reparation
claims and will not only serve as a precedent setter but also as the preferred forum for
cases concerning reparations and compensation for war crimes that are allegedly
unsettled and neither concern Italian nationals nor acts committed on Italian
territory.45
b) Forum Shopping (Universal Jurisdiction)
The concern of forum shopping is in fact not only a theoretical one; there are cases in
which Italian courts and tribunals were seized with cases lacking any relation to
Italy. One of the most prominent and to a degree ‘leading’ cases in this context is the
Distomo case,46 which concerned a claim for execution of a decision delivered by
42Cf in this context, Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Regional Perspective on the Convergence and
Conflicts of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Military Operations: The
European Court of Human Rights’, in Erika de Wet/Jann Kleffner (eds), Convergence and Conflicts
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Military Operations (Pretoria: Pretoria
University Law Press 2014), 333-363; and Dinah Shelton, ‘Humanitarian Law in the Inter-
American Human Rights System’, ibid, 365-393.
43Cf ECtHR, Georgia v Russia II, Application No 38263/08 of 11 August 2008, where the ECtHR
will have to decide whether international humanitarian law is exclusively applicable so that the case
cannot be decided by the ECtHR in the context of an individual complaint.
44See section III.2.
45See also Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, chapter ‘Sentenza 238/2014’, in this volume.
46Corte di Cassazione, Judgments of 29 May 2008, No 14199/2008 and of 20 May 2011, No
11163/2011, on which see: Micaela Frulli, ‘“The Times they are A-Changing”—the Italian Court of
Cassation Denies Germany Immunity from Execution to Allow Compensation to War Crimes’
Victims’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 1129–1142. The execution pro-
ceedings concerned the implementation of the Tribunal of Livadia (Greece) of 30 October 1997
against Germany and Deutsche Bahn AG awarding reparation for war crimes committed by German
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Greek courts for German war-related crimes committed in Greece. Although this
case concerned only the execution of the decision on the costs of the proceedings
before Greek tribunals, the fact that the Italian Court of Cassation admitted execution
on German property located in Italy set a new trend. The Court of Cassation did not
at all tackle questions of state immunity or more generally questions of jurisdiction
with regard to the execution of foreign judgments in Italy but merely referred to
Article 64 of the Law No 218 of 31 May 1995 concerning the Italian international
private law system, which inter alia requires that the foreign judgment does not run
contrary to the national ‘ordre public’ for giving leeway for execution.
Italian tribunals were also confronted with individual reparation claims resulting
from armed conflicts, such as the one that occurred between 1991 and 1995 in the
former Yugoslavia. Thus, the criminal division of the Court of Cassation, for
example, denied immunity to Serbia in relation to a request for compensation
brought by the heirs of Italian victims of war crimes committed in the Yugoslav
armed conflict.47 In two further decisions, the Court of Cassation recognized that
Iran was not entitled to immunity for acts amounting to crimes against humanity,48
although in the cases before it the court denied exequatur to the judgments of US
courts that had awarded damages against Iran for reasons concerning the require-
ments for exercising civil jurisdiction under the relevant Italian law.49
What is interesting in these cases is the fact that the Italian courts and tribunals do
not refer to principles such as universal jurisdiction, which in particular in cases
concerning war crimes is often referred to, but only rely on national law, namely
Law No 218/1995, which regulates the Italian system of international private law. In
the cases concerning civil claims, reference to the principle of universal jurisdiction
would in fact not have been appropriate. Indeed, universal jurisdiction empowers
states to exercise criminal jurisdiction regardless of where the alleged crime was
troops atDistomowhich was the starting point of the controversy on the existence of state immunity
in cases of serious violations of human rights. This decision was upheld by the Greek Supreme
Court on 4 May 2000, but it was eventually not enforced because of the refusal by the Greek
Ministry of Justice to authorize execution. For an overview over the controversy see Andrea Gattini,
‘The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State before the ICJ: Is the Time Ripe for a Change
in the Law?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 24 (2011), 173–200, with bibliographical
references.
47Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 29 October 2015, No 43696/2015 (Opačić); cf, in this context,
Riccardo Pavoni, ‘How Broad is the Principle Upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court in
Judgment No. 238?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 573-585, at 577. See
also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
48Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21946/2015 (Flatow); Corte di
Cassazione, Judgment of 28 October 2015, No 21947/2015 (Eisenfeld). See also Riccardo Pavoni,
chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
49Italian Law 31 May 1995, No 218. Art 64 and Art 3(1-2) require that (1) the foreign judge was
competent according to the Italian legal order (which was not the case with regard to the US Foreign
Immunities Act); (2) that the foreign state was represented in the forum state (which was not the
case because the diplomatic relations between the US and Iran were interrupted since 1979); and
finally that (3) the illegal act, which did not occur in the US but in Israel, had been the subject matter
of criminal proceedings in the US (which was also not the case).
Between Cynicism and Idealism: Is the Italian Constitutional Court Passing the. . . 293
committed and regardless of the accused’s nationality, country of residence or any
other relation with the prosecuting entity.50 Whether criminal jurisdiction would
include civil jurisdiction, as was stated by the Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno, is not
generally admitted51 and was explicitly contradicted by the Court of Cassation in the
two aforementioned cases concerning the execution of US decisions against Iran.52
In these cases, the Court of Cassation stated that ‘what follows from Sentenza
238/2014 is not the recognition of a principle of universal civil jurisdiction in
cases for compensation of delicta imperii, but only the inapplicability of the cus-
tomary rule of immunity from civil jurisdiction in cases concerning compensation
for damages deriving from the commission on the territory of the forum state of
crimes against humanity’ (paragraph 5, ‘considerato in diritto’ of both decisions
(translated by the author)). Accordingly, universal jurisdiction would not constitute a
legal basis for the competence of Italian courts and tribunals to admit compensation
cases, as such competence derives only from Italian international private law rules.53
As, however, the primary hurdle for admitting civil cases against foreign states has
been lifted by Sentenza 238/2014, namely immunity from jurisdiction, exequatur of
foreign decisions is governed primarily by Articles 3 and 64 of Law No 218/1995 or,
in cases involving EU member states, the Brussels Ia Regulation as amended in
2015. The application of this regulation would, however, require that the acts
concerned do not constitute acts of state authority, namely acta iure imperii.54
Thus, the Italian courts and tribunals, by removing the hurdle of state immunity,
50Cf Gerhard Werle/Florian Jeßberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP 3rd
ed 2014).
51In Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno, Order No 523/2015 (n 17), the Tribunal referred to Art 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the context of non-retroactivity of criminal law and the
exception in para 2 of Art 7 concerning punishment for acts considered as criminal ‘according to the
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’. The Tribunal of Ascoli Piceno stated in a
categorical manner that this provision ‘offered the possibility of criminal—and even civil—
sanctions of the war crimes’ at stake (Judgment of 24 February 2017, at 25).
52Corte di Cassazione, Judgments Flatow and Eisenfeld (n 48).
53These rules are similar to the rules on recognition of foreign judgments in many states, eg section
238 of the German Code on Civil Procedure. The main prerequisites concern, on the one hand, some
territorial link, namely that the defendant has at least a representation authorized to appear before
Italian courts according to Art 77 of the Italian Code on Civil Procedure (Art 3 of Italian Law,
218/1995 (n 49)). On the other hand, the recognition of the foreign judgment depends on the
following requirements: (1) that the judge delivering the judgment was competent to decide on the
case according to the jurisdictional principles of the Italian legal order; (2) that the defendant was
informed of the claim brought against him according to the forum law; (3) that the parties appeared
before the court according to the forum law or non-appearance was officially stated; (4) that the
decision has become binding under the forum law; (5) that the decision is not contrary to a binding
decision of an Italian court; (6) that no proceedings are pending before an Italian judge concerning
the same subject matter and the same parties and brought before the court prior to the foreign
proceedings; and (7) that the decision does not produce effects contrary to the ordre public (Art
64 of Italian Law 218/1995 (n 49)).
54See Andreas Zimmermann, chapter ‘Would the World Be a Better Place If One Were to Adopt a
European Approach to State Immunity?’, in this volume.
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offer an attractive forum for cases claiming compensation from foreign states or
recognition of foreign judgments against states.
Although Italian courts and tribunals are thus a promising forum for cases
concerning claims against states, the fact remains that plaintiffs before Italian courts
have only succeeded in achieving a partial, or maybe even only a symbolic, victory.
This is due to the fact that the question of execution of a judgment after a decision
awarding compensation or a decision on recognition of a foreign judgment awarding
compensation is still unsettled and poses even higher barriers than the one
concerning the issue of jurisdiction. In this context the question of state immunity
re-appears with regard to execution of the judgments, and a development with regard
to practice for denying immunity from execution comparable to that concerning
jurisdictional immunity has not occurred yet.
IV. Enforcing a Successful Adjudication: The Constitutional
Court Versus ‘the Last Bastion of State Immunity’?
It remains to be seen whether, and if so when, all of the judgments by Italian courts
considered so far will be enforced, thus making reparations to the victims effective.
After adjudication on one’s claim becomes final, enforcement traditionally occurs
either willingly by the respondent or by way of specific execution proceedings
established under domestic law. However, if the respondent is a foreign state,
general international law provides for a procedural bar preventing the judiciary of
the forum state from enabling enforcement. In the absence of an express waiver of
immunity by the foreign state, this guarantee is generally accorded to every sover-
eign state and is called ‘immunity from execution’. Unlike ‘immunity from adjudi-
cation’, the approach towards lifting immunity from execution has been far more
restrictive in state practice. This brings up the question of whether, following
Sentenza 238/2014, Italian ordinary courts are under obligation to deny Germany
immunity from execution or, conversely, whether they still ought to abide by it and,
if so, on what basis.
For the time being, this question has been dealt with by the Court of Appeal of
Milan and by the Tribunal of Rome. More recently, the Court of Cassation delivered
the final judgment on the question previously decided by the Court of Appeal of
Milan, thereby apparently setting a point in favour of the doctrine whereby immunity
from execution should be upheld even after denial of immunity from adjudication.
Before these pronouncements, however, other courts adjudicating on the merits of
the actions for damages related to crimes committed by Germany on Italian soil
already suggested a different nature existing between immunity from adjudication
and immunity from execution. In particular, in its Judgment No 2468 of 6 July
2015,55 the Tribunal of Florence maintained that the exercise of civil jurisdiction did
55Tribunale di Firenze, Judgment No 2468/2015 (n 30).
Between Cynicism and Idealism: Is the Italian Constitutional Court Passing the. . . 295
not per se pose a risk to the sovereignty of the German state since it merely implied a
judgment having a declaratory nature (‘sentenza di mero accertamento e condanna’)
and not necessarily entailing execution.
In this respect, however, the judgments mentioned above provided for more
nuanced solutions. In its ruling of 27 January 2015,56 the Court of Appeal of
Milan refused to take measures of constraint on Villa Vigoni—a cultural property
belonging to Germany and located in Italy—being conscious of the risk of infringing
upon the right to state immunity from enforcement. In fact, as already acknowledged
by the ICJ in its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment (paragraphs 113–120), immu-
nity from adjudication and immunity from execution are subjected to different legal
regimes under customary international law.57 While in the field of jurisdictional
immunity courts ought to scrutinize the nature of an act as iure imperii or iure
gestionis, when applying immunity from execution, judges ought to check whether
the property against which enforcement measures should be taken is being used for
governmental or commercial purposes. Therefore, insofar as used for
non-commercial governmental purposes, Villa Vigoni could not be seized or
subjected to provisional measures even after Sentenza 238/2014.58 The judgment
of the ItCC, in fact, concerned a question on the application of immunity from
adjudication only.59 Therefore, Article 24 of the Italian Constitution could not
extensively be interpreted as providing for a right to a judge as including also
effective enforcement, otherwise such a right would have encroached upon assets
devoted to a public service (publicis usibus destinata). Yet, the ground for declaring
the invalidity of the judicial mortgage over Villa Vigoni by the Court of Appeal of
Milan was the ineffectiveness of the instrument permitting enforcement (‘titolo
esecutivo’), that is, the non-enforceability of Greek judgments in Italy after the ICJ
56Corte d’Appello di Milano, Judgment of 27 January 2015, No 1278/2015.
57See Michael Wood, ‘Immunity from Jurisdiction and Immunity from Measures of Constraint’;
Chester Brown/Roger O’Keefe, ‘Part IV State Immunity from Measures of Constraint in Connec-
tion with Proceedings Before a Court, Preliminary Material’, both in Roger O’Keefe et al (eds), The
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (Oxford:
OUP 2013), 13–18 and 288–293. Cf also, ILC, Report on the Work of the thirtieth session (1978),
UN Doc A/33/10, 154, para 23. See, in particular, ‘Concurring Opinion of Judge Pellonpää joined
by Judge Bratza in Al Adsani v United Kingdom’, in Elihu Lauterpacht et al (eds), International
Law Reports 123 (Cambridge: CUP 2003), 45-49, arguing that even in the US, where the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) has been amended so as to allow US citizens to raise damage
claims based, inter alia, on torture against specifically designated states, immunity from execution
has ultimately not been removed.
58As regards other similar cases, it ought to be pointed out that execution or attachment measures
against properties situated in the forum state and serving as cultural institutions were generally
prohibited, as the practice of Swiss courts and of the Hellenic Republic shows. See August
Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures’,
The European Journal of International Law 17 (2006), 803-836, at 824; more recently see:
Jean-Marc Thouvenin/Victor Grandaubert, ‘The Material Scope of Immunity from Execution’, in
Tom Ruys et al (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Immunities and International Law (Cambridge:
CUP 2019), 245–265, at 260 mentioning also French case-law.
59ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 7), para 1.2.
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Judgment. The opinion of the Court of Appeal was substantially confirmed in June
2018 by the Court of Cassation. However, the Italian Supreme Court overruled the
reasons on the basis of which the lower judge declared the invalidity of the legal
charge: the question was in fact not the ineffectiveness of the aforementioned
instrument to permit enforceability, as would have been the case if the Italian
judiciary would have abided by the ICJ Judgment (paragraphs 121-131); on the
contrary, according to the Supreme Court, the instrument (‘titolo esecutivo’) remains
effective, but allows for enforceability only against those assets of the Federal
Republic of Germany that are not devoted to public purposes. This not being the
case, the lower judge should have declined jurisdiction and the judicial mortgage
should have been cancelled from the land register.60 Therefore, one should conclude
that the Supreme Court reversed the lower judge decision to the extent to which the
Court of Appeal, building upon the ICJ Judgment, had made the exequatur granted
to Greek judgments null and void, even though it could only adjudicate upon the
legality of the mortgage.
In this respect, the reasoning by the Court of Cassation is only partly consistent
with a decision by the Tribunal of Rome, handed down on 20 May 2015 and upheld
by the same Court of Cassation on 3 September 2019. In fact, the Tribunal
overturned a 2012 order by the enforcement judge of the same Tribunal of Rome
according to which an action for execution in Italy of Greek judgments against
Germany could not be advanced or undertaken. For their execution Greek claimants
had attempted to attach credits owed by the Italian Ferrovie dello Stato (the Italian
state-owned railway company) to Deutsche Bahn AG, the German railway company
and a private corporate body the shares of which are currently held by the Federal
Republic. The Tribunal of Rome argued that, after Sentenza 238/2014, the order
already issued by the enforcement judge on the basis of the ICJ Judgment was null
and void and that execution proceedings of the underlying judgment on the merits,
awarding the victims a sum of nearly €50 million, could be resumed. Objections
brought forward by Deutsche Bahn AG before the Court of Cassation concerning the
fact that it could not be held responsible for the crimes committed by Germany and
that the underlying judgment had not considered this aspect were dismissed as
inadmissible. The reason being that in a procedure on execution, questions of this
kind could not be raised as they are part of the proceedings on the merits. Only in the
case of a serious error in law that aspect could have been reviewed in the execution
procedure. However, such an error did not exist in the case at stake as it is clear that
the Italian legal order does not grant immunity from jurisdiction in cases concerning
violations of human rights, pursuant to Sentenza 238/2014. Accordingly, not only
the judge on the merits, but also the enforcement judge is obliged to dismiss
60Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 8 June 2018, No 14885/2018, which goes back to Corte di
Cassazione, Judgment of 12 January 1996, No 173/1996. See the case note by Olivia Lopes Pegna,
‘Giù le mani da Villa Vigoni: quale tutela “effettiva” per le vittime di gravi crimini compiuti da Stati
esteri’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 4 (2018), 1237-1244; Pierfrancesco Rossi, ‘The Aftermath
of the Italian Constitutional Court Judgment No. 238 of 2014 in Exequatur and Enforcement
Proceedings’, Italian Yearbook of International Law, 28 (2018), 455-459.
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objections based on state immunity and exercise jurisdiction. This implies, in
essence, that the grant of exequatur of Greek judgments by Italian courts, being of
an adjudicatory nature, was deemed legitimate and in line with Sentenza 238/2014.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s judgment applies ‘without prejudice to whether
immunity from execution applies, a question which will potentially be dealt with
once the very execution proceedings will be started’.61 In other words, from a
domestic civil procedural point of view, the execution proceedings in which the
unaffected question on whether Deutsche Bahn AG credit liabilities can legitimately
be attached by the Italian state might be addressed, start in a later moment and not
already when the enforcement judge declares a judgment enforceable. Therefore, the
fact that the enforcement judge cannot decline jurisdiction on grounds of sovereign
immunity does not yet say anything about whether or not the properties of the
foreign state can legitimately be attached.
In this respect, however, from an international law perspective of immunity
application, whereas Villa Vigoni is a German property serving sovereign purposes
and in fact deserves enjoyment of immunity from execution, the credit liabilities of
the German railway company towards the Italian railways could hardly be treated as
fulfilling non-commercial purposes. In this respect, Italian ordinary courts are called
upon to give a consistent interpretation of both the existing customary international
law and the manifold case-law of the ItCC and to assess whether immunity from
measures of constraint should be lifted. Before Sentenza 238/2014, the Corte
Costituzionale already dealt with the question of the compatibility of immunity
from execution with the right to effective judicial protection, ie to enforcement of
a judgment as encompassed in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution.62 In particular,
with its Judgment No 329/1992 the ItCC declared unconstitutional a legal provision
dating back to 1926 that prevented the Italian judiciary from confiscating the goods
of a foreign state without prior authorization from the Minister of Justice.63 By
leaving it up to the discretion of the executive power, the legal provision at hand was
deemed to be contrary to the (then) current state of customary international law and
therefore contrary to Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution since it might have
61Tribunale di Roma, Judgment of 20 May 2015, No 11069/2015, (translated by the authors). So
also: Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 3 September 2019, No 21995/2019. (para 19). Cf Cristina
M Mariottini, ‘Case Note: Deutsche Bahn AG v. Regione Stereá Ellada’, American Journal of
International Law 3 (2020), 486–493; Barbara De Santis, ‘Profili di giurisdizione nell’esecuzione
forzata sui beni dello Stato estero’, Judicium—Il processo civile in Italia e in Europa, 30 April
2020; Luca Baiada, ‘Ancora sull’esecuzione su beni di Stato estero’, Questione Giustizia, 30
September 2019, according to whom the Court of Cassation’s judgment consistently draws upon
Sentenza 238/2014 to bring about the lifting of immunity from execution. Contra see: Giorgia
Berrino, ‘La Corte di Cassazione torna sul tema delle immunità giurisdizionali degli Stati stranieri e
dei loro beni’, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 3 (2020), 844–858, at 856–857.
62On Article 24 of the Italian Constitution and enforcement proceedings see: Luigi Paolo Comoglio,
‘Principi costituzionali e processo d’esecuzione’, Rivista di diritto processuale 2 (1994), 450-469.
63Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 2 July 1992, No 329/1992.
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prevented ordinary courts from lifting immunity from execution also for acta iure
gestionis.64 At the same time, the prior authorization of the Minister also encroached
upon the individual right to a judge as protected by Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution, since ‘the right of the individual to a judicial remedy requires that
the existence of the legal conditions to file a lawsuit before a court be ascertained by
a judge according to the procedural guarantees set out by the law’, and not by a
member of the executive power. Having said that, the ItCC clarified:
[I]t does not deny that, within the context of international relations with foreign states, the
fundamental right to judicial protection can be limited beyond what customary international
law provides, as introduced through Article 10 of the Italian Constitution. However, this
limitation ought to be justified by a public interest potentially outweighing the principle set
out in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution, which is one of the supreme principles of the
constitutional order (cf. Judgment No 18/1982). Moreover, the norm providing for a
limitation to the individual right at hand shall undergo a rigorous assessment of this interest
in the light of the specific aspects of the case.65
That Article 24 of the Italian Constitution does not provide for an absolute right
and can be outweighed by a higher public interest has been further confirmed by the
ItCC in its Sentenza 238/2014.However, the sacrificing of the right to a judge should
not be deemed disproportionate to the interest pursued and the means employed.
Such an interest could not be assessed in the case regarding immunity from adjudi-
cation, thus making the right to a judge prevail over state immunity.66 It remains to
be seen whether a different balancing operation could be carried out if immunity
from execution was at stake.
As we have seen, pursuant to Sentenza 238/2014, mere compliance with custom-
ary international law, as well as the promotion of comity and good relations with
other states, might provide for a legitimate aim to restrict the right to a judge but
cannot per se constitute a proportionate means for justifying such a restriction.67
Therefore, the decision adopted by the Court of Appeal of Milan would probably not
be confirmed in the same way by the ItCC. On the contrary, the final decision by the
Court of Cassation appears to be much more in conformity with Sentenza 238/2014,
as it does not uphold immunity from execution as such but only to the extent to
which the properties of the foreign state at stake truly serve a public interest. This
leaves open the practical question of what properties different from Villa Vigoni do
allow for measures of constraint to be taken and, in particular, whether the credit
liabilities of Deutsche Bahn AG or other German government-owned companies
may legitimately be attached as assets within the property of a foreign State.
64Similarly in the US, as pointed out by Reinisch, ‘European Court’ 2006 (n 58), 814.
65ItCC, Judgment No 329/1992 (n 63), (translated by the authors).
66ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 7), para 3.4.
67The ItCC’s reasoning is radically different from that of the ECtHR adjudicating on the compat-
ibility of immunity with Article 6 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court, in fact, did not hesitate to consider
domestic decisions to accord immunity as pursuing a legitimate aim and as being proportionate. On
these judgments see, inter alia, Matthias Kloth, Immunities and the Right of Access to Court under
Article 6 ECHR, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2010), 21-158.
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In this respect, however, one should also keep in mind that a judicial mortgage
over part of the property of Villa Vigoni was recorded again on 11 November 2019
after the Tribunal of Sulmona had issued its Order of 2 November 2017. Therefore,
even though the ICJ Judgment qualified Villa Vigoni as fulfilling ‘entirely’ non-
commercial purposes (para. 119), Italian enforcement tribunals may soon be
required to decide otherwise, ie that execution can be carried out as regards part of
the real property of the cultural centre, considering its various uses.68
The ItCC could also argue that immunity from execution as such does not bring
about an absolute and therefore disproportionate sacrifice of the right to a judge,
since adjudication on the merits (‘la verifica giurisdizionale’, as the ItCC literally
called it) had already been enabled after denial of immunity from adjudicatory
jurisdiction.69 Quite surprisingly, such an outcome is hinted at in the Order of the
Tribunal of Florence No 85/2014, by means of which it referred the question of
constitutionality to the ItCC. There the Tribunal maintained that immunity from
execution might not be in breach of Article 24 of the Italian Constitution since one
could have reasoned as follows: ‘While Article 24 of the Italian Constitution requires
an assessment on the merits and a conviction for such serious crimes, (. . .) the same
provision sets a limit in terms of execution, [being] (. . .) only this portion of
jurisdiction, if exercised, intrusive on State sovereignty.’70 However, upholding
the benefit of immunity from execution in these terms would display an utmost
cynicism towards the victims’ destiny,71 thus making Sentenza 238/2014 a Pyrrhic
victory.72 A sounder approach appears to conform to the first solution, according to
which immunity from execution should be treated no longer as a taboo, but only to
the extent that assets used for commercial purposes are concerned.
On the other hand, the ItCC might deny altogether Germany immunity from
execution either by entrusting itself with the power to reinterpret general interna-
tional law differently from that of the ICJ or, alternatively, by following the path of
Sentenza 238/2014 and thereby discarding international law in favour of domestic
constitutional law.
As to the first option, for which the ItCC has no constitutional mandate, it could
follow an approach not completely unknown under customary international law,
68Cf for instance Pål Wrange, ‘Case Note: Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation’, American Journal of
International Law 2 (2012), 347–353, in which the Swedish Supreme Court allowed enforcement
over a Russian real property being the building at stake only to a limited extent and not ‘in
considerable part’ used for official purposes.
69Cf Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
70Tribunale di Firenze, Order of 21 January 2014, No 85/2014 (translated by the authors).
71So also Paolo Palchetti, ‘Italian Concerns after Sentenza 238/2014: Possible Reactions, Possible
Solutions’, VerfBlog, (11 May 2017), available at http://verfassungsblog.de/italian-concerns-after-
sentenza-2382014-possible-reactions-possible-solutions/.
72This epithet is owed to the US District Court Judge Royce C Lamberth in Eisenfeld v Iran, US,
172 F.Supp.2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000).
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whereby enforcement is regarded as a ‘logical consequence’ of adjudication and
therefore could deny Germany immunity from enforcement measures.73 This out-
come could be justified also by means of an a contrario argument, taking into
account recent Italian state practice. In fact, even if it is true that Italian courts
have so far always complied with the rule of immunity from execution, legislation
passed most recently shows that neither the executive nor the legislative powers were
fully convinced of the deeply rooted nature of this customary rule on the matter. For
this reason, immediately following Sentenza 238/2014, the Italian parliament intro-
duced Article 19-bis into Law No 162 of 10 November 2014,74 by virtue of which
the bank and postal accounts of a foreign state’s diplomatic mission or consular posts
are exempt from attachment and execution, insofar as the head of the diplomatic
mission of the foreign state unilaterally declares that the accounts are in use for the
institutional purposes of the mission itself.75 In so doing, it appears that Italian
political bodies were uncertain as to the very existence of a rule of customary
international law providing foreign states with immunity from execution whenever
their property serves a sovereign purpose; alternatively, they probably feared that the
Italian judiciary would have been able to provide for a different interpretation of
general international law, thus potentially engaging Italy's responsibility for an
internationally wrongful act. However, similar to the case adjudicated by the ItCC
in 1992,76 in precluding the assessment by the judiciary regarding the correctness of
the unilateral declaration by the ambassador, the right of access to justice as
73In particular, Swiss courts for a given period of time considered that execution should simply
follow from adjudication on the merits so that once adjudication against a foreign state is under-
taken, enforcement should also be possible. In the Netherlands one could recall a rather isolated and
outdated pronouncement by the Dutch Supreme Court (1973), by means of which any measure of
enforcement against foreign state properties situated in the territory of the forum state could be
taken. In Turkey, a number of decisions have held that foreign property can be seized or attached.
See, for a general survey of state practice on immunity from execution, Hazel Fox/Philippa Webb,
The Law of State Immunity (Oxford: OUP 3rd ed 2013), 482-490; Reinisch, ‘European Court’ 2006
(n 58), 809-811; 813.
74Similarly, while a decision was pending before the ICJ, the Italian government issued the
Law-decree No 68/2010, which suspended the effectiveness of the enforcement order (‘titolo
esecutivo’) upon assets belonging to foreign states until the judgment. See, on the nature of this
law decree and its compatibility with the Italian Constitution, Francesco Salerno, ‘Esecuzione in
Italia su beni di Stati stranieri: il decreto-legge 28 aprile 2010, n. 63’ and Andrea Atteritano, ‘Il DL
63/2010 compromette il diritto dell’individuo a una effettiva tutela giurisdizionale’, (22 September
2010), both available at http://www.sidi-isil.org/?p¼7965.
75Cf Benedetto Conforti, ‘Il legislatore torna indietro di circa novant’anni: la nuova norma
sull’esecuzione sui conti correnti di Stati stranieri’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 2 (2015),
558–561. See also: Antonio Chiusolo, ‘Immunità giurisdizionale e diritti inviolabili: nuova
frontiera per la “giuristocrazia”?’, Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, (14 July 2015), available at
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/chiusolo-nota-238-
2014.pdf, at 9-10; Attila Tanzi, ‘Sulla sentenza 238/2014: cui prodest?’, Forum di Quaderni
Costituzionali, (26 November 2014), available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2014/12/nota_238_2014_tanzi.pdf, at 3-4.
76ItCC, Judgment 329/1992 (n 63).
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enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution has been infringed because its
limitation beyond what customary international law provides is neither sustained by
a higher public interest nor proportionate.77
As to the second option, the ItCC may also stress the need of providing victims
with an effective judicial remedy, since ‘the right to a judge enshrined in the Italian
Constitution requires an effective protection of the rights of the individual’ and
cannot be deemed sufficient whenever a private claimant is allowed to file a lawsuit
against a foreign state.78 The effectiveness of the judicial remedy could be deemed
existent only to the extent that an enforcement order can be issued. In doing so,
however, the ItCC would overrule its own case-law, which unequivocally distin-
guished between immunity from adjudication and immunity from execution and thus
relying on the case-law of those courts that tend to approximate adjudicatory and
enforcement immunity. From this perspective the ItCC would probably have to
activate once more the counterlimits so as to preclude customary international law
governing immunity from execution to enter the Italian legal order.79 Whereas in the
first scenario outlined above the ItCC would close the books with Germany but leave
totally or partially unsettled the question of reparations, in the second scenario the
Corte Costituzionale would coherently follow up Sentenza 238/2014 and tear down
the ‘last bastion of State immunity’.80 The consequences, however, would probably
be severe for the bilateral relations between the two states, as Germany might bring a
new lawsuit before the ICJ. Such proceedings would constitute an unwelcome
development between member states of the EU. An agreed extra-judicial settlement
of the already too long-lasting controversy would thus clearly be the best solution.81
77Cf Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, ‘State Immunity from Enforcement Measures between Respect
for State Sovereignty and Access to Justice’, in Ermanno Calzolaio/Pierre Serrand (eds), La
contrainte en droit—The constraint in Law, (Zurich: LIT Verlag 2017), 167-186, at 181-182.
Doubts were raised also by Riccardo Luzzatto/Ilaria Queirolo, ‘Sovranità territoriale, “Jurisdiction”
e Regole di Immunità’, in Sergio M Carbone/Riccardo Luzzatto/Alberto Santa Maria (eds),
Istituzioni di diritto internazionale (Turin: Giappichelli 5th ed 2016), 203-241, at 206-207. See
also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume.
78As pointed out in the case-law of the Italian Constitutional Court, Article 24 of the Italian
Constitution protects also the right to enforcement. See, inter alia, Judgments of 11 June 2014,
No 182/2014; of 3 June 2013, No 119/2013; of 7 July 2010, No 281/2010, and of 5 March 2007, No
77/2007.
79See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
80This expression belongs to Special Rapporteur Sompong Sucharitkul. Cf Eighth Report on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. See in this respect, ILC, Report on the
Work of the thirty-eighth session (1986), UN Doc A/CN.4/396, Draft Article 18 (para 2).
81For similar considerations, Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Suggesting Solutions: What About Conces-
sions to be Made by Both Sides’, VerfBlog, (15 May 2017), available at https://verfassungsblog.de/
suggesting-solutions-what-about-concessions-to-be-made-by-both-sides/.
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V. The Compatibility of a Reparation Scheme with the Italian
Constitution
A different attitude could be displayed by the ItCC if negotiations on a possible
reparation scheme for the victims excluded by prior reparations were started, a
constellation, however, that appears highly unlikely at the present stage. In this
respect, it could be useful to answer the question on the extent to which Italian courts
should afford immunity from enforcement if negotiations on a possible reparation
scheme were started by Italy and Germany and to what extent this solution would be
compatible with Article 24 of the Italian Constitution. The same question could be
asked if a law decree suspending attachment and/or execution proceedings were
passed after the start of negotiations.
The answers to these questions might differ depending on the terms upon which
negotiations would be started, as well as on the content of such a reparation scheme.
In the first place, one may consider the unusual reparation scheme outlined by the
same Tribunal of Florence. As already mentioned (section II), in its Order of
23 March 2015, when resuming proceedings after the decision of the ItCC the
judge attempted to combine domestic procedural law and passages of the ICJ
Judgment promoting negotiations.82 On the basis of a combined reading of internal
legal provisions and a recommendatory statement by an international court, the
Tribunal of Florence suggested a sui generis conciliation proposal, whose accep-
tance by all parties to the proceedings was conditional upon both the withdrawal of
the claim for reparation by the applicants and the financial compensation amounting
to up to €15,000 by the Federal Republic of Germany specifically for a cultural study
visit to Germany for the victim’s families. This equitable settlement being reached
on an individual basis, albeit not well-founded in positive law,83 would have had the
merit of allowing the judge to do away with the question of whether immunity from
execution ought to be lifted.
A different outcome would probably occur if Italy and Germany willingly
decided to conduct negotiations on a compensation fund covering all the remaining
victims and not only the plaintiffs of a single or a given number of proceedings.84 In
this respect, in entering into negotiations with Germany and upon condition of their
successful conclusion, Italy would itself waive the damages claims in the name of its
82Tribunale di Firenze, Order No 2012/1300 (n 8), referring to ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 9),
paras 99 and 104.
83As pointed out by Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 8), 198.
84As pointed out by Thomas Giegerich, ‘Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations
Override State Immunity from the Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?’, in Christian Tomuschat/Jean-
Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and
Obligations Erga Omnes (Leiden/Bosten: Martinus Nijhoff 2006), 203-238, at 221: ‘[D]iplomatic
or other international mechanisms are arguably more appropriate, as allowing civil claims by
individual victims would give some individuals large sums of money while the majority of the
victims would come away empty-handed’.
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citizens, as traditionally occurs under international law. Would this waiver conform
to Article 24 of the Italian Constitution?
The ItCC could seize the opportunity to explore whether the international cus-
tomary rule—according to which claims to reparations arising from violations of the
law of armed conflicts can be waived by states in virtue of their sovereignty—
infringes upon Article 24 of the Italian Constitution. Unlike a treaty by means of
which two states entirely waive the damages claims of their citizens, the present
bilateral arrangement would rather be aimed at providing a symbolic compensation
to all victims excluded from prior reparation agreements and not, as such, at
defeating the power of the victims to adjudicate upon claims lodged before domestic
tribunals. By contrast, it would be difficult to imagine that such an agreement will
still allow claims regarding the modalities and to the extent to which reparation by
Germany should take place.85
Therefore, it would be difficult for the ItCC to state that the right of access to
justice as enshrined in Article 24 of the Italian Constitution has been violated: once
adjudication on the merits has been allowed, the question as to how and to what
extent the victims will receive satisfaction, as long as it will ultimately somehow be
ensured, should not concern constitutional judges but rest within the discretion of the
state on how to provide them with reparation.86
VI. Concluding Remarks
The above considerations highlight a series of problems resulting from the attempt of
a domestic court, rectius a constitutional court, to contribute to the development of
international law. There is no question that issues of state immunity might need
reconsideration as demonstrated by the adoption of the 2004 UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.87 The fate of this Convention
as such is, however, revealing: that ratifications are sparse shows that states are
reluctant to accept the rules.88 Moreover, the attempt to apply such desirable but not
yet generally accepted new rules to situations dating back more than 70 years and
resulting from war-related actions raises more problems than it resolves. The possi-
bility of re-assessing war-related acts under currently accepted human rights law
raises not only the question of the reasonableness but also the feasibility of such an
undertaking.
85Cf Chiusolo, ‘Immunità giurisdizionale’ 2015 (n 75), 23-24.
86See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, in this volume. Cf Paolo Palchetti,
chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in this volume.
87UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004),
UN Doc A/RES/59/38, UN Doc A/59/49, 486 (not yet in force).
88Until November 2020, there were only 22 ratifications and 28 signatories to the Convention.
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However, the activism of national courts relating to new developments in inter-
national law should reflect the overall consequences: denying state immunity with
regard to jurisdiction only partially resolved the question—and the Corte
Costituzionale was undoubtedly aware of this fact. The hope that might have
propelled the ItCC towards its decision, that immunity from execution might be
denied on the same reasons as jurisdictional immunity, could only be considered as
equivocal at that time. To entrust the further development of this issue to national
jurisdictions and not to the international community could only result in judicial
activism to the detriment of the people concerned: the victims of war crimes and their
heirs. To raise their hopes of being awarded reparations only for said reparations to
be impossible to realize seems rather cynical indeed, as it disregards the expectations
of individuals originating from an ambitious, but short-sighted, decision of the ItCC.
As long as Germany is not ready to step back from its legally justified denial of
awarding reparations89 and Italy maintains its disregard for binding international
law, the question will remain open for an unforeseeable future, since Italian judges
will continue awarding compensation to the victims that Germany will ultimately not
provide.
In this regard, and in order to finally close the chapter of WWII, a possible
solution might be found either in the creation of a fund mutually established by Italy
and Germany90 or by a unilateral action by Germany following the example of the
reparations awarded to Russian prisoners of war:91 In this instance, the German
parliament formally recognized ‘responsibility for that part of the terrible events of
the Nazi period and World War II’ and awarded ‘as a symbolic financial recognition
for their suffering’ the payment of €2,500 to each of the some 4,000 Russian
prisoners still alive.92 Jochen Abraham Frowein was right to consider the question
of reparations as settled, but also that Germany was free to offer reparations through
‘unilateral measures’, adding, however, that the situation of Russian prisoners was
unique and therefore should not be considered as a precedent to be extended to other
cases.93 Consequently, there is no legal obligation to award reparations to Italian
victims of German war crimes and replicate the solution reached for Russian
89The German attitude seems in particular understandable with a view to compensations claims
from other sides, as eg the compensation recently claimed by Poland. In the opinion delivered by the
German Bundestag, Germany confirms its position also with regard to Poland that all war-related
claims have been waived; cf Deutscher Bundestag—Wissenschaftliche Dienste, ‘Völkerrechtliche
Grundlagen und Grenzen kriegsbedingter Reparationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der
deutsch-polnischen Situation’, (28 August 2017), available at www.bundestag.de/blob/525616/
211fd144be8368672e98ecd6a834fe25/wd-2-071-17-pdf-data.pdf.
90See also Stefan Kadelbach, chapter ‘State Immunity, Individual Compensation for Victims of
Human Rights Crimes, and Future Prospects’, and Francesco Francioni, chapter ‘Overcoming the
Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
91Cf section III.3 and n 34.
92Cf Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Plädoyer für Entschädigungen’, (19 May 2015), available at www.
bundestag.de/presse/hib/2015_05/-/375140 (translated by the authors).
93Ibid.
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prisoners of war. But Germany remains free to act on a unilateral basis, in particular
wherever victims exist who have hitherto been excluded from any reparation
scheme, so as to finally close the dispute troubling the otherwise friendly relations
between Italy and Germany.
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Part VI
Negotiations
Deadlocked in Dualism: Negotiating
for a Final Settlement
Andreas von Arnauld
Abstract While on the international plane Germany has as strong a position as one
could wish for, a second appeal to the ICJ does not seem advisable. Though not
formally estopped from challenging Sentenza 238/2014, Germany would at least
face a principled contradiction (Wertungswiderspruch). Like Italy, Germany takes
the position that international obligations must be disregarded should they be found
incompatible with fundamental rights enshrined in the national constitution.
Concerning the underlying conflict, another formally strong German position proves
to have inherent shortcomings. To argue that, as far as Italian citizens are concerned,
all matters of compensation had been dealt with comprehensively in the German–
Italian lump sum agreement of 1961 carries some conviction. However, the limita-
tions of that agreement, the erosion of the individual’s strict mediatisation in
international law, and recent German compensation schemes for other victims of
World War II (WWII) have fuelled a growing discontent with this final settlement.
Having been doubly denied recognition as victims by the injustices of
non-retroactivity and of differentiation, the Italian WWII victims ‘in oblivion’
have pursued compensation claims for over a decade now. It would go too far to
argue an individual claim for financial compensation under international law for
historic wrongs. The principle of intertemporal law, however, has its merits as well
as its defects. This chapter argues in favour of mildly piercing the veil of
intertemporality by reliance on fundamental ethical principles as part of the law in
force already at the time of the original violation. A breach in this kind of obligation
should give rise to an obligatio de negotiando under the principle of just satisfaction.
Such a legal construction takes up the idea that in most of the recent cases of ‘history
taken to court’, compensation is but a secondary aim, the primary aim being to ‘tell
one’s own story’ as a counter-narrative to hegemonic discourse. By entering into
negotiations with the victims ‘in oblivion’, Germany—and Italy—could and should
attempt to finally solve what has been and remains a fundamentally unjust situation.
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I. Jurisdictional Immunities, or a Formally Strong German
Position
On the international plane, Germany has as strong a position as one could wish for.
In its 2012 Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in unambiguous terms found Italy responsible for a threefold violation of the
customary principles of state immunity vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany:
by allowing civil claims against Germany in the first place; by taking measures of
constraint against Villa Vigoni, which serves a non-commercial government pur-
pose; and by declaring enforceable in Italy decisions of Greek courts upholding civil
claims against Germany.1 Nevertheless, in two of the judgment’s 139 paragraphs the
ICJ voiced ‘surprise’ and ‘regret’ that ‘Germany decided to deny compensation’ to
the great majority of Italian World War II (WWII) Military Internees (IMIs) and
pointed out that claims arising from their treatment ‘could be the subject of further
negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to resolving the issue’.2
Legally speaking, however, the position taken by the Court was so clear that several
commentators saw a missed opportunity for allowing future developments of the law
of state immunity in cases of grave breaches of human rights.3
The ICJ did not stop here. By fourteen votes to one it found that ‘the Italian
Republic must, by enacting appropriate legislation, or by resorting to other methods
of its choosing, ensure that the decisions of its courts and those of other judicial
authorities infringing the immunity which the Federal Republic of Germany enjoys
under international law cease to have effect’.4 Neither under the ICJ Statute nor
under general international law can Italy invoke provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to conform with the judgment. This would run counter to
1ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 139.
2Ibid, paras 99; 104.
3See, eg, Carlos Esposito, ‘Jus Cogens and Jurisdictional Immunities of States at the International
Court of Justice: “A Conflict Does Exist”’, Italian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2011),
161-174; Marco Calisto, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: Germany v Italy before the ICJ
from an Italian Perspective’, German Yearbook of International Law 55 (2012), 319-343;
Francesco Francioni, ‘From Utopia to Disenchantment: The Ill Fate of “Moderate Monism” in
the ICJ Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’, European Journal of International
Law 23 (2012), 1125-1132; Sangeeta Shah, ‘Jurisdictional Immunities of the State: Germany v
Italy’, Human Rights Law Review 12 (2012), 555-573; Kimberley Trapp/Alex Mills, ‘Smooth Runs
the Water where the Brook is Deep: The Obscured Complexities of Germany v Italy’, Cambridge
Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (2012), 153-168; Michael Bothe, ‘Remedies of
Victims of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanities: Some Critical Remarks on the ICJ’s
Judgment on the Jurisdictional Immunity of States’, in Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan
Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Leiden:
Brill 2015), 99–115. In a similar vein, Markus Krajewski/Christopher Singer, ‘Should Judges be
Front-Runners? The ICJ, State Immunity and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights’, Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 16 (2012), 1-34.
4ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), para 139, sub 4.
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the customary rule codified in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, according to which a state ‘may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. Some scholarly creativity notwith-
standing, there can be little doubt that Sentenza 238/2014 is in clear contradiction to
Italy’s obligations under the ICJ Statute, thus adding to the violation of the principle
of state immunity itself.5
Theoretically, Germany could therefore appeal a second time to the ICJ in order
to challenge the 2014 judgment by the Corte Costituzionale.6 While the ICJ in 2012
expressly rejected Germany’s claim for a guarantee of non-repetition, as it saw no
indication that Italy would not comply with the judgment,7 the Court could probably
be less reluctant this time. Germany might even ask the ICJ for an ‘equitable
satisfaction’. Though unprecedented, it seems at least arguable that the Italian
Constitutional Court’s express order not to respect the 2012 judgment corresponds
to the situation provided for in Article 30 of the European Convention on Dispute
Settlement, namely that one party’s municipal law does not fully permit the execu-
tion of an ICJ judgment. A point of conjecture is how the ICJ would assess the fact
that there is less a dispute between the German and Italian governments than
between both respective governments and the Italian judiciary.8 However, as long
5Filippo Fontanelli, ‘I know it’s wrong but I just can’t do right: First impressions on judgment
no. 238 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’, VerfBlog, (27 October 2014), available at
https://verfassungsblog.de/know-wrong-just-cant-right-first-impressions-judgment-238-2014-ital
ian-constitutional-court/; Robert Kolb, ‘The Relationship between the International and the Munic-
ipal Legal Order: Reflections on the Decision no 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’,
Questions of International Law: Zoom Out 2 (2014), 5-16; Anne Peters, ‘Let Not Triepel Tri-
umph—How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of the Italian Constitutional Court for a
Global Legal Order’, EJIL Talk!, (22 December 2014), available at www.ejiltalk.org/let-not-triepel-
triumph-how-to-make-the-best-out-of-sentenza-no-238-of-the-italian-constitutional-court-for-a-
global-legal-order-part-i/; Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Das italienische Verfassungsgericht und das
Völkerrecht—eine unerfreuliche Beziehung’, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 42 (2015),
8-16. A more positive assessment ‘as a contribution to a dialectic and normative learning process
between a revolutionary and emancipatory Kantian constitutional mindset and a conservative and
evolutionary managerial mindset’ is offered by Felix Würkert, ‘Historische Immunität?’, Archiv des
Völkerrechts 53 (2015), 90-120. Positive reception also by Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Access to
Justice in Constitutional and International Law: The Recent Judgment of the Italian Constitutional
Court’, Italian Yearbook of International Law 24 (2015), 9-23, stressing the need to strengthen the
international (!) human right of access to justice. Concurring, Gianluigi Palombella, ‘German War
Crimes and the Rule of International Law’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016),
607-613.
6Arguably, it is not the judgment in itself, but only its application by the Italian judiciary which
constitutes a direct violation of international legal obligations: Massimo Iovane, ‘The Italian
Constitutional Court Judgment No. 238 and the Myth of the “Constitutionalization” of International
Law’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 595-605.
7ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1), para 138.
8Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story: The International Court of Justice—The Italian
Constitutional Court—Italian Tribunals and the Question of Immunity’, Heidelberg Journal of
International Law 76 (2016), 193-202; see also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian)
Courts über alles?’, in this volume. Cf, in general, Ingrid Wuerth, ‘International Law in Domestic
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as Germany’s immunity from enforcement measures is still respected by Italian
authorities, the lack of clear damage requiring ‘equitable satisfaction’might turn this
into a moot point altogether.
II. Trapped in Contradictions, or the Ambivalence
of Dualism
Even if Germany could successfully claim satisfaction before the ICJ, and even if it
were to distribute said satisfaction to the victims of German WWII atrocities as a
sign that it does not oppose compensation as such, the question remains whether
such a move seems at all advisable. Because of its own dualist stance towards
international law, Germany is trapped in what one might call the ‘ambivalence of
dualism’.
The Corte Costituzionale based its act of disobedience on basic tenets of the
Italian Constitution (the so-called dottrina dei controlimiti), especially its guarantee
of human rights and access to justice.9 Both, however, are also foundational ele-
ments of the German constitutional order—protected by Article 79(3) of the Basic
Law even against constitutional amendments.10 This has, in fact, been the legal basis
for the Federal Constitutional Court’s (FCC) Solange saga: since Germany could
never transfer public authority to the EU in a manner violating the Constitution’s
core ‘identity’, the Bundesverfassungsgericht remains competent, in principle, to
control Acts emanating from the EU on their compatibility with fundamental rights
guarantees.11 That this might result in disregarding obligations from EU law is part
and parcel.
While this conflict might have appeared solved since the Solange II armistice
between the FCC and the European Court of Justice (ECJ),12 recent decisions clearly
Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case’, Melbourne Journal of International
Law 13 (2012), 819-837, at 829-835. Paolo Palchetti argues that the Constitutional Court should
have deferred the matter to the political organs on the basis of an emerging international and
constitutional obligation to exercise diplomatic protection, ‘Can State Action on Behalf of Victims
Be an Alternative to Individual Access to Justice in Case of Grave Breaches of Human Rights?’,
Italian Yearbook of International Law 24 (2015), 53-60. Taking a similar line, Enzo Cannizzaro,
‘Jurisdictional Immunities and Judicial Protection: The Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court
No. 238 of 2014’, Rivista di diritto internazionale 98 (2015), 126-134, at 130-131; Francesco
Francioni, ‘Access to Justice and Its Pitfalls: Reparation for War Crimes and the Italian Constitu-
tional Court’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 629-636.
9Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014, para 3.5.
10That the relevant provisions of the Italian Constitution also ‘fall outside the scope of constitutional
review’ has been stated by the Corte Costituzionale, as well, (n 9), para 3.2.
11Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 (Solange
I).
12Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339
(Solange II).
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show that the Bundesverfassungsgericht is still prepared to disobey international and
supranational obligations on the basis of internal constitutional principles. On
15 December 2015 the Court infamously accepted an unconditional ‘treaty override’
by the German Parliament, based on an ‘absolute’ interpretation of the democratic
principle (an exception was made, however, for human rights treaties);13 even more
pertinent is a decision, from the very same day, concerning the execution of a
European arrest warrant.14 Here, the FCC amended its Solange jurisprudence. It
argued a competence and even a duty of German courts to assess whether the
accused will be inhumanely treated in the member state demanding extradition,
according to the standard of Article 1(1) of the Basic Law. Should such treatment be
reasonably expected, the extradition is not to be granted. As the case at hand
concerned convictions in absentia, the FCC stressed that fundamental principles of
due process directly derive from human dignity and could thus trump any suprana-
tional obligation to extradite. It makes no real difference that the FCC superficially
avoided the conflict with the ECJ by stating that a correct application of EU law
would lead to the same conclusion:15 the ‘correct’ application of EU law being in
open contradiction to the ECJ’s—admittedly flawed—Melloni judgment of 2013.16
Since the aforementioned case and that of Sentenza 238/2014 are unrelated,17
Germany would not be formally estopped from challenging before the ICJ a legal
position it takes itself within the context of EU obligations; Germany would,
however, be at least trapped in a principled contradiction (Wertungswiderspruch)
should it attack on the international plane Sentenza 238/2014 as disregarding the
13Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 15 December 2015, 2 BvL 1/12, BVerfGE 141, 1 (Treaty
Override).
14Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317
(European Arrest Warrant II/Identity Control).
15FCC, European Arrest Warrant II (n 14), 355-366. On a rhetorical level, however, the German
court’s approach might at least be seen as inviting judicial dialogue—what the Italian court’s
Sentenza did not; cf Kolb, ‘The international and the municipal legal order’ (2014) (n 5), at 6 (‘a
high peak of a new form of robust dualism’). Also critical towards Sentenza 238/2014 for this
reason, Raffaela Kunz, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and “Constructive Contestation”: A
Miscarried Attempt?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 621-627; see also,
Raffaela Kunz, chapter ‘Teaching the World Court Makes a Bad Case’, in this volume. The ECJ
has, in fact, taken up the ‘invitation’ in its judgment of 5 April 2016, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU
(Aranyosi and Căldăraru), ECLI:EU:C:2016:198.
16ECJ, Melloni, Judgment of 26 February 2013, C-399/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. As to the
incompatibility of both decisions see, eg, Christopher Bilz, ‘Konfrontation statt Kooperation?
“Solange III” und die Melloni-Entscheidung des EuGH’, Juwiss Blog, (15 March 2016), available
at www.juwiss.de/26-2016/.
17It might be interesting to note that Nazi criminals who were convicted for civilian massacres in
Italy during WWII were generally tried in absentia. Germany over the years constantly refused
extradition or to execute these judgments in Germany. See Antonio Sabino, ‘Anno Giudiziario
2018: Intervento del Procuratore Generale Militare della Repubblica presso la Corte Militare di
Appello’ (1 March 2018), available at https://www.difesa.it/Giustizia_Militare/rassegna/
Bimestrale/2018/Documents/2_2018/3%20Relazione%20dott.%20SABINO%20PGMCMA.pdf,
1-44, at 43-44.
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ICJ’s judgment.18 Like Italy, Germany takes the position that international—and
even supranational19—obligations must be disregarded should they collide with
basic constitutional principles of domestic law; like Italy, Germany takes the posi-
tion that due process is one of the grounds that justifies this kind of disobedience. To
make this contradiction even more palpable: the European arrest warrant under
German scrutiny had been issued—ironically—by Italy.20
III. Germany and the Law & Politics of History
Germany is trapped in yet another contradiction: while German foreign policy has
traditionally favoured a mildly progressive path in international law, laying special
emphasis on the importance of human rights,21 the Distomo and Ferrini cases forced
Germany into the role of an advocate of old-school interstate law.22 For obvious
18Concurring with Giuseppe Cataldi, ‘A Historic Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court on the
Balance between the Italian Legal Order’s Fundamental Values and Customary International Law’,
Italian Yearbook of International Law 24 (2015), 37–52. Similarities in both courts’ approaches
(and that of the ECJ) are also pointed to by Michael Bothe, ‘The Decision of the Italian Constitu-
tional Court Concerning the Jurisdictional Immunities of Germany’, Italian Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 24 (2015), 25-36.
19Since the FCC generally acknowledges the primacy of EU law, it would demand even more
compelling reasons for disobedience here. From a different angle, Alessandro Bufalini, chapter
‘Waiting for Negotiations’, in this volume, points out that compared to supranational law,
disobeying international law might have an even more dangerous impact given the fragility of a
legal system with only limited institutions for law enforcement. While this certainly carries some
conviction, the present state of the EU seems not as robust as one might wish for, looking
particularly at the rise of illiberalism and authoritarian policies in central and eastern Europe: see,
eg, Jacques Rupnik, ‘Surging Illiberalism in the East’, Journal of Democracy 27 (2016), 77–87; R
Daniel Kelemen, ‘Europe’s Authoritarian Equilibrium: Invoking Article 7 Against Poland Won’t
Be Enough’, Foreign Affairs (22 December 2017), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/hungary/2017-12-22/europes-authoritarian-equilibrium.
20Cf FCC, European Arrest Warrant II, (n 14), 361-364, citing the extensive jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights concerning trials in absentia.
21For a closer analysis, see Thomas Jäger/Alexander Höse/Kai Oppermann (eds), Deutsche
Außenpolitik (Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2nd ed 2011); Philip Liste, Völkerrecht-Sprechen: Die
Konstruktion demokratischer Völkerrechtspolitik in den USA und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Baden-Baden: Nomos 2012); Michael Staack, ‘Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land’, in Michael Staack (ed), Einführung in die Internationale Politik. Studienbuch (Munich:
Oldenbourg 5th ed 2012), 213-261.
22In parenthesis, it might be mentioned that Italy is faced with a comparable situation concerning its
stand towards the functional immunity of state officials in the Enrica Lexie case; cf Douglas
Guilfoyle, ‘Shooting fishermen mistaken for pirates: Jurisdiction, immunity and State responsibil-
ity’, EJIL Talk!, (2 March 2012), available at www.ejiltalk.org/shooting-fishermen-mistaken-for-
pirates-jurisdiction-immunity-and-state-responsibility/; Hari Sankar, ‘Jurisdictional and Immunity
Issues in the Story of Enrica Lexie: A Case of Shoot & Scoot turns around!’, EJIL Talk!, (25 March
2013), available at www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdictional-and-immunity-issues-in-the-story-of-enrica-
lexie-a-case-of-shoot-scoot-turns-around/.
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reasons, Germany tries to keep its history out of foreign courtrooms. That the Federal
Government, when declaring acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction
according to Article 36(2) of the Statute in 2008, included the—admittedly widely
used—limitation to ‘disputes arising after the present declaration’ does not therefore
come as a surprise.
It would be a misrepresentation to see this as an unwillingness to bear responsi-
bility for atrocities committed by Germans during the Nazi period. At a political
level, Germany is generally prepared to accept that responsibility, not only symbol-
ically but financially also.23 From 1956 to the end of 2013, Germany paid a total of
€71 billion in reparations to surviving victims of National Socialism (NS).24 How-
ever, the patchwork of instruments set up soon after the foundation of the Federal
Republic of Germany (which understood itself—contrary to the German Democratic
Republic—as successor to the German Reich, and thus accepted legal responsibility)
was very much characterized by selectivity.25 Lobbyists, pressure groups, or a lack
thereof, and the rise of the Cold War left their mark on the outcome.26 The central
element of the diverse set of reparation instruments, the Federal Compensation Act
(Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) of 1956 and amended in 1965, excluded foreign NS
victims (with a later exception for Jewish emigrants from eastern Europe). Their
reparation was primarily left to the interstate level. Individual titles to reparation
could be introduced by way of national legislation, but only if the Federal legislator
chose to do so. This position has been upheld in recent years by the FCC when
dealing with—eventually unsuccessful—claims of former forced labourers and war
crime victims.27
23Cf the assessments by Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford:
OUP 3rd ed 2015), 181; Ariel Colonomos/Andrea Armstrong, ‘German Reparations to the Jews
after World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations’, in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The
Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: OUP 2006), 391-417, at 411.
24Joachim Käppner, ‘Summe der Schande’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 March 2015); Christoph
Schult, ‘Stunde der Bewährung’, Der Spiegel Geschichte 2 (2015), 120-123. For a detailed
overview on all relevant compensatory measures, see Bericht der Bundesregierung über
Wiedergutmachung und Entschädigung für nationalsozialistisches Unrecht sowie über die Lage
der Sinti, Roma und verwandter Gruppen, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 10/6287 (31 October
1986) and Federal Ministry of Finance, Compensation for National Socialist Injustice: Indemnifi-
cation Provisions, May 2019, available at https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/
Standardartikel/Press_Room/Publications/Brochures/2018-08-15-entschaedigung-ns-unrecht-engl.
html.
25For a closer analysis, see Andreas von Arnauld, ‘Damages for the Infringement of Human Rights
in Germany’, in Ewa Bagińska (ed), Damages for Violations of Human Rights: A Comparative
Study of Domestic Legal Systems (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer 2015), 101-135, at
121-124. See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, and Francesco Francioni,
chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
26Walter Schwarz, ‘Das Recht der Wiedergutmachung und seine Geschichte’, Juristische Schulung
26 (1986), 433-440; Hans Günter Hockerts, ‘Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland: Eine historische
Bilanz 1945—2000’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49 (2001), 167-214.
27Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 13 May 1996, 2 BvL 33/93, BVerfGE 94, 315 (Forced
Labourers); Chamber Decision of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
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While this jurisprudence conforms well to the traditional and still prevailing view
in public international law,28 reparation at the interstate level has had its flaws, too.29
In order to support the Federal Republic of Germany in its political and economic
recovery, its western partners agreed in Article 5(2) of the London Agreement on
German External Debts to defer the ‘[c]onsideration of claims arising out of the
second World War by countries which were at war with or were occupied by
Germany during that war, and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich
and agencies of the Reich (. . .) until the final settlement of the problem of repara-
tion’.30 This clause was widely understood as a moratorium on claims against
Germany until the conclusion of a peace treaty.31 However, only some of the states
that could have claimed reparation were represented in the negotiations.32
During the 1960s, Germany concluded lump sum agreements on reparations with
11 western European countries, among them Italy. Payments to Italian citizens who
were subjected to NS persecution were covered by a bilateral treaty of 2 June 196133
on the basis of which Germany paid at that time DM (Deutsche Mark) 40 million to
(2004), 3257; Chamber Decision of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (2006), 2542, at 2543; Albrecht Randelzhofer/Oliver Dörr, Entschädigung für
Zwangsarbeit? Zum Problem individueller Entschädigungsansprüche von ausländischen
Zwangsarbeitern während des Zweiten Weltkrieges gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot 1994); Hugo J Hahn, ‘Individualansprüche auf Wiedergutmachung von
Zwangsarbeit im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Das Entschädigungsgesetz vom 2.8.2000’, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 53 (2000), 3521-3526.
28Cf, even for present-day violations of international humanitarian law, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard,
‘Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law’, International Review of the Red Cross
85 (2003), 529–554; Roland Bank, ‘Is There a Substantive Right to Compensation for Individual
Victims of Armed Conflicts against a State under International Law?’, German Yearbook of
International Law 49 (2006), 367–412; Philipp Stöckle, ‘Victims Caught Between a Rock and a
Hard Place: Individual Compensation Claims against Troop-Contributing States’, Die Friedens-
Warte/Journal of International Peace and Organization 88 (2013), 119–141; Christian Tomuschat,
‘State Responsibility and the Individual Right to Compensation Before National Courts’, in Andrew
Clapham/Paolo Gaeta (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford:
OUP 2014), 811-839; Emily L Camins, ‘Needs or Rights? Exploring the Limitations of Individual
Reparations for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, International Journal of Transi-
tional Justice 10 (2016), 126-145.
29Helmut Rumpf, ‘Die deutsche Frage und die Reparationen’, Heidelberg Journal of International
Law 33 (1973), 344-371, at 354-355; Hans Günter Hockerts, ‘Wiedergutmachung in Deutschland
1945–1990: Ein Überblick’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 63(25/26) (2013), 15-20.
30Agreement on German External Debts, 27 February 1953, UNTC No 4764 (London Debt
Agreement).
31That peace treaty never came into being. Functionally, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with
Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990, 1696 UNTS 115 (Two-plus-Four Treaty), which paved
the way for German reunification, is widely regarded as the equivalent of such a treaty.
32Though Italy was among the signatories of the London Agreement, the negotiations were mostly
conducted by the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, ie France, the UK, and the US.
33Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian
Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German
and Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No 22, 791.
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Italy. It has been the position of the German government until today that this treaty
was meant to cover all individual claims, even though hundreds of thousands34 of
IMIs and other victims of German wartime action were by definition excluded from
the notion of ‘persecution’.35 Without going into detail, given the wide-reaching
mediatisation of the individual in international law in 1961, it would be reasonable to
argue that with this treaty both states agreed to limit the circle of beneficiaries, for
whose suffering Italy would demand and receive compensation from Germany, to
those groups covered by the 1961 treaty. It has to be borne in mind that in Article 77
(4) of the 1947 Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers,36 Italy—also on behalf of its
citizens—had already waived all potential rights to compensation against Germany
concerning ‘claims for loss or damage arising during the war’. In another bilateral
treaty of 2 June 1961, the so-called Globalabkommen, Italy agreed vis-à-vis the
Federal Republic of Germany to waive all claims related to the period between
1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945 (Article 2)—against payment of a further DM40
million.37 On the surface, the situation seems settled between Germany and Italy.
IV. Unsettling Settlements: Growing Discontent
Yet, over the last 15–20 years, there has been a growing discontent with this final
settlement, or Schlussstrich approach, for three reasons. Firstly, there are the inherent
limitations of the 1961 treaty that excluded IMIs from the notion of ‘victim’. Though
their treatment might not formally have been in violation of the laws applicable in the
1940s, their fate at least prompted—or even necessitated—a change to these laws in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions: for example, Article 4A(3) of the Third Geneva
Convention, in granting prisoner-of-war status for ‘Members of regular armed forces
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
34While the exact number is not undisputed, most independent sources estimate that there were
around 600,000 IMIs forced to work in Germany. See, eg, Bob Moore, ‘Enforced Diaspora: The
Fate of Italian Prisoners of War during the Second World War?’, War in History 22 (2015),
174–190, at 184; and Deutsch-Italienische Historikerkommission, ‘Bericht der von den
Außenministern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik am 28.3.2009
eingesetzten Deutsch-Italienischen Historikerkommission’, (July 2012), available at www.
villavigoni.it/contents/files/Abschlussbericht.pdf, 1–180, at 33.
35Art 1(1) limits compensation to those ‘persecuted on grounds of race, religion, or ideology’ (‘aus
Gründen der Rasse, des Glaubens oder der Weltanschauung’/‘per ragione di razza, fede o
ideologia’). Arguably, one might view the IMIs as covered by persecution for ideological reasons;
this, however, was presumably not how that clause was understood by the parties in 1961 or later.
36Treaty of Peace with Italy, 10 February 1947, 49 UNTS 3.
37Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain
Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian
version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963, 668.
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Detaining Power’, was explicitly meant to address the situation of IMIs.38 So there is
a strong moral claim by those victims to be included in any given compensation
scheme, even though, legally, the principles of non-retroactivity of international
legal obligations and of mediatisation of the individual through its national state
prove to be gatekeepers to the sphere of law.
Secondly, there is a change to international law. The last 25 years have witnessed
a shift in perspective: the formerly state-centred system has gradually opened up to
include the individual and their rights. As a parallel development, the traditional
concept of interstate responsibility has come under pressure to recognize the right of
individuals to reparation for human rights violations. This has found expression in
the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, adopted by the UN General Assem-
bly in December 2005.39 Claims for reparation do not only concern recent cases of
human rights violations; on numerous occasions there have been attempts to redress
historical injustices by way of compensation claims filed with national and interna-
tional courts alike.40
This leads to the third reason for growing discontent. While, again, the principles
of intertemporal law and the arguably ‘soft’ character of the UN Principles of 2005
shield Germany from claims based on international law, Germany has in some cases
agreed to set up compensation schemes—though only for certain groups of victims,
mostly due to political pressure. Before 1990, it had been only the Jewish Claims
Conference, backed by Israel and the US, that had managed as early as 1952 to
secure payments from the Federal Republic of Germany. After 1990, the victims of
forced and slave labour in German companies during WWII managed to get their
claims accepted. In order to avert the impending threat of judicial proceedings in the
US, the Federal Government together with German trade and industry associations
set up the Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung,
Verantwortung und Zukunft), with a funding figure of DM10 billion.41 However,
38For the historical background, see Jean de Preux et al, III Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War: Commentary (Jean Pictet ed, Geneva: ICRC 1960), 61-64. Cf also
Article 50 of the same Convention limiting the kind of work prisoners of war might be compelled to
do by the detaining power.
39UN General Assembly, A/Res/60/147, 16 December 2005. See Theo van Boven, ‘Victim’s Right
to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United Nations Principles and Guidelines’, in Carla
Ferstman/Mariana Goetz/Alan Stephens (eds), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in the Making (Leiden: Nijhoff 2009),
19–40; José Brunner/Constantin Goschler/Norbert Frei, ‘Die Globalisierung der
Wiedergutmachung’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (17 June 2013), 23-30.
40Shelton, Remedies 2015 (n 23), 263-278.
41Roland Bank, ‘New Programs for Payments to Victims of National Socialist Injustice’, German
Yearbook of International Law 44 (2003), 307-352; Bardo Fassbender, ‘Compensation for Forced
Labour in WWII: The German Compensation Law of 2 August 2000’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 3 (2005), 243-252. See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’,
Stefan Kadelbach, chapter ‘State Immunity, Individual Compensation for Victims of Human Rights
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on the basis of a controversial distinction, Italian forced labourers were by and large
excluded from that scheme. Keeping this in mind, it must have come as another
setback that in 2015 Germany agreed to a voluntary payment to surviving former
Soviet prisoners of war.42 Though only symbolic in amount (a mere €2,500 per
victim), this at least signals a willingness on Germany’s part to accept responsibility
and to recognize the recipient as a victim. Such a recognition was belatedly extended
in 2016 to IMIs—in the form of a memorial site and an exhibition sponsored by the
German government.43 Without wanting to criticize these well-designed and
thoughtful mementos, other than their fellow sufferers, the IMIs still remain outside
any financial compensation scheme, and crucially they have not been included in the
process of deciding on the most adequate way to address the historical wrongs they
experienced.
V. Unmaking History: Possible Solutions
In an answer to a parliamentary question, the German Federal Government stated in
March 2016 that Italy remains obliged to observe the ICJ judgment of February 2012
and that it does not intend at the moment to institute further proceedings against
Italy, while nonetheless reserving the right to do so.44 In substance, the German
government repeated its position that, as far as Italian citizens are concerned, all
matters of compensation had been dealt with comprehensively in the 1961 Treaties.
Legally speaking, this position is sound. Sometimes, however, relying on law—or a
certain legal framing of a problem—misses one of the law’s central objectives: to
settle disputes. Behind the legal concepts of state immunity, ius cogens,
mediatisation, and intertemporality lies a yet unresolved conflict: that of the WWII
victims ‘in oblivion’. The IMIs and others that suffered from German wartime action
have been doubly denied recognition as victims: diachronically, in that their suffer-
ing has been treated as lawful under the rules applicable during WWII while it
would be illegal today under the amended Geneva rules—the injustices of
non-retroactivity; synchronically, by excluding them from the notion of ‘victims’
in the 1961 treaty; and again, by not offering them a compensation scheme, which
was done, for example, for other forced labourers and the former Soviet prisoners of
war—the injustices of differentiation. While formally applied correctly, the rule of
Crimes, and Future Prospects’, and Filippo Fontanelli, chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’,
in this volume.
42Cf Richtlinie über eine Anerkennungsleistung an ehemalige sowjetische Kriegsgefangene,
30 September 2015, Bundesanzeiger AT 14.10.2015 B1. Cf also Jörg Luther, chapter ‘A Story of
“Trials and Errors” that Might Have No Happy End’ and Giovanni Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm,
chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
43See, inter alia, Oellers-Frahm, ‘A Never-Ending Story’ 2016 (n 8), 202.
44Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/7852, 10 March 2016. See also Drucksache 18/3492,
9 December 2014.
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non-retroactivity of law(s) turns out to be too one-dimensional for legally assessing
the historical past. While it certainly has a reasonable moral basis in cases of criminal
accountability (namely, the principle nulla poena sine lege praevia), in cases of state
responsibility it is unable to grasp that when raising historical claims, the claimants
do not mean history but the present. They are not arguing for correcting a historic
record for historiography’s sake. The question is how today’s law accommodates the
needs of those who still suffer from historic legal discrimination—or even legal
annihilation. Once these exclusionary rules have been overcome, they should no
longer determine the legal position of those who suffered from them.
I do not intend to argue for the opening of Pandora’s box by allowing individual
claims for compensation based on historical wrongdoings. There are inherent dan-
gers in such a concept. Judges are not historians; they are, to quote Robert Cover,
‘people of violence’ whose decrees on historical truth might turn out even more
exclusionary and difficult to revise than historical narratives outside the courtroom.45
What is more, adjudicating history might prove bottomless once one goes further
back, with claims relating to early colonialism and beyond. However, in most of the
recent cases of ‘history taken to court,’ compensation is but a secondary aim, the
primary aim being to make the voice of the victims heard, allowing space for them to
‘tell their own story’ as a counter-narrative to the hegemonic discourse of the former
oppressors.46 Courts are turned into fora to make one’s story heard—and this process
is used as leverage to exert pressure on the political system to listen.
If the law is to solve conflicts and serve justice, it should provide means to address
this need. Elsewhere, and in the context of German colonial history, I have suggested
an obligatio de negotiando following from the breach of fundamental ethical
principles of law in force already at the time of the original violation.47 In our
case, this could be the Martens clause, with its appeal to the ‘laws of humanity and
the dictates of public conscience’.48 The treatment of ‘military internees’, the killing
of members of resistance movements and of hostages has surely shaken the public
conscience, paving the way for the amendments to the Geneva Conventions in
45Robert Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’,Harvard Law Review 97 (1983–1984), 4-68, at 53. David J
Bederman, ‘Foreign Office International Legal History’, in Matthew Craven/Malgosia Fitzmaurice/
Maria Vogiatzi (eds), Time, History and International Law (Leiden: Brill 2007), 43-64, at 62-63,
reminds us of the ‘enduring truth’, ‘that legal history and legal truth are not always the same thing,
and they certainly cannot be ascertained by the same means and modalities’.
46Cf generally Richard Delgado, ‘Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others’, Michigan Law
Review 87 (1989), 2411-2441; Milner S Ball, ‘Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities’,
Michigan Law Review 87 (1989), 2280-2319; Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law
(London/New York: Routledge 1992); Andreas von Arnauld, ‘Norms and Narrative’, German Law
Journal 18 (2017), 309-329, at 317-320.
47von Arnauld, ‘Damages for Infringement’ 2015 (n 25), 128.
48Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907,
Preamble, para 8.
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194949—a prime example of Durkheim’s colère publique in action.50 Arguably,
even if not formally violating specific provisions of the law of warfare in force at the
time51 (different from other atrocities committed by Germans during WWII), the
treatment of IMIs at least constituted a violation of fundamental ethical principles
incorporated through the Martens clause into the sphere of legal obligations. From
these ‘soft’ obligations one might derive not a strict obligation to compensate but a
procedural obligation to engage in negotiations as a means of satisfaction. These
negotiations are open-ended, that is, they might not necessarily lead to financial
compensation, but could also lead to setting up a commemorative scheme like the
one introduced in 2016. This, however, should not be decided over the heads of the
victims themselves.
If one takes this approach seriously, the victims have to be included in these
negotiations, especially since Italy in 1947 and 1961 was prepared to waive their
interests.52 That, generally, violations of humanitarian law and principles do not give
rise to individual claims for reparation could be disregarded once the responsible
state decides to lift the veil of mediatisation for some groups of victims by setting up
reparation programmes for individual claimants (the above-mentioned ‘injustice of
differentiation’). That we are dealing with past wrongs and injustices does not alter
the fact that the decision (not) to enter into serious talks about the most adequate
form of compensation is to be taken in the present. This decision has to conform to
today’s moral and legal standards.53 Non-retroactivity of the law is one of those
standards (standards of present-day justice, that is). However, that its
undifferentiated use might undermine the law’s capability of solving present-day
49See n 38.
50Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail: Etude sur l’organisations des sociétés supérieures
(Paris: Felix Alcan 1893), 109–112. On Durkheim’s influence on the concept of solidarity in
international law in the writings of Georges Scelle, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Global Consti-
tutional Struggles: Human Rights between colère publique and colère politique’, in Wolfgang
Kaleck/Michael Ratner/Tobias Singelnstein/Peter Weiss (eds), International Prosecution of Human
Rights Crimes (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer 2007), 13-27, at 24-27.
51Cf de Preux, III Geneva Convention 1960 (n 38), 264-265, as to the different views of the
belligerents under the 1929 Geneva Conventions.
52For a similar reason, Krajewski/Singer, ‘Should Judges be Front-Runners?’ 2012 (n 3), 31-33,
argue de lege ferenda for an inclusion of victims in proceedings before the ICJ in cases of human
rights abuses in order to include ‘the missing voices’.
53Cf, mutatis mutandis, the—lesser known and received—second principle of intertemporal law as
stated by Max Huber, in the Island of Palmas (Netherlands v US), Award of 4 April 1928, 2 UN
Rep Intl Arb Awards, 829-871, at 845: ‘As regards the question which of different legal systems
prevailing at successive periods to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a
distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same
principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises,
demands that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the
conditions required by the evolution of law.’ For a closer analysis, see Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The
Application of International Legal Norms Over Time: The Second Branch of Intertemporal Law’,
Netherlands International Law Review 58 (2011), 147-172.
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disputes, which—like practically all disputes—are rooted in the past, has hopefully
been made plausible in this chapter.
Is Germany then legally obliged to open negotiations? Certainly not on the basis
of a traditional reading of international and constitutional law. If one is prepared,
however, to accept the idea of procedural rights and obligations following from
violations of ‘ethical-legal’ norms and how they are being addressed today, Ger-
many is, in fact and in law, obliged to offer serious talks to victims. For its
participation in the historical wrongs—at this late point, merely mentioning
Mussolini’s Repubblica di Salò will have to suffice—and for its waiver of rights
of Italian citizens, Italy ought to be included in the negotiations and in any compen-
sation scheme.54 In following this path, the law would better live up to its claim of
settling conflicts by addressing injustices.
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Moving Beyond Judicial Conflict
in the Name of the Pre-Eminence
of Fundamental Human Rights
Valerio Onida
Abstract Sentenza 238/2014 can be criticized insofar as it seems to ground Italy’s
refusal to comply with the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment of the International
Court of Justice on the basis of the right of access to a judge for the victims of the
conduct of German armed forces during World War II. Indeed, the principle of
state’s immunity to the civil jurisdiction of other states regarding the conduct of their
own armed forces does not in itself breach a victim’s right of access to a judge, which
theoretically in this case might also be granted by a German court. However,
Sentenza 238/2014 has the merit of highlighting, in the specific case of the Italian
Military Internees (IMIs), the violation of the victims’ right to an effective judicial
protection of their fundamental rights, given that German jurisdictions excluded
every reparation that favoured IMIs. Such fundamental rights must prevail over the
international rules relating to state immunity because, according to the supreme
principles of the Italian constitutional order and to international law itself, funda-
mental human rights violations related to crimes against humanity must benefit from
an effective protection. The impasse between Italy and Germany should be solved
through a new joint initiative between the two governments (carried out ideally
under a common understanding of the two Presidents of the Republic), which should
examine the applicants’ cases in order to grant them reparation. Though symbolic,
such reparation will have an important moral dimension.
I. Introduction
The situation following the adoption of the 2012 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Judgment—which holds that the German state is not subject to the jurisdiction of
Italian courts for proceedings brought by former Italian Military Internees (IMIs) or
their families, and other victims of acts carried out by German armed forces in Italy
V. Onida (*)
University of Milan, Faculty of Law, Milan, Italy (emeritus)
e-mail: valerio.onida@oralex.eu
© The Author(s) 2021
V. Volpe et al. (eds.), Remedies against Immunity?, Beiträge zum ausländischen
öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 297,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62304-6_17
331
after the armistice of September 19431—and the adoption of Judgment 238/2014 of
the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC), which ruled the Italian law purporting to
implement the 2012 ICJ Judgment unconstitutional,2 is apparently unsolvable in
terms of formal law. The conflict is not in fact between the Italian and the German
governments but between an international court, by the rulings of which the states of
the international community are bound, and a national constitutional court, the
rulings of which are binding on the Italian government and legislature and are not
subject to any form of appeal (Article 137(3) of the Italian Constitution).
II. Quid Iuris or Quid Iustum?
The ItCC did not deny that Italy is subject in general terms to a duty to abide by the
judgments of the ICJ concerning the Italian state. However, it rejected the view that
the provision of international law on which this particular ICJ Judgment was based
(namely the exemption of the German state from Italian civil jurisdiction for acts
carried out by German armed forces, even where these acts involved the commission
of war crimes and crimes against humanity) could be applied in Italy and thus
annulled the provision of Italian law, which had by contrast purported to assert
this exemption in line with the 2012 ICJ Judgment.3
Thus, if we pose the question of quid iuris—namely, what is the rule of law that
must apply in this case?—we cannot avoid establishing the existence of an irrecon-
cilable conflict between international law and Italian law. In keeping with a ‘dualist’
conception of relations between the two legal systems, we would have to content
ourselves with concluding that, in this case, the two systems do not express the same
rule or stipulate any rule for harmonization but rather the two rules conflict irrecon-
cilably with each other, and therefore offer different solutions to the specific
disputes.
However, if we ask the question of quid iustum—namely, what would be a fair
solution to this specific case?—we can no longer content ourselves with only noting
the conflict between the two legal systems but must answer a different question:
within the dispute between the Italian victims of crimes against humanity committed
by German armed forces and the German state (legislature and judiciary), which has
refused to recognize a right of redress to victims, should not the fundamental rights
of the individual prevail over the rule providing for exemption from Italian jurisdic-
tion, which has been inferred from international law?
This case in fact involves a conflict between two values: on the one hand, the need
to grant immunity from jurisdiction to the actions of the armed forces of a state
1ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2012, 99, paras 79, 80, 91, 97, 101-103.
2Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014, para 4.1.
3ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), para 4.1.
332 V. Onida
operating within the territory of another state (and in their dealings with the nationals
of that other state), based on the doctrine of state sovereignty and the characteristics
of the state of war; on the other hand, the requirement to respect the fundamental
rights of the persons involved. Nevertheless, defending the fundamental rights of
individuals, including in particular those rights that we normally consider irreducible
and inviolable, must inevitably prevail not only in moral terms but also from a legal
standpoint (in terms of the universal law that humanity generally recognizes as a
matter of principle, though frequently violated). This may be inferred for example
from proclamations such as those set forth in Article 1 of the German Constitution,
which proclaims the inviolability of human dignity, or in Article 15(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits any derogation, even
during time of emergency, from the core fundamental rights to life and to the
prohibition of torture and slavery.
III. The Right to an Effective Judicial Protection
The principle of prevalence of the fundamental human rights is worth both for
international law and for domestic law and prevails over other norms, including
constitutional provisions (for Italian law, this is expressed through the assertion that
the supreme principles of the constitutional order prevail over any other provision,
including those of constitutional law). Moreover, it is precisely in this vein that in
Sentenza 238/2014 the ItCC refused to incorporate into Italian law rules that were at
odds with the principle of prevalence of human fundamental rights.
It could be objected that, in this case, the ItCC did not expressly invoke rights
such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture or slavery but the right to judicial
protection, which it held to prevail over the principle of state immunity from the civil
jurisdiction of other states in cases involving war crimes or crimes against humanity.
However, the right to effective judicial protection is an ‘instrumental’ right, the
guarantee of which is a prerequisite for the effective protection of other rights: to
deny it when protection is sought for rights violated by crimes against humanity
would be tantamount to denying these other rights.
It may be observed that the ItCC perhaps did not sufficiently stress that the case
involved not the right to judicial protection in general, but the fundamental right to
effective judicial protection for fundamental rights that were violated by crimes
against humanity committed by German troops against IMIs and other similarly
situated victims of Nazi crimes.4 In fact, considered in itself, the right to judicial
protection could have also been guaranteed to the interested parties via access to a
German court. The point is that the German courts, acting in accordance with
4ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), paras 3.4, 3.5. For a different perspective, see Christian
Tomuschat, chapter ‘The Illusion of Perfect Justice’, Alessandro Bufalini, chapter ‘Waiting for
Negotiations’, and Sabino Cassese, chapter ‘Recollections of a Judge’, in this volume.
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German law, refused the claimants the right to any redress, by failing to allow them
to benefit from compensation awarded to other classes of victims.5
Theoretically, it would have been possible for the Italian victims who had also
brought an action before a German court to obtain judicial protection before those
courts, perhaps according to a different interpretation of German law or even by a
ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court, ruling in the name of the very
same supreme principles which the Italian court invoked in order to preclude the
applicability of the 2012 ICJ Judgment. However, in view of the stance taken by the
German legislature and courts, the effective judicial protection sought could only
specifically be achieved through the disapplication—in this specific case—of the
2012 ICJ Judgment along with the Italian law requiring compliance with it.
This is not to negate the validity and effect of international law, as it were, from
the perspective of ‘nationalist’ closure. In fact, both international law and state law
(or at least the domestic law of states that have adhered to UN conventions on the
protection of human rights and the prevention and punishment of war crimes6)
cannot avoid recognizing the pre-eminence and hence the predominance of the
principle of fundamental human rights protection: even where it conflicts with
other legal principles, such as the principle of state immunity before the courts of
another state regarding acts carried out by the armed forces of the first one in the
territory of the second. In this area, absent any ad hoc international tribunal, a
universal principle that guarantees effective judicial protection to victims must
also apply before civil courts.
IV. Conclusion
Since it is difficult to give a specific (quantitative) form to the right to compensation
for damages against the German state in accordance with general national principles
of civil law, it is clear that it would be appropriate, and in fact necessary, for a new
agreement to be reached between the German and the Italian government, something
that the ICJ itself stated would be desirable.
On the other hand, to leave the Italian courts to issue rulings against the German
state whilst subsequently refusing to enforce these judgments, thereby separating the
5See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277;
Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, Judgment of 9 September 2004, 9 A 336.02. In this context, see also
the Distomo cases where German courts refused to grant redress to Greek victims of World War II
massacres: Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 15 February 2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, BVerfGK
7, 303. See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
6See for instance International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966;
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, 26 November 1968.
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judicial recognition of the right from the question of enforcement,7 would not be a
good solution. This would in fact amount to a hypocritical and formalist solution and
would not resolve the conflict, which instead calls for a substantive and mutually
agreed solution.
Within the framework of the new agreement, it would be possible for the two
states to recognize that under the historical circumstances that led to the crimes in
question they both bear some form of responsibility.8 It would also be possible to
establish criteria for defining the status of ‘victims’, enabling the recognition of
moral responsibilities and the quantification of the (largely symbolic) compensations
due. I believe that those who have taken action before the Italian courts, as victims or
as family members of victims, have done so not so much with the aim of securing
financial redress—given that the damages suffered cannot be compensated—but
also, and perhaps principally, with the purpose to get a moral recognition of their
status as victims.
It would be highly desirable for a new agreement to be called for and promoted by
the Heads of State of Italy and Germany acting in concert with each other in order to
express at the highest level considerations rooted in the shared recognition (also
within the common European context), of the same principles of respect for and
protection of fundamental human rights that would serve as a basis and a justification
for such an agreement.9
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7See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, and Giovanni
Boggero/Karin Oellers-Frahm, chapter ‘Between Cynicism and Idealism’, in this volume.
8In fact, at the time the events occurred, there were two opposing governments in Italy: the
legitimate government, which had signed the armistice along with the partisans fighting the German
troops, and the Fascist Republic of Salò, which was allied with the Nazis. See also Andreas von
Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
9See also Filippo Fontanelli, chapter ‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, and Francesco Francioni,
chapter ‘Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum’, in this volume.
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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Italian
Concerns Between Constitutional Rights
and International Law
Andreas L. Paulus
Abstract Sentenza 238/2014 has led to a sharp dissonance between the interna-
tional law of state immunity as interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
and Italian constitutional law as understood and applied by the Corte Costituzionale.
While the interpretation and application by the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) of
the access-to-courts provision in the Italian Constitution may not have been inevi-
table, this does not remove the need for finding a solution to the stalemate between
international and domestic law. On the one hand, the easy solution, namely that the
rejection of German state immunity from jurisdiction does not necessarily remove
immunity from execution into German property, appears unlikely to be accepted by
the ItCC because it would give stones rather than bread to the complainants and
render court access a futile exercise. On the other hand, bringing Sentenza to its
logical conclusion would result in Italy having to return to Germany what Italian
courts took from her by requiring compensation—either by way of the general
international law of restitutio in integrum, which the Corte Costituzionale has
neither contemplated nor contradicted, or by way of the 1961 Treaty between
Germany and Italy in which Italy promises to indemnify Germany against any
further claims. Thus, a compromise would have to distinguish between full access
to the Italian courts notwithstanding international immunity—as required by the
ItCC—and substantive law, which could accept a more symbolical recognition of the
suffering of the victims. That recognition could stem from a direct source other than
the two states involved, such as a common fund, and address only the small group of
immediate victims who were unjustly, if arguably legally, excluded from the previ-
ous compensation scheme of the 1960s. It is by no means certain, however, whether
such an outcome would be acceptable to all sides—including the Corte itself. Thus,
legal certainty would have to be established as quickly as possible so that the victims
can still receive at least symbolic compensation.
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Sentenza 238/2014 has created a sharp dissonance between the international law of
state immunity as interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the one
hand, and Italian constitutional law as understood and applied by the Corte
Costituzionale on the other. To wit, while the ICJ maintained that a state is immune
against any claim of civil damages for its acts iure imperii,1 both present or past, the
Corte Costituzionale held in Sentenza 238/2014 that the Italian Constitution
demanded that Italian courts provide court access to parties requesting reparation
for violations of basic fundamental rights—for acts both past and present.2 Thereby,
the Italian Constitutional Court (ItCC) went further than the European Court of
Human Rights in cases regarding contemporary state torture3 and reparations for
expropriations committed by Germany during World War II (WWII) prior to the
European Convention on Human Rights had entered into force.4 By declaring Italian
ratification of the UN Charter retroactively a violation of its Constitution, and thus
limiting the internal purview of the most basic international treaty since WWII, the
Corte Costituzionale took an unprecedented step not only in Italy but in the world at
large.
II. The Stalemate Between International and Domestic Law
Reassuringly enough, Italy will not cease to be a member of the UN and will not try
to ‘bail out’ of international law altogether. Indeed, and this is the good news, the
ItCC explicitly confirmed the bindingness of international law on Italy, including the
very immunity the Corte Costituzionale rejected in domestic law. It was only that
Italy could not practically abide by the decision and deny court access for the claims
1ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 77.
2Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 22 October 2014, No 238/2014, paras 5 et seq.
3See ECtHR, Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 November 2001,
Application No 35763/97; see also ECtHR, Nait-Liman v Switzerland, Grand Chamber Judgment of
15 March 2018, Application No 51357/07 (no extra-territorial jurisdiction for adjudication of civil
claims regarding compensation for torture, with a careful analysis of domestic case law in paras
67 et seq, concluding in paras 187–188 that such jurisdiction is an exception in domestic law and
not warranted by international treaties); similarly ECtHR, Jones and Others v The United Kingdom,
Judgment of 14 January 2014, Applications Nos 34356/06 and 43525/06, para 116 et passim
(no violation of Art 6(1) ECHR by not recognizing universal jurisdiction for compensation claims);
confirming UK House of Lords, Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26.
4ECtHR, Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany, Decision of 12 December 2002,
Application No 59021/00 (Distomo); ECtHR, Associazione Nazionale Reduci and 275 Others v
Germany, Decision of 4 September 2007, Application No 45563/04 (Ferrini), 12. See also ECtHR,
Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany, Judgment of 12 July 2001, Application No
42527/98, paras 59 et seq.
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in question for reasons of internal law—even if its interpretation was quite singular
in comparison to those of its foreign brethren in similar cases. While it is thus
doubtful that the interpretation and application by the ItCC of the access-to-court
provision in the Italian Constitution was doctrinally inevitable, this does not remove
the need for a resolution in the resulting stalemate between international and
domestic law.
On the one hand, the easy solution, according to which rejecting immunity from
jurisdiction does not necessarily remove immunity from execution, appears unlikely
to be accepted by the ItCC because it would render court access a futile exercise—
the very access the Court had demanded so strongly in Sentenza.5 On the other hand,
bringing Sentenza 238/2014 to its logical conclusion leads to the equally awkward
result that Italy would have to compensate Germany for the eventual losses suffered
from a success of the victims’ compensation claims before Italian courts. The reason
for this counterintuitive result lies in the schism Sentenza created between interna-
tional and domestic law when it—even only grudgingly—accepted the authority of
the 2012 ICJ Judgment as to the state of contemporary international law, though the
Corte Costituzionale all but invited the World Court to eventually reverse its
judgment.6 However, this does nothing to prevent Italy’s international obligation
to provide redress to Germany for any wrongful act it may have committed under
international law. International law, in turn, in the judgment rendered by the ICJ,
requires respect for Germany’s immunity and provides, as a secondary remedy,
restitutio in integrum for any violation of said immunity. In other words, the ICJ
Judgment requires the re-establishing of the situation prior to an eventual violation of
immunity:7 including, after an eventual seizure of property to indemnify the victims
of crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during WWII, its return to Germany or at
least compensation for the lost property. This part of international law the ItCC has
neither contemplated nor contradicted. But, even in the case that Italy would not
recognize this seemingly inevitable result, which derived from customary interna-
tional law as codified by the International Law Commission,8 there remains the 1961
Agreement between Germany and Italy in which Italy explicitly promised to indem-
nify Germany against any further claims.9 One may, of course, argue that this treaty
5See also the parallel treatment of adjudication and enforcement in ECtHR, Distomo (n 4).
6ItCC, Judgment 238/2014 (n 2), paras 4.1 et seq.
7Cf Arts 31(1), 32, 34, 35 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 (Final Outcome), UN
Doc A/56/10, 43, UN Doc A/RES/56/83, Annex, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, GAOR 56th
Session Supp 10, 43 (2001). Art 39 on Contribution of the injured State will not be of much help
because it cannot be used to remove immunity through the backdoor.
8ILC, Art 36 ASR, 2001 (n 7).
9Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain
Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian
version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963 No 19, 668; see therein Art 2: ‘(1) The
Italian Government declares all outstanding claims on the part of the Italian Republic or Italian
natural or legal persons against the Federal Republic of Germany or German natural or legal persons
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did not cover the damages in question, or that this treaty by itself amounted to a
violation of ius cogens as Italy had argued before the World Court.10 However, the
Corte Costituzionale’s explicit acceptance of the ensuing judgment in international
law—in the true spirit of Italian dualism—seems to close down this argument. Thus,
on the basis of international law as recognized by Sentenza 238/2014, Italy would
have to render under international law any property seized by way of domestic
decisions. In the end, Italy, not Germany, would have to indemnify the victims.
III. You Cannot Have Your Cake and Eat It
This result shows how complicated the relationship between international and
domestic law is, and how difficult it is to bridge a gap between these two systems
of law. While states regularly can and do violate international rules of behaviour, and
Louis Henkin’s famous phrase that ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time’11 may
turn out to be wishful thinking in the age of Donald Trump, gaps between interna-
tional and domestic law lead to confusion and paradox, not to legal certainty and the
rule of law. It is one thing to maintain that states are only bound by the rules they
have explicitly (treaties) or implicitly accepted, or at least acquiesced to (custom or
general principles),12 so that new rules may not be held against them; it is quite
another thing to deny the validity of generally accepted rules and principles that an
international court has explicitly declared valid and applicable to the case at hand.
To use domestic law as an excuse to not implement an international court ruling
would amount to nothing less than a contradiction of the Italian insistence on the
legal nullity of treaties in violation of ius cogens. In other words, Italy cannot have
to be settled to the extent that they are based on rights and circumstances which arose during the
period from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945. (2) The Italian Government shall indemnify the
Federal Republic of Germany and German natural or legal persons for any possible judicial
proceedings or other legal action by Italian natural or legal persons in relation to the above-
mentioned claims.’ Germany agreed to pay Italy DM (Deutsche Mark) 40 million in another
Agreement (concluded on the same day) between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on
the Compensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution
(Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No
22, 791.
10See Counter-Memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy),
22 December 2009, paras 5.46 et seq. See also Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice and Its
Pitfalls: Reparation for War Crimes and the Italian Constitutional Court’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice 14 (2016), 629–636; see also Werner Wilmanns, ‘Die Forderungen der
Verbündeten des Deutschen Reiches gegen deutsche Schuldner nach dem Londoner
Schuldenabkommen’, Der Betriebs-Berater 10 (1955), 820–821.
11Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University
Press 2nd ed 1979), 47.
12Cf Art 38(1) ICJ Statute.
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her cake and eat it, that is, she cannot on the one hand present herself as the true
standard bearer of the highest values of the international community of states as
embodied in ius cogens, and on the other flout international law as enshrined in
customs and treaties for avoiding to indemnify the victims herself. This may indicate
an important lesson from the present case, namely that relying on domestic law to
flout the execution of international decisions carries the risk of international respon-
sibility. Of course, states have the power to reject international law—either in
general or in specific cases. But in this instance, they will have to suffer the
consequences.
IV. Conclusion
How then to solve this stalemate? Mere waiting will not do because at some point
Italian courts will have to make a decision in the cases now before them, including
whether to confiscate German property such as Villa Vigoni—with the added irony
that this precious centre of German–Italian friendship would thereby risk to be
transformed into its opposite. Thus, a practical solution is needed: a compromise
that does not rely so much on the application of hard and fast legal rules but rather on
the distinction between full access to the courts notwithstanding international immu-
nity—as required by the ItCC’s interpretation of Italian constitutional law—and
substantive law, which does not require reparations for every singular claim but
accepts lump sum payments of a compensatory nature leaving open the question of
legal obligation as a form of reparations (of war claims in general), not reparation
(of each individual wrong separately).13 Indeed, such a solution already exists in the
1961 Agreement between Germany and Italy, but has left gaps regarding coverage of
Italian Military Internees and other victims.14 The ICJ itself has explicitly expressed
regret for this gap, and thus considered further negotiations.15
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Overcoming the Judicial Conundrum:
The Road to a Diplomatic Solution
Francesco Francioni
Abstract The role of international law and of international lawyers is at its best
when it results in a ‘work of reconciliation and realistic construction’ (Dag
Hammarskjöld, 1953). Unfortunately, it is difficult to find much of this spirit in
the unfolding, regrettable and never-ending saga of Germany versus Italy. In
answering the basic question of whether Germany is obliged to negotiate a settle-
ment with Italy, this chapter argues that even if there is no hard and fast legal
obligation, there is a political and moral obligation to negotiate a settlement, as
indicated by paragraph 104 of the Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ); the same obligation is incumbent upon Italy. The
current legal ‘black hole’ cannot be filled by further proceedings before the ICJ
because immunity serves the value of the equality of states, yet equality is not a value
in its own sake but is functional to the preservation of peaceful and orderly
international relations and to the ‘realistic construction’ of conditions for the fulfil-
ment of human rights. Negotiations in view of the creation of a joint German–Italian
fund for the reparation of victims is the appropriate way to overcome the present
impasse and to do justice to a whole class of victims who so far have fallen into
oblivion.
I. Introduction
There could not have been a more appropriate time to discuss possible solutions to
the legal deadlock that has followed Sentenza 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional
Court (ItCC). I appreciate that in the introductory chapter the editors have stressed
that the spirit of the volume should be ‘forward looking and conciliatory’. I will do
my best to honour this shared ambition, convinced as I am that the very aim of
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international law, and the very function of international lawyers, should be a ‘work
of reconciliation and realistic construction’.1
Unfortunately, I must say that it is precisely this spirit of reconciliation and
realistic construction that has been lacking in the regrettable controversy between
two founding members of the European Union. On the German side we have seen an
insistence on a formalistic interpretation of international rules, which does justice to
states and their sovereignty but hardly contributes to individual justice for victims of
gross human rights violations. This has resulted in a somewhat incoherent and
selective approach to reparations for victims of German World War II (WWII)
crimes and in a protracted denial of justice to a whole category of victims of
deportation, enslavement and massacres. On the Italian side, there has been a
deplorable lack of political initiative to fill the gap resulting from the incomplete
implementation of Germany’s post-war reparation schemes and from the Italo-
German agreement of 1961. This is especially regrettable since similar gaps have
been filled by German compensation schemes, as already indicated in the chapter by
Andreas von Arnauld.2 Faced with the passivity of the Italian government, the
problem was left in the hands of judges. Italian international lawyers, or at least a
significant part of them, have eagerly contributed to fuelling the hubris of ius
cogens,3 convinced as they were that the problem could be solved by judges rather
than by a ‘work of reconciliation and realistic construction’. As is now visible, this
has produced a zero-sum dispute before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and a
last-ditch defence by the ItCC declaring the unconstitutionality of the law giving
effect to the ICJ judgment in the Italian legal order.
It is timely and appropriate at this point to ask whether there is, in this apparently
never-ending dispute, an obligation to negotiate a settlement. The editors framed the
question overall with regard to Germany, but my opinion is that the question
concerns Italy as well. I will examine separately the reasons why I believe the
responsibility to seek a diplomatic solution falls upon both countries.
1These are the words used by Dag Hammarskjöld in his speech at the UN General Assembly of
10 April 1953 after his election as the UN Secretary-General, reprinted in Wilder Foote (ed),
Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld (New York:
The Bodley Head 1962), 28.
2See Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
3See, for authors arguing in favour of the primacy of ius cogens norms over the principle of state
immunity, Annamaria Viterbo, ‘I diritti fondamentali come limite all’immunità dello Stato’,
Responsabilità Civile e Previdenza 69 (2004), 1030–1039; Pasquale De Sena/Francesca De Vittor,
‘State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case’, The
European Journal of International Law 16 (2005), 89–112.
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II. The German Position
There are several sources of a possible German duty to open negotiations to end the
present dispute with Italy. The most immediate source is the obiter dictum pro-
nounced by the ICJ in its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment,4 in which, after
acknowledging that recognition of Germany’s immunity would unavoidably result
in a form of injustice for individuals (namely the deprivation of judicial protection by
their ‘natural judge’), the Court went on to indicate that the claims of victims ‘could
be the subject of further negotiation involving the two States concerned’.5 This
judicial invitation is not perfunctory. It reflects the tension felt within the Court
between two conflicting goals of international justice: on the one hand, the goal of
substantive justice requiring some form of remedial action for victims of egregious
violations of human rights and humanitarian standards, and, on the other hand, the
goal of formal international justice arising from the core realities of international law,
which require the sovereign equality of states and the rule of immunity to be
respected. The ICJ was able to diffuse this tension by resorting to the rhetorical
argument that immunity belongs to the category of procedural norms and that its
recognition does not have any impact on rules of substantive justice, even when
those rules were to belong to ius cogens. The acknowledgment of the existence of a
problem of ‘justice’ left open by the affirmation of immunity was rendered all the
more necessary after the rejection of the Italian counterclaim for reparations. What is
significant in this respect is the expression of ‘surprise and regret’ uttered by the
Court in paragraph 99 of the judgment with regard to the realization that ‘Germany
decided to deny compensation to a group of victims on the ground that they had been
entitled to a status [prisoners of war] which, at the relevant time, Germany had
refused to recognize’.6
These statements are not in themselves a sufficient ground to permit the construc-
tion of a perfect legal obligation for the two states to negotiate a solution to the
dispute that may include some form of reparation to the victims. But their legal
relevance to substantiate Germany’s responsibility to begin serious negotiations in
view of reparations to the surviving victims and their successors becomes more
apparent when we examine the origin and overall context of this controversy. The
context emerges from the attitude taken by Germany in the past two decades with
regard to compensation schemes for victims of atrocities committed by the Third
Reich. As already pointed out in von Arnauld’s chapter, Germany has been forth-
coming in accepting legal responsibility for the commission of such atrocities during
the Nazi period. However, ‘the patchwork of instruments set up soon after the
4ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
5Ibid, para 104. See also Paolo Palchetti, chapter ‘Right of Access to (Italian) Courts über alles?’, in
this volume.
6Ibid, para 99. See also Jörg Luther, chapter ‘A Story of ‘Trials and Errors’ That Might Have No
Happy End’, in this volume.
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foundation of the Federal Republic (. . .) was very much characterized by selectiv-
ity’.7 Certainly, such selectivity was influenced by the realities of international
relations at that time, including the long Cold War period and the different degree
of political pressure put on Germany by other states and groups representing victims.
All this is true, but there was more: the pressure exerted upon Germany by individual
claims brought by victims of Nazi crimes before national courts, especially US
courts. It is well known that German reparations law was modified after the 1994
Princz case in order to cover foreign victims of Nazi crimes,8 and that in the
aftermath of this case Germany agreed to set up by federal law the Foundation
‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ (Erinnerung, Verantwortung und
Zukunft) to provide a comprehensive scheme of individual compensation to former
slaves, forced labourers and other victims of Nazi crimes.9 Section 11(3) of the Law
provides that ‘[e]ligibility cannot be based on prisoner-of-war status’. Such exclu-
sion was justified by the assumption that prisoners of war (POW) can be lawfully
detained under international law. But as far as many of the Italian claimants are
concerned, far from enjoying a POW-protected status under international law, they
were deprived of any rights and subjected to inhuman treatment, starvation and
summary execution. So, one cannot understand the logic of the POW-status argu-
ment, advanced on the German side, to exclude any form of reparation to the
dwindling numbers of Italian victims. The morality of their exclusion from the
compensation schemes available for similar victims of other nationalities is even
more dubious when we think that the Italian deportees, and especially the ‘military
internees’, had seen their hardship aggravated by the resentment, hatred and humil-
iation they received for refusing to join the Nazi–Fascist war enterprise. Considered
as ‘traitors’, they were treated with contempt and malevolence. Now we know,
however, that their silent refusal reveals their morally dignified resistance at a time
of tragic uncertainty for Europe. This makes the lack of any initiative on the German
side after the Ferrini judgment, and the flurry of similar cases brought before Italian
courts, all the more troublesome and incomprehensible to the victims. The rigidity of
Germany’s denying any responsibility towards the Italian victims stands in sharp
contrast to the attitude taken in the mid-1990s after the Princz case in the US. In this
case, the judicial action by the victims worked as a catalyst for the establishment of a
comprehensive reparation scheme; in the Italian case, it produced only a defensive
reaction based on immunity, with the result of letting the dispute drag on into the
present.
7See Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume, at 319.
8Princz v Germany, 26 F 3d 1166 (DC Cir, 1 July 1994).
9See also Riccardo Pavoni, chapter ‘A Plea for Legal Peace’, and Filippo Fontanelli, chapter
‘Sketches for a Reparation Scheme’, in this volume.
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III. The Italian Position
As I have already mentioned, Italy bears its own responsibility for the continuation
of this dispute and for its failure to undertake effective negotiations in view of a
diplomatic solution respectful of the right of the victims. When the Ferrini judgment
made clear in 2004 that the half-century pall of silence covering Nazi–Fascist war
crimes and crimes against humanity was being lifted with the refusal of the Court of
Cassation to grant immunity to Germany,10 it was evident that alternative diplo-
matic, legislative and administrative remedies were morally necessary for the respect
due to the victims and politically urgent in order to defuse the time bomb that was the
emerging dispute with Germany. But rather than proactively seeking a diplomati-
cally agreed solution similar to the one reached 20 years earlier in the aftermath of
the Princz case, the then Italian government found it convenient to accede to
Germany’s decision to bring the matter to the ICJ in the not-so-secret conviction
that the real dispute was not with Germany but rather with the perceived
hyperactivism of judges at a time of tense relations in Italy between the executive
and the judiciary. Italy’s failure in this respect is all the more regrettable because it
completely sidelined the case of the victims, so belatedly claiming justice, while at
the same time contradicting its own professed policy on diplomatic protection. In
this respect, I wish to recall that during the preparatory work on the Draft Articles on
Diplomatic Protection prepared by the International Law Commission,11 the Italian
delegation at the General Assembly strongly supported a progressive development
of international law on this topic and the recognition of a state’s obligation to
exercise the diplomatic protection of individual victims of human rights violations.12
The Italian proposal went as far as envisaging a justiciable right of victims to obtain
diplomatic protection from the state. What would have been the logical implication
of this legal position in the wake of the Ferrini judgment? Coherence would have
required that a serious diplomatic initiative be undertaken in view of ensuring a fair
recognition of the claims of the victims and at the same time eliminating the cause of
the emerging dispute with Germany. Instead, the government let the matter drift
further into a judicial conundrum. The parliament on its part limited itself to a
cosmetic initiative by adopting Law No 296/2006, which memorialized victims of
forced deportation to German camps and established procedures for the granting of
medals of honour.13 Too little too late for the victims.
There is a further legal basis for Italy’s responsibility to take diplomatic action in
view of an international solution of this dispute. This basis is provided by a rather
neglected arbitral clause contained in Article 25 of the 1961 Italo-German agreement
10Corte di Cassazione, Judgment of 11 March 2004, No 5044/2004 (Ferrini).
11ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, adopted by the Commission at its fifty-eighth
session in 2006, UN Doc A/61/10, GAOR 61st Session Supp 10.
12ILC, ‘Comments and Observations Received from Governments’ (2006) UN Doc A/CN. 4/
561 and Add 1–2.
13Italian Law, 27 December 2006, No 296, Art 1(1271–1276).
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on reparations for victims of Nazi persecution.14 That clause permits unilateral
activation of an arbitral procedure to settle disputes over the interpretation and
implementation of the agreement. To the best of this writer’s knowledge, no
initiative based on this provision has ever been undertaken by the Italian govern-
ment, notwithstanding the apparent divergences between Germany and Italy over the
finality of the settlement provided by this agreement and over its applicability to
victims of war crimes and of crimes against humanity other than persecution. If
Germany insists that the 1961 agreement should have covered all kinds of victims of
Nazi crimes, why has Italy never contested such a view by seeking a third-party
interpretation of the agreement on the basis of the available arbitral clause?
IV. Conclusion
This is a sorry saga. Germany and Italy share a tragic historical role in WWII and
share the responsibility for having contributed to a situation where victims of
appalling crimes, including forced deportations, slave labour and civilian massacres,
were not recognized as victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity eligible
for compensation. This is the ‘black hole’ on which the ICJ expressed ‘surprise and
regret’.
The injustice of this situation is aggravated by the fact that victims have waited
for such a long time to obtain some form of recognition and reparation, most of them
are no longer alive and their descendants are also fast disappearing. This protracted
injustice cannot be addressed by further proceedings before the ICJ as a response by
Germany to Sentenza 238/2014. Such insistence would only exacerbate the conflict
and further increase the distance between formal international justice, as adminis-
tered by the ICJ, and the substantive justice sought by the individual victims. The
re-affirmation of immunity by the ICJ would serve the logic of once more vindicat-
ing the realities of international relations and the related need to preserve the
sovereign equality of states, but it would do little to advance the cause of individual
justice, whose unavoidable place in international law was reiterated by the UN
General Assembly’s Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.15 In the context of
this case, and more generally from the point of view of the development of
international law toward a system of global justice, the ultimate question is whether
sovereign equality and immunity should be considered as values in their own sake or
14Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Settlement of Certain
Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German and Italian
version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 26 June 1963 No 19, 668.
15UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005.
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rather as functional to the construction and preservation of peaceful and orderly
international relations and to the fulfilment of human rights. Sentenza 238/2014 does
not answer this question, being exclusively based on an argument of domestic
constitutional identity and justice. But Germany and Italy could seize an opportunity
that this dispute offers and attempt an answer to this question by seriously addressing
the case of the victims and entering negotiations in view of reaching an agreement on
the establishment of a joint fund to compensate the victims of past atrocities who
have so far been left out of any available reparation scheme. Such agreement could
establish criteria for the identification of ‘victims’, with a possible distinction
between direct victims and descendants. This joint fund could also address the
concern expressed by the editors of this volume about the morality and legality of
‘guaranteeing the rights of “others” with the resources of a state’s own citizens and
taxpayers’. A joint fund would help eliminate that troubling ‘other’ that today seems
to revisit Europe with renascent forms of nationalism. It would serve as a reminder
that the European Union, and the eurozone in particular, were created not only to
facilitate the market, financial transactions and transnational commerce but to reduce
the historical heritage of that ‘other’ and of the separation of the European people.
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Part VII
The Past and Future of Remedies
Recollections of a Judge
Sabino Cassese
Abstract As a former justice of the Italian Constitutional Court serving at the time
of Sentenza 238/2014, this chapter illustrates my major concerns towards this
Judgement. I outline several reasons for a possible ‘dissent’ (procedural, factual,
constitutional, theoretical and strategic). With ex post remarks, the chapter elabo-
rates some additional thoughts on the unnecessary opposition between national and
international law and on certain Italian ambiguities towards its past.
I. Introduction
As I am the only author in this volume who can provide a view from the inside, I
shall speak as a witness and not as a scholar, making ex-post public my dissent as a
former justice of the Corte Costituzionale (ItCC) who decided Sentenza 238/2014 in
October 2014.
In my dissent I was not alone. A large minority of the ItCC was opposed to the
Judgment, and in my nine years at the ItCC, this was the most divisive of all its
judgments.1 In fact, I was very close to resigning from the Court. For procedural
reasons, if I had resigned, the judgment would not have been adopted. As it
happened, however, I was convinced by those minority members who were against
Sentenza that it would have been better not to resign. Nevertheless, I did not
participate in the meeting in which the decision was read.
My dissent was based on five points: procedural, factual, constitutional, theoret-
ical, and strategic, to which now, a few years later, I can add a few comments.
S. Cassese (*)
LUISS Guido Carli University, School of Government, Rome, Italy
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II. Reasons for Dissent
1. Procedural
As it is well known, constitutional courts engage themselves in either abstract or
concrete review. The French Conseil Constitutionnel, until the question prioritaire
de constitutionnalité,2 had only abstract review powers. In our case, the ItCC has the
power of concrete review. Concrete review means that the case has been raised in a
case or controversy, to use the American legal terminology. However, the case must
be ripe; and citing William Shakespeare, ‘ripeness is all’.3
The first problem for the ItCC was indeed to decide if this case was ripe or not.
The Tribunale di Firenze, the court that raised the case, was in that phase of the
procedure we call giudizio di cognizione and not in a giudizio di esecuzione, and did
not really demonstrate whether the case before it was indeed ripe.4 Therefore, in my
opinion, the correct decision for the court would have been to judge the case
inadmissible without even entering into the merits of the question.
2. Factual
The second point is more complex. Germany had paid in the past a large amount of
money to the Italian government,5 which was not given directly to the victims but
instead used to rebuild those parts of the country that had been partly destroyed
during the war.6 In other words, the money was directed to national purposes other
than for those victims directly affected by Nazis crimes. It was not the German
government but the Italian one to choose who would have been the beneficiaries of
those funds.
2French Constitutional Law 23 July 2008, No 2008-724.
3William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act V, Scene II, Reginald A Foakes (ed) (London: The Arden
Shakespeare new ed 1997) 363.
4Tribunale di Firenze, Orders of 21 January 2014, Nos 84/2014, 85/2014, 113/2014.
5Cf Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy on the Compensation for Italian
Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures of Persecution (Bonn, 2 June 1961), German
and Italian version published in Bundesgesetzblatt II 5 July 1963 No 22, 791.
6Cf ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99, para 101.
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3. Constitutional
Article 24 of the Italian Constitution provides the right to a judge. Is this a right to an
Italian judge or is this a right to any judge? This question was particularly relevant
for Sentenza 238/2014 because several cases had been raised before lower courts in
Germany and once even before the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).7 If
one person has a right to a judge and had the opportunity to bring their case before a
judge in Germany, why raise the same case in Italy while complaining that in fact
they did not have an opportunity to have their case reviewed by a judge?8
4. Theoretical
Why set domestic law against international law, and in the process declare interna-
tional law unconstitutional (a point later raised by Stefano Battini in an excellent
commentary to Sentenza 238/2014)9? With that Judgement, the ItCC has revived
Heinrich Triepel and the dualism national-international. The Court could have taken
another route: not to oppose the national to the international plan but to recognize
that international law also has a well-established principle that safeguards access to
justice. Therefore, the ItCC had the opportunity to oppose state immunity from
jurisdiction to another international law principle.
5. Strategic
This Judgement was also an example of legal protectionism. To build walls around a
national legal order is not a good strategy for a constitutional court; it is better to
open the doors to supranational and universal principles.10 This was a contradictory
behaviour in the strategy of the ItCC. We would do well to remember that the ItCC in
2007 opened its doors to the Strasbourg court and to the European Convention on
7Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 28 June 2004, 2 BvR 1379/01, BVerfGK 3, 277; Eg
Verwaltungsgericht Berlin, Judgment of 9 September 2004, 9 A 336.02.
8Cf Valerio Onida, chapter ‘Moving Beyond Judicial Conflict in the Name of the Pre-Eminence of
Fundamental Human Rights’, in this volume.
9Stefano Battini, ‘È costituzionale il diritto internazionale?’, Giornale di diritto amministrativo
3 (2015), 367-377, at 372-373.
10See also Sabino Cassese, I tribunali di Babele: I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale
(Rome: Donzelli editore 2009).
Recollections of a Judge 355
Human Rights,11 and later to the law of the European Union.12 That Court had
established a dialogue. Therefore, the strategy of the ItCC was inconsistent. Consti-
tutional courts should not go in search of national ‘identities’, like the FCC,13
because we all have plural identities. For the same reason, courts should not oppose
their national constitutions to international law.
III. Ex Post Remarks
Ex post, there are three additional comments I would like to make. Firstly, the
majority of the Court’s justices fell prey to the worst temptation for a constitutional
judge: to write ‘the great judgment’. You may know pages by Guido Calabresi14
against judges wanting to put their name under an important judgment. Secondly, the
majority followed one epistemic community, that of international lawyers. This was
another contradiction because international lawyers have put themselves against
international law. Thirdly, no constitutional judge should try to write history in the
courtroom:15 judges are judges, historians are historians.
That being said, let me put my opinion in a more constructive manner. I thought
that the ItCC could have taken the following decision: ‘Tribunal of Florence: you are
raising the right question in the wrong manner. It is true that there is problem of
access to justice, but you are interpreting Article 24 of the Italian Constitution in a
very strict manner. There are hundreds of decisions by the Italian Council of State
that establish that Article 24 covers also what we call deliberative democracy, that is
taking decisions by administrative bodies after consultation and discussion with the
people affected or who are going to be affected by the decisions. Therefore, I accept
your point, but I conclude that there is an obligation of the two governments to
consult and reach an agreement between themselves and with the affected people’.
If we recall the famous Canadian Supreme Court decision on the secession of
Quebec,16 we will remember that it was simple: Quebec had right to secede, but
could not exercise this right unilaterally without entering into negotiations with the
rest of Canada.
A few years ago, I was at the Global Constitutionalism Seminar at Yale Univer-
sity, and one theme was state immunity in comparative terms. The conclusion was
11Corte Costituzionale, Judgments of 22 October 2007, Nos 348 and 349/2007.
12Cf Corte Costituzionale, Order of 13 February 2008, No 103/2008; Corte Costituzionale Order of
3 July 2013, No 207/2013.
13Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317
(European Arrest Warrant II/Identity Control).
14Guido Calabresi, Il mestiere di giudice: Pensieri di un accademico americano (Bologna: Il
Mulino 2014).
15See also Andreas von Arnauld, chapter ‘Deadlocked in Dualism’, in this volume.
16Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217.
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that immunities are being eroded. They are similar to shared sovereignty, an
oxymoron, because if states are sovereign, they cannot share sovereignty. If they
share it, they are no longer sovereign. The same is true for immunity, which has been
eroded in different ways by the international community.17
IV. Italian Ambiguities Towards Fascism
I would like to make a final point on the Italian ambiguities towards Fascism.
Ambiguities that are evidenced by different viewpoints on national history. Was
the nature of Italian Fascism one of authoritarianism, totalitarianism (according to
the Hannah Arendt definition),18 or was it in reality a dictatorship?
Renzo De Felice, Italy’s preeminent historian of Mussolini and Fascism, did not
entirely share the idea that it was a totalitarian state, while his pupil, Emilio Gentile,
on the other hand, is in favour of defining Italy’s Fascist regime as totalitarian.
Historians are divided on this major point. I would like to recall how De Felice’s
considerable biography of Mussolini was received by the public and the critics. The
subtitle of that book was ‘Gli anni del consenso’,19 which implied that in the central
years of the ‘Regime’ there existed a large majority of Italians in favour of Mussolini.
The publication of that book raised strong reactions. When Claudio Pavone’s ‘Una
guerra civile’20 was published, which put forward the idea that there had been a civil
war amongst Italians, it too was received with astonishment. Furthermore, the book
‘La morte della Patria’,21 equally deals with very divisive aspects of national
history, focusing on the problem of Italians moving from being allied with the
Germans to being against the Germans and therefore being divided.
All these debates highlight the difficulty of closing the ‘memory book’ in Italy
and put Sentenza 238/2014 into a broader historical perspective which needs to be
taken into consideration when discussing possible ‘ways out’ to the current legal
deadlock.
17See also, Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in
the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 2015).
18Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Penguin Books new ed 2017).
19Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce: Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936 (Turin: Einaudi 2007).
20Claudio Pavone, Una guerra civile: Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza (Turin: Bollati
Boringhieri 2006).
21Ernesto Galli Della Loggia, La morte della patria: La crisi dell’idea di nazione tra Resistenza,
antifascismo e Repubblica (Rome/Bari: Editori Laterza 2003).
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Joseph H. H. Weiler
Abstract In this Dialogical Epilogue, I address a series of both general and specific
questions to some of the contributors of this volume. The intent is to seek clarifica-
tion on or even contest one or more propositions presented in the various chapters. In
the role of a “Consul of the Readers” I enter into a conversation with the book’s
authors to discuss some of the fundamental questions to which Sentenza 238/2014
gives rise and that have, at best, received only indirect answers in the various
chapters. I believe answering them will enhance the value of each contribution and
of the book as a whole.
It is the nature of all law books, and edited books in particular—where authors are
constrained by the space available to them—that oftentimes readers, if they could,
would love to put a question, seek a clarification on, or even contest one or more
propositions in what they read. My role here is to be a Consul of the Readers and to
put such questions to some of the contributions to this excellent volume. The book is
interesting in so many ways that go beyond the strict legal issues in question. For
example: participation was limited to German and Italian nationals. (Oh, yes! I am a
proud and patriotic Italian citizen). But the critical mood did not coincide (as is often
the case in arbitrations or with national and ad hoc judges on the International Court
of Justice (ICJ)) with nationality. Indeed, the most critical voices against the Italian
Constitutional Court (ItCC) decision came from Italians and some of the most
sympathetic voices to the real legal/moral dilemma it faces came from Germans.
Only a few, if any, were categorical in their conclusions; all understood that from
an ethical perspective this was a tough issue—on the responsibility for which views
differed—and almost all suggested various ways of squaring a circle.
In what follows I will be posing specific questions to some of the authors. In
addition, there are two underlying fundamental questions to which the case gives rise
and at best received only indirect answers in the various chapters. I believe these two
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questions would be lurking in the minds of many readers working their way through
the various contributions, and it is hoped that answering them will enhance the value
of each contribution and of the book as a whole.
General Questions
JHHW: In what circumstances and under what conditions, if any, would you say that it
would be justified or at least legitimate for a national court or tribunal, against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy, to defy a decision of the ICJ (or any other
international tribunal), which under the rules of international law is binding on such a
state? And, similarly, to give a decision which defies a rule of international law,
clearly articulated by the ICJ or a relevant international tribunal, in some other case.
I want you to imagine that such a case is before a national court and one of the
parties is making an impassioned plea that this is an instance where the national
jurisdiction should disregard the ICJ (or a relevant international tribunal) in the two
circumstances mentioned above. And imagine further that either of the parties
before the national court is to use your brief and terse statement as giving guidance
on how to resolve this critical issue.
I want to make two further pleas: kindly do not hide behind the ‘it all depends on
the circumstances’ cop-out; and kindly make your statement relevant to any national
court (it should not be Italo-German specific).
Finally, this is not an invitation to write a whole new chapter. Imagine that you
are involved in litigation and the court in question requests a written submission
limited to 500 words.
The second, related question, is as follows: in what circumstances and under
what conditions, if any, would you consider it justified or legitimate for a national
court or tribunal, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy, to defy a
clearly established rule of international law, or legal obligation deriving from a
treaty—ie in this case I am not putting in question the authority of the ICJ or another
relevant international tribunal. I am not interested in cases where the national court
calls into question the specific interpretation of the rule, or its validity, but where it is
squarely accepted by both parties before it, and then by the court itself, that there is
a binding international obligation but is asked to defy it.
The three pleas above apply here too.
Paolo Palchetti
My answer relates to your second question. Let me start with the ‘if any’ option. It is
difficult to accept that under no circumstances would a national court be correct in
defying a clearly established rule of international law, or legal obligations deriving
from international rules (including, eventually, from binding judgments of the ICJ).
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Nor do I think that recourse by national judges to mechanisms such as those based on
the assessment of the ‘equivalent protection’ or the respect for controlimiti should
necessarily be regarded as an expression of a nationalistic attitude or an insufficient
propensity to accept values originating from the international system.
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit can coexist with a cautious attitude towards international
law; it certainly does not require invariably bowing to the dictates of international law.
There are indeed good reasons justifying a cautious attitude towards, and potentially
defiance of, international law. First, international law has dramatically expanded its
scope of application. To invariably treat it as the ‘higher law’ risks having the effect of
progressively limiting the scope of application of fundamental principles of domestic
law. Secondly, rule-making at the international level might be used by a government
(or even by a parliamentary majority) to expand their legislative power at the domestic
level, eventually circumventing any possibility of constitutional scrutiny by domestic
courts. And finally, while it is crucial for international law to find support in domestic
law, the impact of occasional discrepancies should not be exaggerated. International
law has the means for coping with these challenges. A certain degree of tension
between domestic law and international law is inevitable, and may even prove
beneficial for the development of international law.
‘In what circumstances and under what conditions’? Unsurprisingly, the first
condition is that the non-application of an international rule should be limited to
cases involving a lack of consistency with a rule of internal law ‘of fundamental
importance’. In this respect, the doctrine of controlimiti has much to be praised. In
identifying and interpreting the fundamental rules and principles that act as
controlimiti, national judges should adopt, as far as possible, an internationally
oriented stance: the non-application of an international rule may prove to be more
‘acceptable’ if the domestic principle at stake protects a value that is shared by a
plurality of other states. A second condition involves the lack of any alternative
solution other than disregarding international law. This may be obvious, but I find it
important to insist on it. Sometimes national judges prefer to sacrifice the application
of an international rule even if alternative means would be available under domestic
law to protect the interests of the affected individuals. Despite the tendency to
simplify the terms of the debate (‘my values against your values’), it is not always
an either/or situation; compromise solutions can and should be found. Finally, when
defying an international rule, a judge must make every effort to clearly delimit the
consequences and implications of its decision. The tension generated by the
non-application of an international rule may be more easily defused if political
organs can clearly identify the room-to-manoeuvre available to them.
Christian Tomuschat
It is immensely hazardous to speculate about imagined future cases the specific
circumstances of which are obviously unknown. Additionally, any commentator
must acknowledge that in Europe we live in an environment that has been shaped by
fundamental principles: the rule of law and human rights, both at the domestic and
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international level. Miscarriages of justice, which might possibly warrant departing
from a binding decision of an international court or tribunal, can therefore occur only
in exceptional circumstances.
First of all, a distinction should be drawn between the ICJ and ‘any other interna-
tional tribunal’. The ICJ is ‘the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’. Its
judges, all of them eminent lawyers, are selected through a careful process in which all
the nations of the world participate. Thus, the ICJ is the voice of the international
community regarding international law issues. No other international court or tribunal
attains a similar level of authority. In particular, international arbitral bodies do not
necessarily present the same guarantees of knowledge and expertise. In some instances,
one may therefore be tempted to criticize them for having taken their decision with a
somewhat light touch. By contrast, to charge the ICJ with ignoring or having ignored
basic tenets of the international legal order is an act of extreme temerity.
What is a ‘clearly established rule of international law’? In borderline cases the
existence and scope of the determinative rule will invariably be controversial. In
particular, serious doubts may creep into the legal debate through the concepts of ius
cogens and obligations erga omnes. Moreover, distinctions are imperative. Treaties,
customary law rules, and general principles are not of the same nature.
There is no doubt that treaties of all kinds are binding. However, treaties of the past
may not fully correspond to the exigencies of the present. In such circumstances, a
well-informed and knowledgeable interpreter may be required for a cautious mise à
jour. Here, the identity of the relevant judicial bodymatters decisively. Errors are more
likely to be committed by an ad hoc body than a well-established permanent court. On
the other hand, multilateral treaties that have come into being under the auspices of the
UN, particularly since the end of decolonization, generally deserve broad confidence.
During the drafting stage, they are submitted to thousands of critical eyes. Regarding
such contemporary treaties, it becomes fairly arrogant to take the position that their
rules are defective and do not correspond to the exigencies of law and justice.
Where the ICJ, or any other international court, has applied a rule of general
international law, things are different. Customary rules cannot be framed unilaterally
by one state alone. They arise from practice and consensus among the members of the
international community. Customary law follows societal developments, but never
abruptly from one day to the next. This time factor of slowness affords it stability but
may also be a feature that awakes criticism. The rules of general international law
introduce the past into the present. What happened decades ago becomes the guide-
line for today in a world that has seen events and upheavals that have changed the face
of the earth. In many instances the precedents of the past may seem outdated and even
obsolete. However, on what authority should a national judge be entitled to question
propositions accepted by the entire international community? In any event, the rebel
judge has to shoulder a heavy burden of proof and discharge it diligently.
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Alessandro Bufalini
There are several important reasons why it is not an easy task to answer such general
and abstract questions. First, it is reasonable to presume that the normative (and in
case judicial) conflict would impinge on certain fundamental norms, among which it
is impossible to determine a clear hierarchy. Second, even when a primacy can be
accorded to a certain rule (or value) above others, the potential sacrifice of other
fundamental norms shall always be necessary and proportionate. Third, when
applying the necessity and proportionality tests, one has to look at the substance of
the case, to take into account the concrete and material outcomes of a certain
solution. Fourth, the task of assessing the justifiability or legitimacy of a national
act of defiance to an international decision (or other international obligations)
implies, to a certain extent, an abandonment of the legal vocabulary in favour of
the language of ethics and politics. Presumably, it is not a question here merely of
solving a normative conflict but of determining who has the authority to decide on
the prominence of certain societal values over others.
The legitimacy/authority issue is strictly related to the state of relations between
the national and international judge (and legal order) and their degree of reliability
and reputation at a given moment for a certain community. This means that the
answer to the questions may depend on how the judicial organs involved in the
conflict perceive their role and power and are perceived by local and global societies.
Moreover, the judicial organs’ perception of their own role and power may vary
according to the nature of the dispute and the underlying legal determination
(whether it concerns human rights protection or, for example, the interpretation of
a commercial treaty). The picture is even more complex if one takes into account that
political organs (at the national and international level) may be willing to have the
last word on a decision that could determine the very essence of both the national and
international legal order. The attitudes of political actors may also play a crucial role
in tipping the balance one way or the other.
With these considerations in mind, it may be still possible to imagine a few
circumstances under which a national court may legitimately defy an international
decision or a state obligation stemming from a clearly established rule of customary
law: (1) when the international decision denies the existence of a clearly established
peremptory norm; (2) when the international decision has the effect of legitimizing a
manifest abuse of power or an arbitrary act of a political organ; or (3) when the
international decision (or the customary law obligation) has the effect of causing an
unnecessary or disproportionate sacrifice of a fundamental value of the national legal
order. In this latter scenario, two conditions need to be met: firstly, the state’s failure to
comply with the decision (or other international obligations) should not have the effect
of unnecessarily or disproportionally sacrificing a fundamental value of the interna-
tional legal order; and secondly, all attempts to explore the existence of alternative
means of dispute settlement (or of reparation for the injury caused) have been made.
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Giovanni Boggero and Karin Oellers-Frahm
A domestic court of last resort should be allowed to defy a decision by an interna-
tional tribunal only as an exception to the rules. Ordinarily, domestic courts are
required to abide by binding international decisions insofar as the jurisdiction of the
international tribunal in question has been accepted by the state. However, excep-
tions ought to be considered on the basis of defiance. Yet, defiance of binding
international judgments by domestic judges should be the outcome of a procedural
endeavour and not of a straight application of the hierarchy-of-norms principle. In
fact, as long as international law exists beyond the realm of states’ domestic
jurisdiction, an in-depth review of the circumstances and criteria according to
which an international tribunal has bindingly applied it should be carried out first
by domestic judges of last resort. Should it be detected that a conflict exists between
an international legal rule—as interpreted by the international tribunal—and a state’s
constitutional domestic law that cannot be solved by means of an interpretation
whereby the latter conforms with the former, the answer cannot be found on the
simplistic basis of the higher rank of one source over another, regardless of whether
we assume a monistic or a dualistic approach, whatever these categories might mean.
Instead, domestic judges of last resort should be vested with the power of engaging
in a dialogue with the corresponding international tribunal. The purpose of this
dialogue should be to reconcile the two constitutional orders, that is, of triggering a
valuable compromise that satisfies both authorities and thus safeguards the founda-
tions of both legal orders. Therefore, even if a domestic judge of last resort has the
upper hand to defy the international decision, she should ordinarily abstain from
doing so at her pleasure, assuming the international tribunal is willing to make
concessions towards the domestic judge or at least to explain in detail and in a
plausible manner the reasons on which its decision is founded.
Concerning your second question, the rule should be one of abidance by inter-
national customary law or international treaty law with the aim of fostering good
relationships among the contracting parties and within the international community.
Ordinary domestic judges should only be allowed to question the applicability of a
clearly established rule of international treaty law or customary law before a
domestic court of last resort to the extent to which no interpretation in conformity
with domestic constitutional law can be provided. To this end, ordinary domestic
judges should give particular consideration to the existing international case-law, as
well as to statements and reports from committees and treaty bodies and to the
national case-law of other states confirming or defying such a rule. The domestic
court of last resort should weigh the interpretation of the rule, as given in the
international legal order and as checked by the ordinary domestic judge, against its
own case-law. It should defy the international rule only if no judicial dialogue with
the corresponding international judge or committee is available in order to check
whether the adequacy or extent of the rule could (still) justify the required restriction
of the constitutional domestic principle. However, in the event that a corresponding
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international judge or committee has reaffirmed the existence and meaning of the
international rule, the domestic courts should not defy its application.
Francesco Francioni
Thanks, Joseph, for raising these important and pertinent questions. As for the
questions regarding the circumstances and conditions under which a national court
could/should disregard a judgment of the ICJ or another international court or
tribunal, or could/should decide to ‘violate’ an established rule of international
law, my answer is the following: the concept and scope of international justice
does not coincide with the concept and scope of national justice. The latter is
essentially ‘individual’ justice, based largely on the assessment of rights and respon-
sibility of individuals in their mutual relations and in their interaction with public
authorities; the former is ‘inter-state’ justice involving rights of states and responsi-
bilities of states (even in the field of human rights adjudication). This entails that
there may be a ‘mismatch’ between the two spheres of justice and that a supreme
court, or a constitutional court, may find it justifiable or even necessary, in the
absence of alternative remedies, to defy a judicial decision of an international court
or a norm of international law in a situation where some fundamental and inalienable
rights guaranteed under the national constitution are ignored at the international
level.
When the object of the disagreement is a norm of customary international law,
the challenge posed by a national court may also be functional to the ‘virtuous’
renewal and progressive development of customary international law, provided
that the initial ‘violation’ of the norm is followed by a widespread practice and a
sense of obligation that such practice responds to a social necessity. In the case of
treaty norms, the conflict between the national and the international levels should
be resolved by the substantive and procedural rules of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, including Article 64 concerning the emergence of new rules of
ius cogens and the procedures for the termination or suspension of operation of a
treaty.
Specific Questions
Thank you for your illuminating chapters. My task here is to raise some questions
that I think readers of your contributions may themselves wish to raise either by way
of clarification or by way of objection.
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To Paolo Palchetti
JHHW: In the opening of your piece you write in a somewhat critical idiom:
‘On the one side, there is a hyperactive judiciary, which appears determined to
provide court access to victims through a controversial interpretation of interna-
tional rules and, in the case of the ItCC, irrespective of the costs in terms of
compliance with the international rule of law.’
I find this statement problematic in at least three ways, which I invite you to
clarify.
1. Why ‘hyperactive’, when these courts seem to be operating in what they consider
the interest of justice? If Italian courts followed a ‘non-controversial’ interpre-
tation of international rules, could they not be accused, in the same vein, of
‘hyperpassively’ shutting their eyes to the perceived injustice of the international
rule?
2. Is it a true representation of the ItCC to say that it decided irrespective of the
costs in terms of compliance with the international rule of law? Surely it is a
legitimate reading of its judgment to say that it is entirely based on the Court’s
consideration of the cost—regarding important values, moral and constitu-
tional—of compliance with the international rule?
3. Are you not begging the most important question underlying this decision: how
should one understand what the ‘international rule of law’—indeed what the
‘rule of law’, international or otherwise—demands in a situation such as this?
I do not raise these issues simply as ‘debating points’ (got you!) but because of
my belief that framing the issue correctly has an impact on how to understand it
correctly.
Likewise, you write elsewhere:
‘While the main consequence of Judgment 238/2014 is that Germany is currently
being denied jurisdictional immunity before Italian courts, the inflexible conception
of the right of access to court[s] adopted by the Corte Costituzionale has a number
of implications (. . .)’.
Is it truly an ‘inflexible’ conception? Is it not precisely the opposite? Is not the
Italian Constitutional Court acting against an inflexible position, which would
accord blanket sovereign immunity, and introduce (just as they point out happened
in an earlier epoch where an exception was introduced for commercial transactions
by a state) some flexibility in the case of egregious violations of fundamental human
rights in time of war?
PP: I answer these questions together because they prompted in me the same
reaction: ‘was I as critical of the Italian Constitutional Court as Professor Weiler’s
questions appear to suggest?’. To be clear: I am indeed critical of the ItCC. But I
don’t criticize the fact that the Court reacted against the situation created by the lack
of any political initiative coming from the Italian and German governments follow-
ing the judgement of the International Court of Justice. To the contrary, as I have
written, the Court has ‘the merit of forcefully raising the question of the rights of the
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victims of grave breaches of human rights and of the way in which these rights are to
be protected’. My criticism is directed at how the Court reacted, namely ‘by focusing
exclusively on individual access to justice and on the need to promote an evolution
of the law of state immunity’. In sum, it is certainly true that I focus on the empty half
of the glass. If I do so, it is also because I believe that a different solution was
available, as I will explain below. But I do recognize that there is also another more
positive half of the glass. I concede that if this does not come across from my chapter
as clearly as it should, I should like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to
clarify.
The use I have made of certain terms for defining the conduct of ItCC may not be
very precise or require further explanations. The intent behind their use was not
necessarily to criticize the Court.
The hyperbole in my describing the judiciary as ‘hyperactive’ was intended to
emphasize the contrast between the attitude of the judiciary and the (‘hyper-passive’)
political organs. You may be right in pointing out that Italian courts had their reasons
for acting as they did. My only point, however, was simply to stress the difference in
attitude. I concede that when I wrote ‘irrespective of the costs in terms of compliance
with the international rule of law’, I may give the mistaken impression that the ItCC
took lightly the decision to defy international law. This was not my intention, and I
thank you for allowing me to be more precise on this. I simply intended to indicate
that the Court accepted to defy international law in order to give full effect to the
principle of judicial protection.
With regards to ‘the inflexible conception of the right of access to court[s]’, I
don’t think I have anywhere in my chapter contrasted the conception of the right of
access to courts retained by the ItCC and the conception of the right of foreign states
to immunity retained by the ICJ. If I use the term ‘inflexible’ it is simply because
nowhere in its judgment did the ItCC allude to the possibility that, under certain
circumstances, the right of access to courts might be sacrificed. As I have tried to
show, this gives rise to a number of questions, which also touch the delicate issue of
the compatibility with the Italian Constitution of alternative means of redress that
Germany and Italy might put in place for the purpose of putting an end to their
dispute.
Finally, I tentatively addressed your question regarding ‘what the “rule of law”,
international or otherwise—demands in a situation such as this?’when responding to
the second of your general questions.
JHHW: A very important section of your chapter concerns the distinction
between ‘immunity from jurisdiction’ and ‘immunity from execution’. You point
out that even after Judgment 238/2014, Italian courts under Italian law will grant
German authorities immunities from execution for any decision against them
awarding damages to the victims. You also express dissatisfaction with this situation
by rightly pointing to—also following the Greek saga where the victims of the
German Distomo massacre were denied relief in Greece by virtue of immunity of
execution—a decision upheld by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
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Strasbourg. What is the point, one may summarize your position, of a right recog-
nized if it is not accompanied by an adequate remedy?
You also point out that the question of immunity of execution will surely return to
the Italian Constitutional Court in the follow up to lower court decisions in the
current ongoing imbroglio. But here, somewhat frustratingly, your analysis stops.
You do not seem to get off the fence. The analysis is brilliant in showing the
conflicting considerations, but finally what is your position as to the correct answer
the Italian Constitutional Court should give when the immunity from execution is
before it? All things considered, if you were a judge on the ItCC, how would you
decide this issue? Taking into account that Sentenza 238/2014 has already
occurred, it is against its background that you will have to decide the case.
PP: In my view, in order to reconcile compliance with international law and
respect for the fundamental rights of victims, the ItCC should establish that, in line
with the Italian Constitution, the Italian state is under an obligation to assume the
burden of repairing the victims. This is what the ItCC could, and in my view should,
have done in 2014. The idea that, in cases involving the application of the rule of
immunity from execution, the Italian state could substitute itself for the foreign state
was already alluded to by the Court, albeit for different purposes, in a past judgment
(Judgment 329/1992). An answer of this kind has much to be praised from a legal,
moral and political perspective. Legally, not only would it reconcile two conflicting
values—the interest in complying with a rule of international law and the right of the
individual to obtain redress—it would also have the effect of transferring onto the
state the risk that any attempt to obtain redress from Germany through interstate
negotiations may be unsuccessful. In other words, this kind of solution would not
imply any waiver of the claim against Germany. It would simply change the main
actors in the dispute: exit the individuals and domestic courts, enter the state and
interstate negotiations, in line with the suggestion contained in the 2012 ICJ Judg-
ment. Shifting the risk from the individual to the state responds also to a wider
imperative: affected individuals should not be left alone in bearing the cost of
complying with international law. If there is a state interest in complying with
international law, the state should be associated with the affected individual in
bearing the costs. From a political perspective, such a solution might hopefully
facilitate the conclusion of an agreement between the two states. After Judgment
238/2014, the message sent to Germany was ‘we don’t comply with the ICJ’s
judgment, but you should negotiate an agreement on reparation with us’. In this
situation, the reputational damages for not engaging in negotiations are not neces-
sarily high. They would be much higher if Germany would leave Italy alone in
providing reparation to the victims. I am aware that imposing on Italian taxpayers the
cost of paying for the crimes committed during World War II (WWII) is far from the
perfect solution but, given the circumstances of the present case (and the historical
background of this longstanding dispute), I consider it an acceptable compromise.
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To Christian Tomuschat
JHHW: You argue that the Italian Constitutional Court failed to show the existence
of any individual reparation and omitted to assess the issue of war reparations owed
by Germany in their broad complexity as reasons for rejecting its renegade decision.
Imagine now that the ItCC had done exactly these things and (perhaps after
remitting the case back to the lower court for further fact finding) that, after careful
examination, the Court would have established the existence of some individual
claims and, even in the broad complexity of the German–Italian war reparations
saga, that very fundamental human rights had been violated without adequate
remedy.
In such hypothetical circumstances, would your appraisal of the action of the
ItCC be different?
CT: This question attempts to lead me down an erroneous path. Of course, I did
criticize the Italian Constitutional Court’s failure to provide a solid foundation for its
conclusion that any victim of a war crime must be a holder of an individual
reparation claim. The ItCC avoids specifying in which legal order such a claim
should be anchored. International law does not provide the requisite basis. If the
ItCC had carried out any research, it would have found that in the past—before
1945—international armed conflicts had never been settled, in respect of their
financial dimension, by granting the affected individuals the right to assert their
own losses by way of individual claims. Recent instances have followed a different
course—claims against Iraq on account of its aggression against Kuwait; reciprocal
claims in the relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia—but on the basis of special
arrangements. The practice as it stood until 1945 is quite clear: violations of
humanitarian law may lead to compensation claims at the interstate level in accor-
dance with Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. This legal position cannot be altered
or turned around by speculation.
The legal rule reflected in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV is reasonable. But is
it effective, and has it stood the test of time? The Italian jurisprudence has remained
isolated apart from the Greek judgments that were also before the ICJ. In particular,
how should a mass phenomenon like World War II be otherwise dealt with? For a
judicial body, which is committed to specific fact-finding rules, it is simply impos-
sible to clarify, in an unchallengeable manner, hostilities on the battle field, allega-
tions of mistreatment in camps for prisoners of war or civilians, attacks against
fleeing populations etc. Millions of people died during WWII, in many instances as a
consequence of undeniable criminal acts or other forms of atrocious conduct con-
trary to humanitarian law. Fortunately, alleged perpetrators may be prosecuted
before national or international criminal courts or tribunals. Prosecutorial wisdom
will inevitably focus on persons that are believed to be the main responsible authors.
However, in civil cases, where compensation is sought, anyone considering that they
have suffered damage could initiate proceedings if the obstacle of immunity fell.
Accordingly, not only thousands but millions of claims would have to be processed,
at a tremendous cost. Lawyers looking for sources of income would inevitably make
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use of such opportunities. A race for compensation would ensue according to the
adage: first come, first served. Claimants with the best lawyers would have the best
chances—to the detriment of those at the back of the line. Lastly, rights granted to
Italian citizens would also have to be recognized to German victims of war crimes—
of which there were millions. A revival of WWII at the legal level? The legal battles
would go on for decades even after reconciliation has been attained in intergovern-
mental relations. What horrendous perspectives!
Therefore, the settlement of compensation claims by way of international agree-
ments between the parties concerned is certainly the best solution. Germany paid a
high price for global settlement, partly imposed by the victorious Allied Powers. In
the future, as was done regarding the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, the UN
Security Council could, in similar instances, establish a just mechanism with equal
chances for every victim.
JHHW: The danger of providing a pretext for ignoring decisions of the ICJ is
very serious and must weigh heavily in assessing such a case. But, for example, in
theMelloni saga, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), having no doubt
examined the complexity of all issues, handed down a decision protecting funda-
mental human rights guaranteed by the German Constitution in what to most would
appear a clear contradiction with the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice, thus creating a similar precedent. Are there no cases in your view where
a national constitutional court is justified in defying an international jurisdiction?
CT: This question has an entirely different structure. In the case of war damage
claims between Germany and Italy, one of the parties has arrogated to itself the right
to assess the conduct of the other party, and therefore constitutes a departure from the
principle of sovereign equality. It postulates for itself the right to the truth, brushing
aside one of the basic premises of the international legal order, namely the rule that
no state is superior to another. In the controversy about extradition on the basis of a
judgment rendered in absentia, however, three high judicial bodies—the Spanish
Constitutional Court, the FCC, and the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU)—were in competition with one another regarding their degree of human
rights protection. This was not a case where the ultimate national decision inflicted
harm to any other stakeholder.
JHHW: The law of sovereign immunity is still rooted in customary law, despite
the relevant treaties in question. Is it not the case that progressive changes in
customary law almost by necessity require some state actors at some point to go
against lex lata in the hope of other states joining them and shifting the burden of
general practice and opinio iuris? You might object that this case did not justify such
action. But would you also argue that it is never justified?
CT: This question invites the commentator to deeper reflection. It is true that
substantively not all rules of customary law are of the same importance for the good
functioning of the international legal order. Some rules, since they arise out of
practice, have a contingent origin. The law of the sea provides prominent examples
in this regard. The traditional canon-shot rule evolved successively in consonance
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with factual and legal developments within the framework of the UN. Similar
adjustments to evolving circumstances regarding other customary rules are perfectly
conceivable, and someone must then indeed take the lead in departing from the
traditional pattern. However, sovereign equality and its complement, sovereign
immunity, belong to the ground rules of international law and do not belong to the
mass of other customary precepts that have sprung up from contingent occurrences.
Whoever challenges the system of reparation for injury caused by armed hostilities
would have to show that the present-day interstate model of compensation is
insufficient and that the alternative, reparation by way of individual claims before
the tribunals of the victim’s state, is better suited to fulfil legitimate expectations.
That demonstration cannot be made and was not done in the case before the ItCC—a
particularly poor decision in respect of its legal reasoning where the interstate
dimension was completely left aside.
To Heike Krieger
JHHW: In section II of your chapter (‘Adverse Effects’) you rightly point out that a
judicial rebellion (my term) risks engaging the international responsibility of the
state that the ‘rebelling’ court belongs to. I entirely agree and find the analysis
convincing. What I think is lacking is a full rehearsal of the counterarguments. Now,
I do not mean that the counterarguments are necessarily stronger than the weighty
arguments you put forward, but they are necessary in order for the reader to arrive
at an informed position.
1. Customary law develops slowly, oftentimes in a community of states that does not
reflect the current composition of the international community (eg the law of
expropriation) and likewise against a set of public values crystallized into
customary law at the time. The well know structural problem is that it is extremely
difficult to change or mutate in order to reflect the more contemporary values of a
changing international community. Sometimes this can happen through the
negotiation of a broad multilateral treaty, but experience has taught us how
difficult and time consuming (measured in decades) it is to negotiate and then
ratify such treaties—and even then it is binding only on those ratifying states. The
passage from a new treaty norm modifying earlier customs can take even more
time and is inured to persistent objectors. The alternative is a mutation in
customary law itself through a shift in general practice and opinio juris. This
has happened quite regularly, for example the 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone recalls the Iceland-UK trawler war. But for customary law to mutate in
this way, it is inevitable that at first some actors would adopt positions in
violation of extant international law (the New Haven school calls these ‘proto-
normative’) claiming (and sometimes, lying through their teeth) that these reflect
opinio juris in the hope of enlisting a change through silent acquiescence or
imitation. Given the ‘primitive’ nature of international law—with the absence of
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a central legislator—could one not argue that without this process we would
often be locked into a custom that is truly in need of change but for which no other
mechanism exists? That sometimes there is even either a legal imperative
(a national constitutional court in most systems owes its primary loyalty to its
own constitution) or a moral one?
2. It is true as you state that a decision by a national court may trigger the
international responsibility of its own state. This is no different from a decision
of the executive branch or the legislator that may trigger state responsibility. This
happens not infrequently in international life, including by liberal democracies
that generally follow the rule of law. To give but one recent example, the decision
of the EU to retaliate against Donald Trump’s tariffs based on national security
(and not on the WTO safeguard regime) was in clear violation of Article 23 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding. Morally justified, legally violative. Would you
not agree, however, that when it comes to issues of justice and fundamental
rights, if state responsibility is to be triggered, it should be done by, or with the
authority and agreement of, constitutional or supreme courts?
3. In the same section II you object, justifiably in my view, to the argument of the
democratic character of the state. You ask rhetorically: Why would not be
legitimate for Russia (in the Yukos case) what would be legitimate for Germany
and Italy? But could you then comment on the decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court in the famous Constitutional Identity case where it defied
(indirectly) the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and extant EU law
in the name of fundamental rights protected by the German Basic Law, ironically
in a case concerning Italy. Was this decision justified in your view? Should we
assess it differently from Sentenza 238/2014?
In section II.3 (‘Change “desired by many”?’), you very convincingly show that
there is far from consensus on the issue of human rights exceptions to sovereign
immunity. But here, also, there are two structural issues on which I am sure your
readers would value your comments.
1. The first echoes my first structural comment. Could not the evidence you adduce
for the lack of consensus operate, too, in the opposite direction? First, as a matter
of legal doctrine, it becomes a demonstration that the condition for a stable
custom—general practice accompanied by opinio juris—has been fractured. As a
matter of policy, wouldn’t there be even more incentive for those unhappy with
the current state of custom to act accordingly, seeing that an alternative
approach—even if not dominant—is no longer maverick? Again, how else
would custom change?
2. Second, international law privileges states and, in reality, governments. But the
whole human rights revolution (of the last half century) was to insist that
individuals are to be regarded not simply as objects but as subjects and mean-
ingful stakeholders in international governance. Governments and even courts
are often oblivious or not sufficiently mindful of this and, moreover, governments
are often driven by a self-interest not to find themselves in analogous situations
where their own sovereign immunity will be challenged; self-protective instinct
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often spills over to courts. Courts are reluctant not to follow the lead of govern-
ments in matters involving foreign affairs and relations with other states. Should
we not, from time to time, celebrate a court that, in the interest of protecting
human rights, is willing to take a position which might embarrass its own
government or which is based on a more holistic view of what international
law is about?
HK: I take the liberty to answer your questions posed to me as well as the general
question in one line of argument since the relevant considerations are closely
interrelated.
Law reform is a deep-seated challenge for international law and there is indeed a
wide-spread perception that its rules sometimes do not change quickly enough to
meet certain moral imperatives or to react to urgent demands, for instance in relation
to climate change. On the other hand, high hurdles for changing rules of customary
international law contribute to locking-in acquired and consented standards and to
protecting them against unilateral attempts of bringing about change, in particular by
powerful states. Even where these states claim to act unilaterally in the name of
common values shared by the international community, a (new) rule of customary
law cannot be brought about without a uniform and widespread practice and a
corresponding opinio iuris. This guarantees a broad consensus of states and may
work to protect weaker states.
Take the example of the right to self-defence in relation to non-state actors. The
‘unable and unwilling test’, which is advocated by the US and some other predom-
inantly western states, has gained traction in recent years, in particular in the context
of the conflict with Daesh. States that are under a constant or recurring threat of
military attacks by non-state actors may claim a legitimate interest in changing the
right of self-defence. This may be prompted by consideration of their human rights
duties to protect their citizens as much as the interests of the international community
to prevent terrorism. However, for states of the Global South, this perspective might
be less convincing since most of the military interventions justified by this standard
will be directed against non-western, non-European states in the southern hemi-
sphere. Moreover, there is considerable doubt that the standard fits with the telos of
Article 51 of the UN Charter and thus many consider unilateral efforts to establish
the ‘unwilling and unable test’ as contributing to an erosion of the prohibition on the
use of force.
Eventually, lasting changes in relation to the interpretation of Article 51 of the
UN Charter will depend on a finding of the ICJ. There is a strong presumption that
due to its singular role under the UN Charter, its functions within the international
legal order, its composition and its long-standing authority, the ICJ is the decisive
institution for determining the existence and interpretation of rules of customary
international law.
National courts may contribute to processes of creating and changing customary
law but as organs of the rule of law they should be careful not to challenge the
authority of the ICJ by acts of non-compliance. After all, according to the idea of a
‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ (Georges Scelle), international law needs to rely on
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national organs, in particular national courts, for its implementation. Thus, a plea for
a change to customary international law requires taking into account the interna-
tional legal context and should be guided by the following three considerations:
1. A decision of a national court advocating a change of customary international law
should not directly oppose a judgment of the ICJ in the very dispute in which the
ICJ has only recently passed this judgment against the court’s own state. Oppos-
ing a decision of the ICJ in such a case is first of all an incident of non-compliance
in view of the judgment’s binding effect on the parties. The plea for law reform
has already been raised before the ICJ, which rejected it in its decision. Given the
authority of the ICJ for determining rules of customary international law, the
same applies where the ICJ has only recently determined a rule of customary
international law in a case concerning other states. However, a national court may
under certain circumstances and conditions argue in favour of a change of an
otherwise clearly established rule of customary international law. This may either
be the case where there is no international jurisprudence at all or where pertinent
ICJ decisions date a long time back. The Pinochet case is a case in point where the
House of Lords quite successfully pushed for law reform. In doing so, it did not
directly oppose a decision of the ICJ.
2. In such a case, a court should base its reasoning not on the national constitution
but on an interpretation of international law, thereby allowing other states or
courts to engage in a legal discourse under international law. Refusing to comply
with a judgment of the ICJ on the basis of national constitutional law does not
provide legal arguments for further developing international law and thus is more
a plea for (norm) conflict than for law reform. In the interpretative process, the
court can indeed rely on a lack of consensus on the existence or content of a rule
of customary international law as indication that the conditions for a stable
custom have been fractured, which in turn legitimizes a deviation from the rule.
Thus, by now a strong argument can be raised that the rules on the immunity of
state officials are indeed changing. There are a number of judgments in diverse
jurisdictions allowing for human rights-based exceptions for acting state officials.
There was a split in the pertinent International Law Commission (ILC) debate
leading to a vote where those in favour of human rights exceptions attained the
majority. Likewise, there was a split in the 6th Committee. However, in the case of
Sentenza 238/2014, I do not think that the international legal discourse in regard
to state immunity would reflect such a type of dissent. Criticism is still predom-
inantly literature based.
3. The different branches of government should agree about the necessity for
changing customary international law. As the Italian case demonstrates, in par-
ticular democratic states under the rule of law face the dilemma that different
organs may take different positions towards customary international law. For the
purposes of international law, the ILC Conclusions on Identifying Customary
International Law stressed that ‘where the practice of a particular State varies, the
weight to be given to that practice may, depending on the circumstances, be
reduced.’ Thus, it is preferable if these organs speak with one voice, in particular
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where there is a risk of incurring state responsibility. However, I do not think that
constitutional courts are per se more legitimate actors in this process, especially
where they disagree with both of the other two branches. In comparison to the
legislative branch, they have lesser democratic legitimacy. In comparison to the
executive, they may sometimes give too little weight to diplomatic consider-
ations. Such diplomatic considerations should not be mistaken for governmental
self-interest. There are several legitimate rationales behind such considerations,
which may range from functional reasons over concerns for legal stability to
broad considerations of maintaining peace and security. While deference to the
executive is today often seen negatively, I still think that it may be a useful tool
for courts in balancing conflicting interests in foreign relations. After all, a more
holistic view of international law is not necessarily one that is based on national
fundamental rights concepts.
In your questions you invite us to assume that the court is asked to defy an
international legal obligation as a kind of last resort. But I already disagree with the
assumption that it is inevitable that conflicts will arise. National jurisdictions have
developed various techniques for mitigating norm conflicts by way of interpretation
precisely in order to prevent such severe frictions from arising. Any state that faces a
norm conflict between national and international law may have a bundle of further
options available beyond mere non-compliance through court decisions or defying a
binding international obligation. These options include parliamentary legislation,
parliamentary decisions that aim to prompt the executive to pursue certain acts on the
international level, diplomatic protection, issuing reservations or interpretative dec-
larations, or even withdrawals. In deciding on the appropriate measures to be taken,
state organs should act with mutual loyalty as well as with loyalty towards the
international legal order, not least because of the idea of a ‘dédoublement
fonctionnel’. Constitutional courts have to balance democracy and rule of law
considerations against each other. In this process compliance with the international
legal obligations of a state is an important element of the rule of law.
My concern is that constitutional courts may be increasingly inclined to claim that
demands of constitutional identity require them to defy international law or EU law.
And the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the 2016 Constitu-
tional Identity case is a case in point. The decision dealt with an extradition request
by Italy on the basis of a European arrest warrant for a person who was sentenced to
30 years of imprisonment in absentia proceedings without legal representation in
Italy. The FCC held—by means of the identity review—that in such a case an
extradition would violate the right to human dignity. Thereby, it indirectly defied
the Melloni judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union which held that
member states are not allowed ‘to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in
compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed
by that State’s constitution’.1 In my view, there would have been other options for
1CJEU, Melloni, Judgment of 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107, para 58.
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the FCC to protect the applicant’s human rights without relying on its concept of
identity control. The Court could have either opted for a preliminary ruling by the
CJEU or it could have chosen an interpretation preventing a norm conflict with EU
Law. It is doubtful that the act in question had to be considered as an act of German
public authority determined by Union Law. Interpreting the Framework Decision on
the European Arrest Warrant in light of Article 47 and 48 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the Court could have concluded that EU law does not require
extradition in cases of absentia proceedings. The decision of the Higher Regional
Court was not determined by EU law. The part of the decision violating human
dignity could have been considered exclusively as an act of German public authority,
which the Court could have assessed on the basis of the German Constitution.2
Eventually, you may argue that I am evading the baseline of your argument,
namely that in exceptional cases and for moral reasons a court should defy a rule of
customary international law or a judgment of an international tribunal. But my
worries are that such cases are not as exceptional as you suggest. In a multipolar
world order characterized by increasing value contestations, arguments based on
national identity as embodied in national constitutions are already being raised more
frequently. Pertinent cases in recent years do not only refer to severe war crimes but
they include cases on extradition, expropriation, or refugee relocation schemes. To
define where there is sometimes a justified legal or moral imperative and where such
imperatives are abusively claimed to protect all kinds of ostensible national values
may become a slippery slope. With its reliance on human dignity in the Constitu-
tional Identity case, the FCC may indeed have opened yet another door for widening
national identity jurisprudence against international courts given that a human
dignity core may well underlie all fundamental rights. In this light, I have always
been sceptical about recourse to morality for creating instances of ‘civil disobedi-
ence’ between courts. In the end, international human rights protection exists
precisely for those who get into conflict with national identities.
To Riccardo Pavoni
JHHW: I think we are all in favour of peace, not least legal peace. And I think that
your use of international comparative precedents makes a strong case for how this
peace may be obtained in negotiations between the parties. But the proposed ‘peace
agreement’ you advocate for does have legal ramifications for evaluating Sentenza
238/2014. Since, assuming I and your readers understand you correctly, it is
2Dana Burchardt, ‘Die Ausübung der Identitätskontrolle durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht -
Zugleich Besprechung des Beschlusses 2 BvR 2735/14 des BVerfG vom 15.12.2015 (“Solange
III”/”Europäischer Haftbefehl II”)’,Heidelberg Journal of International Law, 2 (2016), 527–551, at
549.
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premised on the assumption that if adequate remedies for serious rights violations
were not provided to victims, the parties have to negotiate such remedies.
But does that not at least implicitly vindicate the position taken by the ItCC? And
had the ItCC not taken that principled position—which would lead to what you
consider to be the necessary fair and equitable solution—what incentive would there
be for the parties to engage in negotiations?
RP: I am very thankful for your question, Professor Weiler, as it gives me an
opportunity to reiterate some of my thoughts on Sentenza 238/2014. Indeed, I
believed it was more in line with the spirit and purpose of this volume to espouse
a forward-looking approach in my chapter and accordingly enquire into the future
prospects of the German–Italian dispute concerning outstanding compensation
claims by victims of crimes committed during World War II. Yet a clarification on
the interaction between my findings and Sentenza is certainly in order.
Yes, you do understand me correctly. The ‘legal peace’ I am advocating, prefer-
ably by way of an intergovernmental arrangement between the parties setting up
meaningful compensatory procedures for uncompensated victims, is premised on the
assumption that, under international law, victims of serious breaches of human
rights and humanitarian law are entitled to adequate remedies and reparation. Pace
the ICJ’s Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment, in my view—and that of a substantial
number of scholars—this international law right to a remedy and reparation3
qualifies the rule of state immunity for international crimes: the immunity of the
responsible state before the courts of other states may be denied if and when effective
alternative remedies are unavailable to the victims. Thus, not only should the
negotiation of ‘legal peace’ between the parties be regarded as a reflection of their
obligation to secure such remedies and reparation, it would also be a means of
protecting state immunity for acta iure imperii—admittedly a key tenet of the world
order—against backlashes and challenges coming from turbulent domestic courts, as
the ItCC in delivering Sentenza may be depicted.
However, only indirectly and implicitly (at best) do the foregoing observations
vindicate the holdings of Sentenza 238/2014. Certainly, Sentenza, by declaring in
essence the 2012 ICJ Judgment incompatible with the Italian Constitution, has
provided a robust incentive for the parties to come back to the negotiating table. It
is easy to assume that, in the absence of Sentenza 238/2014, the whole affair would
be buried once and for all, both at the judicial and—a fortiori—governmental levels.
This is probably the key message arising from the Judgment and a number of
comparable domestic cases, notably in the US, where the denial (or threat of denial)
of state immunity has given impulse to fresh diplomatic representations and nego-
tiations for the sake of victims’ right to reparation for human rights violations. But
this has little to do with the legal reasoning of the Constitutional Court. That
reasoning lends itself to distinct layers of criticism.
3UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, Annex, GA Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005.
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First, the Constitutional Court was not crystal clear about the (domestic law)
implications for state immunity stemming from the lack of alternative remedies for
the victims. The decision may be interpreted as envisaging the commission of
serious violations of human rights as the sole requirement for the loss of state
immunity and, accordingly, as playing down the ‘alternative remedies’ test or merely
using it as an a fortiori argument. This is the view expressed, for instance, by the late
Benedetto Conforti in his commentary on Sentenza published in the Revue générale
de droit international public and, in the judicial practice post-dating Sentenza
238/2014, by the Italian Court of Cassation in its 2015 Opačić decision involving
and denying Serbia’s immunity for war crimes. If this view were correct, the
principle upheld by Sentenza 238/2014 would be especially broad as it would justify
a withdrawal of immunity in each and every case implicating serious breaches of
human rights by foreign states. I would consider this principle unacceptable as it
would not draw a reasonable balance between the competing values at stake.
Secondly, one may well take the opposite view and believe—as I do—that the
Sentenza was a breakthrough vis-à-vis the previous Italian jurisprudence in this area,
precisely because the absence of alternative remedies was a key reason for the
holdings of the Constitutional Court. Yet, Sentenza did not recognize that it could
be implemented via political negotiations yielding whatever intergovernmental
agreement and compensatory mechanism open to the victims. The Constitutional
Court repeatedly pointed out that, in order to fulfil the victims’ right to reparation,
effective judicial remedies must be available. As the concerned Italian victims were
denied such remedies in any other jurisdiction including before German courts, the
only way forward was the repudiation of Germany’s immunity and the consequent
endorsement of assertions of jurisdiction by Italian courts. In short, according to the
Court, ‘legal peace’ should be pursued through the judicial route, not by means of
administrative or political processes. Of course, this does not mean that diplomatic
negotiations would be a waste of time, but it does at least mean that the putative
arrangements devised by the governments concerned might well be scrutinized
by the Italian Constitutional Court under the high threshold of effective judicial
protection set by Sentenza. Although clearly arising from frustration about the
decades-long unwillingness of the German and Italian governments to engage in
meaningful negotiations, the unbending position of the Court should be rejected as
once again not establishing a satisfactory balance between the competing interests
at play.
Thirdly, and most fundamentally, I firmly disagree with the methodological
stance taken by the Court in Sentenza 238/2014. The latter contains a sort of
preliminary disclaimer where the Court, relying on a confusing version of the
doctrine of consistent interpretation, stated that it would only assess the consistency
of the customary rule of state immunity for international crimes within the Italian
constitutional order, without questioning how that rule was interpreted by the ICJ in
its Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment. I do not subscribe to this view and I am not
at all vindicating it in my chapter. On the contrary, and this is a good occasion to
answer—at least in part—the general questions put to the volume’s authors, I am
unable to find any legal rule characterizing the decisions by the ICJ (or other
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international courts) and the interpretations of international law offered therein as
untouchable by domestic courts. Of course, this question must be kept distinct from
the binding effect of such decisions. At any rate, the Constitutional Court did not
justify its domestic law approach on account on that binding effect, which it
explicitly rejected, and merely highlighted the ‘especially authoritative’ nature of
the ICJ’s interpretations. The result was perverse: the ICJ’s decisions addressed to
Italy may not be binding as a matter of Italian constitutional law, whereas the ICJ’s
interpretations in those same decisions are binding under both international and
domestic law. There was nothing in theory or precedent barring an autonomous
review of the pertinent practice by the Constitutional Court, that might have paved
the way for findings different from those of the ICJ yet still justified under interna-
tional law. It is true that Sentenza 238/2014 includes a number of tacit critiques of
the ICJ’s holdings, and it is also true that the Constitutional Court perceived itself as
contributing to the progressive development of international law. But you cannot
have your cake and eat it too! With its exclusive domestic law approach and
associated disregard for its consistency with international practice and opinio
juris, Sentenza rests on a fragile legal basis. This consideration may easily be relied
upon to depict Judgment 238/2014 as a violation of international law sic et
simpliciter, one which is liable to further engage the international responsibility of
Italy arising from this affair. Full stop. Game over. The practical significance of the
Sentenza may militate in favour of ‘legal peace’ and may be conducive to an
evolution of international law in this area but not its legal reasoning.
To Filippo Fontanelli
JHHW: You suggest a mutually agreed reparations scheme. If the two parties agree,
this might indeed solve the problem. But one can understand German reticence to
indicate their willingness to reopen settled agreements with multiple countries that
fell victim to German WWII atrocities. How do you prevent such a settlement from
destabilizing such agreements with claims of a differing nature surfacing from many
quarters?
Be that as it may, you sidestep the question of whether Sentenza was justified.
Was it?
FF: Indeed, my chapter does not speak about Sentenza 238/2014, let alone assess
it. The omission is deliberate: reparation schemes derive in all or in part from the
states’ agreements, so their establishment is possible also (and precisely) when there
is no underlying obligation to set up one or when the obligation is contested.
Incidentally, I do not think Sentenza is justified under international or Italian law,
and I find it ethically dubious. Being righteous with another’s money is a cheap
method of virtue-signalling at best, and at worst a way to pass the buck and redirect
away the claims of victims. This is why the proposed Reparation Scheme would call
Italy’s bluff and force it to put its money where its constitutional mouth is. The
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proposal would require each state to fund the Scheme in equal parts, creating an
‘Amazon-doubles-your-donation’ effect whereby Germany’s liability would not be
measured upon an alleged duty of reparation but would spur from a (presumed)
urgency to match Italy’s contribution and save its Teutonic face.
Perhaps I should explain why I presume that German authorities would feel such
urgency. There is something vaguely shameful in the idea that Italy, having in vain
exhausted all avenues of legal redress for the IMIs, would openly pay out reparations
for Nazi crimes while Germany just idly watched. I think Italy should reverse the
paradigm and engage Germany in a race to the top, not the bottom: instead of a fight
for responsibility, it should launch a decency challenge. Consider what happened
between South Korea and Japan in the case of reparations for comfort women.
Korean public opinion expressed affront at Japan’s stance and Korea decided to
replace the Japanese payments with its own resources. The move was a PR catas-
trophe for Japan: its conduct was held to be so despicable that its money was not
worth taking. To publicly accept liability for the wrongdoing of others is doubling
down on the injustice. Japan now has to reckon with an even greater stigma. If Italy
is determined to go through with its part of the deal, Germany’s refusal to participate
would be hard to watch irrespective of one’s views on its original responsibility
vis-à-vis IMIs. If there is any force to hunger strikes, it is not that they are
convincing; it is that they are compelling.
The ex gratia and Telethon-like aspects of the Reparation Scheme would also
make it unfit as a precedent and an encouragement for other claims. To be sure,
differential treatment triggers discontent and incites demands from those treated less
favourably; ask the vineyard workers hired at dawn or the brother of the prodigal
son. However, the Reparation Scheme escapes easy analogies.
First, in sidestepping the issue of responsibility, it would signal the ad hoc
voluntary origin of the mechanism. Other claimants might think themselves and
IMIs to be in ‘like circumstances’ and claim discrimination. However, absent an
acknowledgment of responsibility, the simple fact that Germany would accept Italy’s
proposal to join the Reparation Scheme would alone differentiate the circumstances
and justify differential treatment: Germany’s act of goodwill would concern only
certain recipients. Hence why custom does not build on practice alone: favours,
donations, and graceful payments do not count. It is hard to demand for oneself the
effect of generosity that benefitted others. After all, the existence of several repara-
tion schemes managed by Germany and other states in favour of other groups of
beneficiaries have so far not given any traction to the IMIs’ claims, so past practice
does not support the fear of snowballing. Indeed, precedents do not carry much
weight: if anything, it was Sentenza that advanced the IMIs’ hopes for reparation
(more on this below).
Second, any hypothetical copycat claim would not fly without overcoming a
gateway condition, that is, to have secured 50% of its own payment. If the Repara-
tion Scheme would serve as a precedent (it would not), it would only do so with
respect to joint payments. It is hard to imagine many claims coming out of the
woodwork that could count on a 50% promise of payment by the home government.
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Ultimately, it is possible that the Reparation Scheme could incite other claims. I
am not sure that this should be opposed altogether, as indeed it might be desirable
that Germany address those too, just as now it is desirable that it provide reparation
to IMIs. However, I estimate this scenario to be unlikely and such potential claims to
gain little mileage from the operation of the Reparation Scheme. Germany, in other
words, could not escape the embarrassment of declining Italy’s proposal by hiding
behind an improbable snowball effect.
JHHW: If a scheme such as yours is adopted, would you not agree that it is only
because the ItCC took its controversial decision? Is this a good lesson? A bad
lesson?
FF: Yes, I would share that impression. In fact, there are only two imaginable
scenarios: either a reparation scheme is finally established (in the wake of the
hullabaloo caused by Sentenza) or it is not (in spite of Sentenza). The likelihood of
the scheme arising is still quite low, but without Judgment 238/2014 it would be
non-existent.
I have not reflected nearly enough on civil disobedience to have a view on the
appropriateness, in general, of illegalities producing public goods. The bad lesson
would be the encouragement of acts of legal disobedience motivated by the apparent
success of one such act. If the Russian Constitutional Court wants to avoid Stras-
bourg decisions, Sentenza 238/2014 is a handy crutch to lean on. Even more
worrisome would be imitation by diligent and well-intentioned courts attracted by
the Italian take-away.
However, I suggest a change in perspective. If the Reparation Scheme is a
desirable outcome—and I believe it is—its desirability does not depend on its
chances of realization and, in turn, by the circumstance that increased them
(Sentenza). Sentenza worked as an act of public shaming, itself a practice that
walks the line between advocacy and abuse. Public shaming can occasion virtuous
results. Something similar happened in Kadi before the CJEU. Two frankly debat-
able judgments by the CJEU undoubtedly caused the UN to improve its practices.
I would hesitate to call Kadi a good lesson, but I also believe that a few isolated ‘bad
lessons’ can be tolerated if they improve the world.
I also believe that there is no evident risk of a ‘school for cheaters’ developing.
Italy taking on half of the financial burden of the Scheme, and its ex gratia nature,
would tip the balance towards the ‘good lesson’ verdict and minimize the general-
izations (ie ‘international law must be observed unless it is convenient not to’).
Should an agreed Scheme arise, Sentenza—for all its awkwardness—would have
proved to be the catalyst for the development recommended by the ICJ to happen,
namely that there be ‘further negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a
view to resolving the issue’. Is it fair to reward a prodigal court, which strayed away
from orthodoxy? I cannot answer this question in general, but I can suggest that in
this case the reward (the Scheme) is not a fattened calf. The Scheme would not
benefit the Constitutional Court, nor would it clearly benefit Italy altogether (in fact,
Italy would have to pay for half of it).
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In a certain sense, Sentenza might prove to be a smart trolling device: it created
a controversy where the law warranted none; in so doing, it damaged both Italy
and Germany. Concurrently, by creating a dispute it inevitably made its settlement
desirable, and thus valuable. It created out of thin (and stagnant) air novel incen-
tives for both states. The Reparation Scheme would constitute the reasonable
solution: Italy would pay for the harm caused by trolling at the edges of the law,
and Germany would pay for the trolling to stop. Both payments would go to charity
(to IMIs).
To Alessandro Bufalini
JHHW: The solution that you seem to advocate would perhaps bring closure to this
particular dispute. But, arguendo, the importance of Sentenza 238/2014 was not
simply in pressing for a specific solution to the particular case before it but to rethink
the question of sovereign immunity in cases where the state claiming immunity is
responsible for grave human rights violations, some of which at least would qualify
as ius cogens.
You will have noted that in its decision, the ICJ gave considerable importance to
the decisions of national courts. The decision of the Italian court could be a
contribution towards a new jurisprudence and could eventually lead to an adjust-
ment of the current law, as was the case a century ago when absolute immunity was
removed in relation to commercial and other acts. It is a fact of international law
that customary law often changes through initially proto-normative actions—and a
decision of a court is almost by definition proto-normative—which contradict lex
lata.
Would not your solution squelch this potentially important development by the
Italian government, itself contradicting the principled general thrust of its own
constitutional court even if complying the particularistic dimension?
AB: Thank you for your thought-provoking questions as they allow me to better
clarify my views.
As a premise I think it is important to emphasize that if the aim of Sentenza
238/2014 was to question customary law on state immunity, as identified by the ICJ,
the ItCC could have followed a different approach. The strong dualistic approach of
the decision seems, in fact, to end up recognizing and confirming current law at the
international level, as opposed to the fundamental principles of the Italian Constitu-
tion. A stronger claim for an adjustment of the current law would have been to
critically respond to the ICJ, both underlying the existence of decisions by national
courts supporting the evolution of customary law and arguing against the contradic-
tion inherent in preventing a reparation for a breach of ius cogens rules by applying a
customary norm on immunity.
That said, the crucial issue here is whether a ‘political solution’, namely the
involvement of the Italian government, would somehow arrest the potential
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development of customary law on state immunity. In this regard, while it is certainly
true that changes in customary international law may often happen through viola-
tions of current law, the latter is not always the best way to pursue a change. In
particular, these violations might be successful when changing forces are strong
enough to cause the breach of the rule to become the rule itself. As regards state
immunity, one is currently faced with a clear-cut ICJ judgment and a multitude of
national governments (including, perhaps, the Italian government) and domestic
courts that do not seem to be disposed to let the change happen. Other paths,
however, are available for a development of international law. National judges
may have called on the Italian government to grant reparation to victims, and thus
engaging in the affirmation (or consolidation) of the existence of an individual right
to reparation for gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
At the end of the day, while Sentenza 238/2014 might be a potential element of
support for the current law on state immunity, the call for a necessary and urgent
intervention of the Italian government could have been an important step towards the
recognition of an individual right to reparation at the international level.
To Christian J. Tams
JHHW: I think that your critique that the Italian Constitutional Court did not
integrate international legal norms and sensibilities into its reasoning on Italian
constitutional law is powerful. That was, inter alia, part of the critique faced by the
majority of the Court by the minority (see, for example, Sabino Cassese’s chapter in
this volume).
Is it true? Did not the ItCC address the process of change of international law in
relation to sovereign immunity and ius gestionis?
CJT: This is an important question and I hope that I can clarify and situate points
that my chapter attempted to make in my reading of Judgment 238/2014. Was there
not, you ask, in the judgment some openness towards international law? My short
response would be ‘perhaps some, but not enough’.
I remain concerned with how marginal international legal rules governing immu-
nity were to the ItCC’s reasoning in Judgment 238/2014. As you noted in your
question (and as I probably should have noted in my chapter), the ItCC did reflect on
changes in the scope of sovereign immunity and as an example mentioned the move
towards the restrictive doctrine: this is described as a ‘progressive definition of the
content of the international norm [on immunity, which] (. . .) originated in the
national jurisprudence’ of a number of states (paragraph 3.3). However, this refer-
ence to developments in the law of sovereign immunity serves to make a fairly basic
point, namely to illustrate that change in international law is possible, and that
domestic courts can be agents of change. That in itself is not controversial. But it
did not help with the real question on which Judgment 238/2014 turned: whether
‘the international norm [on immunity]’, insofar as it mattered in Judgment 238/2014,
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had been ‘progressive[ly] defin[ed]’ so to exclude immunity for grave breaches, or to
require immunity to yield to remedial claims based on human rights (paragraph 3.3).
It mattered so little, in fact, that the arguments about changes in international law
all but disappear from the relevant parts of the ItCC’s reasoning. As we will discuss
below, in engaging with international law, the ItCC accepts the construction by the
ICJ as binding: rules of international law reach into the Italian legal order ‘as
interpreted in the international legal order’, that is by the ICJ. On the ItCC’s home
turf of Italian constitutional law, changes in international law do not matter either.
The balancing is between two constitutional values—the right to remedy and respect
for human rights on the one hand, and respect for international law on the other—and
the outcome is the result of a constitutional assessment: ‘insofar as the law of
immunity from jurisdiction of States conflicts with (. . .) fundamental principles
[of the Constitution protecting human rights and the right to a remedy], it has not
entered the Italian legal order and, therefore, does not have any effect therein’
(paragraph 3.5). On the key questions that mattered, domestic law controlled.
JHHW: Be that as it may, there seems to be an assumption in your critique that if
only the Italian Court had integrated international legal elements the decision would
(necessarily) be different. This I think is questionable. Grant me at least that a
non-specious case could be made that a combination of the robust development of
human rights law in the last decades as well as a better understanding of ius cogens
could call into question extant positive international law. Could you at least point
out some internal contradictions that might suggest the necessity for rethinking and
change?
The argument that positive law on the whole has not shown signs of welcoming a
reconsideration of sovereign immunity in the face of grave violations is correct, but
your argument would make it remain such, since the deep logic of your argument is
that if positive law is x, not least in the area of customary law, then it must remain
x. How will it ever change if any attempt to push for change is met by your kind of
argument? Do you not accept that there have been many examples where progres-
sive developments of customary law were initiated by actions that at the time went
against positive law? Consider Solange I by the German Federal Constitutional
Court, which was clearly in defiance of the established jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice. But, without that defiance, it is not clear if the CJEU
would have rethought its prior ‘positive law’ position and developed a new juris-
prudence that gave just weight to. . . human rights. Is there not some kind of lesson
here in the relationship between international tribunals and constitutional courts?
Even if you do not accept this argument, imagine now that in its decision the ItCC
had in fact taken into account international legal norms and come to the conclusion
that it reached. Would you appraise Sentenza 238/2014 any differently? And if not,
why? In assessing international legal norms, should the Court necessarily adopt
your own view on how that law should impact their decision?
CJT: This set of questions addresses issues that to me seem closely related. They
go to the heart of the debate triggered by Judgment 238/2014 and identify tensions in
my discussion of it. They also suggest that I may not have been entirely clear in
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setting out my position; perhaps, while chiding the ItCC for its ‘Lutheran’ approach,
I was in fact sounding a bit Lutheran myself. Be that as it may, I appreciate this
opportunity to reclaim my inner agnostic. I do so in three steps that seek to respond
to this set of questions.
1. I proceed from two points of agreement. We both consider that at present
international law does not recognize a grave-breaches exception to sovereign immu-
nity. In your words, ‘positive [international] law on the whole has not shown signs of
welcoming a reconsideration of sovereign immunity in the face of grave violations’.
I put matters more firmly in the second part of my chapter because I wanted to
emphasize that the international law case for such an exception—‘ha[ving] been
made in dozens of settings, and almost inevitably rejected’—is at present fairly
weak. But that difference (to which I will come back shortly) may be a matter of style
or degree. In any event (and this is the second point of agreement), neither you nor I
think the current state of the law is set in stone. Of course, it can change, of course
arguments for an exception remain plausible, but the question is whether in the
future those involved in the process of international law-making will be persuaded.4
2. In such a discourse about future directions of the law, disobedience with
international law—or with ICJ decisions—is one possible strategy. Domestic courts
can be powerful agents of legal development, and there are, as you rightly stated,
‘many examples where progressive developments of customary law were initiated
by actions that at the time went against positive law’.5
I have no principled concerns with that. In the on-going process of affirming,
adjusting, and developing customary international law, disobedience has a role. It is
not so uncommon, and in cases pitting human rights against sovereign immunity,
domestic courts voicing disobedience are likely to do so with the approval of groups
on whose support international law counts: from NGOs, human rights lawyers, and
the media to the wider public. This is why I purposefully ended my chapter with a
call for argumentative disarmament, suggesting we move beyond scandalizing
Judgment 238/2014. Judging from your questions, I should have put this more
clearly and I hope to have done so now.
3. While not so much concerned about domestic court disobedience as such, my
chapter contrasted two strategies for voicing such disobedience. I emphasized that
Judgment 238/2014 marked a change of tack: rather than arguing that international
4My chapter looked at the present state of the law: Joseph Weiler considers it to be based on a ‘deep
logic’ of continuity: ‘the deep logic of your [the CJT’s] argument is that if positive law is x (. . .) it
must remain x’. However, my main point was (meant to be) more limited: the argument for a grave-
breaches exception under international law in my assessment had so far simply not persuaded states,
international organizations, or the majority of international and domestic courts. As part of the
constant evolution and adjustment of custom, this may well change (as noted on page 245);
arguments in favour of a grave-breaches exception ‘remain plausible, and who knows, they might
one day find greater acceptance’.
5As an aside, there may be more examples of regressive development initiated by domestic court
disobedience, but who could authoritatively say which changes are progressive and which regres-
sive? It does not seem obvious to me that the recognition of a grave-breaches exception would
illustrate the progress of international law.
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law recognized a grave-breaches exception, the ItCC took the debate to the home turf
of constitutional law and refused to give effect to sovereign immunity as ‘defined’ by
the ICJ. I took this to be a conscious move, reflecting the ItCC’s acceptance that
under contemporary international law, the argument for a grave-breaches exception
to sovereign immunity was weak. This view, which of course may be wrong, makes
it difficult for me to respond properly to this set of questions. Is it really ‘question-
able’ that if the ItCC had argued on the basis of international law, Judgment
238/2014 would have been decided differently? My reading is that the ItCC—unlike
the Italian Supreme Court in Ferrini—conceded the international law argument.
Rather than seeking to rehearse the debates about immunity exceptions under
international law, it took the debate to the home turf of constitutional law. By the
same token, as regards your third question, I do not mean to suggest that the ItCC
‘should adopt [my] own view’ of the scope of sovereign immunity, but it seems to
me that Judgment 238/2014 is in fact based on the view that international law does
not at present recognize a grave-breaches exception to sovereign immunity. This is
how I read the ItCC’s reference to ‘the interpretation by the ICJ of the customary law
of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States’, which did ‘not
allow further examination by national governments and/or judicial authorities,
including this Court’ (paragraph 3.1). Judgment 238/2014 is intriguing because it
takes the debate to a different level.
JHHW: Your analysis is acute in pointing out the retreat to domestic constitu-
tional law. But can you dismiss such a retreat in all cases and all circumstances?
Are there not cases where you would consider this the best way? The only way?
CJT: This different level is the constitutional law provisions regulating the impact
of international law within the domestic legal order: the foreign relations law of Italy.
Rereading the chapter, I do not think I articulated my position as clearly as I should
have, and you press me on this, with good reason, in your question. In response, let
me offer three clarifications. First, in the aforementioned spirit of argumentative
disarmament, there is nothing wrong as such with relying on foreign relations law to
limit the impact of international legal rules. Domestic courts have done this fre-
quently and often successfully. (You mention Solange I, I referred to Görgülü,
Medellin, and Kadi). Judgment 238/2014 is not the first ‘Triepelian’ domestic
court decision. Second, domestic foreign relations law will often be an effective
line of defence: state responsibility is the price to pay, but international law does not
rule out constitutional overrides. In cases such as the present one, it may be perhaps
not the only but the most obvious way of avoiding the implications of international
law. Third, is it the ‘best way’, you ask? I would say it is a high-risk strategy, and this
is where I felt that the ItCC was on a dangerous course, and not sufficiently aware of
the implications of its change of tack. High-risk because a domestic court refusing to
give effect to intrusive, undesired rules of international law—and doing so by
reference to constitutional law provisions—uses a very broad argument that is
open to all courts in all jurisdictions and no longer limited to the field of immunity.
(If Italian courts rely on the Italian Constitution to justify Italy’s non-compliance
with an undesired ICJ decision, what stops courts elsewhere from invoking their
386 J. H. H. Weiler
constitutional principles to justify non-compliance with other undesired decisions?)
In Judgment 238/2014, the ItCC seemed to ignore these dangers. Unlike German
courts under the Solange approach, it does not threaten disobedience but orders it—
the judgment is not a shot across the bow but one that hits home. Unlike many other
domestic courts, it does not present disobedience as an ultima ratio; nothing in the
judgment suggests that, even on the home turf of constitutional law, respect for
international law should be the norm. Perhaps most importantly, Judgement
238/2014 does not accept that international law should guide the interpretation of
domestic values, at least in the normal run of events. In short, while a ‘retreat to
domestic constitutional law’ (to use your words again) is a plausible strategy,
domestic courts should in my view use it with care, exceptionally, and within clearly
articulated limits. The absence of these limitations is my main concern with Judg-
ment 238/2014.
To Raffaela Kunz
JHHW: It is difficult to argue with your informative, thoughtful, and realistic
analysis of the interaction of domestic and international tribunals.
There will, I think, remain among your readers possible doubts.
First, why do you seem to suggest, at least implicitly—and I am happy to stand
corrected if proved wrong——that in some ways Sentenza is worse than several
other cases where we have witnessed direct or indirect defiance? No one has gone to
the gallows here, as indeed was the case when the American Supreme Court
committed its acts of defiance. Is there anything structurally different in this case?
RK: Thank you, Professor Weiler, for your thought-provoking question. It is an
honour for me to enter into this dialogue with you, all the more because my own
chapter deals with dialogue in a broad sense, namely with judicial dialogue between
courts of different legal orders.
Indeed, is there a structural difference between this case of defiance of an
international court decision and, let’s say, Medellín, the case in which the US
Supreme Court decided not to implement the ICJ judgment in the Avena case? Let
me retrace the facts of this case. The ICJ found that the US had violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rights, but the main issue regarded the consequences this
would have for the concerned individuals who were all waiting on death row in
American prisons.Medellín tried to enforce the international judgment before the US
Supreme Court and to reach the review and reconsideration of his case. This case is
thus not just a typical inter-state dispute; it fundamentally touched upon individual
rights and in fact dealt with life and death questions.
When I make the point that there is a difference between the ItCC’s judgment and
that of the US Supreme Court, my aim is thus not to judge the outcome, or to say one
was worse than the other. As I just tried to show, the Medellín judgment had very
serious consequences. In fact, I think that the Supreme Court should have
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implemented Avena, but this is another question. My point about the difference
between Medellín and Sentenza is structural and concerns the changed quality or
tone the two judgments have. I believe that something has really changed since
Medellín, which was issued in 2008. But let me explain.
In Medellín the defiance was somehow indirect. The US Supreme Court argued
that the judgment was not directly applicable and thus phrased the issue as one of a
separation of powers—it was up to the parliament and not the judiciary to implement
the judgment. Of course, this can be—and has been—seen as an ‘avoidance strategy’
by the Supreme Court, but the difference of this line of reasoning to judgments
where domestic courts declare international judgments to be altogether unconstitu-
tional is that technically the judgments could still be implemented, (which in the case
of the complainant in Medellín is not entirely true given that the death sentence
against him has been executed).
The judgment of the ItCC, on the other hand, stands for a more recent type of
jurisprudence, one in which domestic courts do not shy away from openly
contradicting international courts. The ItCC’s defiance of the ICJ is not an isolated
example, as I argue in my chapter, and there are a number of examples by other
domestic courts taking a similar stance. To come back to the Medellín comparison,
today it seems that domestic courts are more confrontational and direct in their
defiance. Thus, it could be said that Sentenza 238/2014 stands for a new self-
perception of domestic courts. This goes in the direction of what you called the
‘third wave’ of judicial review.
I think that the change of this self-perception has to do with the proliferation of
international courts and the fact that the interplay between legal orders has become
even more complex.
JHHW: A second, more substantive and substantial doubt is the following.
Your analysis is premised on the assumption that national courts are attempting
to ‘cushion’ the domestic impact of international decisions. This might be true in
some or even all of the cases you mention. But it might not be the only explanation or
justification for the behaviour of domestic courts. You seem to argue that ensuring
compliance with decisions of international tribunals is the supreme value. You call
this compliance partners. I agree that this is an important part of a well-functioning
international legal system. But there is a ‘but’.
With the much-discussed proliferation of international tribunals—sometimes
(and this is hugely important to my question) with contradictory jurisprudence,
and with many of them operating as courts of first and last instance in the same case
(namely lacking the possibility of appeal)—the system does not perhaps provide for
appeal and review of such decisions by many of these tribunals, including the ICJ.
The European Court of Human Rights has a laudable system of chambers and the
Grand Chamber. But absent such mechanisms, would you not agree that it might by
necessity fall to national constitutional courts to act in such role? With prudence,
with caution and all other good advice you give, but see themselves also acting in
such a role? Would it not be better if there was actually a mechanism for dialogue
between the national constitutional court and the international tribunal so that the
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latter can be informed by the sensibility of the former? Should not the Taricco saga
in which, in the face of such a dialogue by the Italian Constitutional Court, the
European Court of Justice climbed down from the high branch it had perched itself?
But absent such a mechanism?
RK: There is no doubt that in times of global governance, there are tensions and
even clashes between legal orders, and that these pose challenges to courts. With
regard to international judgments, it is of course unsatisfying that they are commonly
first and last instance at the same time, and I agree that domestic courts can to a
certain extent step in and make up for this gap. In other words, there might be
legitimate reasons for domestic courts not to follow an international judgment—this
has been called ‘constructive contestation’. This highlights the productive side that
this ‘dialectic’ interplay between different legal orders can have, which arguably in
the end leads to better—and in this case especially more legitimate—results. (I prefer
not to use the term ‘judicial dialogue’ for cases of actual defiance).
The more cautious stance of domestic courts that we see today may also have a
positive consequence. And in any case, is it not something that has always been
present but only recently become more explicit? Is open defiance not more honest
than hiding behind ‘avoidance doctrines’? To some extent yes, but there is a ‘but’,
and this is the point I try to make: I think that there is a real risk that courts go too far.
It is true that international courts are powerful players today, but they nonetheless
remain vulnerable and dependent on the cooperation of their domestic counterparts.
Even though today it is widely recognized that the superiority of international law in
the sense of a strict monism is neither realistic nor even desirable, a very dualist
approach, according to which international judgments systematically have to pass a
domestic (constitutional) law test before being followed domestically, cannot be the
answer to our complex legal reality either. This neglects the interest in an overall
functioning system of adjudication across systems and levels.
What then might be a middle-ground solution? We cannot deny that the applica-
tion of international law can have problematic consequences, and at the same time it
remains true that in times of global governance there is no way around international
law. Rather than secluding ourselves behind a dualist vision of the world, we need to
face reality and productively think about how to best cope with the challenges of our
times.
In my opinion, this is done most convincingly by pluralist thinkers such as Paul
Schiff Berman or Nico Krisch. They recognize on a descriptive level the complex,
maybe even ‘messy’ legal reality; but rather than trying to bring order into it, they try
to work productively with it. What does this entail for our constellation? My reading
is that under such a pluralist vision, rather than defining clear criteria about how to
solve different types of norm conflicts, what is required is a flexible approach, one
that allows the circumstances of each case to be considered. The different legal
claims and interests at play should be balanced according to their importance and
weight rather than their provenance from the domestic or international sphere.
Rather than big theories, we need solutions for those complex cases of clashing
normative claims.
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It is probably quite self-explanatory why Sentenza 238/2014 does not fulfil this
pluralist ideal. In my view, the justices, seeking to find simple answers to complex
problems, fell into the ‘dualist trap’. I do not want to delve deeper into this again—
my position is already stated in the chapter. But let me highlight once more that,
while acknowledging that there can be cases where ‘defiance’ is necessary and
‘resistance’ against international institutions has a productive and constructive
side, I do not think that Sentenza 238/2014 is an exemplary case of legitimate
resistance against a wrong or unjust international judgment. And I do not think
that we should use it as a blueprint for judicial interactions.
To illustrate my point, and delving a bit deeper into your more general question
about justified or legitimate cases of defiance, allow me to name an example of a
court that in my view did a better job at respecting the overall interest of a
functioning system of adjudication when it refused to follow an international
judgment.
The example is the judgment of the Argentinian Supreme Court following the
ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the case of Bueno
Alvez, in 2007. In this case, the complainant was accused of having mistreated an
arrested man by beating him and refusing him his medicine. The IACtHR had
qualified these acts as torture and ordered an investigation into the allegations. In
Argentina, however, the case had already been closed through final judgement, as
the court in charge found the offense to be time-barred.
Even though the Argentinian Supreme Court usually follows the IACtHR and
indeed for many years was said to be one of its strongest allies, on this occasion it
refused to do so, arguing that this would violate basic rule-of-law standards, namely
the procedural rights of the accused in the sensitive area of criminal law, enshrined
both in the Argentinian Constitution and the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR). The Supreme Court in this case, always highlighting its general
loyalty towards the IACtHR and careful not to make a principled case, comprehen-
sively described the norm conflict and stressed that the implementation of the order
would not only violate the Argentinian Constitution but also the ACHR itself. At the
same time, it distinguished the case from other cases, namely cases involving crimes
against humanity. The reason not to follow the Court—even though it later changed
its position—was thus that in this case the domestic court considered the interest to
uphold the due process rights of the concerned individual higher than the interest to
implement the international judgment. Let me conclude by stating that interestingly,
this is one of the few reported cases in which the IACtHR indeed seems to have
listened to a domestic court disagreeing with it and subsequently adjusted its
position.
To Giovanni Boggero and Karin Oellers-Frahm
JHHW: One cannot argue with the first set of considerations that you meticulously
raise, and which would need to be resolved in operationalizing Sentenza 238/2014.
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But I do not think that you are suggesting that these inevitable dilemmas should have
meant that the Italian Constitutional Court should have refrained from taking the
decision it did. It could, as you suggest, give more guidance, draw more lines, but do
you question the principled aspects of the decision against immunity in this case?
GB/KOF: Professor Weiler’s question concerns a central aspect of our argument.
We are pleased to have the opportunity to explain our line of reasoning and yet, at the
same time, we are afraid that our answer will not be positively accepted. But this is
exactly the value of judicial dialogue, especially at a time when the role of states and
state-related legal norms as compared to individual rules/human rights is declining. The
problem of state immunity in cases of grave violations of human rights is a developing
field and where a limitation of all-over immunity is challenged with good reason.
The question of Professor Weiler concerns our argument that Sentenza raises a lot
of problems for Italian courts and tribunals, and this question is, moreover, directly
related to Professor Weiler’s first general question regarding the reaction of national
courts to ICJ decisions, in particular the defiance of an ICJ judgment. Professor
Weiler says that ‘one cannot argue’ as we did without giving reasons for such a
categorical statement concerning a well-pondered scientific opinion. However, our
argument is based on an analysis of the decisions of Italian courts or tribunals
directly following Sentenza 238/2014 which are facing a dilemma: by abiding by
Sentenza they are violating international law; by not abiding by Sentenza they would
be in violation of national law. Professor Weiler supposes that these ‘inevitable
dilemmas’ would not result in us believing that ‘the Constitutional Court should
have refrained from taking the decision’. But this is exactly what we meant and the
reasons underlying our opinion have been elaborated and further explained in a
number of publications, some of them cited in our chapter. There might be situations
where it may be justified to disregard a judgment of an international court—although
such situations appear to be rare exceptions—but the 2012 ICJ Judgment, as well as
a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the same vain, is not such a
judgment. The main reasons may be summarized shortly in the following points. The
ICJ was asked to find out whether state immunity before the judiciary of states is still
a rule of customary international law even if acts of grave human rights violations are
at stake. Thus, the question was whether the customary law rule had changed—a
possibility that exists but requires, as the coming into existence of a new customary
law rule, opinio iuris and general practice. As such the ECtHR and the ICJ came to
the conclusion that this was not yet the case. On the basis of this finding, the ICJ did
not have to answer the question of the retroactivity of such a new rule, as the acts
committed dated back more than 70 years, or whether such a rule would also be
applicable to war related crimes where reparation agreements had been concluded as
usual in order to come to peaceful terms between former enemies.
According to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, the 2012 ICJ Judgment was binding
upon Italy and, by becoming a party to the UN Charter, Italy had ‘undertake(n) to
comply with the decision of the ICJ’ (Article 94 (1) of the UN Charter). This fact had
led the Italian Parliament—the representative of the people, the sovereign—to adopt
Law No 5/2013 obliging the national judiciary to comply with the ICJ Judgment.
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Despite not only the existence of treaty obligations under the most important treaty,
short of a universal constitution (the UN Charter), but also the national law
representing the intent of the Italian sovereign, the Constitutional Court decided
that the national law was unconstitutional and, with regard to the UN Charter, the
law ratifying it was also unconstitutional, but only with regard to Article 94(1) and
the Court’s Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment. For the rest, Italy considered itself
to be a party to the UN Charter.
With regard to the limited space accorded to our answers, it may be sufficient to
mention here only that it seems evident that the reasoning of the Italian Constitu-
tional Court is unacceptable as it disregards the basic principle of international law,
namely the principle of pacta sunt servanda, thus leaving it to the discretion of states
to pick and choose which of the accepted obligations shall be honoured or not, and
whether they shall be honoured permanently or only for a period—or even single
moment—defined by the state. The implications of this approach undermine the
validity and security of international law as such, which requires that states comply
with their international obligations and with the decisions of courts whose jurisdic-
tion they have voluntarily accepted. Disregard of international judgments may be
justified in the extremely hypothetical case of a judgment gravely violating basic/
peremptory rules of international law, but in such cases other means (for example the
involvement of the UN Security Council) should first be sought because defying
decisions of international courts and tribunals risks generating unforeseeable impli-
cations for the whole system of international law.
As to the additional questions of Professor Weiler in this context, in our view a
change of customary international law usually starts by non-application of the ‘old’
rule by states. This is an unavoidable implication of the development of international
law. However, in the event that an international court has been asked explicitly to
discover whether that particular rule of customary law has changed or not, the
decision found by the court has to be complied with. As international courts are
composed of judges from different regions of the world, and as the ICJ in particular
represents the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the
world (Article 9 ICJ Statute), they are best qualified to assess whether opinio iuris
and general state practice are present. To comply only with court decisions
supporting the view of the claimant would undermine the ideal of settling disputes
peacefully. The alternative of not complying with international law and international
judgments reminds us of the old reservation of ‘vital state interests’ dating as far
back as the beginnings of international arbitration. This reservation was always
under discussion because it leaves the assessment of what are the vital interests to
the concerned state; it therefore allows the state to escape from its general submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of an international court rendering such a submission
unreliable.
Besides the concerns it raises with regard to general international law, Sentenza
238/2014 left it to the ordinary judiciary to decide on basic questions, such as the
time-limit for bringing claims—are ‘only’ claims from World War II admissible or
also claims dating back to World War I, or for that matter any war?—as well as the
definition of who may bring claims (family members of which generation?),
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guidelines for reparation/compensation issues, the requirement of a territorial link
and lastly, the question of execution. It thus risked opening the floodgates for an
unforeseeable number of claims leading to inconsistent decisions with regard to
questions that would have required a framework predetermined by the Italian
Constitutional Court if not probably by the parliament.
JHHW: You raise a floodgate argument, or rather two: one macro and another
micro. The first is that other courts in other jurisdictions would follow a similar line
of jurisprudence in the face of sovereign immunity claims in cases of grave viola-
tions of human rights. Would you consider that this, should it happen, might be a
positive development: unsettling the extant law in favour of a new rule on sovereign
immunity that would not allow states to shield themselves behind sovereign immu-
nity when they are the authors of grave human rights violations and in the absence of
other effective remedies?
You also seem to suggest that the floodgates would open with claimants from
other jurisdictions, like the Greek plaintiffs in this case, and would therefore flood
Italian courts with similar claims. Floodgate arguments are difficult to predict. But
do not Italian courts and the Italian legal system have adequate mechanisms to
squelch such a flood: with doctrines of the family of forum non conveniens, rules of
standing and the like? How realistic is this fear of an avalanche of cases?
GB/KOF: These questions can be succinctly answered. The macro floodgate
argument, namely that other jurisdictions might follow the Italian approach, may,
although starting from a breach of international law, contribute to the development
or change of the international customary law rule on state immunity. Such a
development may be considered positive, especially if an evolution towards denial
of state immunity becomes part of an accepted custom shared by an increasing
number of governments. As to the micro floodgate argument, namely that even
victims lacking a territorial link to Italy, as in this case the Greek plaintiffs, could and
would bring their claims before Italian courts, Professor Weiler objects that Italian
jurisdiction could itself limit the flood by using the legal mechanisms foreseen in the
Italian legal order. This might be true, but there remains the question, which cannot
be answered definitively, whether Italian courts and tribunals would be willing to
‘squelch’ such a flood, which in our opinion seems rather questionable with regard to
the previous practice.
To Andreas von Arnauld
JHHW: You are commendably forthright and intellectually honest in accepting that
Germany, like Italy, holds to the doctrine that it is the duty of the judiciary—not least
of the Constitutional Court—to disregard international obligations if they are
incompatible with fundamental rights (and perhaps other fundamental principles
such as ‘constitutional identity’) guaranteed by the national constitution. The
German Federal Constitutional Court asserted this principle even against
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European Union norms—which in the eyes of many, including the European Court
of Justice, constitute a much ‘tighter’ legal order compared to general international
law. You raise this as a reason to dissuade a second ‘appeal’ to the ICJ even though
you claim that Germany has as strong a position under international law ‘as one
could wish for’.
I wish to probe this interesting dialectical position a bit further.
Imagine a second appeal or even the original trial before the ICJ. Imagine a very
direct question to the Counsel for Germany: is it the German position that a national
constitutional court has to comply with international norms, or even a decision of
the ICJ itself, in a case where said national constitutional court would consider that
such compliance would violate its most fundamental constitutional principles?
1. Would you agree that under international law the answer must be ‘Yes’—under
the equally fundamental principle of international law that a violation cannot be
excused by reference to domestic municipal law?
2. Would you agree, that if asked in such a direct manner, the Counsel for Germany
could only respond in one of two ways: ‘Yes, but the German legal order does not
accept such compulsion’; or ‘No, we believe that under international law in such
a case a state would be justified in not applying the international norm or the
decision of the ICJ (or any other international tribunal)’?
3. The first answer (Yes, but the German legal order does not accept such compul-
sion) is not so uncommon. It occurs in dualist systems in the face of
non-incorporated treaties—the situation of British courts, for example. It could
still be the case that the answer is ‘Yes, but the internal constitutional order
simply does not allow national judges to comply with the state obligations under
international law with the result that state responsibility would be engaged’. Be
this as it may, does not another general principle of international law, reciproc-
ity, entail that Germany cannot demand of Italy compliance in a situation where
analogously it would not offer compliance itself? (The French Constitution
famously enshrines this principle of reciprocity in its Article 55). If this is the
case, maybe the German position in international law is not quite as strong as
one may wish for.
AvA: Concerning this first set of questions, the Counsel for Germany would most
probably agree that, according to its own standards, a violation of international law
can never be justified by reference to municipal law, even though she would have to
concede that the German legal order is based on dualism and that it gives precedence
to the Basic Law in case of an otherwise unresolvable conflict between international
obligations and constitutional principles. If she is worth her salt, however, the
Counsel for Germany would stress that this does not affect the present dispute.
Reciprocity might be an underlying concept of international law but has no binding
force in itself. Estoppel might turn the concept into a norm of procedural interna-
tional law. But for Germany to be estopped from bringing claims, there would have
to be an inherent connection between the present dispute and a similar violation of its
international legal obligations towards Italy by Germany. Since this is not the case,
Germany maintains its formally strong position under international law.
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If she is more audacious, the Counsel for Germany might argue that well-founded
disobedience can sometimes, though not in the case at hand, be beneficial for the
international legal system itself (and I would follow her here). International institu-
tions might sometimes be at fault. Notwithstanding the general obligation to obey
international law and binding decisions by international institutions, there should
also be room for contestation within the international legal system. This is basically
the Kadi problem where the CJEU challenged with good reasons the Security
Council’s binding decisions. To avoid a deadlock, however, such acts of disobedi-
ence should be framed as an offer to engage in a discourse about the law, not as a
mere act of refusal. This is why, firstly, the reference should (also) be to shared
norms and principles not (only) to domestic law. Compare the Court of First
Instance’s original approach to Kadi, though it only referred to international ius
cogens and eventually shied back from finding the obvious violation. Secondly,
there should be space for compromise as a way out. Paradigmatically, this is the
Solange strategy, which communicates a willingness to give in as soon as certain
standards are met. Such forms of constructive dissent could be seen as an exercise in
‘compensatory constitutionalisation’ (Anne Peters) bottom-up.
JHHW: I find interesting, constructive and morally commendable your willing-
ness to pierce the intertemporal rule—especially with your very important caveat
that it must be based on moral principles prevailing as part of the law at the time—a
matter for empirical analysis. The consequence of your analysis would be to trigger
an obligatio de negotiando. Would you, however, be willing to take the reader one
step further. Given the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, the hands of the
Italian negotiators would be tied—they could not accept a solution that their own
Court indicated would violate the Italian Constitution. (A German government
would be in a similar situation if the shoe were on the other foot.) So, let’s imagine
that the negotiations reach an impasse—not an impossible possibility. (And to take
the hard case so as not to make life easy for ourselves, let’s further imagine that it is
clear that both parties negotiated in good faith, as sometimes even good faith
negotiations result in an impasse.) Having acknowledged that the intermingling of
the dry positive law and the ethical principles are sufficient to breach the principle of
intertemporality. What then?
AvA: I would like to swerve away from your question by providing a rather
pragmatic answer. Given that the issue of German wartime reparations has been
pushed by the Italian judiciary, and has only reluctantly been taken up by Italian
governments so far, I am more optimistic about reaching an agreement in those
tripartite negotiations, at least as far as both governments are concerned. Of course,
there is no guarantee here, and of course it is possible that on the side of the victims
some will not agree with a proposed solution. So, the matter could be referred back
to the Italian courts. In such a scenario my hope would be that a scheme redressing
the past wrongs, and supported by a sound majority in the negotiations, will prove a
game-changer. After all, it was the perceived lack of engagement on the German
side, government and courts alike, that prompted Italian judges to ‘step in’ (compare
the references to the denial of ‘any possibility of judicial examination’ and the
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‘absolute sacrifice of the right to judicial protection’). Once a widely agreed solution
has been found, the Corte Costituzionale might give up its principled opposition—
alongside the lines I sketched out in my answer to your first question.
I understand that you want to push me further, though. A procedural obligation is
always a sly suggestion—assuming that the procedure works. If negotiations reach
an impasse, don’t we then need a decision based on substantive legal principles? I
think that there are inherent problems in applying this kind of decisionist logic to
historical events. Courts can ascertain facts (even ‘historical’ facts) to be applied to
legal norms. They cannot solve, however, the underlying historical conflict; that
issue can only be addressed discursively. As far as court proceedings offer a forum
‘to tell one’s story’ (even to a reluctant opponent), they contribute to this purpose;
judicial decisions that create winners and losers do not. Where there are binding legal
norms in force, we accept this ‘jurispathic’ (Robert Cover) office of judges. In our
case, however, the principles of intertemporality still weigh in (although I have
attempted to loosen them up a bit). So, in case of an impasse and Sentenza 238/2014
still being upheld, the ICJ in a second judgment should ‘pepper up’ paragraphs
99 and 104 of its previous judgment and admonish the parties to sit down again and
come up with an equitable solution.
JHHW: Imagine, finally, that the Italian government expropriates, say, Villa
Vigoni, in compliance with the decision of their constitutional court. What should
be the reaction of the German government in light of your own progressive and
moderate position?
AvA: If this were to happen, Germany should protest against this violation of
international law and should consider another judgment from the ICJ, including a
request for provisional measures to halt the expropriation proceedings. As much as I
am in favour of relaxing the strict rules of intertemporality in certain cases to ‘bring
the parties to the table’, I am highly sceptical of a deconstruction of state immunity
before foreign domestic courts. Allowing charges against a foreign state is ever more
prone to abuse when ‘lawfaring’ states are attempting to impress their own ideas on
others by excessive claims of jurisdiction. In my perception, as mentioned earlier,
the Italian judiciary opposed the ICJ’s decision on jurisdictional immunity as it
perceived a lack of engagement from the German side. Its aim was thus to create a
judicial forum for bringing (and eventually deciding) such claims. In Sentenza
238/2014, the Court was wise enough not to touch upon the issue of immunity
from execution (which, by the way, is less intrinsically connected to the right to
judicial protection, at least regarding its core guarantee). Thus, whether such an
expropriation of Villa Vigoni would really be ‘in compliance with’ the Court’s
decision might be open for discussion.
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To Francesco Francioni
JHHW: I find myself in agreement with all the important points you make—the voice
of reason and I say this with no irony. But I also find myself somewhat unclear in
regard to where you position yourself on the hard legal issues.
You make an important point regarding Article 25 of the 1961 Italo-German
Agreement and the failings of Italy in that respect. You make the equally important
point of what would appear to be not only the discriminatory position of the German
government vis-à-vis different groups of victims but also the legally incoherent
position regarding the status of the Italian victims as prisoners of war. And you
are of course right that, as time passes, biology is taking care of the immediate
problem; although I should add that compensation to the families (as would be the
case in a situation of wrongful death) will survive, at least as a moral right, the death
of the victims themselves. So, yes, let’s try and negotiate a satisfactory solution as
soon as possible.
But assuming failed negotiations (even good faith negotiations can fail), where
do you come out on the hard legal issues? Given all the circumstances to be taken
into account, do you think the ItCC was right—for the reasons it gave or for other
reasons—to take the position it took, under Italian Constitutional Law and, more
intriguingly in light of your evocative comments on sovereign equality and immu-
nity, in light of international law itself?
Accepting, arguendo, your seductive suggestion of the functionality of these two
principles to ensure a peaceful international order, should one not add also that this
functionality should serve not only a peaceful but also a just international order,
which seems to me more germane in this case.
FF: Thanks, Joseph, for raising these thoughtful questions. You ask whether the
Italian Constitutional Court was right in applying the ‘counterlimits’ doctrine to the
Italian statutory enactment implementing the ICJ’s Jurisdictional Immunities Judg-
ment. My answer to this question is negative. This clearly transpires from my
contribution. But here I can further articulate the reasons for my negative opinion.
First, I think that the judgment of the ItCC was wrong in its using of Article 24 of
the Italian Constitution—access to justice—as a parameter for declaring illegitimate
the domestic law implementing the judgment of the ICJ. The cases involving the
responsibility of German armed forces for mass atrocities committed in Italy, and
against Italians during the period of Nazi occupation of the country, called for the
recognition of a right to compensation for the harm suffered by the victims, not a
right of access to justice.
Second, as a right to compensation under the Constitution was at stake, the ItCC
had good reasons to consider the question of constitutionality not ‘ripe’ for adjudi-
cation, both because the avenue of diplomatic protection was still open and because
alternative remedies were still available, such as Article 25 of the 1961 Italo-German
Agreement.
Third, even without considering the above reasons, the judgment of the ItCC is
wrong from the point of view of judicial policy. It is a missed opportunity to bring an
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innovative impulse to international practice in the field of immunity. If the Court was
so convinced of the incompatibility between the rule of immunity and the respect of
the inalienable right of victims of mass atrocities to obtain compensation, why did it
not state explicitly that it wanted to vindicate such a right at the international level
and contribute to the consolidation of the ‘territorial tort exception’, an exception
that still remains in a sort of limbo of international practice? Instead it paid a
perfunctory homage to the authority of the ICJ and retrenched itself behind the
argument of constitutional identity and the doctrine of the ‘duality’ of legal orders.
Finally, my argument regarding the functionality of the rule of immunity to serve
a peaceful international legal order was meant to underscore that immunity is not a
value in itself. It is only an instrument to safeguard other substantive values: the
sovereign equality of states and the orderly conduct of international relations. These
values often trump the value of individual justice, as sadly witnessed by the
Jurisdictional Immunities Judgment. My chapter suggests that there are valid alter-
native remedies—executive action with negotiation, diplomatic protection, and
legislative measures—to the constitutional doctrine of ‘counterlimits’ and to the
hubris of judicial activism.
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IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Composed of:
President Giuseppe TESAURO; Judges: Sabino CASSESE, Paolo Maria
NAPOLITANO, Giuseppe FRIGO, Alessandro CRISCUOLO, Paolo GROSSI,
Giorgio LATTANZI, Aldo CAROSI, Marta CARTABIA, Sergio MATTARELLA,
Mario Rosario MORELLI, Giancarlo CORAGGIO, Giuliano AMATO,
Delivered the following
JUDGMENT
in the cases concerning the constitutionality of Article 1 of LawNo. 848 of 17 August
1957 (Execution of the Statute of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco on
26 June 1945) and of Article 1 (recte: Article 3) of Law No. 5 of 14 January 2013
(Accession by the Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and their Property, signed in New York on 2 December
2004, as well as provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal order), brought
by the Tribunal of Florence through Orders Nos. 84, 85 and 113 of 21 January 2014,
and published in the Official Gazette of the Italian Republic Nos. 23 and 29, First
Special Series, Year 2014.
Having regard to the appearance of S.F., A.M. and others, and B.D., as well as the
intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;
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having heard in the public hearing of 23 September 2014 the Judge-Rapporteur
Giuseppe Tesauro;
having heard Mr Joachim Lau, attorney for S.F., for A.M. and others, and for B.D.,
and Ms Diana Racucci, state attorney for the President of the Council of Ministers.
Conclusions in Point of Fact
1. By means of three identical orders adopted on 21 January 2014 (Orders Nos.
84, 85, and 113/2014), the Tribunal of Florence raised the question of
constitutionality:
1) of the “norm created in our legal order by the incorporation, by virtue of Article
10, para. 1 of the Constitution”, of the international custom, as found by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Judgment of 3 February 2012, insofar as
it denies the jurisdiction [of civil courts] in the actions for damages for war crimes
committed jure imperii by the Third Reich, at least in part in the State of the Court
seized;
2) of Article 1 of Law No. 848 of 17 August 1957 (Execution of the United Nations
Charter, signed in San Francisco on 16 June 1945), insofar as, through the incorpo-
ration of Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, it obliges the national judge to comply with
the Judgment of the ICJ, which established the duty of Italian courts to deny their
jurisdiction in the examination of actions for damages for crimes against humanity,
committed jure imperii by the Third Reich, at least in part in Italian territory;
3) of Article 1 (recte: Article 3) of Law No. 5 of 14 January 2013 (Accession by the
Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property, signed in New York on 2 December 2004, as well as
provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal order), insofar as it obliges the
national judge to comply with the Judgment of the ICJ, even when it established the
duty of Italian courts to deny their jurisdiction in the examination of actions for
damages for crimes against humanity, committed jure imperii by the Third Reich in
Italian territory, in relation to Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution.
These norms are questioned in relation to Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution. They
are said to conflict with the principle of absolute guarantee of judicial protection,
enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution, as they preclude the judicial examination
of the case and compensation for damages for the gross violations of human rights
suffered by the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed in the
territory of the Italian State (which has the duty to ensure judicial protection) by
another State in the exercise of its sovereign powers ( jure imperii). The principle of
absolute guarantee of judicial protection is a supreme principle of the Italian
constitutional order and, as such, constitutes a limit to the introduction [in the
domestic legal order] of generally recognized norms of international law (under
Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution), as well as of norms contained in treaties
establishing international organizations furthering the ends envisaged by Article
11 of the Constitution, or deriving from such organizations.
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1.1 The referring judge indicates that he was seized:
with regard to the first case, by Mr F.S., in order to obtain compensation from the
Federal Republic of Germany for damages suffered during World War II. F.S. was
abducted by German military forces in Italian territory and deported to Mauthausen
on 8 June 1944. He was only set free on 25 June 1945, after untold sufferings;
with regard to the second case, by the legitimate heirs of Mr L.C., in order to obtain
compensation from the Federal Republic of Germany for damages suffered by
L.C. during World War II. L.C. was abducted in Italian territory by German military
forces on 8 September 1943 and deported to Germany to slave labor. He was killed
in one of the concentration camps of Kahla (Thuringia) in Germany and, according
to the International Red Cross, was buried in a mass grave together with six thousand
prisoners reduced to slavery;
with regard to the third case, by Mr D.B., in order to obtain compensation from the
Federal Republic of Germany for damages suffered during World War II. D.B. was
abducted by German military forces in Italian territory on 9 September 1943.
[He was taken prisoner] in Verona (where he had been hospitalized) and deported
to slave labor. He was segregated in the Zeitz concentration camp, a subcamp of
Buchenwald, and was then transferred to the Hartmannsdorf Stammlager IVF
concentration camp, and then again to Granschutz, where he was eventually set
free by Allied forces at the end of the war.
The referring judge recalls that the Federal Republic of Germany filed appearances
in the cases and raised the lack of jurisdiction of Italian judicial authorities. [The
Federal Republic of Germany] requested that the judge apply the Judgment of the
ICJ of 3 February 2012 and therefore did not accept to proceed to examine the merits
of the case. Hence, the referring judge raised the aforementioned question of
constitutionality of the norms that required the Tribunal to deny its jurisdiction.
1.2. – The Tribunal of Florence notes that the subject-matter of the cases is the
examination of whether the [Italian] legal order (which conforms to generally
recognized norms of international law) requires that the courts of the State in
which the international crime has been committed deny the examination of actions
for damages even in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of
fundamental rights, perpetrated in [Italian] territory by a foreign State, although in
the exercise of sovereign powers.
The referring judge points out that the nature of the acts forming the subject-matter
of the claims, amounting to international crimes, and their potential to breach
fundamental rights are uncontested. He also recalls that, before the ICJ rendered
its Judgment, the Court of Cassation had affirmed the non-absolute character of the
immunity of foreign States from civil jurisdiction recognized by international law.
[The Court of Cassation had indeed] held that immunity can be limited even when
the State exercises its sovereign powers, insofar as the acts complained of constitute
crimes against humanity, which are considered international crimes (Judgments
No. 5044/2004 and No. 14202/2008).
The referring judge notes, however, that the Court of Cassation changed its juris-
prudence after the Judgment of the ICJ of 3 February 2012. In that Judgment, the ICJ
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held that “customary international law continues to require that a State be accorded
immunity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed on the territory of another
State by its armed forces and other organs of State in the course of conducting an
armed conflict”, even if [the foreign State] is accused of serious violations of
international human rights law. The Court of Cassation aligned itself with the ruling
of the ICJ and held that Italian courts lacked jurisdiction, since “the doctrines put
forward by the Court of Cassation in Judgment No. 5044/2004 have remained
isolated and have not been upheld by the international community, of which the
ICJ is the highest manifestation. Therefore the principle (. . .) can no longer be
applied” (Judgments No. 32139/2012 and No. 4284/2013).
In line with this orientation, [the Legislator] passed Law No. 5 of 14 January 2013
(Accession by the Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and their Property, signed in New York on 2 December
2004, as well as provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal order), which
explicitly excludes (in Article 3) the jurisdiction of Italian courts for war crimes
committed by the Third Reich, including in instances of ongoing proceedings.
The Tribunal of Florence points out that the ICJ maintained that it was not necessary
to examine the interference between fundamental human rights and the principle of
sovereignty of the State accused of an unlawful act. The ICJ held that there was no
conflict between substantive jus cogens norms and norms considered to have a
formal or procedural character (such as the norms of immunity), since they operate
at different levels. Hence, the referring judge submits that, while on the one hand
Italian courts cannot interpret the imperative and non-derogable character of jus
cogens, since the International Court of Justice has exclusive and absolute compe-
tence over the matter, on the other hand Italian courts cannot be denied the compe-
tence to assess whether the indiscriminate grant of immunity to States—to the
detriment of the victims [of gross human rights violations]—complies with the
Italian Constitution, as well as with complementary sources thereof (including
supranational sources). In other words, [Italian courts have competence to assess]
whether or not the receptiveness [of the Italian legal order] to external legal orders
(as enshrined in Articles 10, 11, and 117 of the Constitution) is to some extent
limited, with the consequence of affecting, in the case at issue, the preliminary
question raised by the Federal Republic of Germany.
According to the referring judge, it can be doubted that the immunity of States
(European Union States in particular) still allows, by effect of international customs
existing prior to the entry into force of the Constitution and of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for the indiscriminate denial of judicial
protection of fundamental rights violated by war crimes and crimes against human-
ity, in breach of inviolable human rights.
The ICJ itself acknowledged that this situation results in the concrete and irreversible
violation of judicial protection of the rights infringed, and nevertheless it considered
that the violation of substantive jus cogens norms (fundamental human rights
infringed by a widespread practice of war crimes and crimes against humanity)
does not conflict with the norms of international law of state immunity of procedural
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nature. In light of this, the Tribunal of Florence questions that, as far as domestic law
is concerned, the principle of sovereign equality of States (in particular, its corollary
in matters of immunity) can justify the sacrifice of judicial protection of fundamental
rights, in cases where judicial protection is invoked against a State—different from
the State of the Court seized—which committed an international crime, albeit in the
exercise of sovereign powers.
[The referring judge acknowledges] that, following the ruling of the ICJ, which does
not leave any discretion on the matter, domestic courts do not have competence to
establish whether or not the criminal acts committed by the Third Reich in occupied
Italian territory can be considered jure imperii under international law. Nevertheless,
the referring judge submits that the absolute character of international immunity
cannot entail that the individuals affected are denied any possibility of judicial
examination and remedy, both of which, in the case at issue, are also denied by
the German legal order.
The Tribunal of Florence recalls that, since an early Judgment (No. 48/1979), the
Constitutional Court has upheld that, in case of conflict between generally recog-
nized norms of international law (incorporated in the Italian legal order by virtue of
Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution) and fundamental principles of the Italian legal
order, the latter shall prevail.
In a later decision (Judgment No. 73/2001), this Court—as the referring judge
recalls—reaffirmed the principle that “the tendency of the Italian legal order to be
open to generally recognized norms of international law and international treaties is
limited by the necessity to preserve its identity; thus, first of all, by the values
enshrined in the Constitution”.
Therefore, [the referring judge contends that] the fundamental principles of consti-
tutional order and inalienable human rights constitute a limit to the introduction of
generally recognized norms of international law (to which the Italian legal order
conforms under Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution), as well as of norms
contained in treaties establishing international organizations furthering the ends
envisaged by Article 11 of the Constitution, or deriving from such organizations.
Considering that the principle in Article 24 of the Constitution is one of the supreme
principles of the Italian constitutional order, since it is “intrinsically connected to the
principle of democracy itself and to the duty to ensure a judge and a judgment to
anyone, anytime and in any dispute” (Judgment No. 18/1982), the referring judge
questions the constitutionality of the customary norm [of immunity]. [According to
the referring judge], the norm of customary international law at issue (as defined by
the ICJ) cannot prevail over the supreme principle of absolute guarantee of judicial
protection, when fundamental rights were violated as a result of a crime against
humanity, committed in the State of the Court seized, even if that crime was
committed by another State in the exercise of sovereign powers.
In short, according to the referring judge, Italian courts cannot follow the ruling of
the ICJ and therefore deny their jurisdiction. Italian courts cannot leave the
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protection of individuals to the dynamics of the relationships between the political
organs of the States involved, since these organs have not been able to come up with
a solution for decades. If judicial adjudication and compensation for the perverse
actions perpetrated by the Third Reich were denied, the right to an effective remedy
would be irretrievably sacrificed.
Moreover, the referring judge clarifies that he had to raise the question of constitu-
tionality as a result of the ruling of the Constitutional Court in Judgment
No. 311/2009. [In that Judgment, this Court held] that when international law
conflicts with the Constitution, “the referral to the international norm does not
operate, and thus the international norm does not constitute a parameter under
Article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution.” Therefore, since “there can be no effect
on the lawfulness of the external norm itself, this results (. . .) in the unconstitution-
ality (. . .) of the law of adaptation (Judgments Nos. 348 and 349/2007)”.
In light of the above, the Tribunal of Florence refers the question of constitutionality
to this Court. The Tribunal considers that the question of constitutionality of the
domestic norm (created by virtue of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution, in
conformity with the international custom, the formation of which took place before
the entry into force of the Italian Constitution) which, in case of actions for damages
for war crimes, denies the jurisdiction of the State where the unlawful acts had, at
least in part, detrimental effects, is not manifestly ill-founded.
The referring judge further notes that Article 94 of the United Nations Charter—
which provides that “each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with
the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it is a party”—has been incorporated into
the domestic legal order through of a law of ratification—sub-constitutional in
nature—but by virtue of a constitutional norm (i.e., Article 11 of the Constitution).
Hence, it has binding effects in the domestic legal order only to the extent that it is
compatible with the Constitution. Accordingly, the referring judge submits that the
question of constitutionality also concerns Law No. 848/1957, insofar as it incorpo-
rates the United Nations Charter, in particular Article 94, and thus obliges all state
organs to comply with the judgments of the ICJ, including the Judgment of
3 February 2012.
For the same reasons, the referring judge also questions Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013,
which regulates the duty of the national judge to comply with the ruling of the ICJ
that denied the jurisdiction of Italian courts in the examination of action for damages
for crimes considered jure imperii, committed by the Third Reich in Italian territory.
Lastly, the Tribunal of Florence clarifies that the constitutionality of each questioned
provision bears independent relevance in the main judgment, as any of these norms,
even taken individually, can exclude the exercise of its jurisdiction.
2. The President of the Council of Ministers, represented and defended by the
Avvocatura Generale dello Stato [the Office of the State attorney, hereafter
“Avvocatura”], intervened in the cases. The President requested that the question
of constitutionality be declared inadmissible and/or ill-founded.
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Firstly, the Avvocatura contends that the question raised is inadmissible, because it
entails a constitutional review of the customary norm of immunity, the formation of
which took place before the adoption of the Constitution. [According to the
Avvocatura], this norm cannot be subject to constitutional review in light of consis-
tent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which is said to have stated that
constitutional review of customary international norms is only allowed in the case of
norms formed after the Constitution entered into force (in alleged support of this
argument, Judgments Nos. 48/1979, 471/1992, 15/1996, and 262/2009 are recalled).
The President of the Council of Ministers further contends that the issue of jurisdic-
tion logically needs to be addressed preliminary to the examination of the merits of
the case. The establishment of jurisdiction of the territorial State merely on the basis
of a claim filed for compensation for damages, caused by acts in breach of substan-
tive jus cogens norms, results in an “unacceptable reversal of the relationship of
logical priority between distinct procedural and substantial judicial assessments”.
In the merits, the Avvocatura calls attention on the fact that the Constitutional Court
(allegedly) affirmed that Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution incorporates generally
recognized norms of international law and thus grants them the status of constitu-
tional law. This Court is said to have resolved the alleged conflict between immunity
and the right of judicial protection, protected by Article 24 of the Constitution, by
applying the principle of lex specialis, i.e. by recognizing that the limitation to the
principle provided by Article 24 of the Constitution can be justified in light of the
prevailing interests implied in the need to accord immunity from territorial jurisdic-
tion to foreign States. Given the reasonableness of the scope of the right of defense in
view of the need to respect the immunity of the foreign State, the questions of
constitutionality of the impugned provisions are said to be ill-founded.
[The Avvocatura further contends that] the duty to respect the immunity of the
foreign State is confirmed by other (impugned) provisions, in particular by Article
94 of the UN Charter (incorporated into the Italian legal order by Law
No. 848/1957), which obliges each Member State to comply with the decisions of
the ICJ, as well as by Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013, which complements [Article
94 of the UN Charter] itself.
The duty of Italy to conform to customary international law, as well as to the
decisions of the ICJ (as established in the aforementioned Article 94 of the UN
Charter) is said [by the Avvocatura] to be confirmed by Article 11 of the Constitution
as well, since this Article obliges Italy to respect customary international law, the
content of which is defined by the ICJ in the judgments Italy has to comply with
under the UN Charter.
3. – The claimants in the main proceedings filed appearances in all three cases
(Orders Nos. 84, 85, and 113/2014) and have requested that the Constitutional Court
accept the questions raised by the Tribunal of Florence.
3.1. – Firstly, the defense of the claimants in the main proceedings recalls that the
actions for damages were only filed after sixty-seven years because of the
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moratorium the Federal Republic of Germany and the Allies had agreed upon. Italy
was bound to respect the moratorium as well, by virtue of Article 18 of the Peace
Treaty. The defense further notes that, since the end of the moratorium, requests for
compensation have been rejected by the Federal Republic of Germany, which has
also denied any other form of redress for the crimes committed by the Third Reich
and its government.
With specific regard to the questions raised by the Tribunal of Florence, the defense
of the claimants in the main proceedings makes a number of preliminary
observations.
The defense recalls that on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, in response to serious
human rights violations, the States of the international community undertook to
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion (Article 1, para. 3 and Article 55 (c) of the UN Charter). Among
these rights was the right of access to justice (Article 14 of the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966), which later became
a cornerstone of the international system of protection of human rights (UN General
Assembly Resolution No. 60/147 on “Basic principles and Guidelines on the Right
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”). Therefore,
the conflict between human rights protection and the principle of non-interference in
internal affairs (to which the issue of jurisdictional immunity of States is connected)
cannot be resolved to the detriment of fundamental rights.
Hence, the defense contends that Law No. 5/2013 is unconstitutional not only
because it is in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution, but also because it
conflicts with international law, which protects fundamental rights, including the
right of access to a court with jurisdiction over the matter.
Therefore, the defense of the claimants requests that the Constitutional Court accept
the questions of constitutionality raised by the Tribunal of Florence, also in order to
avoid that the ICJ be accused of exceeding its competence.
The defense further contends that, according to current international law, Italian
courts have jurisdiction. Therefore, the questioned provisions conflict with Articles
10 and 117 of the Constitution as well, insofar as they exclude the jurisdiction of
Italian courts in cases of actions for damages for crimes against humanity committed
by German military forces during World War II. As far as [the questioned pro-
visions] affect the right of private parties to bring cases before a court of law in order
to protect their rights under civil and administrative law, they conflict with custom-
ary and conventional international law.
In light of the above, the defense of the actors in the main proceedings requests that
the Constitutional Court declare the unconstitutionality of Law No. 5/2013 for
contravening Articles 24, 11, and 117 of the Constitution, and thus recognize the
jurisdiction of Italian courts (thereby also excluding any indirect effects of the
Judgment of the ICJ of 3 February 2012).
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[omissis]
4. – At the public hearing, the parties to the proceedings and the President of the
Council of Ministers requested that the Court uphold the submissions laid down in
their written pleadings.
Conclusions in Point of Law
1. The Tribunal of Florence questions the constitutionality of certain provisions that
require that the Tribunal deny its jurisdiction (as argued by the defendant) with
regard to three proceedings brought against the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). [These proceedings were initiated] by three Italian citizens in order to obtain
compensation for damages suffered during World War II, when they were captured
by German military forces and deported to Germany to slave labor in concentration
camps.
More specifically, the Tribunal of Florence questions the constitutionality of:
1) the norm “created in our legal order by the incorporation, by virtue of Article
10, para. 1 of the Constitution”, of the international custom of immunity of States
from the civil jurisdiction of other States, as interpreted by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in its Judgment Germany v. Italy of 3 February 2012, insofar as it
considers war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of inviolable human
rights, committed in Italy and Germany against Italian citizens in the period 1943 to
1945 by Third Reich troops, to be acts jure imperii and thus excluded from the
jurisdiction of civil courts;
2) Article 1 of the Law of Adaptation to the Charter of the United Nations (Law
No. 848 of 17 August 1957 on the “Execution of the Statute of the United Nations,
signed in San Francisco on 16 June 1945”), insofar as it obliges the national judge to
comply with the Judgment of the ICJ, even when it established the duty of Italian
courts to deny their jurisdiction in the examination of action for damages for crimes
against humanity, committed jure imperii by the Third Reich in Italian territory;
3) Article 1 (recte: Article 3) of Law No. 5 of 14 January 2013 (Accession by the
Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and their Property, signed in New York on 2 December 2004, as well as
provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal order), which obliges the
national judge to comply with the judgment of the ICJ and thus to deny their
jurisdiction in future cases concerning acts committed jure imperii by a foreign
State, even when those acts constitute gross violations of international humanitarian
law and of fundamental rights, such as the war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Italy and in Germany against Italian citizens in the period 1943 to 1945
by Third Reich troops, [and which also obliged the national judge] to allow the
revision (revocazione) of final judgments that did not recognize the immunity.
The aforementioned norms are questioned in relation to Articles 2 and 24 of the
Constitution. They are said to conflict with the principle of the absolute guarantee of
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judicial protection, enshrined in Article 24 Constitution, since they preclude the
judicial examination of the action for damages for the gross violations of human
rights suffered by the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed
by another State, albeit in the exercise of sovereign powers ( jure imperii). The
principle of absolute guarantee of judicial protection is a supreme principle of the
Italian constitutional order and, as such, constitutes a limit to the introduction [in the
domestic legal order] of generally recognized norms of international law under
Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution, as well as of norms contained in treaties
establishing international organizations furthering the ends envisaged by Article
11 of the Constitution (or deriving from such organizations) and subject of laws of
adaptation.
The referring judge notes that the ICJ upheld, in its Judgment of 3 February 2012, the
ongoing existence of the customary international norm that establishes the immunity
of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States, for all acts indiscriminately
considered jure imperii. The ICJ thus excluded the formation of an exception with
regard to acts jure imperii that can be considered war crimes or crimes against
humanity, in breach of fundamental human rights—as expressly recognized in the
case at issue with regard to the episodes of deportation, slave labor, and massacres,
committed in Italy and in Germany against Italian citizens in the period from 1943 to
1945 by Third Reich troops. The ICJ also denied the existence of a conflict between
substantive jus cogens norms (international human rights law) and procedural norms
(immunity of States from the jurisdiction of other States), as they operate at different
levels.
Nevertheless, the Florentine judge, albeit recognizing that the ICJ has “absolute and
exclusive competence” as to the interpretation of international law, questions the
constitutionality of the domestic norm corresponding to the customary international
norm—which is limited by the fundamental principles and constitutionally
guaranteed inviolable rights, including the right to judicial protection of inviolable
rights—as well as of the relevant incorporation provisions.
The referring judge points out that it cannot be ignored that “if international
immunity is given an absolute character, as upheld by the ICJ, the individuals
affected are denied any possibility of judicial examination and remedy, both of
which, in the case at issue, are also denied by the German legal order” (Referring
Orders No. 84/2014, page 7; No. 85/2014, page 7; No. 113/2014, page 7).
Accordingly, [the referring judge] raises analogous concerns over the constitution-
ality of the provisions contained both in the Law of Adaptation to the United Nations
Charter (Article 1 of the Law No. 848/1957), and in the Law of Accession to the
New York Convention (Article 3 of the Law No. 5 of 2013), insofar as they require,
similarly to the aforementioned customary international norm, that the judge deny
their jurisdiction in compliance with the Judgment of the ICJ.
410 Sentenza 238/2014
Lastly, the Tribunal of Florence clarifies that the constitutionality of each questioned
provision bears independent relevance in the main judgment, as any of these norms,
even taken individually, can exclude the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Moreover, the referring judge limits the questions raised to the issue of the jurisdic-
tion to examine the claim for compensation for damages, and does not include the
issue of enforcement action.
As the claims and the arguments are identical in all three cases, they shall be
discussed and decided jointly.
2. – Preliminarily, this Court shall assess the objections to admissibility of the
questions of constitutionality raised by the Tribunal of Florence.
2.1. – With the first objection, the Avvocatura submits that the immunity from
jurisdiction at issue here is subject to a generally recognized norm of customary
international law the formation of which took place before the entry into force of the
Italian Constitution, and therefore cannot be subject to constitutional review. This
Court is said to have stated, in its Judgment No. 48 of 1979 (see para 2. of the
Conclusions in Point of Fact) that constitutional review of customary international
norms is only allowed in the case of norms formed after the Constitution entered into
force.
The objection is ill-founded.
As a matter of fact, on the occasion mentioned by the Avvocatura, this Court
examined precisely the constitutionality of the customary international norm of
immunity of diplomatic agents, which expressly defined a “centuries-old custom
of States in their reciprocal relations”. [The Court also] stated that “The question as it
was raised by the referring judge – concerning the execution order contained in Law
No. 804/1967, in relation to Article 31, paras. 1 and 3 of the Vienna Convention –
appears to be only formally correct because, in the relevant part, the conventional
provision is merely declaratory of the norm of general international law described
above. The [legal] basis for the question must thus be determined in relation to that
latter norm, and the actual subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court
concerns the compatibility between the domestic norm of adaptation to the interna-
tional custom and the abovementioned constitutional principles” (para. 3. of the
Conclusions in Point of Law).
Later in that Judgment, the Court added: “At any rate, it should be noted, more
generally, with regard to the generally recognized norms of international law that
came into existence after the entry into force of the Constitution, that the mechanism
of automatic incorporation envisaged by Article 10 of the Constitution cannot allow
the violation of the fundamental principles of our constitutional order, as it operates
in a constitutional system founded on popular sovereignty and on the rigidity of the
Constitution” (para. 3. of the Conclusions in Point of Law).
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Regardless of whether the interpretation of the Decision No. 48/1979 made by the
Avvocatura is correct or not, this Court wishes to specifically confirm what it clearly
noted in its Judgment No. 1 of 1956:
“The assumption that the new notion of “unconstitutionality” concerns only laws
subsequent to the Constitution, and not laws prior to it, cannot be accepted. From a
textual standpoint, both Article 134 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Constitu-
tional Law No. 1 of 9 February 1948 address questions of constitutionality of laws,
without any distinction. From a logical standpoint, it is undeniable that the relation-
ship between ordinary laws and constitutional laws, as well as their respective status
in the hierarchy of sources remain unchanged, irrespective of whether ordinary laws
are subsequent or prior to constitutional laws”.
Hence, it must be recognized today that the principle set out in Judgment No. 1/1956,
according to which the control of constitutionality concerns both norms subsequent
to the republican Constitution and those prior to it, also applies to generally
recognized norms of international law automatically incorporated by Article, para.
1 of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they formed before or after the
Constitution.
Likewise, the norm subject to the referral made by Article 10, para. 1 of the
Constitution to customary international law, cannot be excluded from constitutional
review only because Article 134 of the Constitution does not explicitly envisage this
specific possibility. According to that provision, all laws, acts and norms that have
the same legal effects as formal laws (ordinary or constitutional), but came into being
through means other than the legislative process—including the aforementioned
[customary international] norms—are subject to centralized constitutional review.
The scrutiny of this Court is excluded only for acts that are hierarchically below the
law, and do not enjoy the same legal force as the law.
In short, there is no reason, from a logical and systematic standpoint, to exclude the
constitutional review of international customs, or to limit it to customs subsequent to
the Constitution. The latter have the same legal force as customs previously formed,
and both [types of customary law] are limited by the respect of the identifying
elements of the constitutional order, i.e. the fundamental principles and inviolable
human rights.
The first objection raised by the defense of the President of the Council of Ministers
is therefore ill-founded.
2.2. The second objection is founded on the assumption that the lack of jurisdiction
cannot be assessed on the basis of the scope of the international norm of state
immunity for acts considered jure imperii, since otherwise this would result in an
“unacceptable reversal of the relationship of logical priority between distinct proce-
dural and substantial judicial assessments”.
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This objection is not well-founded either, simply because an objection concerning
jurisdiction necessarily requires an examination of the arguments put forward in the
claim, as formulated by the parties.
2.3. – Also, preliminarily, it has to be reaffirmed that the statements of the private
party that aimed at broadening the subject-matter of the cases by invoking additional
constitutional parameters, are inadmissible.
The subject-matter of an incidental constitutional review consists of the provisions
and the parameters as indicated in the referring orders (Judgment No. 32/2014; but
also Judgments No. 271/2011 and 56/2009). Therefore, the questions
[of constitutionality] raised by the claimants in the main proceedings (who appeared
in the cases before this Court) in relation to Article 117, para. 1 of the Constitution,
as well as to the norms of international law invoked by means of Article 117 itself,
cannot be taken into consideration.
2.4. – Lastly, it is appropriate to point out that, although the operative part of all three
referring orders indicates Article 1 of Law No. 5/2013 as one of the questioned
provisions, it is clear from the whole context of the three orders that the complaint
does not concern Article 1, which contains the authorization to the accession to the
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty of 2 December 2004, but rather Article 3 of the same Law, insofar as it
incorporated—with ordinary adaptation procedure—the ruling of the ICJ as laid
down in its Judgment of 3 February 2012.
Therefore, Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013—and not Article 1—is subject to constitu-
tional review. This is in line with consistent constitutional jurisprudence, according
to which the subject-matter of the dispute must be identified—with regard to the
questioned provision—keeping in mind the motivation of the orders and the context
of the referral (ex plurimis, Judgment No. 258/2012 and No. 181/2011; Order of the
Court No. 162/2011).
3. – In the merits, the question of constitutionality of the norm “created in our legal
order by the incorporation, by virtue of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution” of the
international custom of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States,
is ill-founded under the terms set out below.
3.1. – First, it should be noted that the referring judge excluded from the subject-
matter brought before this Court any assessment of the interpretation given by the
ICJ on the norm of customary international law of immunity of States from the civil
jurisdiction of other States.
The Court, indeed, cannot exercise such a control. International custom is external to
the Italian legal order, and its application by the government and/or the judge, as a
result of the referral of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution, must respect the
principle of conformity, i.e. must follow the interpretation given in its original legal
order, that is the international legal order. In this case, the relevant norm has been
interpreted by the ICJ, precisely with a view to defining the dispute between
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Germany and Italy on the jurisdiction of the Italian judge over acts attributable to the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
In its Judgment of 3 February 2012, the ICJ stated that, for the time being, there are
insufficient elements in international practice to infer the existence of a derogation
from the norm of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States for
acts jure imperii in case of war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of
fundamental human rights. [That such crimes were committed] was established by
the ICJ and was also admitted by the FRG itself.
The same Court also expressly recognized (see Judgment, page 144, para. 104) that
the lack of jurisdiction of the Italian judges entails the sacrifice of fundamental rights
of the individuals who suffered from the consequences of crimes committed by the
foreign State. This was confirmed by the defense of the FRG as well, which excluded
the existence of other judicial remedies for the victims of the aforementioned crimes
(Reply of the FRG, 5 October 2010, page 11, para. 34). The ICJ pointed out that the
opening of new negotiations is the only means available to settle the dispute in
international law.
It has to be recognized that, at the international law level, the interpretation by the
ICJ of the customary law of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other
States for acts considered jure imperii is particularly qualified and does not allow
further examination by national governments and/or judicial authorities, including
this Court. This principle was clearly stated in Judgments Nos. 348 and 349/2007 in
relation to the interpretation of the norms of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) given by the Strasbourg Court.
As a matter of fact, the referring judge does not question the interpretation given by
the ICJ of the international norm of immunity for acts considered jure imperii. The
judge notes (with concern) that the scope of the norm has been so defined by the ICJ.
Further, he recalls that it is uncontested that the acts attributed to the FRG are
unlawful, and that they have been qualified by the FRG itself and the ICJ as war
crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of fundamental human rights—
nevertheless, this issue belongs to the merits of the main claim and therefore falls
outside the subject-matter brought before this Court.
That said, it is nevertheless clear that another issue has to be examined and resolved,
namely the envisaged conflict between the norm of international law (a norm that is
hierarchically equivalent to the Constitution through the referral of Article 10, para.
1 of the Constitution) incorporated and applied in the domestic legal order, as
interpreted in the international legal order, and norms and principles of the Consti-
tution, to the extent that their conflict cannot be resolved by means of interpretation.
This is the case of the qualifying essential principles of the state constitutional order,
including the principles of protection of fundamental human rights. In those situa-
tions it is up to the national judge, and in particular exclusively to this Court, to
exercise the constitutional review, in order to preserve the inviolability of funda-
mental principles of the domestic legal order, or at least to minimize their sacrifice.
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And this is precisely the subject-matter brought before this Court by the Tribunal of
Florence when it raised the questions of constitutionality cited above. The Tribunal
asked to review the compatibility of the international norm of immunity of States
from the civil jurisdiction of other States, as interpreted by the ICJ, with a funda-
mental principle of our constitutional order, namely the right to a judge (Article 24),
in conjunction with the principle of protection of fundamental human rights (Article
2). It is indeed possible to review the [constitutional] compatibility even when both
norms—as in the case at issue—have constitutional status, since balancing is one of
“the ordinary tasks that this Court is asked to undertake in all cases within its
competence” (Judgment No. 236/2011).
3.2 – As was upheld several times by this Court, there is no doubt that the
fundamental principles of the constitutional order and inalienable human rights
constitute a “limit to the introduction (. . .) of generally recognized norms of inter-
national law, to which the Italian legal order conforms under Article 10, para. 1 of
the Constitution” (Judgment No. 48/1979 and No. 73/2011) and serve as ‘counter-
limits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of European Union law (ex plurimis: Judgments
No. 183/1973, No. 170/1984, No. 232/1989, No. 168/1991, No. 284/2007), as well
as limits to the entry of the Law of Execution of the Lateran Pacts and the Concordat
(Judgments No. 18/1982, No. 32, No. 31 and No. 30/1971). In other words, they
stand for the qualifying fundamental elements of the constitutional order. As such,
they fall outside the scope of constitutional review (Articles 138 and 139 Constitu-
tion, as was held in Judgment No. 1146/1988).
In a centralized constitutional review system, it is clear that this assessment of
compatibility pertains to the Constitutional Court alone, and not to any other
judge, even with regard to customary international law. The truth is, indeed, that
the competence of this Court is determined by the incompatibility of a norm with
constitutional law—this obviously includes a fundamental principle of the State’s
constitutional order or a principle that guarantees inviolable human rights. The
examination of this contrast is a task of the constitutional judge alone. In this
centralized constitutional review system, any different solution goes against the
exclusive competence given by the Constitution to this Court, which stated in its
very first case that “The declaration of unconstitutionality of a law can be made only
by the Constitutional Court according to Article 136 of the Constitution itself”
(Judgment No. 1/1956).
Moreover this Court has reaffirmed, even recently, that it has exclusive competence
over the review of compatibility with the fundamental principles of the constitutional
order and principles of human rights protection (Judgment No. 284/2007). Further,
precisely with regard to the right of access to justice (Article 24 Constitution), this
Court stated that the respect of fundamental human rights, as well as the implemen-
tation of non-derogable principles are safeguarded by the guaranteeing function
assigned to the Constitutional Court (Judgment No. 120/2014).
3.3 – The customary international norm of immunity of States from the civil
jurisdiction of other States was originally absolute, since it included all state
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behaviors. More recently, namely in the first half of the last century, this norm
undertook a progressive evolution by virtue of national jurisprudence, in the major-
ity of States, up until the identification of acta jure gestionis (an easily understand-
able expression) as the relevant limit. And it is well known that this limit to the
application of the norm of immunity was progressively established mainly thanks to
Italian judges (ex multis, Tribunal of Florence, 8 June 1906, Rivista di Diritto
Internazionale 1907, 379; Court of Cassation, 13 March 1926, idem 1926, 250;
Court of Appeal of Naples, 16 July 1926, idem 1927, 104; Court of Appeal of Milan,
23 January 1932, idem 1932, 549; Court of Cassation, 18 January 1933, idem 1933,
241) and to Belgian judges (ex multis, Court of Cassation, 11 June 1903, Journal de
Droit International Privé 1904, 136; Court of Appeal of Brussels, 24 June 1920,
Pasicrisie Belge 1922, II, 122; Court of Appeal of Brussels, 24 May 1933, Journal de
Droit International 1933, 1034)—the so-called “Italian-Belgian theory”.
In short, national judges limited the scope of the customary international norm, as
immunity from civil jurisdiction of other States was granted only for acts considered
jure imperii. The purpose was mainly to exclude the benefit of immunity at least
when the State acted as a private individual, as that situation appeared to be an unfair
restriction of the rights of private contracting parties.
This process of progressive definition of the content of the international norm has
long been established in the international community (Judgment No. 329/1992). It is
of significant importance that the evolution as described above originated in the
national jurisprudence, as national courts normally have the power to determine their
competence, and leave to international organs the recognition of the practice for the
purposes of identifying customary law and its evolution.
Since such a reduction of immunity for the purposes of protection of rights took
place, as far as the Italian legal order is concerned, thanks to the control exercised by
ordinary judges in an institutional system characterized by a flexible Constitution
(in which the recognition of rights was supported by limited guarantees only), the
exercise of the same control in the republican constitutional order (founded on the
protection of rights and the consequent limitation of powers, as guaranteed by a rigid
Constitution) falls inevitably to this Court. It falls exclusively to this Court to ensure
the respect of the Constitution and particularly of its fundamental principles, and
thus to review the compatibility of the international norm of immunity of States from
the civil jurisdiction of other States with those principles. The result is a further
reduction of the scope of this norm, with effects in the domestic legal order only. At
the same time, however, this may also contribute to a desirable—and desired by
many—evolution of international law itself.
3.4 – Furthermore, such a control is essential in light of Article 10, para. 1 of the
Constitution, which requires that this Court ascertain whether the customary inter-
national norm of immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign States, as interpreted in
the international legal order, can be incorporated into the constitutional order, as it
does not conflict with fundamental principles and inviolable rights. [On the con-
trary], if there were a conflict, “the referral to the international norm [would] not
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operate” (Judgment No. 311/2009). Accordingly, the incorporation, and thus the
application, of the international norm would inevitably be precluded, insofar as it
conflicts with inviolable principles and rights.
This is exactly what has happened in the present case.
This Court has repeatedly observed that the fundamental principles of the constitu-
tional order include the right to appear and to be defended before a court of law in
order to protect one’s rights guaranteed by Article 24, i.e. the right to a judge. This is
especially true when the right at issue is invoked to protect fundamental human
rights.
In the present case, the referring judge aptly indicated Articles 2 and 24 of the
Constitution as inseparably tied together in the review of constitutionality required
of this Court. The first [Article 2] is the substantive provision, in the fundamental
principles of the Constitutional Charter, that safeguards the inviolability of funda-
mental human rights, including—this is crucial in the present case—human dignity.
The second [Article 24] is a safeguard of human dignity as well, as it protects the
right of access to justice for individuals in order to invoke their inviolable right[s].
Although they belong to different fields, the substantial and the procedural, the two
provisions share a common relevance in matters of constitutional compatibility of
the norm of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States. It would
indeed be difficult to identify how much is left of a right if it cannot be invoked
before a judge in order to obtain effective protection.
As early as in Judgment No. 98/1965 concerning European Community law, this
Court held that the right to effective judicial protection “is one of the inviolable
human rights protected by Article 2 Constitution. This is also clear from the
consideration given to this principle in Article 6 of the ECHR” (Para. 2 of the
Conclusions in Point of Law). More recently, this Court unequivocally defined the
right to judicial protection as “one of the supreme principles of our constitutional
order, intrinsically connected to the principle of democracy itself and to the duty to
ensure a judge and a judgment to anyone, anytime and in any dispute” (Judgment
No. 18/1982, as well as No. 82/1996).
With an eye to the effectiveness of judicial protection of fundamental rights, this
Court also noted that “the recognition of rights goes hand in hand with the recog-
nition of the power to invoke them before a judge in judicial proceedings. Therefore,
“the recourse to a legal remedy in defense of one’s right is a right in itself, protected
by Articles 24 and 113 of the Constitution. [This right is] inviolable in character and
distinctive of a democratic State based on the rule of law. (Judgment No. 26/1999, as
well as No. 120/2014, No. 386/2004, No. 29/2003). Further, there is little doubt that
the right to a judge and to an effective judicial protection of inviolable rights is one of
the greatest principles of legal culture in democratic systems of our times.
Nonetheless, precisely with regard to cases of immunity from jurisdiction of States
envisaged by international law, this Court has recognized that, in cases involving
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foreign States, the fundamental right to judicial protection can be further limited,
beyond the limitations provided by Article 10 of the Constitution. However, this
limit has to be justified by reasons of public interest potentially prevailing over the
principle of Article 24 Constitution, one of the “supreme principles” of the consti-
tutional order (Judgment No. 18/1982). Moreover, the provision that establishes the
limit has to guarantee a rigorous assessment of the [public] interest in light of the
concrete case (Judgment No. 329/1992).
In the present case, the customary international norm of immunity of foreign States,
defined in its scope by the ICJ, entails the absolute sacrifice of the right to judicial
protection, insofar as it denies the jurisdiction of [domestic] courts to adjudicate the
action for damages put forward by victims of crimes against humanity and gross
violations of fundamental human rights. This has been acknowledged by the ICJ
itself, which referred the solution to this issue, on the international plane, to the
opening of new negotiations, diplomatic means being considered the only appropri-
ate method (para. 102, Judgment of 3 February 2012).
Moreover, in the constitutional order, a prevailing public interest that may justify the
sacrifice of the right to judicial protection of fundamental rights (Articles 2 and
24 Constitution), impaired as they were by serious crimes, cannot be identified.
Immunity from jurisdiction of other States can be considered tenable from a legal
standpoint, and even more so from a logical standpoint, and thus can justify on the
constitutional plane the sacrifice of the principle of judicial protection of inviolable
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, only when it is connected—substantially and
not just formally—to the sovereign functions of the foreign State, i.e. with the
exercise of its governmental powers.
Respect for fundamental principles and inviolable human rights, identifying ele-
ments of the constitutional order, is the limit that indicates (also with a view to
achieving the goal of maintaining good international relations, inspired by the
principles of peace and justice, for whose realization Italy agrees to limitations of
sovereignty by virtue of Article 11 of the Constitution) the receptiveness of the
Italian legal order to the international and supranational order (Articles 10 and 11 of
the Constitution), as this Court has repeatedly upheld (with regard to Article 11 of
the Constitution, Judgment No. 284/2007, No. 168/1991, No. 232/1989,
No. 170/1984, No. 183/1973; with regard to Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution,
Judgment No. 73/2001, No. 15/1996, No. 48/1979; also, Judgment No. 349/2007).
This in itself rules out that acts such as deportation, slave labor, and massacres,
recognized to be crimes against humanity, can justify the absolute sacrifice in the
domestic legal order of the judicial protection of inviolable rights of the victims of
those crimes.
The immunity of the foreign State from the jurisdiction of the Italian judge granted
by Articles 2 and 24 Constitution protects the [sovereign] function [of State]. It does
not protect behaviors that do not represent the typical exercise of governmental
powers, but are explicitly considered and qualified unlawful, since they are in breach
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of inviolable rights, as was recognized, in the present case, by the ICJ itself, and—
before that Court—by the FRG (see above, para. 3.1). These rights are deprived of an
effective remedy, as acknowledged in the ICJ Judgment. The ICJ stated that it was
not unaware “that the immunity from jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with
international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian nationals concerned”
(para. 104), thus hoping for the re-opening of negotiations.
Therefore, in an institutional context characterized by the centrality of human rights,
emphasized by the receptiveness of the constitutional order to external sources
(Judgment No. 349/347), the denial of judicial protection of fundamental rights of
the victims of the crimes at issue (now dating back in time), determines the
completely disproportionate sacrifice of two supreme principles of the Constitution.
They are indeed sacrificed in order to pursue the goal of not interfering with the
exercise of the governmental powers of the State even when, as in the present case,
state actions can be considered war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of
inviolable human rights, and as such are excluded from the lawful exercise of
governmental powers.
Lastly, it has to be noted that the right to a judge established by the Italian
Constitution, as in all democratic systems, requires effective judicial protection for
individual rights (on the effectiveness of judicial protection of rights under Article
24 Constitution see, inter alia, the recent Judgments No. 182/2014 and
No. 119/2013; see also Judgment No. 281/2010 and No. 77/2007).
This Court had in the past recognized, as mentioned above, that the judicial control
system in the Community legal order appeared to satisfy the requirements of judicial
protection equivalent to those set out by Article 24 Constitution (Judgment
No. 98/1965). However, this Court evaluated in a different manner the practice of
the EU Court of Justice of delaying the beneficial effects of a judgment in the
preliminary ruling also for the parties that had invoked the later recognized rights.
As a result, the function of the reference for a preliminary ruling was indeed
frustrated and the effectiveness of the requested judicial protection was strongly
reduced, in violation—for the purposes of the review of this Court—of the require-
ments of the right to a judge established by the Italian Constitution (Judgment
No. 232/1989, which led the EU Court of Justice to change its jurisprudence on
that matter).
It is equally important [to recall the ruling of] the EU Court of Justice concerning the
action for annulment of a Council regulation that provided for the freezing of assets
of individuals included in a list of alleged terrorists drawn up by a body of the United
Nations Security Council (the Sanctions Committee). First, the EU Court of Justice
rejected the argument of the Court of First Instance that essentially held that the
Community judicature lacked jurisdiction. [On the contrary, the EU Court of Justice]
held that [the Community judicature] must ensure the review of the lawfulness of all
Union acts, including review of [Union measures] designed to give effect to resolu-
tions of the United Nations Security Council. The Court then held that the
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obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot prejudice the principle
that all Union acts must respect fundamental rights.
As a result, the Community regulation was annulled, insofar as it violated the
principle of effective judicial protection, since the United Nations system lacks an
adequate mechanism of review of the respect of fundamental rights (EU Court of
Justice, Judgment of 3 September 2008, cases C-402 P and 415/05 P, paras. 316 ff.,
320 ff.)
3.5. – In the present case, the impossibility of effective judicial protection of
fundamental rights, acknowledged by the ICJ and confirmed before that Court by
the FRG, makes apparent the contrast between international law, as defined by the
ICJ, and Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution.
This contrast, insofar as the international law of immunity of States from the civil
jurisdiction of other States includes acts considered jure imperii that violated
international law and fundamental human rights, obliges this Court to declare that,
to the extent that international law extends immunity to actions for damages caused
by such serious violations, the referral of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution does
not operate.
Consequently, insofar as the law of immunity from jurisdiction of States conflicts
with the aforementioned fundamental principles [of the Constitution], it has not
entered the Italian legal order and, therefore, does not have any effect therein.
The question posed by the referring judge with regard to the norm “created in our
legal order by the incorporation, by virtue of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution”,
of the customary international law of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of
other States is, therefore, ill-founded. International law, to which our legal order
conforms under Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution, does not include the norm of
immunity of States from civil jurisdiction in case of actions for damages for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of inviolable human rights. These
rights are therefore not deprived of the necessary effective judicial protection.
4. – Different conclusions can be drawn with regard to the question of constitution-
ality of Article 1 of the Law of Adaptation to the United Nations Charter (Law
No. 848 of 17 August 1957). That provision is said to be in breach of Articles 2 and
24 of the Constitution, insofar as it gives execution to the United Nations Charter,
and in particular Article 94, which provides that “each Member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which it
is a party”, and therefore requires that the domestic legal order conform to the
Judgment of the ICJ even when it established (as in the present case) the duty of
Italian courts to deny their jurisdiction in case of acts of the [foreign] State that
constituted serious violations of international humanitarian law and of fundamental
rights, as is the case of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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4.1 – The question is well-founded under the terms set out below.
Article 1 of Law No. 848/1957 gave “full execution” to the United Nations Charter,
signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, whose goal was to maintain international
peace and security. The ICJ was established (Article 7) as the United Nations
Organization’s principal judicial organ (Article 92), whose decisions are binding
on each Member State in any case to which it is a party (Article 94). This binding
force produces effects in the domestic legal order through the Special Law of
Adaptation (authorization to ratification and execution order). It constitutes one of
the cases of limitation of sovereignty the Italian State agreed to in order to favour
those international organizations, such as the UN, that aim to ensure peace and
justice among the Nations (Article 11 of the Constitution), always within the limits,
however, of respect for the fundamental principles and inviolable rights protected by
the Constitution (Judgment No. 73/2001). Hence, the obligation to comply with the
decisions of the ICJ, imposed by the incorporation of Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter, cannot include the Judgment by which the ICJ obliged the Italian
State to deny its jurisdiction in the examination of actions for damages for war
crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of fundamental human rights, com-
mitted jure imperii by the Third Reich in Italian territory.
In any case, the conflict between the Law of Adaptation to the United Nations
Charter and Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution arises exclusively and specifically
with regard to the Judgment of the ICJ that interpreted the general international law
of immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign States as to include cases of acts
considered jure imperii and classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity,
in breach of inviolable human rights. As has been repeatedly recalled, judicial
protection of fundamental rights is one of the “supreme principles of the constitu-
tional order”. Accordingly, the questioned provision (Article 1 of the Law of
Adaptation) cannot be opposed to this principle, insofar as it binds the Italian
State, and thus Italian courts, to comply with the Judgment of the ICJ of 3 February
2012, which obliges Italian courts to deny their jurisdiction in the examination of
actions for damages for crimes against humanity, in blatant breach of the right to
judicial protection of fundamental rights.
In any other case, it is certainly clear that the undertaking of the Italian State to
respect all of the international obligations imposed by the accession to the United
Nations Charter, including the duty to comply with the judgments of the ICJ,
remains unchanged.
The impediment to the incorporation of the conventional norm [Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter] to our legal order—albeit exclusively for the purposes of the
present case—has no effects on the lawfulness of the external norm itself, and
therefore results in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the special law of
adaptation, insofar as it contrasts with the abovementioned fundamental principles
of the Constitution (Judgment No. 311/2009).
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This is consistent with the constant practice of this Court, as significantly emerges
from Judgment No. 18/1982, where this Court upheld, inter alia, “the unconstitu-
tionality of Article 1 of the Law No. 810 of 27 May 1929 (Execution of the Treaty, of
the Four Annexes, and of the Concordat, signed in Rome, between the Holy See and
Italy, on 11 February 1929), so far as it concerns the execution of Article 34, para.
4, 5 and 6 of the Concordat, and of Article 17 of the Law No. 847 of 27 May 1929
(Provisions for the Implementation of the Concordat of 11 February 1929 between
the Holy See and Italy, in Matters of Marriage), to the extent that these provisions
state that the Court of Appeal can render enforceable under civil law the ecclesias-
tical dispensation for the unconsummated marriage, and order the indication in the
civil status records, next to the marriage record” (in the same sense, inter alia,
Judgment No. 223/1996, No. 128/1987, No. 210/1986, and No. 132/1985).
The remainder of the Law of Adaptation No. 848/1957 continues to be undisputedly
in full force and effect.
Hence, Article 1 of the Law of Adaptation No. 848/1957 has to be declared
unconstitutional, so far as it concerns the execution of Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter, exclusively to the extent that it obliges Italian courts to comply with
the Judgment of the ICJ of 3 February 2012, which requires that Italian courts deny
their jurisdiction in case of acts of a foreign State constituting war crimes and crimes
against humanity, in breach of inviolable human rights.
5. – Lastly, the question of constitutionality of Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013 has to be
examined. On the basis of arguments similar to those put forward in support of her
other questions (see above, paras. 3 and ff.), the referring judge questions, with
regard to Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution, the constitutionality of the afore-
mentioned Article [3 of the Law No. 5/2013], to the extent that it obliges the national
judge to comply with the Judgment of the ICJ even when, as in the case at issue, it
requires the national judge to deny their jurisdiction in the examination of the action
for damages for crimes against humanity, committed by the Third Reich in Italian
territory. [According to the referring judge], that provision conflicts with the princi-
ple of judicial protection of inviolable rights, enshrined in Articles 2 and 24 of the
Constitution, insofar as it precludes judicial examination and compensation for
damages for gross violations of human rights suffered by victims of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, committed in the territory of the Italian State (which
has the duty to ensure judicial protection) by another State, albeit in the exercise of
sovereign powers.
5.1. – The question is well-founded.
The questioned provision falls within the scope of Law No. 5/2013, by which Italy
authorized the accession and the full execution of the United Nations Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, adopted in New York on
2 December 2004. That Convention, which shall enter into force thirty days after the
date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, aims to incorporate in a
treaty the generally recognized principle of customary international law of
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jurisdictional immunity of States, and to define its scope through the identification of
cases in which State immunity cannot be invoked (such as, e.g., commercial trans-
actions, contracts of employment, and personal injuries and damage to property—
Articles 10, 11, and 12 respectively), with a view to guaranteeing “legal certainty,
particularly in dealings of States with natural or juridical persons” (so reads the
Preamble). Hence, the Italian legislator incorporated through Law No. 5/2013 the
aforementioned Convention into the domestic legal order and thus became bound to
respect all its provisions. Article 1, as mentioned above, provided for the authoriza-
tion to accession, whereas Article 2 provided for the execution order. Moreover, [the
Legislator] included the questioned Article 3, which provides that “1. For the
purposes of Article 94, para. 1, of the United Nations Charter, (. . .) when the ICJ,
in a judgment settling a dispute in which Italy is a party, excluded the possibility of
subjecting certain specific conducts of another State to civil jurisdiction, the judge
before whom a dispute concerning the same conducts has been brought shall declare
ex officio at any stage of the proceedings their lack of jurisdiction, even when they
have already rendered an interlocutory judgment with final effect as to the existence
of jurisdiction [sentenza non definitiva passata in giudicato] in which they upheld
their jurisdiction. 2. The final judgments contrary to the judgment of the ICJ referred
to in para. 1, even when the latter has been passed subsequently, can be impugned for
revision [revocazione] for lack of civil jurisdiction, in addition to the grounds
provided for by Article 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such circumstances,
Article 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply”.
This is essentially a provision of ordinary adaptation that executes the Judgment of
the ICJ of 3 September 2012. In other words, this article specifically regulates the
obligation of the Italian State to comply with all of the rulings by which the ICJ
excluded certain conducts of a foreign State from civil jurisdiction. It requires that
the judge declare ex officio at any stage of the proceeding their lack of jurisdiction,
and also provides for an additional ground for the revision [revocazione] of final
judgments when they conflict with the ruling of the ICJ.
The Parliamentary proceedings clearly show that this article was adopted (shortly
after the judgment of the ICJ of 3 February 2012) in order to ensure explicitly and
immediately respect [of that judgment] and to “avoid unfortunate situations such as
those created by the dispute before the Court of The Hague” (Acts of the Chamber of
Deputies No. 5434, Third Commission – Foreign Affairs, meeting of
19 September 2012).
And this without excluding the cases in which the ICJ, as in the Judgment of
3 February 2012, upheld the immunity of States from civil jurisdiction in cases of
actions for damages for acts regarded as war crimes and crimes against humanity, in
breach of inviolable human rights, even if they were committed by the armed forces
of a [foreign] State on the territory of the State of the court seized.
As such, the impugned law also derogates from the what has been explicitly
established in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and their Property. This is confirmed by the interpretative declaration deposited by
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the Italian government at the time of the accession, which explicitly excludes the
application of the Convention and its limitations to the norm of immunity in case of
damages or injuries caused by the activity of armed forces in the territory of the State
of the court seized.
The duty of the Italian judge—established in the questioned Article 3—to comply
with the ruling of the ICJ of 3 February 2012 (which requires that Italian courts deny
their jurisdiction in the examination of the action for damages for crimes against
humanity, committed jure imperii by a foreign State in Italian territory, without any
other form of judicial redress for the fundamental rights violated) contrasts—as has
been extensively demonstrated above with regard to the other questions
[of constitutionality] (see above, paras. 3. and 4.)—with the fundamental principle
of judicial protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 24 of the
Constitution. As observed above, the absolute sacrifice of the right of judicial
protection of fundamental rights—one of the supreme principles of the Italian
legal order, enshrined in the combination of Articles 2 and 24 of the republican
Constitution—resulting from the immunity from Italian jurisdiction granted to the
foreign State, cannot be justified and accepted insofar as immunity protects the
unlawful exercise of governmental powers of the foreign State, as in the case of
acts considered war crimes and crimes against humanity, in breach of inviolable
human rights.
Therefore, Article 3 of Law No. 5/2013 has to be declared unconstitutional.
6. – The declaration of jurisdiction of the referring judge is without prejudice to the
merits of the main proceedings, whose examination is a duty of the referring judge.
The claim for damages filed by the applicants is not included in the subject-matter
brought before this Court, nor is any assessment of matters of facts or of law that may
confirm or deny the validity of their claim.
FOR THESE REASONS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
1) declares the unconstitutionality of Article 3 of Law No. 5 of 14 January 2013
(Accession of the Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities of States and their Property, signed in New York on 2 December
2004, as well as provisions for the amendment of the domestic legal order);
2) declares the unconstitutionality of Article 1 of Law No. 848 of 17 August 1957
(Execution of the United Nations Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945),
so far as it concerns the execution of Article 94 of the United Nations Charter,
exclusively to the extent that it obliges the Italian judge to comply with the Judgment
of the ICJ of 3 February 2012, which requires that Italian courts deny their jurisdic-
tion in case of acts of a foreign State constituting war crimes and crimes against
humanity, in breach of inviolable human rights;
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3) declares ill-founded, under the terms set out in the reasoning, the question of
constitutionality of the norm “created in our legal order by the incorporation, by
virtue of Article 10, para. 1 of the Constitution”, of the customary international law
of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other States, raised in relation to
Articles 2 and 24 of the Constitution by the Tribunal through the Orders mentioned
above.
So decided in Rome, at the seat of the Constitutional Court, Palazzo della Consulta,
on 22 October 2014.
Giuseppe TESAURO, President and Drafter
Gabriella Paola MELATTI, Registrar
Deposited in the Registry on 22 October 2014.
Gabriella Paola MELATTI, Director of the Registry
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